UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Senator Harry Reid's Request to Put the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP) under Special Access Protection

Senator Harry Reid sent a letter to you on June 24, 2009 requesting the Department of Defense put the AAITP under 'Restricted Special Access Protection'(Tab A). The AAITP that SEN Reid refers to is officially the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP) contract managed by DIA. Its primary purpose is to investigate revolutionary advances in future aerospace technologies with emphasis on research of unconventional and revolutionary technologies. The sole bid for the contract was from Bigelow Aerospace Advance Space Studies located in Las Vegas, NV. The resulting contract was for multiple sub-contractors to perform unclassified research in 11 technical areas and deliver technical reports on those areas by July 31, 2009. (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) directed a quality review of the technical reports that DIA completed in October 2009.

In late October 2009, DIA completed the technical review of the program deliverables (Tab B) and provided USD(I) SAPCO the current status of the AAWSAP. The program manager and his leadership advised that they saw no justification for Special Access protections based on the content of the FY09 deliverables or the anticipated FY10 work. This recommendation is formally stated and outlined in the attached memorandum from (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) (Tab C).

Senators Reid and Inouye co-sponsored a $10M earmark in the July 2008 supplemental to fund this DIA effort to look at potential future aerospace weapons threats. A $12M earmark has been allocated to support the program in FY2010.

Based on the recommendation from DIA and my staff's review of the technical reports, I recommend against establishing a Special Access Program at this time.

James R. Clapper Jr.

Attachments: As stated

Talking Points
DepSecDef Meeting with Senator Harry Reid
November 17, 2009

Topic: Senator Harry Reid's Request to Protect the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program as a Special Access Program

Background

- Early 2008: Senator Reid met (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) a DIA analyst, at a technical conference.
- July 2008: Senators Reid and Inouye co-sponsored a $10M earmark in the Supplemental Appropriation Bill to assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. A $12M earmark has been allocated to support the project in FY2010.
- August 2008: DIA learned of counter-intelligence concerns with Bigelow Aerospace, the parent company of Bigelow Aerospace Advance Space Studies. These concerns do not appear to be directly related to Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP).
- September 2008: DIA awarded the contract to the sole bidder, Bigelow Aerospace Advance Space Studies (Las Vegas, NV), to perform unclassified research in 11 technical areas and deliver technical reports on those areas by July 31, 2009.
  - (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) is the Program Manager for the AAWSAP. Its primary purpose is to investigate revolutionary advances in future aerospace technologies with emphasis on research of unconventional and revolutionary technologies.
    - Senator Reid's office refers to the AAWSAP as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program.
- May 19, 2009: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) met with Senator Reid about several issues, one of them being the AAWSAP. The project was briefly discussed and limited feedback was provided. (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) did not commit to SAP the program.
- June 24, 2009: Senator Harry Reid sent a letter to Deputy Secretary Lynn requesting that DoD put the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP) under Special Access Protection (Tab A).
- July 31, 2009: DIA received all 26 papers, based on research in 12 technical areas.
- July – October 2009: Bob Herbert, Senator Reid's personal staffer, made multiple phone calls to Marcel Lettre, PDASD/LA, inquiring on the status of our response to the June 24th letter.
- October 30, 2009: DIA completed quality reviews of all papers and provided an assessment to Lt. Gen. Burgess (Tab B). The papers are currently Unclassified//For Official Use Only.

- November 4, 2009: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) met with Senator Reid's personal staffer, Bob Herbert. Mr. Herbert relayed the Senator's impatience with the DoD's lack of response to the June 24th letter. (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) assured Mr. Herbert that DIA would provide an assessment to OSD regarding classification of the project in the coming weeks.
- November 13, 2009: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) sent a memorandum to USD(I) SAPCO outlining the results of their official review of Senator Reid's Special Access Program request (Tab C). DIA can see no justification for Special Access Protections based on the content of the FY09 deliverables or the anticipated FY10 work.

Key Talking Points

- The FY09 deliverables for AAWSAP are for academic research and basic scientific research. The FY09 technical reports are being used to expand the FY10 research into the realm of scientific and technical intelligence.
- The current level of scientific capability does not appear to risk grave damage to national security if available information was revealed.
- Some topics may warrant "Secret" classification consistent with the subject matter being researched.
- The department has reviewed all available information regarding the FY10 research and finds no justification for applying Special Access Program protection at this time.

Attachments

- Tab A June 24, 2009 Letter from Senator Reid to Deputy Secretary Lynn
- Tab B October 30, 2009 Memorandum from (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) Subject: Review of Advanced Aerospace Contract Deliverables
- Tab C November 13, 2009 Memorandum from (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6 to USD(I) SAPCO, Subject: Review of Special Access Program Request

Prepared by: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

HARRY REID
NEVADA

MAJORITY LEADER

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

June 24, 2009

Honorable William Lynn III
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Lynn:

Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.

Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP) and study were first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AATIP.

In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to future systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured. Although not every aspect of AATIP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level:

- **The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AATIP.**
    - Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).

- Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.

- **Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.**

  - Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.

  - Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.

  - Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.

  - Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.

- **Application and engineering.**

  - The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List.

  - Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravitics, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be used with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.

Ultimately, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the U.S. Government but I believe will directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will provide the U.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its preeminence as a world leader.

Thank you in advance from your time and consideration of this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact (b)(6)

Sincerely,

HARRY REID
United States Senator

HR:rth

Attachment 1

Sponsoring Agency: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Component-level SAP Central Office: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

Unclassified Nickname: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP)

Program Length: FY09-FY13 (Preliminary)

Program Funding: FY09-O&M, FY10-FY13-TBD

SAP Category Designation: Intelligence, DoD Acquisition

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Government Personnel:

1. Honorable William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't)
2. Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Gov't)
3. Honorable Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii (Gov't)
4. Robert T. Herbert (U.S. Senate)
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)
6.
7.
8. ONI (USN)
9. (b)(6) ONI (USMC)
10. Special Agent USDI (Gov't)
11. USDI (Gov't)

Jay Straton (ONI), was a DIA employee at the start of this contract and was involved in the program.

FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP:

1. Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies LLC (BAASS), (CTR) (b)(6)
2. BAASS (CTR)
3. BAASS (CTR)

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemptions 1 and 5 apply.

INFO MEMO

U-429-09/(b)(3):10 USC 424 30 October 2009

FOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

FROM: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Review of Advanced Aerospace Contract Deliverables

(U) This info memo responds to your request for the (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424 to review the quality and value of the first-year technical reports delivered under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications contract with Bigelow Aerospace Advanced Space Studies (BAASS), LLC. As a reminder, you made this request to (b)(3):10 USC 424 personnel during a 15 May 2009 meeting with you after your meeting with Senator Harry Reid. The goal of the contract is to identify key technologies and physics concepts that would support revolutionary aerospace vehicle research and development. Contracted studies were designed to provide a prioritized list of technologies/concepts that then would drive detailed, focused searches into foreign aerospace research and development. Each research report (in the areas of lift, propulsion, control, power generation, spatial/temporal translation, materials, structural configuration, signature reduction, human interface, human effects, and armament) was written by world-class technical experts in industry and/or academia.

(U) The table in Enclosure 1 lists the 26 extensive technical reports delivered to DIA in FY 2009. The report titles highlighted in red and green are the ones that were reviewed. Eight reviews were performed by other authors listed in the table; five were performed by outside reviewers, including three research staff members at Sandia National Laboratories. The (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) has reviewed all of the papers and concurs with the reviews. As the excerpts indicate, all of the reviews were positive, some exceptionally so. Even within the limitation of being able to conduct only unclassified research in the first contract year, the quality hoped for in the reports was achieved. (b)(3):10 USC 424 intends to publish them in coming weeks as Defense Intelligence Studies. Some or all of these studies may be of interest to Defense Department agencies, national laboratories, and/or defense industries focused on blue-force capability development, and (b)(3):10 USC 424 will ensure that they receive copies.

(U) Based on draft budget guidance, Congress apparently will fund the contract's option year one at $12 million. In FY 2010, [redacted] will use the 26 FY 2009 technical reports in having BAASS evaluate potential adversary exploitation worldwide, select studies amenable to classified experimental verification by BAASS, and have BAASS conduct new classified and unclassified studies with select academic and industry partners. Deliverables are expected in late summer 2010.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2 enclosures as stated

(U) Prepared by: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

(U) FY 2009 Technical Reports

UNCLASSIFIED

Title	Author	Affiliation
Inertial Electrostatic Confinement Fusion	(b)(6)	
Pulse-Power-Based Weaponry		
Space-Time Modifications for Spaceflight Applications		
Novel MEMS-Based Biosensors		
Theory and Experiments of Invisibility Cloaking		
Wormholes in Space Time		
Gravity Wave Communication		
Superconductors in Gravity Research		
Antigravity for Aerospace Applications		
Field Effects on Biological Tissues		
Positron Aerospace Propulsion		
Vacuum Energy Applications		
Improved Statistical Approach to Drake Equation		
Maverick vs. Corporate Research Cultures		
Biosensors and BioMEMS		
Metamaterials for Aerospace Applications		
Warp Drives		
Controlling Devices Without Limb-Operated Interfaces		
Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms		
Metallic Glasses		
Programmable Matter		
Metallic Spintronics		
High-Energy Laser Weapons		
Quantum Entanglement Communications		
Space Access: Where Been, Where Go		
Advanced Nuclear Propulsion for Deep Space		

Red – Independent review.
Green – Sandia National Laboratories review.

(U) Excerpts From Reviews

(U) All of the following review information and comments are UNCLASSIFIED.

Antigravity for Aerospace Applications in 2050

(b)(6)

(b)(6) *has provided an excellent overview of conventional approaches to gravity manipulation within the confines of Newtonian, relativistic and quantum physics. With his typical lucid style, he takes the time to add useful explanatory notes which are especially enlightening for those for whom Relativity is not their first language. In addition, his extensive technical appendix concerning such exotica as squeezed vacuum states, zero-point fluctuations and negative energy is of great benefit.*

(b)(6)

Technological Approaches to Controlling External Devices in the Absence of Limb Operated Interfaces

(b)(6)

The paper by (b)(6) *looks at the present and future prospects for the human thought control of robotics and machines by way of high technology neural interfaces. The ultimate aim of such research is to allow an individual to control the function of a prosthetic or robot as an extension of his own body and mind or to exercise thought-based control over a mechanized environment. We find from* (b)(6) *current review that the state of the art is still quite far away from achieving such control but strong efforts are being made on a number of approaches.*

(b)(6)

On The Role of Superconductors in Gravity Research

(b)(6)

Because of the author's involvement and activity in the field, it seems natural that he chose to write on this subject, and he is able to demonstrate not only a solid

understanding of the research area, but is also able to provide his personal accounts of meetings with the prominent researchers. In addition, he describes his own experimental results, or lack thereof. Because of his own personal attachment to the field, I found the report to be somewhat captivating, as I felt a strong sense of being close to the research and hearing from the 'horse's mouth,' so to speak. Despite his involvement, (b)(6) *point of view seems to be that of an impartial observer and he does not appear to take sides, or seem to be trying to promote or 'sell' the research field. He does an excellent job of relaying a candid and informative survey of what, to me, seems to be a tantalizing yet controversial field of study.*

(b)(6)

Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

(b)(6)

This is an excellent and highly readable Survey report that defines Metallic glasses, the advantages and disadvantages to other composite materials, and how their mechanical properties are both alike and different from those of pure metals. These properties include strength, stiffness, and toughness. The author makes a case that the processing capability meets and sometimes exceeds those of thermoplastic polymers, and traditional metals. Glass hybrid composites are found to excel in almost all cases to current materials in widespread use.

(b)(6)

Theory and Experiments of Invisibility Cloaking

(b)(6)

The report by (b)(6) *describes the background and recent advances in the field of invisibility cloaking. This field recently emerged as one of the most exciting applications of metamaterials – artificially structured media possessing unusual refractive properties.* (b)(6) *...is a pioneer in this field, having published one of the first theoretical papers describing the possibility of cloaking. This topic still evokes misunderstandings and confusion. That is not surprising: the concept of invisibility (although not its technical implementation) has been preoccupying people for centuries if not millennia.* (b)(6) *report does an excellent job of clearing some of this confusion and providing clear definitions of what constitutes true cloaking/invisibility. It also honestly discusses technological challenges to making a practical invisibility cloak.*

(b)(6)

Positron Aerospace Propulsion

(b)(6)

This status paper is very exciting and provides new important information about the present status and prospects for positron energy production and storage, especially for space applications. It is recommended reading for both researchers in the area and aerospace scientists. In addition, others interested in national policy for both future energy and future space exploration should consider this status paper to gain further insight into positron energy and propulsion.

(b)(6)

Metamaterials for Aerospace Applications: Energy Harvesting, Sub-Wavelength Imaging, Optical-Device Miniaturization, and Non-Reciprocal Optical Devices

(b)(6)

Metamaterials are "materials beyond materials" with unusual electromagnetic or optical properties. The report by (b)(6) *describes several possibilities how such materials can be used for advanced aerospace applications. As examples, he often uses his own experiments.* (b)(6) *is one of the research leaders in the field of metamaterials and has built up a highly credible reputation in this area. Although the research area of metamaterials is still rather new and mostly confined to proof-of-principle academic research at present, it will undoubtedly revolutionize photonics and lead to commercial applications that are interesting for the aerospace industry.*

(b)(6)

Biosensors and BioMEMS: A Survey of the Present Field

(b)(6)

This paper reaches toward and achieves a laudable goal: making BioMEMS understandable and relevant. The author's contribution is important, because the number of current programs and projects in the US Government that are either touting the importance of, or making responses to research requests in 2009

numbers in the thousands. As many recent US Academy of Sciences and other scholarly studies have shown, few persons in the decision-making areas of the government have sufficient background in BioMEMS from which to make intelligent decisions. As key customers of this study, the sponsors are well-served with (b)(6) *survey. Throughout the Survey, the author often introduces ancillary technologies that will enable further BioMEMS development, solve problems, or lead to alternative technologies. The survey is made more useful to the reader and the sponsor because of this.*

(b)(6)

Metallic Spintronics

(b)(6)

(b)(6) *paper is concerned with an emerging technology known as spintronics ("spin-based electronics"). In this technology information is carried by moving or altering the spin of electrons, rather than by moving the charged particles themselves.* (b)(6) (b)(6) *has at least a dozen publications in the field of study in top-tier journals, and has won NSF grants to pursue the topic. As a result one must regard him as an expert in the subject and take his opinions seriously. In addition, the paper cites 97 references, which is quite a lot for a 10,000 word paper. Clearly,* (b)(6 *is giving an overview of the entire field rather than just supplying an incremental addition to it.*

(b)(6)

Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms

(b)(6)

The position (b)(6) *takes at the first instant is that previous design methodologies have largely failed, because of a lack of appreciation of material property life cycles, which are clearly now known to be very different. If one is to examine, for example, in an attempt to reverse engineer materials and components possibly of interest, one might want to approach the "reverse" paradigm from first principles of materials in contexts of observed performance.* (b)(6) *at the beginning of the study subtly suggests that observed performance…or even claimed performance…may be a better starting point.*

The author elegantly describes how this "commonly encountered inconsistency between technical innovation and commercial progress" has become [in the West] a current deterrent to the development and the deployment (adoption) of "literally all classes…of polymers, metals, and ceramics."

(b)(6)

Metallic Glasses: Status and Prospects for Aerospace Applications

(b)(6)

I found it to be a clear and even-handed evaluation of the pros and cons of bulk metallic glasses (BMG) and composites employing them. The author clearly points out possible advantages in processing while he equally clearly points out the difficulties associated with inherent unstable shear band formation and consequent lack of general ductility.

(b)(6)

Theory and Experiments of Invisibility Cloaking

(b)(6)

Overall, this is a nice qualitative description of the rapidly moving field of invisibility and cloaking and can serve as a good starting point for someone interested in diving into the details of this new technology.

(b)(6)

State-of-the-Art & Evolution of High Energy Laser Weapons

(b)(6)

The technical discussions and history review are generally correct to the extent they address the topics and this paper is a good general introduction for those unfamiliar with high energy lasers.

(b)(6)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100

INFO MEMO

U-09-2660/(b)(3):10 USC 424

NOV 1 3 2009

FOR: DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Review of Special Access Program Request

(U/~~FOUO~~) This info memo responds to your request for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (b)(3):10 USC 424 to evaluate a request from Senator Harry Reid (enclosure 1) to establish a restricted special access program (SAP) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, referred to in Senator Reid's letter as the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP). In reviewing the deliverables to date and looking ahead to planned production in fiscal year (FY) 2010, DIA cannot find adequate justification to establish a restricted SAP.

(U/~~FOUO~~) All program documents delivered to (b)(3):10 USC 424 during FY 2009 (the first year of the program) were unclassified because the contractor had not established a secure facility, and program employees were being vetted for clearances. In FY 2010, most research products will remain at the unclassified level. However, four to six of the original technical reports will be expanded to included classified data. These reports will focus on foreign research in a particular technology area and will likely be derivatively classified at the secret level. Based on classification levels of current and projected program deliverables, there are insufficient grounds to classify this open program, invoke alternative or compensatory control measures (ACCM), or establish a restricted SAP.

- (U/~~FOUO~~) Classifying the overall program by derivative means is impractical given Department of Defense Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R Information Security Program guidance: No reports produced thus far have extracted, paraphrased, or restated information obtained from previously classified material (para C3.1.1). Future reports that contain classified information will be marked and protected according to the original classification authority (para C3.1.2.1.1).

- (U/~~FOUO~~) Classifying the overall program by original means is inadvisable: Information contained in the reports is not owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the U.S. government (para C2.3.1.1). DIA cannot identify any damage that

could result from unauthorized disclosure (para C2.3.1.3) of publically available information. Although the information can loosely be tied to one of the eligibility criteria for classification (scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security (para C2.3.2.5)), DIA is prohibited from classifying basic scientific research, and its result, unless it clearly relates to national security (para C2.4.3.2). This requirement has not been met.

- (U/~~FOUO~~) In the second paragraph of his letter, Senator Reid cites "the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings" that will "require extraordinary protection." Although most of the unclassified reports discuss unconventional aerospace technologies, DIA is unaware of any report containing information sufficiently sensitive and vulnerable to require extra protection associated with either ACCM or a restricted SAP (paras C6.8.1.2 and C8.1.1.3). DIA assumes these statements are in reference to future phases of this program and highlight security and counterintelligence concerns that appear to be the main focus of Senator Reid's letter.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Pursuant to a request from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Special Programs staff, (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) for the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program Contract, has forwarded draft copies of technical reports from the first year, which will be published in the coming months. If you have questions about the contents of these reports, please contact (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) He will arrange to have (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6) review the reports with your staff.

(U) Prepared by: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

DIA (

SUBJECT: Review of Special Ac

Date Received: 4 Nov 09 | O

Date Logged-In: 5-Nov-09 09:26

TO	INITIAL	DATE
(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)		
		05NOV09
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		6 NOV
		13 Nov
		9 NOV 09

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20340-0001

TO: (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

Subject: Review of Special Access Request

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

Attached please revised subject info memo to OUSD(I) for your review and approval. This version incorporates CP comments.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

Need (b)(3):10 USC 424 to review ASAP.

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(6)

11.13.09

09-2660

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(b)(3):10 USC 424