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(U) On November 7, Emin Agalarov directed Benjaminov to work with Agalarov’s head of security to confirm Trump’s security guard.¹⁸⁹² Shugart recalled that the Agalarovs designated the security guard. Shugart said that because Trump was not there long, Trump “had a police escort and I know a car and driver. . . . there were a couple of people that were there. I just don’t know who they were, but they were definitely local.”¹⁸⁹³

(U) Schiller told the Committee he did not recall who picked them up at the airport, or who drove them, or what vehicle they were in, or where they went. He also did not recall doing any vetting of the transportation entities or arrangements for Donald Trump, or having any communication with the Agalarov’s organization to coordinate.¹⁸⁹⁴

(U) According to Graff’s itinerary, Trump was scheduled to arrive at the Ritz Carlton hotel at 4:00 p.m. According to the itinerary, Trump was scheduled to do a short interview with a television host, A.J. Calloway, at the Ritz Carlton at 5:10 p.m.¹⁸⁹⁵ Publicly available information indicates that the interview with Calloway took place, though the timing is not clear.¹⁸⁹⁶

(U) Trump was scheduled to depart the hotel at 5:15 p.m. for an event at Nobu, a restaurant, that was hosted by Aras Agalarov and Russia’s largest bank, the state-owned Sberbank, from 5:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.¹⁸⁹⁷ This included a 20-minute question and answer and meet and greet, followed by an optional private dinner.¹⁸⁹⁸ According to Goldstone, who attended, Trump was the focus of the event, which had been organized for approximately 20 prominent Russian business and banking leaders. According to Emin Agalarov, the event was for “Sberbank top partners and clients.” Neither Emin Agalarov nor Goldstone recalled the

¹⁸⁹² (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Benjaminov, Bignova, and Goldstone, November 7, 2013 (Benjaminov Production); see also E. Agalarov Tr., p. 29.

¹⁸⁹³ (U) Shugart Tr., p. 127.

¹⁸⁹⁴ (U) Schiller Tr., p. 62, 66–68.

¹⁸⁹⁵ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al. including Trump’s itinerary, November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141) (“If time is tight, will do [the Calloway interview] on return from Nobu.”).

¹⁸⁹⁶ (U) “‘Extra’ Interviews Donald Trump About Miss Universe in Moscow,” *Extra*, archival footage posted January 11, 2017. Goldstone told the Committee that Trump came directly from the airport to Nobu, but the reliability of this recollection was unclear. Goldstone Tr., p. 83.

¹⁸⁹⁷ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141). The identities of almost all of the attendees at the Nobu event continue to be unknown, and as many as 35 people may have attended. Email, E. Agalarov to Goldstone, et al., October 29, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00746). Sergey Gorkov, a graduate of Russia’s FSB Academy, was a senior Sberbank official at the time of the event.

¹⁸⁹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

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names of any of the attendees other than the head of Sberbank, Herman Gref.¹⁸⁹⁹ Gref has significant ties to Putin.

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(U) Following the pageant, Trump wrote to Gref:¹⁹⁰²


¹⁸⁹⁹ (U) E. Agalarov, Tr., pp. 17–18. Goldstone told the Committee that the Agalarovs hired a translator for Trump. According to Goldstone the translator was generally present at the Nobu event and the same translator was used for the duration of the trip. Goldstone Tr., pp. 85–93.

¹⁹⁰⁰ [REDACTED]

¹⁹⁰¹ [REDACTED]

¹⁹⁰² (U) TRUMPORG_18_00011. On November 19, 2013, Sberbank agreed to finance \$2.4 billion of construction at the Agalarovs’s Crocus City complex in Moscow. It was reportedly the largest real estate loan in the history of Sberbank. See Alexander Panin, “Sberbank Funds \$2.4 Billion Construction at Crocus City,” *The Moscow Times*, November 19, 2013.

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November 11, 2013

Mr. Herman Gref
Chairman and CEO
SBERBANK
19 Vavilova Str.,
117997 Moscow, Russia

Dear Herman,

It was wonderful being with you in Moscow --- I hope you enjoyed yourself as much as I did.

You have done an absolutely fantastic job and I look forward to seeing SBERBANK in the number one position (not easy) in the not too distant future.

Whenever you are in New-York, please feel free to call and we will have lunch or dinner.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Donald J. Trump', with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

Donald J. Trump

PS --- Mr. Agalarov is wonderful man and developer.

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(U) Goldstone told the Committee that the Nobu event lasted 30 to 45 minutes.¹⁹⁰³ Goldstone did not recall additional substantive information about the meeting.¹⁹⁰⁴

(U) Trump may have gone to the hotel following the Nobu event.¹⁹⁰⁵ At 9:30 p.m. on November 8, Trump was scheduled to depart for Crocus City Hall, where the Miss Universe rehearsal had been taking place from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.¹⁹⁰⁶

(U) Shugart recalled Emin Agalarov showing Trump around the Crocus City complex on Friday, November 8.¹⁹⁰⁷ Shugart also recalled that there was a meeting where the building of a Trump Tower in Moscow was briefly discussed. She recalled:

It was an impromptu meeting with Emin, which is the only time I heard a Trump Tower Moscow being discussed. It was [Friday], because Emin had shown his whole Crocus City Complex. Emin had a plan to call it – to do part of that complex and call it ‘Manhattan.’ So that’s when I remember them saying: ‘Oh, and a Trump Tower for Manhattan would be good.’¹⁹⁰⁸

Shugart further recalled: “I want to say that [meeting] was during rehearsal [on Friday], when he met – right after he met the contestants.” Shugart said that Phil Ruffin joined the meeting but Aras Agalarov did not.¹⁹⁰⁹

¹⁹⁰³ (U) Shugart, who was in Moscow but not at the event, told the Committee that the event lasted “about two hours.” When asked what gave her that impression, she responded: “Rob, just judging from the schedule and hearing when I would check in to hear how they were doing. Donald said it was a few hours, but I think it was probably about two. And just I think I kept track of the schedule.” Shugart Tr., p. 142.

¹⁹⁰⁴ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 91-92 (“somebody asked Mr. Trump for his comments on the European debt crisis and especially as it related to the Greek bailout. Mr. Trump said: ‘Have any of you ever watched The Apprentice? It’s a TV show I created with Mark Burnett, and it’s a major money-spinner for NBC. And let me tell you how it’s a major money-spinner and how it works and what it’s about, and how amazing it is, and it has a prime viewership on a Sunday night in America.’ And he then said: ‘Thank you very much for inviting me. Your economy’s doing great, you’re all doing great.’ And he stood up and got a standing ovation for that answer. And that is what I recall of that meeting primarily.”). Schiller claimed he had no recollection of the event at Nobu. Schiller Tr., p. 73.

¹⁹⁰⁵ (U) Goldstone told the Committee: “Our suggestion was that after Nobu he [Trump] went to the hotel, checked in, and got ready. That was our suggestion to him, and we had cars and drivers to take him and Keith there; and to the best of my knowledge, he went there.” Goldstone’s recollection is inconsistent with Trump’s itinerary. The Committee was not able to reconcile this discrepancy. Goldstone Tr., p. 97.

¹⁹⁰⁶ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139-141).


¹⁹⁰⁷ (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 163-164.

¹⁹⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰⁹ (U) Shugart told the Committee that she did not see Trump on Saturday until he was backstage because she was very busy with the pageant preparations, so she believed she wouldn’t have recalled a meeting if it happened on Saturday. Shugart Tr., p. 164.

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(U) Trump wrote a letter to Phil Ruffin following the pageant that referenced “making the rounds of the city” but the timing of that activity is unclear.¹⁹¹⁰



(U) The night before the pageant, Trump was scheduled to attend Aras Agalarov’s birthday party at 10:00 p.m.¹⁹¹¹ All 86 Miss Universe contestants were also scheduled to

¹⁹¹⁰ (U) Letter, Trump to Ruffin, November 13, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000012). On December 4, 2013, Trump again wrote to Ruffin, thanking Ruffin for allowing Trump to use Ruffin’s airplane to travel to the pageant in Moscow. Letter, Trump to Ruffin, December 4, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000013).

¹⁹¹¹ (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 144–146 (“He [Trump] came to the rehearsal. There was a rehearsal going the day before. He came out for that at one point, and then he stayed out there, because Aras was having his birthday party and Aras had actually moved his birthday party out there, so people wouldn’t have to come back in town and Donald wouldn’t have to come back in for the traffic.”).

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attend.¹⁹¹² The event was held at Zafferano, a restaurant in the Crocus complex, and was attended by several hundred people.¹⁹¹³ Shugart, who went to the party, was told that the “Russian elite” were in attendance, along with the contestants and many of Aras Agalarov’s friends and family members.¹⁹¹⁴

[REDACTED] At the event, Trump was photographed with Igor Krutoy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] khmetov is an associate of Paul Manafort, Konstantin Kilimnik, and others.¹⁹¹⁵

(U) Shugart recalled that she stayed with Trump for most of the party, and that she was there for “a few hours.” Shugart recalled that she left the party around midnight and that Trump and Schiller were still there.¹⁹¹⁶ Goldstone estimated that, “the earliest he [Trump] would have left is probably 1:00 a.m.; maybe a little after that. Then you’ve got this 40-minute or so drive back into the center of Moscow.”¹⁹¹⁷ Goldstone recalled that he remained at the party until Trump and Schiller left to return to the hotel, again with a police escort and security.¹⁹¹⁸ Emin Agalarov told the Committee that he stayed at the party and did not return to the hotel with Trump and Schiller.¹⁹¹⁹ Several items on the hotel room bill may indicate additional social activity following the birthday party.¹⁹²⁰

(U) According to documents produced by Ritz Carlton Moscow, Trump was initially booked in the Presidential Suite, but that reservation was later canceled, and Trump was moved

¹⁹¹² (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141).

¹⁹¹³ (U) Goldstone estimated 500 or more. Goldstone Tr., p. 95. Kaveladze estimated 200. Kaveladze Tr., p. 26. Shugart estimated 200. Shugart Tr., p. 144. Benjaminov said “a few hundred.” Benjaminov Tr., p. 157.

¹⁹¹⁴ (U) Shugart Tr., p. 148.

¹⁹¹⁵ [REDACTED] For more on the relationship between Manafort and Akhmetov, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.

¹⁹¹⁶ (U) Shugart Tr., p. 151. Kaveladze, who attended, estimated that he left at midnight, and that the party was still going. Kaveladze Tr., p. 26. Schiller said he did not recall attending a birthday party. Schiller Tr., pp. 73.

¹⁹¹⁷ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 103.

¹⁹¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

¹⁹¹⁹ (U) E. Agalarov Tr., p. 26.

¹⁹²⁰ (U) Invoice, Ritz Carlton Moscow, November 10, 2013 (RC-Moscow 053). The Ritz Carlton Moscow charged Trump’s room approximately \$720 at the O2 Lounge, which is on the roof of the hotel, possibly early in the morning of November 9. Separately, the room was also charged approximately \$306 for shisha, which is offered at the O2 Lounge, also possibly early in the morning of November 9. There were also approximately \$146 in charges to the in-room bar, the timing of which are unclear. Other charges include meals at restaurants and room service.

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to a different room, a Carlton Suite.¹⁹²¹ Despite Trump's scheduled arrival on November 8 being known significantly in advance, his room was reserved, and paid for, for an additional two nights prior to arrival, starting on November 6.¹⁹²² The Committee was not able to determine why this advance reservation took place.¹⁹²³

(U) On November 7, Feliciano emailed to Svetlana Bignova, Paula Shugart and others, stating that, "Keith has also requested a person to stand in front of room when Trump is in the rooms I will work on that and hope to have someone provide."¹⁹²⁴ Witnesses the Committee spoke with did not have any knowledge of this taking place. Schiller told the Committee that, usually, after Trump was in his room, Schiller "would stand out there maybe for a little bit" and then go to his room, and that was what happened in Moscow.¹⁹²⁵

(U) Schiller told the Committee that, generally, the preference when traveling was for Schiller to have the room next to Trump, however that was not always possible.¹⁹²⁶ On Friday, November 8, Goldstone emailed a Crocus employee named Katia Kosenkova to inform her that "[i]t appears Trump needed a second room for his head of security Keith" but that room had not been previously booked. Goldstone wrote that, "they got a Second room but Emin says for you to handle the Charge [sic]."¹⁹²⁷ It is not clear which room Schiller stayed in.

(U) On the way to Trump's room, possibly on the evening of November 8, Schiller recalled telling Trump that Schiller had been approached at a meeting earlier in the day by a man who offered to send five women to Trump and Schiller's rooms.¹⁹²⁸ Schiller recalled:

¹⁹²¹ (U) Email, Zaitseva to Kuhlen, et al., January 11, 2017 (RC-Moscow 012) (reflecting Trump's stay in a "Carlton Suite," room #727).

¹⁹²² (U) Email, Sukhanova to Kuhlen, et al., January 11, 2017 (RC-Moscow 011) (stating the room was reserved and paid for by a Russian company, Academservice). Invoice, Ritz Carlton Moscow (RC-Moscow 001). Records from the Ritz Carlton Moscow indicate that, despite the room being booked starting on November 6, the hotel was aware that the guest would not arrive until two days later. Document titled "VIPs of the weekend," Ritz Carlton Moscow (RC-Moscow 032). Goldstone told the Committee that Svetlana Bignova, who works for the Agalarovs, was responsible for arranging the hotel. Goldstone Tr., p. 79. Ultimately, Trump was in Moscow for two nights, November 8 and November 9, departing in the early morning hours of November 10.

¹⁹²³ (U) Schiller told the Committee he did not know who reserved the hotel rooms, and did not recall being involved in reviewing the hotel selection. Schiller did not recall taking any security precautions regarding Trump's room other than looking to see that there was no one else in it. Schiller told the Committee he did not recall how many nights they were in Russia, or what hotel they stayed at. Schiller Tr., pp. 70, 72-73, 85, 98.

¹⁹²⁴ (U) Email, Feliciano to Bignova, Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (Benjaminov Production).

¹⁹²⁵ (U) Schiller Tr., p. 84, 90.

¹⁹²⁶ (U) Schiller Tr., p. 24.

¹⁹²⁷ (U) Email, Goldstone to Kosenkova and Benjaminov, November 8, 2013 (Benjaminov Production).

¹⁹²⁸ (U) Schiller Tr., pp. 85-90.

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*I told him [Trump] that later on that evening. . . . We just laughed. I thought it was as a joke. I told him as we were walking to the room. I said: One of these clowns, or something to that effect, made this proposal and I thought it was funny. And he [Trump] just laughed, and that was the end of it.*¹⁹²⁹

(U) It is not clear, based on Schiller's recollection, where or when the offer was made, or by whom. Schiller told the Committee that the offer was not made by either of the Agalarovs, who were the only people in the room that Schiller recognized. The man who approached Schiller was wearing a suit and tie, and made the offer in English.¹⁹³⁰ Schiller recalled that the man who made the offer was one of the people in a meeting, and that "[t]here was a bunch of people in suits and ties talking," sitting around a "large table," and there were "restaurant-type" people serving hors d'oeuvres.¹⁹³¹ Schiller recalled Emin and Aras Agalarov being at the meeting, and Schiller referred to it as a business-related meeting.¹⁹³² Schiller believed that there may have been Europeans and Russians present at the meeting, but that English was being spoken.¹⁹³³ According to Schiller, the offer was not made in front of a group, but there were other people in the room.¹⁹³⁴

(U) Regarding the offer, Schiller told the Committee, "I don't know if it was a joke, but I took it as a joke."¹⁹³⁵ Nevertheless, Schiller also told the Committee, "I took it serious and I made it very clear: Don't even try that, don't even attempt, and it's not happening. I put an end to it immediately."¹⁹³⁶ Schiller said, "I would remember if that happened. I don't recall. I know that didn't happen." When asked how he knew nothing happened, Schiller told the Committee, "Because, well, while I was with him I know it wouldn't happen, because he would never tolerate that; and I would never allow it as well, not on my watch. So I know; it just wouldn't happen. It's never happened."¹⁹³⁷

¹⁹²⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

¹⁹³⁰ (U) Schiller Tr., pp. 99-100.

¹⁹³¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 80, 78.

¹⁹³² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁹³³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 100.

¹⁹³⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 87. Schiller told the Committee that he was standing at the time of the offer and had the sense that the man who made the offer may have been lower-level in seniority. Schiller said that the offer may have taken place at the hotel, however he did not have a clear recollection of the timing or location of the offer. *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 100. Schiller's description of the meeting at which the offer took place may be generally consistent with the Sberbank event earlier on Friday, November 8, which took place at Nobu. Goldstone recalled that the Sberbank meeting took place initially standing, and then seated at a large dining table, which "almost looked like a conference table," with Russian business leaders, Emin and Aras Agalarov, and drinks and food. Goldstone Tr., pp. 89-90.

¹⁹³⁵ (U) Schiller Tr., p. 100.

¹⁹³⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁹³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 85. Cohen has testified that, "Keith is the ultimate protector, and he was his [Trump's] bodyguard, his attaché for many, many years. And he was the keeper of Mr. Trump's secrets. So, for example, if he was going

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b. (U) Saturday, November 9, 2013

(U) On Saturday, November 9, at 11:00 a.m., Trump was scheduled to participate in filming a music video with Emin Agalarov at the Ritz Carlton Moscow.¹⁹³⁸ Roman Beniaminov recalled that after Trump arrived to film the video he briefly greeted people in the room, then was given a microphone and makeup. Beniaminov told the Committee, “I remember him [Trump] sitting down at a conference table . . . a couple takes. It didn’t take long at all, and then he departed. . . . It was all very quick and mechanical almost.”¹⁹³⁹ Emin Agalarov has said that Trump was only present at the music video filming for 10 minutes.¹⁹⁴⁰

(U) At 12:00 p.m. Trump was scheduled to depart for a press conference at Crocus City Hall that was taking place at 12:30 p.m.¹⁹⁴¹ According to Shugart, following the press conference Trump did an interview with Thomas Roberts of *MSNBC*, who was a host for the pageant.¹⁹⁴²

(U) Between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Trump’s schedule included “Full Dress Rehearsal” and “Return to Hotel” without specific times.¹⁹⁴³ Shugart recalled that Trump did return to the hotel mid-day.¹⁹⁴⁴ The next event on the itinerary was not until 7:30 p.m., when Trump was scheduled to depart the hotel for the pageant.

(U) There are several events that may have taken place during this unscheduled time. Kaveladze told the Committee that Trump visited Agalarov Estate.¹⁹⁴⁵ Emin Agalarov did not recall if Trump visited Agalarov Estate. Agalarov said that Kaveladze would have been the one

to text a female, he would have Keith do it on his phone.” Cohen has also testified that he has seen Schiller lie for Trump. HPSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Cohen, Part 2, March 6, 2019, p. 236.

¹⁹³⁸ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart et al, November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141). The video filming was originally scheduled for 11:30 a.m., and Emin Agalarov asked that it be moved later. Email, E. Agalarov to Goldstone, November 6, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00794). Shugart told the Committee that the video may have been filmed at 10:00 a.m., but that she wouldn’t have scheduled it early in the morning because she was being protective of Trump’s schedule. Shugart Tr., p. 154.

¹⁹³⁹ (U) Beniaminov Tr., p. 167–168. Regarding the music video, Emin Agalarov has said, “He [Trump] really did me a favor by being in the video. You know he Tweeted out ‘check out Emin’s amazing new video and song and track,’ which is cool. I think that’s the support you cannot buy. Only through a relationship.” Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr.

¹⁹⁴⁰ (U) Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr. Schiller told the Committee he had no recollection of a music video being filmed; Schiller Tr., p. 76.

¹⁹⁴¹ (U) Tweet, @ARTEM_KLYUSHIN, November 9, 2013.

¹⁹⁴² (U) Shugart Tr., p. 155; Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, November 9, 2013.

¹⁹⁴³ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141).

¹⁹⁴⁴ (U) Shugart Tr., p. 162.

¹⁹⁴⁵ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 31.

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to arrange it, and that Aras Agalarov would have wanted to show Trump the property. Emin Agalarov told the Committee that he had been busy preparing for the pageant concert, and may have skipped the visit.¹⁹⁴⁶ Scenes from Emin Agalarov's music video were filmed at Agalarov Estate, however the music video scenes that feature Trump appear to have been filmed at the hotel.¹⁹⁴⁷

(U) On November 9, 2013, Trump wrote on Twitter that he had received “a great tour of Moscow.”¹⁹⁴⁸ Goldstone told the Committee that in the afternoon Emin Agalarov had shown Trump around Crocus, and that Trump had “gone on this little drive around the property.”¹⁹⁴⁹ Goldstone stated that, “Emin wanted to show him [Trump] some of the Crocus structure and parts, and that was it. He [Emin] said he would do that before the press conference.”¹⁹⁵⁰ Goldstone told the Committee that Emin showed Trump “some of the new developments . . . at that point they were talking about this idea of possibly a Trump Tower. He [Emin] showed him [Trump] where that might be built.”¹⁹⁵¹ Emin Agalarov told the Committee that he did not recall taking Trump on a tour or doing any sightseeing however he did recall pointing out parts of the city surrounding Trump's hotel.¹⁹⁵²

(U) By November 9, 2013, joint business discussions appeared to be moving forward. *RT*, the Russian-government sponsored news outlet, quoted Trump as saying, “I have plans for the establishment of business in Russia. Now, I am in talks with several Russian companies to establish this skyscraper.”¹⁹⁵³ The same *RT* story quoted Aras Agalarov telling the Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS, “We started talking about joint work in the field of real estate a few days ago.”¹⁹⁵⁴

(U) Separately, the issue of a Trump-Putin meeting remained unresolved. Goldstone told the Committee that the unscheduled time on the afternoon of Saturday, November 9, was

¹⁹⁴⁶ (U) E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 30–31. Aras Agalarov may have indicated that he showed Trump around Moscow. See Evgenia Pismennaya, et al., “The Day Trump Came to Moscow: Oligarchs, Miss Universe and Nobu,” *Bloomberg Government*, December 21, 2016.

¹⁹⁴⁷ (U) Benjaminov Tr., pp. 160–161, 165.

¹⁹⁴⁸ (U) Tweet, @RealDonaldTrump, November 9, 2013. Emin Agalarov has said that although Trump's movement and destination would typically need to be provided to “his security staff,” Trump told his security detail, “don't bother them [the Agalarovs]. I [am] going wherever I'm going with them. I trust them.” Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr.

¹⁹⁴⁹ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 132.

¹⁹⁵⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁹⁵¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 132–133. It is not clear if these real estate-related events on Saturday are the same as, or are different than, the real estate-related events on Friday that were recalled by Shugart.

¹⁹⁵² (U) E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 23–24.

¹⁹⁵³ (U) “US ‘Miss Universe’ billionaire plans Russian Trump Tower,” *RT*, November 9, 2013.

¹⁹⁵⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

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intentionally left open on Trump's itinerary in the event that the meeting with Putin was accepted at the last minute.

(U) Goldstone recalled:

[W]e allowed a period of time on the [day of the pageant] around 4:00 p.m., 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. We didn't fill it with anything, just in case there was a meeting, maybe there was a call, maybe there was something. We left a little bit of time so that if it did happen he would be able to react. . . . Me personally, I asked on numerous occasions to Emin: Is there going to be a call, is there going to be a meeting? We have to know. The schedule's very, very tight. And the answer was always: We'll hear from my dad, we'll hear from the Kremlin.¹⁹⁵⁵

(U) Goldstone continued:

The most likely time looked to be around 4:00. What in fact happened was at about that time that's when this – that's when a call took place. . . . So we were told that there was a call. We were called into a room a bit like this, a conference room, and Emin said: You know, my dad's going to get the answer, is there going to be a meeting, is there not going to be a meeting. Mr. Trump was there, Paula, myself, Aras, Emin. I'm not sure who else, probably Keith. Aras took a call . . . [which was translated] through Emin. He's saying that the call is from a man named Dimitry Peskov, who is the spokesperson, who has a message that says that President Putin is very sorry, but because the King of Holland has been delayed on an official visit to the Kremlin, he's unable to make time to receive Mr. Trump. He wishes him well, and he says that he'd like to invite him on his next visit to meet with him, whenever or wherever that should be within Russia. And he actually said to him that, if he could, he'd like to invite him to the Sochi Winter Olympics. If not, at the next possible time that Mr. Trump might be in Russia he would do everything he could to meet with him. And that was it. We knew at that point there was no meeting, no call going to take place, and that was the call that determined that.¹⁹⁵⁶

(U) Regarding the call, Goldstone was uncertain but told the Committee, "Aras may have passed over the phone briefly to Mr. Trump to say 'thank you, hello, and thank you.' But if he did, it was literally a 'hello and thank you.' It's in my mind that that may have happened, but

¹⁹⁵⁵ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 111-112.

¹⁹⁵⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

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the bulk of it was Aras and Peskov.”¹⁹⁵⁷ Goldstone believed the call took place before a press conference that Trump participated in later that day.¹⁹⁵⁸

(U) At 7:30 p.m., Trump was scheduled to depart to Crocus City Hall for the Miss Universe pageant. The red carpet prior to the pageant was scheduled to begin at 8 p.m.¹⁹⁵⁹ Alex Sapir and Rotem Rosen may have ridden with Trump and Schiller to the event.¹⁹⁶⁰ Additionally, at some point on the evening of June 9, likely after the pageant, Trump signed a plaque in the shape of a star for Aras Agalarov and Emin Agalarov.¹⁹⁶¹

(U) Shugart recalled Trump being backstage at approximately 9 p.m.¹⁹⁶² According to Trump’s itinerary, from 10 p.m. to midnight the Miss Universe live show was scheduled to take place. Trump sat next to Aras Agalarov, and Agalarov social media manager Artem Klyushin and his then-wife sat behind them.¹⁹⁶³

(U) Although Putin did not attend the pageant, he reportedly sent a senior Kremlin official, Vladimir Kozhin, in his place.¹⁹⁶⁴ Kozhin may have already had a connection to Aras Agalarov.¹⁹⁶⁵

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¹⁹⁵⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 123–124.

¹⁹⁵⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁹⁵⁹ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000142).

¹⁹⁶⁰ (U) Email, Rosen to I. Trump, Macchia, and Sapir, January 11, 2017 (TRUMPORG_16_000004). On January 11, 2017, Alex Sapir and Rotem Rosen wrote a message to Trump rejecting any allegation of impropriety by Trump during the 2013 weekend in Moscow. In the message, they claimed to have been with Trump throughout his stay, including riding with him to the pageant. Although both men attended at least some of the events in Moscow, the recollections of a number of people who spent significant time with Trump during the trip were not consistent with some of Sapir and Rosen’s assertions. *See, e.g.*, Shugart Tr., pp. 160–161, 136 (stating she did not recognize either man and they would not have fit in Trump’s car); Schiller Tr., pp. 96–97 (stating he had no recollection of either man at the events or in the car); Goldstone Tr., p. 288 (stating he had no recollection of either man).

¹⁹⁶¹ (U) Email, Agalarov to Parado, cc Gorokhova, January 29, 2017 (EA-SSCI-02078). The star was for a Crocus version of the Hollywood Walk of Fame in the Vegas Mall. Goldstone Tr., p. 132.

¹⁹⁶² (U) Shugart Tr., p. 159.

¹⁹⁶³ (U) Instagram, artem_klyushin, November 9, 2013; Tweet, @AlferovaYulya, November 10, 2013.

¹⁹⁶⁴ (U) Michael Stott and Catherine Belton, “Trump’s Russian Connections,” *Financial Times*, December 13, 2016.

¹⁹⁶⁵ (U) Invitation, Crocus charity auction, (RB002671–2680); Andrew Roth, “The man who drives Trump’s Russia connection,” *The Washington Post*, July 22, 2017; Mikhail Klimentyev, *Sputnik*, Kremlin Pool Photo via the Associated Press, September 6, 2012.

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(U) Shugart told the Committee, “While we were there at the pageant, he [Trump] had told me—it might have been right afterwards, but I think it came up at the pageant—that if anyone asked, for me to allude to the fact that Putin had been there; and that he said that no one would know because he could have come in when the lights went down for the show.”¹⁹⁶⁷

(U) The pageant was followed by a press event, coronation ball, and an after party at Crocus Expo Hall 16 from midnight to 3:00 a.m.¹⁹⁶⁸ Goldstone told the Committee, “It was a very fluid thing. If Trump wanted to [go to the party]. We knew he had to leave that night to be back in the States, and nobody knew exactly when he was going to leave. I had asked a number of times to Paula and to Keith. Nobody knew exactly when. But then he said he would go to the after-party.”¹⁹⁶⁹

(U) Shugart recalled that Trump had a press conference following the pageant and arrived at the after-party around 12:30 a.m.¹⁹⁷⁰ Goldstone recalled that Trump was seated in a VIP enclave but that there were lots of people around. Shugart told the Committee that there were approximately 200 people in the VIP area.¹⁹⁷¹

(U) Goldstone said that Trump appeared to be having a good time, and stayed later than they had planned, leaving around 3:00 a.m.¹⁹⁷² Goldstone said he was told that the bags had been packed and were in the car and that Trump left the party directly to the airport, but he had

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¹⁹⁶⁷ (U) Shugart Tr., p. 203.

¹⁹⁶⁸ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–142); Tweet, @ARTEM_KLYUSHIN, November 9, 2013; Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, November 9, 2013.

¹⁹⁶⁹ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 138–140.

¹⁹⁷⁰ (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 172–173. This is generally consistent with Goldstone’s recollection that Trump arrived at midnight. Goldstone Tr., p. 140.

¹⁹⁷¹ (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 173–175. Roustam Tariko, a Russian billionaire who has said that he has “known Trump for many years” and was a sponsor of the pageant, may have been present. See Evgenia Pismennaya, et al., “The Day Trump Came to Moscow: Oligarchs, Miss Universe and Nobu,” *Bloomberg Government*, December 21, 2016. See also Jeffrey Toobin, “Trump’s Miss Universe Gambit,” *The New Yorker*, February 19, 2018.

¹⁹⁷² (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 140, 147–148. This is generally consistent with Paula Shugart who estimated that Trump stayed until 3:30 a.m. Shugart Tr., pp. 172–173.

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no personal knowledge of this other than seeing Trump leave the party. Paula Shugart also recalled that Trump left directly for the airport.

(U) According to Goldstone, “at the last minute” A.J. Calloway asked Trump if he could fly home with Trump, and likely did join the flight.¹⁹⁷³ Although Trump used Phil Ruffin’s airplane in both directions, and although Ruffin and his wife attended the pageant, it appears that they flew separately in both directions.¹⁹⁷⁴

(U) At 2:30 a.m. on November 10, Trump was scheduled to depart the after-party for Moscow’s Vnukovo airport. Trump’s flight was scheduled to depart for Newark, New Jersey, at 3:30 a.m. in Moscow, and was scheduled to arrive in Newark at 3:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time.¹⁹⁷⁵ Public reporting indicates that the flight was approximately 30 minutes behind schedule, taking off at 3:58 a.m. and landing at 4:11 a.m.¹⁹⁷⁶

(U) As the pageant concluded, discussion of future business continued. On November 10, Emin responded to an email from the architect William McGee, informing McGee that, “We may do a tower with him [Trump] now.”¹⁹⁷⁷ The following day, November 11, Trump wrote on Twitter to Aras Agalarov praising the Agalarovs and stating that Trump Tower Moscow would be next.¹⁹⁷⁸ The following day, Emin Agalarov replied on Twitter with thanks, and wrote that they should make Trump Tower Moscow happen.¹⁹⁷⁹

(U) On November 12, Olivia Cellini from the Trump Organization emailed Goldstone and Benjaminov: “Can you please send me Aras’ email address? Mr. Trump would like to send him a message.”¹⁹⁸⁰

v. (U) Communications with the Agalarovs Following Miss Universe Moscow

¹⁹⁷³ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 139–140. This is supported by a copy of Trump’s Moscow itinerary with A.J. Calloway’s name handwritten in for the return flight. Itinerary, Trump Organization (TRUMPORG_18_000009).

¹⁹⁷⁴ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–142); Ben Schreckinger, “Trump’s false claims to Comey about Moscow story could aid Mueller,” *Politico*, April 23, 2018.

¹⁹⁷⁵ (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141). According to Trump’s itinerary Steve Tyler and Aimee Preston were scheduled to join the flight.

¹⁹⁷⁶ (U) Vernon Silver, “Flight Records Illuminate Mystery of Trump’s Moscow Nights (1),” *Bloomberg Government*, April 23, 2018.

¹⁹⁷⁷ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to McGee, November 10, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00845).

¹⁹⁷⁸ (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, November 11, 2013.

¹⁹⁷⁹ (U) Tweet, @eminofficial, November 12, 2013.

¹⁹⁸⁰ (U) Email, Cellini to Goldstone and Benjaminov, November 12, 2013 (Benjaminov Production). The Committee has no additional information regarding this communication.

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(U) On November 19, 2013, Donald Trump Jr. emailed Emin Agalarov to introduce himself for the first time. Trump Jr. wrote that he had spoken to his father about working with the Agalarovs to develop a Trump Tower or hotel in Moscow, and that his father had asked him to reach out to Emin and Aras Agalarov to discuss moving forward.¹⁹⁸¹ Later that day Emin Agalarov replied and said “let’s speak and see if we can make things happen.”¹⁹⁸²

(U) On November 20 Emin Agalarov wrote to Trump Jr. in hopes that Trump Jr. would remind his father to tweet a link to Agalarov’s new music video, which featured Donald Trump.¹⁹⁸³ Trump Jr. replied that he would, and wrote that he would be calling “shortly to discuss the potential tower.”¹⁹⁸⁴ Later that day, Donald Trump tweeted a link to Emin Agalarov’s video.¹⁹⁸⁵

(U) On November 21, 2013, Emin Agalarov sent an email to Donald Trump Jr., and copied Shugart and Goldstone. The subject line of Agalarov’s email was, “President,” and in the body of the email Agalarov wrote, “My father just received a letter and gift for your dad from Mr. Putin.” Agalarov attached images of the gift, which was a *Fedoskino*-style lacquer box, as well as images of the letter from Putin. Trump Jr. appeared to have passed the email and photographs on to his father.¹⁹⁸⁶

¹⁹⁸¹ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to E. Agalarov, November 19, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00879).

¹⁹⁸² (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr, November 19, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00875).


¹⁹⁸³ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., November 20, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00879).

¹⁹⁸⁴ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to E. Agalarov, November 20, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00883).

¹⁹⁸⁵ (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, November 20, 2013.



¹⁹⁸⁶ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., November 21, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000035-40); Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr. (RG000014).

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(U) Images of the box and letter that were attached are included below¹⁹⁸⁷:

¹⁹⁸⁷ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., November 21, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000035-40); Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., Goldstone, and Shugart, November 11, 21, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00891-00896).



(U) The unofficial English translation of the letter that was included states:

Dear Mr. Trump, I would like to congratulate you and your colleagues on successfully holding the Miss Universe contest in Moscow. I hope that all the participants in this remarkable event will go home with good memories of their visit to the Russian capital. It is a pity that we were not able to have our meeting, but I hope we will be able to talk during one of your upcoming visits to Russia. Yours sincerely, V. Putin¹⁹⁸⁸

(U) The package with the box from Putin was brought to the United States by Irina Agalarova, Aras Agalarov's wife.¹⁹⁸⁹

a. (U) Joint Real Estate Development Effort in Moscow 2013-2014

(U) Shortly after the Miss Universe pageant, discussions began between the Agalarovs' Crocus Group and the Trump Organization about a joint real estate development project.

(U) Goldstone told the Committee that Emin Agalarov believed that Trump's initial reaction to being shown possible sites in Moscow during the Miss Universe contest was positive.¹⁹⁹⁰ As noted, at Trump's suggestion, on November 19, 2013, Donald Trump Jr. reached out to Emin Agalarov regarding a possible joint development project in Moscow.¹⁹⁹¹ On November 22, Emin Agalarov wrote to Trump Jr., stating, "I've spoken to my Father about our conversation and all looks very positive, general terms are suitable for a negotiation, lets identify the land and building (we have a few options) and get the ball rolling contractually." In the interim, Emin Agalarov suggested an exclusivity arrangement.¹⁹⁹²

(U) On November 27, Yulya Klyushina emailed Emin Agalarov, Rob Goldstone, Artem Klyushin and others, to inform them that Trump had written about the Agalarovs on Twitter and had posted a link to an article about Emin Agalarov's new music video, which Trump was featured in.¹⁹⁹³ On December 2, at Trump's request, one of Trump's employees sent Emin

¹⁹⁸⁸ (U) Letter, Putin to Trump, November 19, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000039).

¹⁹⁸⁹ (U) Emin, Agalarova to Shugart, November 28, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000102).

¹⁹⁹⁰ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 150-151.


¹⁹⁹¹ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to E. Agalarov, November 19, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00879).

¹⁹⁹² (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., November 19, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00971).

¹⁹⁹³ (U) Email, Klyushina to E. Agalarov, et al., November 27, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00922); *see also* Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, November 27, 2013. Klyushina and Klyushin had been hired to promote Emin Agalarov online. Beniaminov Tr., pp. 175-177.

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Agalarov a copy of the article that Trump posted on Twitter with a hand written note that referenced the possibility of a Trump Tower Moscow.¹⁹⁹⁴



(U) On December 4, Trump Jr. wrote to Emin Agalarov, “I am back and ready to go.” Trump Jr. offered to have the Trump Organization draft a letter similar to the one suggested by Emin Agalarov as an initial step.¹⁹⁹⁵ A preliminary, but formal, agreement was signed on December 5, 2013; the signatories were Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov.¹⁹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁹⁴ (U) Email, Chelsea Frommer to E. Agalarov, December 2, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00946, 00947).

¹⁹⁹⁵ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to E. Agalarov, November 19, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00969).

¹⁹⁹⁶ (U) Letter, Trump Jr. to Crocus Group, December 5, 2013 (Kaveladze Proffer Documents). Kaveladze referred to this document as the Letter of Intent (LOI). Kaveladze Tr., pp. 34, 40–41.

Trump International Development LLC

December 5, 2013

Crocus International
2471, Profsoyuznaya Street
Moscow, Russia 117292
Attention: Emin Agalarov

Gentlemen:


The Crocus Group ("you") has expressed interest in acquiring a license to use a derivative of the "Trump" name for the purpose of identifying a to be built super luxury, 5-star comp set real estate project in Moscow. This letter agreement is not a grant of such a license, or an agreement by either you or Trump International Development LLC ("we" or "us") to enter into any license in the future. This letter agreement is simply a good faith accommodation by us of your request that we temporarily refrain from seeking similar licensing agreements in Moscow with other firms while you attempt to identify appropriate land for construction in Moscow and formulate a business plan and proposal.

We agree that, until March 5, 2014 but not thereafter, we will not, nor will we permit any company that we control or that is under common control with us, to directly or indirectly, negotiate, enter into, solicit, or accept any offer to license the "Trump" name for identifying any residential, hotel and/or office project located in Moscow. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we will not be bound by the preceding sentence, even during the period prior to March 5, 2014, if (i) you notify us that you are no longer seeking the above-described license, (ii) we notify you that we believe that you are no longer diligently attempting to identify appropriate land for construction in Moscow or to formulate a business plan and proposal, or (iii) you breach any of your obligations described below.

You agree not to disclose to anyone our interest in any potential licensing arrangement in Moscow or the existence or contents of this letter agreement.

You and we represent to each other that it has not dealt with any broker or finder with respect to the potential transaction described above.

The immediately preceding three paragraphs, and this paragraph, shall be binding. Otherwise, this letter does not contain any binding promises by either party and, without limitation, neither party is obligated to the other to pursue any further discussions or negotiations. This letter agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York, without regard to conflicts of law principles. You and we each consent to sole and exclusive personal and subject matter jurisdiction and venue in the federal and state courts in the City and County of New York, New York. This letter agreement (i) contains the entire agreement between you and us, (ii) may not be modified or waived in whole or in part orally or by e-mail, (iii) is non-assignable and (iv) may be executed in counterparts each of which may be effectively delivered as an attachment to an e-mail.


Donald J. Trump, Jr.
Executive Vice President

Donald J. Trump, Jr.
Executive Vice President


ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED
CROCUS GROUP

Emin Agalarov

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(U) On December 6, 2013, Emin Agalarov sent the signed agreement to Trump Jr. and introduced him, by email, to Irakli Kaveladze, who Agalarov said had worked on the Miss Universe pageant, had met Trump, and would be working on the Trump Tower deal for Crocus.¹⁹⁹⁷ Kaveladze told the Committee that his primary interlocutor at the Trump Organization was Trump Jr., and that Emin and Aras Agalarov were both involved on the Crocus side. Kaveladze said that negotiations with the Trump Organization took place primarily by email and conference calls, and that he was against the joint project.¹⁹⁹⁸

(U) Kaveladze told the Committee that the joint project was designed as an incentive fee deal for a residential Trump Tower, and that Kaveladze was mostly focused on negotiating with the Trump Organization to lower its fees.¹⁹⁹⁹ Despite Kaveladze's concerns, negotiations advanced between the Crocus Group and the Trump Organization. Throughout December Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated by email regarding the Trump Organization's fee structure, and ultimately agreed to "an expanded LOI" which Trump Jr. said he could get following the holidays.²⁰⁰⁰

(U) On January 13, 2014, Emin Agalarov and Trump Jr. met in person, along with Goldstone, at Nobu in New York City.²⁰⁰¹ Goldstone recalled that the Trump Tower project was discussed at this meeting and seemed to be moving forward.²⁰⁰²

(U) On January 14, 2014, Trump Jr. sent Emin Agalarov an unsigned expanded letter of intent regarding the proposed development of a "super luxury" real estate project in Moscow. This letter and its attachment totaled 10 pages and was significantly more detailed than the original basic letter from December 5.²⁰⁰³

(U) On January 15, 2014, Goldstone, Trump Jr., and other Trump Organization staff exchanged a number of emails regarding Ivanka Trump meeting with the Agalarovs in Moscow on February 4 for a "site visit," and Emin Agalarov performing for an upcoming golf event at the Trump property in Doral, Florida.²⁰⁰⁴

(U) Kaveladze told the Committee that he met Ivanka Trump briefly at the Crocus Group office in Moscow in February before she went with Emin Agalarov to visit the proposed site for a Trump Tower, which Kaveladze recalled was at the Crocus City complex on land already

¹⁹⁹⁷ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., December 6, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00993).

¹⁹⁹⁸ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 33–38; FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017.

¹⁹⁹⁹ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 36, 43–44.

²⁰⁰⁰ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze, cc E. Agalarov, December 23, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00990–00992).

²⁰⁰¹ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., January 15, 2104 (RB000142).

²⁰⁰² (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 173.

²⁰⁰³ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to E. Agalarov, January 14, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01038–01048).

²⁰⁰⁴ (U) Emails, Goldstone to Trump Jr., January 15, 2014 (RB000142).

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owned by the Agalarovs.²⁰⁰⁵ Following Ivanka Trump's visit to Crocus on February 4, she emailed Emin Agalarov to thank him for the tour. She wrote, "I am very excited about our collaboration and am confident that our families will enjoy great success together. We look forward to meeting with you again in the US in March to review the details of the proposed Trump Tower with your architects."²⁰⁰⁶

(U) On February 11, 2014, at Rob Goldstone's request, Donald Trump Jr. tweeted to promote Emin Agalarov's album.²⁰⁰⁷ On February 19, 2014, Donald Trump tweeted to promote an Emin Agalarov performance in Sochi, Russia, on the Today Show. Later that day Agalarov wrote to Donald Trump Jr, and others, with Ivanka Trump copied, to thank them for supporting him.²⁰⁰⁸

(U) On March 5, 2014, Trump Jr. emailed Emin Agalarov, "Do you have any free time this week. Would love to circle up on Moscow." Emin Agalarov replied that he would be flying to Miami the following day, and Trump Jr. suggested that they meet on March 7 after Agalarov arrived.²⁰⁰⁹

(U) On March 8, 2014, Emin Agalarov performed at the Trump golf event in Doral, Florida. He met with Trump, Ivanka Trump, and Trump Jr. while he was there.²⁰¹⁰ Trump Jr. planned to meet with Agalarov on March 10.²⁰¹¹

(U) By late March, discussions between the Trump Organization, the Agalarovs, and architects hired by Crocus seemed to be progressing. Discussions included issues ranging from interior design to the square footage of residences, need for balconies, amenities, and the ratio of apartments to parking places.²⁰¹² This level of detailed discussion continued through at least mid-July.²⁰¹³

²⁰⁰⁵ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 45–51.

²⁰⁰⁶ (U) Email, I. Trump to E. Agalarov, February 5, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01264); Emin Agalarov told the Committee that Ivanka Trump was in Moscow to visit a friend, Miroslava Duma. E. Agalarov Tr., p. 11. During the campaign, in late 2015, Duma was involved in outreach to Trump by Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Prikhodko. *See Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election*, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Vol. I, pp. 78–79; TRUMPORG_16_000057.

²⁰⁰⁷ (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, February 11, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01274).

²⁰⁰⁸ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., Goldstone, Blavatnik, et al., February 19, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01285–01286).

²⁰⁰⁹ (U) Email, Trump Jr., to E. Agalarov, March 5, 2014 (RB000347).

²⁰¹⁰ (U) Trump Jr. Tr. I, pp. 29–30. Goldstone Tr., pp. 153–154; Instagram, eminofficial, March 9, 2014.

²⁰¹¹ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to E. Agalarov, March 8, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01327). Trump Jr. Tr. I, pp. 29–30.

²⁰¹² (U) Email, Tropea to E. Agalarov, et al., March 27, 2014 (RB000115) (attaching "20131001 Residential tower Alternative massing studies.pdf").

²⁰¹³ (U) Email, Khoo to McGee, cc Trump Jr. et al., July 17, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01371-01372).

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(U) The relationship between the Agalarovs and Trump also continued on other fronts. For example, emails from early July 2014, indicate that Trump was seeking Emin Agalarov's mailing address to thank him for a watch.²⁰¹⁴ The watch given to Trump was likely made by U-Boat, a company that Emin Agalarov has a relationship with.²⁰¹⁵

(U) Eventually, progress on Trump Tower Moscow discussions began to slow. By late summer and early fall 2014, Tropea and Kaveladze expressed frustration internally that the Trump Organization was not being responsive to requests regarding the project.²⁰¹⁶

(U) However, by mid-November 2014 the two sides had discussed design options and parcels of land. On November 14, architects from the firm Jacobs / KlingStubbins who were working on behalf of Crocus emailed Trump Jr. and Florence Khoo at the Trump Organization and copied Emin Agalarov, Kaveladze, and others. The subject line of the email was "Project: Crocus - Residential Complex (Parcel 11)...Trump Tower - Moscow." In the body of the message architect William McGee referenced previous discussions and wrote that "Mr. Agalarov" had suggested that the "Trump project" be moved to a different site along the river. The attached file was titled: "Trump Tower concept study."²⁰¹⁷

(U) As of December 2014, Emin Agalarov continued to direct staff work on the project. On December 14, 2014, Jason Tropea emailed a Crocus employee, writing: "Emin has asked me to review and study the Trump org. / Crocus contract for the residential tower."²⁰¹⁸ Tropea asked for a copy of the contract from the employee.²⁰¹⁹

(U) In December 2014, Trump recorded a video in celebration of Emin Agalarov's 35th birthday.²⁰²⁰

(U) It is not clear that the negotiations with the Agalarovs for a Trump Tower Moscow ever formally ended; however, testimony from witnesses who were involved and other

²⁰¹⁴ (U) Email, Giudice to Benjaminov, July 1, 2014 (RB000079).

²⁰¹⁵ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Goldstone, May 7, 2014 (EA-SSCI-01334).

²⁰¹⁶ (U) Email, Kaveladze to Tropea, September 29, 2014 (RB000393–394).

²⁰¹⁷ (U) Email, Nat Skerry to Trump Jr., et al., November 13, 2014 (Benjaminov Production). Benjaminov told the Committee: "There have been plans for many years to develop -- within Crocus City there is an undeveloped parcel of land which is part of the Crocus City compound. There's just nothing there. There were plans for years to develop a project called "Little Manhattan." It would include, I believe, at some point something upwards of 11 towers, high-rises, so to say. I believe that one of those towers was the tower to be the Trump Tower . . . that undeveloped parcel of land is behind the Crocus City Hall Expo 3 area. It lies between that and the river embankment." Benjaminov Tr., p. 204.

²⁰¹⁸ (U) Email, Tropea to Sergey [likely Sergey Sharov], December 14, 2014 (RB000104–105).

²⁰¹⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰²⁰ (U) YouTube, EminOfficial, December 19, 2014.

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information indicates that communications regarding the project became increasingly infrequent over time, without a specific cause identified.²⁰²¹

(U) Trump Jr. recalled that the project faded. He told the Committee:

*I don't even recall a specific: "Hey, guys, we're just not going to do it." It was just sort of clear that we're sort of going different directions and it probably wouldn't make sense for either side. So it just sort of went out.*²⁰²²

(U) Goldstone told the Committee that, during an in-person meeting in Trump Tower between Emin Agalarov and Donald Trump, Agalarov said that Russia's economy had deteriorated and that, "we may have to reevaluate and relook."²⁰²³ Trump Jr. was unsure but estimated that by the end of 2014 it was clear that the project had lost momentum and wouldn't be moving forward.²⁰²⁴

(U) Emin Agalarov said, in an April 2016 interview, that the negotiations "kind of faded away, because I think he [Trump] is busy with other things, we are busy with other things. It's not something that we decided, like 'Okay, let's stop.' It wasn't at that point. Teams are still in correspondence. It's a work in progress." When pressed, Emin Agalarov acknowledged that "[s]ince he [Trump] started running for the presidency, I don't think we've had a conversation about Trump Tower."²⁰²⁵ Nevertheless, in the same interview, Aras Agalarov stated that Crocus was still "the right place for a Trump Tower."²⁰²⁶

vi. (U) Continuing Communications

(U) Throughout 2015 and 2016, Aras Agalarov and Emin Agalarov remained in regular contact with Trump and Trump Jr., often through Graff and Goldstone or other staff working for

²⁰²¹ (U) Kaveladze recalled that the Trump Organization was interested in building in downtown Moscow, while the Crocus Group preferred to build on land associated with Crocus City, which is outside the city center. Other issues of contention, according to Kaveladze, were the Trump Organization's fees and the question of how involved the Trump Organization would be in managing the construction of the building. Kaveladze Tr., pp. 40–44. In April 2016, Emin Agalarov said that the joint project was going to be a residential building and that, "Right now we're in a crisis of residential development, so we basically froze our developments in that particular direction. We're developing shopping malls, we're not developing any residential buildings at the moment." Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr.

²⁰²² (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 66–67.

²⁰²³ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 39. The exact timing of this conversation is unclear.

²⁰²⁴ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 67.

²⁰²⁵ (U) Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr. (RG000019-22).

²⁰²⁶ (U) *Ibid.* (RG000019).

[REDACTED]

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the Agalarovs. The contact ranged from personal to substantive to logistical and included written correspondence, gifts, and in person meetings.

(U) Goldstone estimated that in addition to in-person meetings between Trump and Emin Agalarov in Las Vegas, Moscow, and Doral, they met three or four times in Trump Tower for visits when Emin Agalarov was in New York. Goldstone characterized these meetings in Trump Tower as personal, rather than substantive or business oriented.²⁰²⁷

(U) One of these meetings occurred on May 20, 2015.²⁰²⁸ That meeting was likely the last of Emin Agalarov's personal meetings with Trump at Trump Tower. Emin Agalarov told the Committee that Trump discussed running for president at the time, but that Trump said he did not know if he would run.²⁰²⁹ Goldstone had a different recollection. He told the Committee that the final meeting between Trump and Agalarov "was approximately six weeks before he [Trump] was due to announce that he was going to run for President. The reason is, on the way out he said: I'm going to be running for President, you know; so next time you won't be coming here; you'll be coming to see me at the White House. That's why I specifically remember that."²⁰³⁰

(U) Recalling his final meeting with Trump, Emin Agalarov has said, "the last conversation before he ran that he and I had, he was criticizing the United States government for not being able to be friends with Russia. He keeps underlining that he thinks that President Putin is a strong leader. And he thinks America, instead of fighting Russia, should bond and be friends and have common goals with Russia."²⁰³¹

4. (U) The Trump-Agalarov Relationship During the 2016 Presidential Campaign

²⁰²⁷ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 39. Emin Agalarov has said, "Also, just to add an important comment. Every time I am in New York, and Trump is also in New York, I go visit him. We kind of hang out at his office." Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr. (RG000016).

²⁰²⁸ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., April 30, 2015 (Benjaminov Production). Goldstone sent Trump Jr. an invitation to attend Emin Agalarov's upcoming performances in New York or Miami. Goldstone also requested that the invitation be extended to Donald Trump and Ivanka Trump.

²⁰²⁹ (U) E. Agalarov Tr., p. 8.

²⁰³⁰ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 296. On January 28, 2015, Yulya Klyushina, who knew Emin Agalarov and Goldstone, announced on Twitter that Trump would be running for President of the United States. It is not clear what Alferova's foreknowledge was based on, or if it was related to any information provided to Agalarov and Goldstone. Tweet, @AlferovaYulya, January 28, 2015; *see also* Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, June 16, 2015 (EA-SSCI-01670).

²⁰³¹ (U) Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr. (RG000016).

[REDACTED]

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(U) On June 16, 2015, the day that Trump announced his candidacy, Goldstone emailed Graff and Trump Jr. with the subject line, “Please pass on mine and Emin’s best wishes and congratulations to Mr. Trump.” The body of the email simply stated, “Wonderful news.”²⁰³²

(U) On July 22, 2015, Goldstone wrote to Graff notifying her that Emin Agalarov would like to invite Trump to Aras Agalarov’s birthday party in Moscow on November 8, and hoped that Trump would be willing to write a small message of congratulations to Aras Agalarov in a celebratory book. Graff responded, “I will certainly make Mr. Trump aware of this invitation, and I know he will be honored that Emin thought of him. However, given his presidential campaign, it’s highly unlikely he would have time on his calender [sic] to go to Moscow in November. Regardless, I am sure he will want to write a congratulatory note.” Goldstone replied to Graff that he understood Trump’s scheduling constraints regarding traveling to Moscow, “unless maybe he [Trump] would welcome a meeting with President Putin which Emin would set up,” and offered to come to the office to pick up the congratulatory note for Aras Agalarov.²⁰³³

(U) On November 8, 2015, Trump wrote to Aras Agalarov²⁰³⁴.

²⁰³² (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, June 16, 2015 (DJTJR00146).

²⁰³³ (U) Emails, Goldstone and Graff, July 22 and 24, 2015 (DJTJR00893).

²⁰³⁴ (U) Letter, Trump to A. Agalarov, November 8, 2015 (TRUMPORG_18_000014).



November 8, 2015

Dear Aras,

It's your birthday and I think you have a lot of reasons to celebrate. I know of one big reason, which is your son, Emin, who has brought a lot of elegance and excitement to my pageants. He is a very big talent and his magnanimous personality has touched many thousands of people throughout the world. I have a feeling he got quite a bit of his talent from you. But Emin aside, I am writing to wish you a very Happy Birthday -- and I'm hoping you will have a most memorable celebration in Moscow!

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald J. Trump".

Donald J. Trump

i. (U) First Outreach Regarding the Russian Social Media Company VK

(U) On January 19, 2016, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and copied Graff. He wrote:

I hope you are well and congratulations on an outstanding job so far re the campaign. With this in mind, I was just in Moscow and met with a good friend who runs the marketing for VK - which is the largest social media platform in Russia. They have more than 2.7 million Russian Americans using the site (living in the USA) and had an idea to create a campaign page on VK for Mr. Trump and market it to the almost 3 million influential Russian American voters living in the USA. I thought it was a very interesting and sensible idea and so wanted to pass it along. I am not sure who handles this kind of thing for the campaign so I hope you don't mind I sent it directly to you both. I can get massive exposure for Mr. Trump on

[REDACTED]

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*the site for sure - and it will be covered in Russian media also - where I noticed your campaign is covered positively almost daily – which [sic] extremely gracious comments from President Putin etc. Please let me know if the campaign is interested and I will connect the dots.*²⁰³⁵

(U) Goldstone's email included the text of a forwarded email from Konstantin Sidorkov, a "Partner Relations Manager" at VK.²⁰³⁶

From: Konstantin Sidorkov [REDACTED]
Subject: Donald Trump on VK
Date: January 18, 2016 at 12:48:06 PM EST
To: Rob Goldstone [REDACTED], Rob Goldstone
[REDACTED]

I want to introduce you the most visited social network in Russia, Ukraine and CIS countries — VK (VKontakte).

Some interesting facts about VK:

- More then 340 million registered users;
- Over 76 million visitors per day;
- Over 2.6 billion page views per day;
- 65% visitors from Russia;
- More then 59% users older then 25 years.

From USA we had 2.7 millions profiles registered and more then 1.5 million visitors monthly.

Our platform includes all types of communication: Messenger + Video + Music + Photo. US press often calls us "Russian facebook", because all other social networks in Russia are rather smaller then VK. For last 2 years VK become a favorite platform for many politics in Russia as the best way to communicate with people. In addition you can find the fool presentation about us with details.

We want to invite Donald Trump to set up an official page on VK, which will have the latest updates from Donald and maybe Russian translation.

Also we will make a huge promotion for it with our marketing instruments and put this page to user's recommendation inc. targeting to all our audience.

Thanks for your attention, will look forward for your answer.

(U) Later that day, January 19, 2016, Graff responded, copying Trump Jr. and Dan Scavino from the Trump Campaign. She wrote, "Thank you for bringing this terrific opportunity

²⁰³⁵ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr. and Graff, January 19, 2016 (RG000003).


²⁰³⁶ (U) Email, Sidorkov to Goldstone, January 18, 2016 (DJTJR00418-00439).

[REDACTED]

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to our attention. I've copied Dan Scavino, who heads up social media for the campaign, and I am sure he will be in touch with you to help 'connect the dots.'"²⁰³⁷

(U) Shortly after Graff's email, Scavino replied to Goldstone, copying Graff and Trump Jr. He wrote:²⁰³⁸



(U) The Russian government and the Internet Research Agency (IRA) use VK, Russia's version of Facebook, for influence operations.²⁰³⁹ According to public reporting, the company's original leadership was pushed out, in an effort that involved the Russian FSB, and replaced with Kremlin-aligned ownership in 2013 and 2014.²⁰⁴⁰

[REDACTED]

²⁰³⁷ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, et al, (RG000003).

²⁰³⁸ (U) Email, Scavino to Goldstone, et al., (RG000006).

²⁰³⁹ [REDACTED] See *infra* Vol. 2; Adrian Chen, "The Agency," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 2, 2015; Todd C. Helmus et al. "Russian Social Media Influence," RAND, 2018, p. 16; [REDACTED]

²⁰⁴⁰ (U) Jennifer Monaghan, "Vkontakte Founder Says Sold Shares Due to FSB Pressure," *The Moscow Times*, April 17, 2014. Alisher Usmanov, an oligarch and close Putin associate, his business partner Ivan Tavrin, and Igor Sechin, another close Putin associate who is sanctioned by the United States, were involved. See Olga Razumovskaya, "Alisher Usmanov Cements Control of Social Network," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 25, 2014; "Russia's VKontakte CEO says he was fired, flees Russia," *Reuters*, April 22, 2014.

²⁰⁴¹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Committee assesses that corporate ownership of VK also raises serious concerns

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Committee’s insight into Sidorkov’s motivations is extremely limited.²⁰⁵³ However, targeting Russian speaking voters in the United States is thematically consistent with [REDACTED] undertaken by the Russian government in support of Trump in the 2016 U.S. election.²⁰⁵⁴

2049 [REDACTED]
2050 [REDACTED]
2051 (U) Geoff Cutmore and Catherine Boyle, “Russia’s Richest Man Usmanov: Wait For Next Facebook Surge,”
CNBC, December 21, 2012.

2052 [REDACTED]
2053 (U) For example, Goldstone has characterized Sidorkov as a “really good ally” of Emin Agalarov, and public information indicates that Sidorkov is also an associate of Yulya Klyushina, who is described elsewhere in this Report. The nature and extent of these relationships remains unknown. Goldstone Tr., 268. Screenshot of Yulya Klyushina and Konstantin Sidorkov, April 29, 2015 [no longer available]. Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, December 7, 2013.

2054 [REDACTED]
2055 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) On January 20, Konstantin Sidorkov wrote to Scavino, copying Goldstone, Graff and Trump Jr.:²⁰⁵⁷

Hi, Dan! Nice to meet you and your team! In attachment you can find the last presentation about VK audience.

Please check this details in the end of my first letter:

- More then 340 million registered users;
- Over 76 million visitors per day;
- Over 2.6 billion page views per day;
- 65% visitors from Russia;
- More then 59% users older then 25 years.

From USA we had 2.7 millions profiles registered and more then 1.5 million visitors monthly.

We can help with a registration, adding first information to the page. But further we want ask you to manage page by yourself with last updates like facebook.

It will be cool also to have Russian translation of publication there to get more coverage, because not so many Russian's know English. But for this thing we need to find in your social media department Russian speaking manager.

[REDACTED]

or more on

Rogozin, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.H.

²⁰⁵⁷ (U) Email, Sidorkov to Scavino, January 20, 2016 (RG000007). The attachment referenced by Sidorkov may refer to the presentation previously discussed.

[REDACTED]

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(U) In 2016, and into at least the beginning of 2017, contact continued between the Agalarovs and their associates and the Trumps and their associates, through a series of emails, gifts, and letters. Some of the communications, not all of which are captured below, were substantive, others were less so.

(U) On January 25, 2016, Emin Agalarov emailed Trump Jr., “I’m in New York send my best to the family and congratulations on all the amazing success!!! My best to the big boss!!!! Emin.”²⁰⁵⁸

(U) On February 29, 2016, Goldstone wrote to Trump Jr. and Graff, copying Emin Agalarov.²⁰⁵⁹

Good morning.
Emin's father has asked me to pass on his congratulations in a letter enclosed below for Mr. Trump on the eve of Super Tuesday vote -- offering his support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues - especially with reference to U.S./Russian relations.
Best of luck to you all and many thanks for passing on this letter.
Best
Rob

Attached to Goldstone’s email was a letter from Aras Agalarov wishing Trump success on Super Tuesday.²⁰⁶⁰

(U) On March 4, 2016, Graff responded to Goldstone, writing, “Please know that the very thoughtful and kind letter from Mr. Agalarov to Mr. Trump was relayed to him earlier this week.”²⁰⁶¹ Graff’s confirmation that Trump had received the letter was passed on to Emin Agalarov and other Agalarov staff.

(U) On March 18, 2016, Trump responded in a hand written note on the original letter from Agalarov.²⁰⁶²

²⁰⁵⁸ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., January 25, 2016 (DJTJR00441).


²⁰⁵⁹ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, et al., February 29, 2016 (RB000056-58).

²⁰⁶⁰ (U) *Ibid*.

²⁰⁶¹ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, March 4, 2016 (RB000056).

²⁰⁶² (U) Handwritten note, Trump to A. Agalarov, March 18, 2016 (DJTJR00406).

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The letter with the note was emailed by a staffer at the Trump Organization to Emin Agalarov, who responded, “Amazing Thank you.”²⁰⁶³

(U) The Agalarovs seemed to feel that this note on the letter demonstrated their relationship with Trump. On April 8, 2016, Aras Agalarov brought the letter to an interview

²⁰⁶³ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Murphy, March 18, 2016 (DJTJR00407).

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with *The Washington Post*'s Moscow Bureau Chief. When Agalarov produced it in the interview, Emin Agalarov stated, "It's the real deal, not fake."²⁰⁶⁴ Aras Agalarov then added:

*Please note that first of all, he didn't just give this to his secretary to type, he wrote it himself. . . . So, he wrote that himself with his own hand. That tells that this is a person who doesn't suffer from the disease of celebrity. Can you imagine that the future president of the United States, using his own hands, spends time writing letters to his friend in Russia? It's a good sign.*²⁰⁶⁵

[REDACTED]

(U) On April 13, 2016, Goldstone wrote to Graff to inform her that the *The Washington Post* interview had taken place. He wrote, "Below is a note from Aras Agalarov for Mr. Trump regarding a recent Washington Post business interview in Moscow in which he was asked some questions and topics regarding Russia and Mr. Trump. If you need a transcript, please let me know."²⁰⁶⁷ A letter from Aras Agalarov was attached.²⁰⁶⁸ On April 15, Graff emailed Goldstone to inform him that Trump had received the letter from Agalarov.²⁰⁶⁹

(U) On April 25, 2016, Graff emailed Goldstone, writing, "Hope all is well! Please see the attached note from Mr. Trump to Mr. Agalarov. Would you kindly relay it to him?"²⁰⁷⁰ The following, a handwritten note from Trump on the original letter from Agalarov, was attached.²⁰⁷¹

²⁰⁶⁴ (U) Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr.

²⁰⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶⁶ [REDACTED]


²⁰⁶⁷ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, April 13, 2016 (DJTJR00179).

²⁰⁶⁸ (U) Letter, A. Agalarov to Trump, April 13, 2016 (DJTJR00190).

²⁰⁶⁹ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, April 15, 2016 (DJTJR00179).

²⁰⁷⁰ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, April, 25, 2016 (DJTJR01191).

²⁰⁷¹ (U) Handwritten note, Trump to A. Agalarov, April 25, 2016 (DJTJR01192). On April 27, 2016, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject line, "Trump." Goldstone wrote, "Amazing win from Trump tonight winning ALL major 5 out of 5 Primary contests! You [should] send him a congrat tweet in the morning." Agalarov replied later that day, writing only, "Amazing." Emails, Goldstone and E. Agalarov, April 27, 2016 (RG000036).



5. (U) The June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting

(U) In addition to business and personal correspondence, the Agalarovs were involved in pushing for a meeting which occurred on June 9, 2016, in Trump Tower (“June 9, 2016 meeting”). The Committee sought to understand the meeting, which involved Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, Paul Manafort, a Russian lawyer named Natalia Veselnitskaya, and four of her associates. The Committee’s efforts focused on the motivations for the meeting on both sides, the content of the meeting itself, and communications involving the participants following the meeting.

[REDACTED]

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(U) The Committee interviewed each of the attendees at the meeting, as well as several other individuals who had non-public awareness of the meeting or communications related to it.²⁰⁷² Nevertheless, the Committee faced significant limitations in its efforts to fully understand the June 9, 2016 meeting. In particular, the almost complete absence of documentary evidence regarding the content of the meeting itself forced the Committee to rely heavily on witness testimony. That testimony, while helpful, was often incomplete, from an interested party, or contradictory to other testimony or documents. Witnesses were not in agreement on basic facts such as what language was being spoken and who was in the room during the meeting. In some cases, testimony was not consistent across multiple interviews with the same individual. The Committee was unable to reconcile some of these challenges and discrepancies.

i. (U) Background on the Information Provided in the Meeting

(U) The June 9, 2016 meeting with members of the Trump Campaign was part of a larger Russian government-supported effort to counter U.S. sanctions. The Committee assesses that some of the information and themes presented by the Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya in the meeting, and again following the election via email, had been used previously in an influence effort targeting individuals perceived to be sympathetic to Russia's position. That previous influence effort occurred in Moscow in April 2016, months prior to the June 9, 2016 meeting, when then-Congressman Dana Rohrabacher was provided a folder of information from the Russian government that was largely similar in content to what Veselnitskaya later used in Trump Tower.

a. (U) Information provided to Rohrabacher in April 2016

(U) In April 2016, Rohrabacher, along with several other members of the House of Representatives and their staff, traveled to Europe, including Russia. While in Moscow, Rohrabacher and his staffer, Paul Behrends, separated from the group and, despite the concerns of the U.S. Embassy, met with Vladimir Yakunin.²⁰⁷³ Yakunin is a close confidant of President Putin.²⁰⁷⁴ Yakunin is also the former president of Russian Railways and the president of the Dialogue of Civilizations (DoC), a Berlin-based non-governmental organization. At the time of

²⁰⁷² (U) The Committee conducted a limited interview of Paul Manafort on July 25, 2017. The interview exclusively covered the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower.

²⁰⁷³ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Paul Behrends, December 19, 2017, pp. 28–30; Rohrabacher Tr., p. 64. Rohrabacher and others also met with Natalia Veselnitskaya and Rinat Akhmetshin in Moscow on this trip. Akhmetshin, Tr., pp. 41-42.

²⁰⁷⁴

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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the meeting, Yakunin was sanctioned by the United States.²⁰⁷⁵ The Committee found that Yakunin is significantly involved in Russian influence activities, including those targeting elections.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁰⁷⁵ (U) Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Members Of The Russian Leadership’s Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The Situation in Ukraine,” March 20, 2014.

[REDACTED]

²⁰⁸¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸² (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸³ (U) *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Rohrabacher told the Committee that he was unsure how the April 2016 Moscow meeting with Yakunin was arranged, but that it may have been proposed by then-Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak.²⁰⁹¹ According to Rohrabacher, at the meeting Yakunin spoke about the DoC and was interested in securing Rohrabacher's participation in the DoC's annual Rhodes Forum.²⁰⁹² Rohrabacher told the Committee he was unable to attend.²⁰⁹³

[REDACTED]

²⁰⁸⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹¹ (U) Rohrabacher Tr., pp. 64–65. Paul Behrends was unsure about Kislyak's involvement, but recalled that a friend of his, Anthony Salvia, may have been involved. Behrends Tr., p. 29.

²⁰⁹² (U) Behrends Tr., pp. 28, 30. Behrends recalled that Yakunin had previously invited Rohrabacher to the DoC's annual Rhodes conference in writing.

²⁰⁹³ (U) Rohrabacher Tr., pp. 65–66.

[REDACTED]

(U) At the meeting, Yakunin also raised a report that had information he believed Rohrabacher should review. Rohrabacher recalled:

*[Yakunin] said: Look, our prosecutors have done an investigation into this Magnitsky thing and would you—were you willing to look at the material, their report? And I said: “Sure, I’ll look at any report; I’ll talk to anybody and I’ll read anything.” And he said: “Well, they’ll try to get it to you at that meeting you’re going to have tomorrow with the Duma foreign affairs committee.”*²⁰⁹⁵

(U) Following the meeting with Yakunin, Rohrabacher, Behrends, and the other members of the delegation met with Konstantin Kosachev, the Chairman of the Council of the Federation Committee on Foreign Affairs.²⁰⁹⁶ The Committee found that Kosachev is significantly involved in Russian influence activities, including those targeting the United States. He was sanctioned by the United States in 2018.²⁰⁹⁷

[REDACTED]

²⁰⁹⁴ [REDACTED]

²⁰⁹⁵ (U) Rohrabacher Tr., p. 66.

²⁰⁹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 66; Behrends Tr., p. 35.

²⁰⁹⁷ (U) Treasury, “Treasury Designated Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity,” April 6, 2018.

²⁰⁹⁸ [REDACTED]

(U) At end of the meeting with Kosachev, Kosachev passed Rohrabacher a note.²¹⁰⁸ On the note, Kosachev had written a question asking whether Rohrabacher would be willing to receive “sensitive documents.”²¹⁰⁹ After responding that he would be willing, Rohrabacher was approached by several individuals who handed him a folder of documents.²¹¹⁰ Behrends recalled:

Mr. Rohrabacher’s in the middle, across the table from Mr. Kosachev. And the meeting’s winding down. . . . Mr. Kosachev hands Mr. Rohrabacher a note on a piece of paper and says: “Would you be willing to accept sensitive documents?” . . . What I remember is the note said that, “Would you be willing to accept these documents?” And Mr. Rohrabacher looked at me and showed me the note. And I said: “Okay, sure.” So Mr. Rohrabacher said: ‘Okay.’ And then the meeting kind of ended, and it was a little awkward. And these two people who we didn’t know who they were, came up and there was like an introduction. But I didn’t know who they were. Even if they introduced us by name, I had no context of who these people were . . . [they were] not in the meeting. They somehow got there as if it was prearranged on their side. And these people gave Mr. Rohrabacher the folder, and he said: Thank you very much; we’ll take a look at it. If we shook hands, I don’t remember. We may have shook hands. All of it took maybe a minute, and then we walked out. But it was a little unusual.²¹¹¹

(U) Rohrabacher told the Committee that he recalled that the two men who provided the documents were from the Russian prosecutor’s office, but otherwise could not identify them.²¹¹²

(U) The Committee obtained a copy of the documents that Kosachev and his associates provided to Rohrabacher in April 2016.²¹¹³ The primary document focuses on a series of allegations related to U.S. Magnitsky Act sanctions legislation. The document provided to the Congressional delegation following the Kosachev meeting is shorter than the document that Natalia Veselnitskaya later used at the June 9, 2016 meeting and is not the same document.

²¹⁰⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²¹⁰⁸ (U) Behrends Tr., p. 35.

²¹⁰⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²¹¹⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²¹¹¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

²¹¹² (U) Rohrabacher Tr., p. 67.

²¹¹³

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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However, the organization and substance of the two documents are similar, and parts of the two documents are nearly, or completely, identical.

b. (U) Natalia Veselnitskaya's Connections to Russian Influence Operations

(U) Natalia Veselnitskaya is a Russian lawyer who previously worked for, and remains in contact with, senior individuals in the Russian government. Veselnitskaya has described herself as a source of information or "informant" for the Russian government, and as a private attorney.²¹¹⁴ The Committee assesses that Veselnitskaya has previously been involved in [REDACTED]

2115

(U) Veselnitskaya has traveled frequently to the United States, in part due to her role representing the Russian businessman Denis Katsyv and his Cyprus-based company Prevezon Holdings. In 2013, the U.S. Government alleged that Prevezon Holdings was involved in laundering the proceeds of a \$230 million Russian tax fraud scheme that involved corrupt Russian officials.²¹¹⁶ Veselnitskaya helped represent Prevezon in the case.²¹¹⁷

²¹¹⁴ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Natalia Veselnitskaya, March 26, 2018, p. 90; "Russian lawyer who met with Kushner, Don Jr. admits to being an informant," *NBC News*, April 23, 2018.

²¹¹⁵ [REDACTED]

²¹¹⁶ (U) U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, "Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Civil Forfeiture Complaint Against Real Estate Corporations Allegedly Involved In Laundering Proceeds Of Russian Tax Refund Fraud Scheme," September 10, 2013. In its complaint, DOJ alleged that Prevezon had "laundered these fraud proceeds into its real estate holdings, including investment in multiple units of high-end commercial space and luxury apartments in Manhattan, and created multiple other corporations, also the subject of forfeiture action, to hold these properties."

²¹¹⁷ (U) The \$230 million fraud was initially uncovered by the Russian tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky had been retained by a U.K. investment firm, Hermitage Capital, which was targeted by the scheme. According to the DOJ's complaint in the Prevezon case, members of the organization of Russian criminals and corrupt government officials that perpetrated the scheme then took "illegal actions in order to conceal this fraud and retaliate against individuals who attempted to expose it." Verified Complaint, *United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., et al.*, Case No. 13-CV-6326 (S.D.N.Y. September 10, 2013). Sergei Magnitsky was one of those individuals. In 2008, following his discovery of the fraud, Magnitsky was arrested on false pretenses. According to the Congressional Research Service, Magnitsky was "denied medical care, family visits, or due legal process while in custody, as well as beaten and possibly tortured. He died in prison in November 2009, at the age of 37." Following Magnitsky's death, his former employer, William Browder, who is an American-born British citizen and the CEO of Hermitage Capital, drew global attention to Magnitsky's death. In 2012 Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act (the "Magnitsky Act"), which after its enactment froze assets and blocked visas for a number of Russian individuals, including some who are connected to the government. Dianne Rennack, "The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act," *CRS*, June 15, 2018. The Prevezon case was settled with the Department of Justice in May 2017 for \$5.9 million. U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, "Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces \$5.9 Million Settlement of Civil Money Laundering and Forfeiture Claims Against Real Estate Corporations Alleged To Have Laundered Proceeds Of Russian Tax Fraud," May 12, 2017.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On April 30, 2017, upon arrival from Moscow to New York's JFK airport, Veselnitskaya disclosed that she was traveling with \$20,000 in cash.²¹¹⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) Veselnitskaya was also one of the leading Russian nationals in the lobbying effort against the Magnitsky Act and its sanctions in the United States.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) In her efforts, Veselnitskaya has had wealthy and powerful Russian supporters. For example, in early 2016, Vasiliy Anisimov, a Russian oligarch with ties to Vladimir Putin and ties to organized crime, sought to hire Louis Freeh, an American lobbyist and former Director of the FBI, to work with Veselnitskaya on the Prevezon case. The connection between Freeh and Anisimov was facilitated by Imre Pakh, who also has ties to Russian organized crime.²¹²⁴

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2123 [REDACTED]

2124 (U) Freeh is believed to have previously done additional work for Anisimov and his associates. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2125 [REDACTED]

2126 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) Freeh is believed to have held multiple meetings in Moscow; likely in 2016, at least one of which included senior Russian government officials, and at least one of which included Veselnitskaya. Strategies regarding the Prevezon case and countering the Magnitsky Act were discussed at both meetings.²¹²⁷

[REDACTED] An initial meeting in Moscow was attended by Louis Freeh, then-Russian Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, the Russian Deputy Prosecutor General, Peter Katsyv, Imre Pakh, and the Associate Managing Director at Freeh's firm. [REDACTED]

Two topics were discussed in the meeting. Foremost was the need to resolve the Prevezon litigation. Secondly, the Russian officials stated that the group needed "to start figuring out a solution to the Magnitsky Act . . . [At the meeting] either Chaika or the Deputy Prosecutor General said Freeh should discuss follow-up details with Natalia Veselnitskaya. . . . They added that Freeh should do this because "she's one of us" or "she's part of us," implying she was working for the Russian government.²¹²⁸ Freeh and the identified Associate Managing Director did have a follow-up meeting with Veselnitskaya regarding both the Prevezon case and the Magnitsky Act on an undisclosed date and then the two returned to the United States.²¹²⁹

(U) Among her other efforts, Veselnitskaya helped establish an organization called the Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation (HRAGI).²¹³⁰ The Delaware-based foundation served in part as a platform for the influence campaign against the Magnitsky Act, and related sanctions, under the auspices of addressing a retaliatory adoptions policy that was put in place by Russia.²¹³¹

(U) Veselnitskaya was involved in the production and promotion of a film that targeted the Magnitsky Act and sought to exonerate the Russian government officials who perpetrated the \$230 million fraud. The film played in Washington, D.C., on June 13, 2016. In her efforts, Veselnitskaya significantly interacted with at least one member of Congress, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, both in Washington and in Moscow. Veselnitskaya also at various points worked

²¹²⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²¹²⁸ (U) Likely in early 2017, Freeh met with then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions regarding Freeh's meeting in Moscow about the Prevezon case and the Magnitsky Act. Sessions was reportedly hesitant to get involved at the time. The Prevezon case was settled in May 2017. [REDACTED]

²¹²⁹ [REDACTED]

²¹³⁰ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 36-37.

²¹³¹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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with Glenn Simpson of Fusion GPS, and worked alongside numerous firms related to the Prevezon case and related matters, including BakerHostetler, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, and Cozen O'Connor.²¹³²

(U) In addition to its work on the Magnitsky Act and adoptions, Veselnitskaya's HRAGI was intended to have a broader mission to conduct cultural exchanges to improve Russia's image in the United States. Such exchanges, while not inherently problematic, have been used by Russian NGOs to facilitate influence operations and recruitment by Russian intelligence services.²¹³³ Although HRAGI signed a contract for services related to conducting cultural exchanges, that effort never came to fruition, and the organization ultimately ceased operations.²¹³⁴

(U) Veselnitskaya's work to counter sanctions legislation in the United States did not take place in isolation. The Committee found that she has significant and concerning connections to Russian government and intelligence officials, and has not been forthcoming about those relationships.

[REDACTED]

²¹³² (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 27–30, 72; Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 20–21, 61; SSCI interview with Anatoli Samochnov, October 3, 2017, pp. 36–37. For more on Veselnitskaya's work with Simpson, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B.

²¹³³ [REDACTED]

²¹³⁴ (U) Samochnov Tr., pp. 23–24; Contract, Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation Contract and Spinario Consulting LLC, May 20, 2016 (Samochnov Production); Akhmetshin Tr., p. 94.

²¹³⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Veselnitskaya told the Committee that she established Kamerton Consulting, a law firm, in 2003.²¹⁵⁶ According to a press report, Veselnitskaya and Kamerton represented the FSB between 2005 and 2013 in a real estate dispute.²¹⁵⁷

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²¹⁵² (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 70, 89.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²¹⁵⁶ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 6.

²¹⁵⁷ (U) Maria Tsvetkova and Jack Stubbs, "Moscow lawyer who met Trump Jr. had Russian spy agency as client," *Reuters*, July 21, 2017.

[REDACTED]

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(U) Veselnitskaya also told the Committee that she represents Aras Agalarov on some issues, and has worked for him since 2013 or 2014.²¹⁵⁸ According to Kaveladze, “Ms. Veselnitskaya represents Crocus in numerous real estate-related, land-related transactions.”²¹⁵⁹

(U) Both Agalarov and Veselnitskaya are connected to Petr Katsyv.²¹⁶⁰

[REDACTED]

(U) Separately, Agalarov and Veselnitskaya both have close ties to Yuri Chaika, who until 2020 was Russia’s Prosecutor General.²¹⁶² While Chaika was in that role Veselnitskaya told the Committee that she was in contact with the Prosecutor General’s office, and would personally brief Chaika.²¹⁶³ Chaika was a member of President Putin’s Security Council, and Russian press reports have characterized him as part of part of the security establishment at a high level, along with Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev and head of the FSB Aleksandr Bortnikov.²¹⁶⁴ Chaika likely has been involved in Russian influence activities, and his son is sanctioned by the United States.²¹⁶⁵

[REDACTED]

²¹⁵⁸ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 83–84. Irakli Kaveladze believed that she did not start representing Crocus until after the June 9, 2016, meeting. Kaveladze Tr., p. 82.

²¹⁵⁹ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 77.

²¹⁶⁰ (U) Samochornov Tr., p. 82; Kaveladze Tr., p. 79.

²¹⁶¹ [REDACTED]

²¹⁶² (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 110; Brett Forrest and Paul Sonne, “Russian Lawyer Whom Trump Jr. Met Says She Was in Contact With Top Russian Prosecutor,” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 14, 2017; Samochornov Tr., pp. 58–59.

²¹⁶³ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 70, 89.

²¹⁶⁴ [REDACTED]

²¹⁶⁵ (U) Treasury, “United States Sanctions Human Rights Abusers and Corrupt Actors Across the Globe,” December 21, 2017.

²¹⁶⁶ [REDACTED]

²¹⁶⁷ [REDACTED]

(U) On January 8, 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Veselnitskaya with obstruction of justice related to the Prevezon case.²¹⁷¹

c. (U) Rinat Akhmetshin

(U) Rinat Akhmetshin is a Russian-American lobbyist who has worked on a number of foreign lobbying efforts, some of which were undertaken with Veselnitskaya. Akhmetshin first worked with Veselnitskaya on issues related to the Prevezon case.²¹⁷² Akhmetshin also worked with Veselnitskaya through HRAGI, which was described previously, and on HRAGI's efforts related to countering the Magnitsky Act. Akhmetshin told the Committee that after doing research on Browder related to depositions in the Prevezon case, he had the idea to establish HRAGI and proposed it to Veselnitskaya and her client in Russia, Katsyv. Akhmetshin said he didn't know who the financial backers of HRAGI were, but believed that Katsyv was one of the smaller contributors.²¹⁷³ In testimony to the Committee, Akhmetshin sought to downplay the extent and nature of his work for HRAGI.²¹⁷⁴

[REDACTED]

²¹⁷¹ (U) DOJ, "Russian Attorney Natalya Veselnitskaya Charged With Obstruction Of Justice In Connection with Civil Money Laundering and Forfeiture Action," January 8, 2019.

²¹⁷² (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 4, 17–20.

²¹⁷³ (U) *Ibid.* pp. 31, 33-34, 39-40; When asked who the HRAGI contributors were, Akhmetshin replied, "I do not know. I was given—the director gave me the three names which I put for my form. I asked him for my LDA registration I needed some names, which he gave me, and I put them down. I'm not aware of how much was contributed and who contributed. I have three names, and Katsyv's among them." The other names or entities provided on Akhmetshin's Lobbying Disclosure Act form are: Mikhail Ponomarev, Albert Nasibulin, Vladimir Lelyukh and Berryle Trading Inc. Akhmetshin told the Committee he has never filed under the Foreign Agent Registration Act. Akhmetshin Tr., p. 40.

²¹⁷⁴ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 32. Akhmetshin's own description of the origins of HRAGI made clear that it was initially conceived as a method for sharing perceived derogatory information regarding William Browder and the Magnitsky case, and that this is what interested Veselnitskaya and her clients when Akhmetshin proposed establishing a foundation. Akhmetshin indicated that Browder and Magnitsky continued to be Katsyv's primary motive, and that Katsyv had previously been unaware of the adoption issue. The adoption issue was used for outreach to Congress to "target" offices that were engaged on the topic and "to tell the HRAGI story." Following the 2016 election, less than a year after HRAGI was established, its funders in Russia lost interest and eventually "pulled the plug." *Ibid.* pp. 28, 38-39, 81-82, 94.

[REDACTED]

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(U) The Committee assesses that Akhmetshin has connections to the Russian government, a Russian oligarch with ties to Putin, and to Russian intelligence. In several cases these ties were more extensive than what has previously been publicly known. The Committee found that Akhmetshin was not fully forthcoming in his testimony.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2175 [REDACTED]

2176 (U) *Ibid.*

2177 (U) *Ibid.*

2178 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36

2179 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Akhmetshin has a history of allegations against him regarding hacking and the dumping of stolen information as part of influence operations.²¹⁸⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²¹⁸⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²¹⁸⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

²¹⁸⁸ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 12.

²¹⁸⁹ [REDACTED]

²¹⁹⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) However, Akhmetshin testified to the Committee that he had never met Manafort in person prior to the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower, but he had known of Manafort due to Manafort's work in Ukraine and their mutual relationship with Lanny Wiles.²¹⁹⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Akhmetshin has been friends for 15 or 20 years with Sam Patten. Patten, in 2018, pleaded guilty to being an unregistered foreign agent.²²⁰¹ Patten was a close business associate of Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian intelligence officer.²²⁰² Patten testified to the Committee that Akhmetshin and Kilimnik have met, without Patten present, possibly more than once. The nature of the meeting or meetings between Akhmetshin and Kilimnik, according to Patten, related to then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich visiting New York.²²⁰³ Akhmetshin told

²¹⁹⁷ [REDACTED]

²¹⁹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²¹⁹⁹ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 72–73.

²²⁰⁰ [REDACTED]

²²⁰¹ (U) Patten Tr., p. 134; Criminal Information, *United States v. W. Samuel Patten*, Case No: 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. August 31, 2018).

²²⁰² (U) For more information on the relationship between Sam Patten and Konstantin Kilimnik, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.

²²⁰³ (U) Patten Tr., p. 141-142.

[REDACTED]

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the Committee that he has also known Simpson for many years, and that they have had mutual clients like Prevezon, but they have never worked together.²²⁰⁴

d. (U) Anatoli Samochornov

(U) Anatoli Samochornov is an interpreter. He was born in Russia in 1968, and came to the United States in 1991. He testified to the Committee that he has been interpreting professionally since roughly 1997 and has worked as a subcontractor for the Department of State, both as a program manager related to the International Visitor Leadership Program and as an interpreter. Samochornov testified to the Committee that he has never worked for the FBI. Samochornov has done some contract work for United Nations (UN) agencies, like UN AIDS and UN Women, but has never worked formally for the UN itself.²²⁰⁵

(U) Samochornov first met Natalia Veselnitskaya and Denis Katsyv in the fall of 2015 when Samochornov was asked to fill in for a colleague to do deposition work related to the Prevezon case.²²⁰⁶ In that capacity, Samochornov was interpreting for BakerHostetler and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, two law firms that were hired by the defendants. Following his work on the Prevezon case,²²⁰⁷ Samochornov was approached by Veselnitskaya and BakerHostetler to continue doing interpreting work for HRAGI, and he accepted.²²⁰⁸

ii. (U) Origins and Foreknowledge of the June 9, 2016 Meeting

(U) The effort to plan the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower likely began on June 3, 2016, and consisted of a phone call from Emin Agalarov to Rob Goldstone. Goldstone testified to the Committee:

On the morning of, I believe it was June 3rd [2016], Emin called me...and asked if I could possibly contact "the Trumps," was how he called them, because his father had met with a well-connected government lawyer in his office, who had some interesting information about illicit Russian funding to the Democrats and its candidate; and could I pass that on and get the meeting. . . . I asked him what he was talking about, first of all. I said: "Could you articulate, what does that mean? Who is this person?" And he says: "It doesn't matter; all you need to do is get the meeting. Ike [Kaveladze] will coordinate it. You don't have to attend. And you don't have to report back on it to me. You just have to get a meeting."

²²⁰⁴ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 96–98.

²²⁰⁵ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 15-16, 9.

²²⁰⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 9. For more information on the Prevezon case, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.5.i.

²²⁰⁷ (U) Samochornov Tr., p. 10.

²²⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 17. For more information on the HRAGI case, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.5.i.

[REDACTED]

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. . . And I simply asked if he could possibly articulate what it was that I was supposed to be conveying. And he said again that she was very well-connected and she had some potentially damaging information. . . I'm not even sure that he said 'she' at that point. He just said "a Russian lawyer." I again asked: "Who is this person?" And he said "Well-connected." Again, I can be quite flip. I said: 'Well, connected to what, the power grid? She must be connected to something.' And he said 'Connected.' And that was it. I pushed a few times on that and that was my final answer: The lawyer was well-connected. I then said: "You know, this isn't your field of expertise, it isn't my field of expertise, and I'm not comfortable. I don't know what you're asking me to convey. They're going to ask me." And he said again: "There's information, it's potentially damaging to the Democrats and Hillary, and I think you should contact the Trumps; my dad would really like this meeting to take place." My final statement on that, I just said to him: "I really don't want to do this; I know nothing about politics, you don't, and your father certainly doesn't." And he goes: "Please, just ask for the meeting. You don't need to do anything else."²²⁰⁹

(U) Kaveladze, who learned about the planned meeting shortly after Emin Agalarov tasked Goldstone, told the Committee that the meeting was Aras Agalarov's "initiative and project" and that Aras Agalarov was "directly and personally involved."²²¹⁰ Kaveladze believed that Aras Agalarov was doing a "favor" for "someone" by organizing the meeting.²²¹¹ However, Kaveladze noted that "[w]hoever contacted Mr. Agalarov Senior, I don't know."²²¹² Kaveladze explained that Emin Agalarov was only involved because Aras Agalarov would not contact Goldstone directly, but would instead pass the message through Emin Agalarov.²²¹³

(U) Emin Agalarov told the Committee that he did not know why, or for whom, his father wanted the Trump Tower meeting with Veselnitskaya to be set up, because Emin Agalarov had not asked. Emin Agalarov stated that, "When my father asks, I cannot say no to him," and that, "He is not the kind of guy you get to ask questions. And I wouldn't. . . . It doesn't matter. If I'm dying, I'm not going to ask him a question."²²¹⁴

²²⁰⁹ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 157-160.

²²¹⁰ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 51-55; 83-85.

²²¹¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 84. Veselnitskaya told the Committee that Aras Agalarov was aware of her work and its connection to high-level officials in the Russian government. Veselnitskaya Tr., 69-70.

²²¹² (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 84.

²²¹³ (U) *Ibid.* Goldstone similarly told the Committee that he was "never" tasked directly by Aras Agalarov, but would be asked to do things through a "chain of command" that either went through assistants, or through Emin Agalarov. Goldstone Tr., pp. 221-222.

²²¹⁴ (U) E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 50, 58-59.

[REDACTED]

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(U) Later on June 3, 2016, after the phone call with Emin, Goldstone emailed to Donald Trump Jr. with the subject line “Russia - Clinton - private and confidential.”²²¹⁵

On Jun 3, 2016, at 10:36 AM, Rob Goldstone [REDACTED] wrote:

Good morning

Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very interesting.

The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump - helped along by Aras and Emin.

What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emin about it directly?

I can also send this info to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first.

Best

Rob Goldstone

(U) Goldstone testified to the Committee that his portrayal of the offer of derogatory information being part of “Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump” was based on his general assessment of Russian enthusiasm for Trump.²²¹⁶ Goldstone told the Committee that at the time he did not have any specific information to indicate that Veselnitskaya was connected to the Russian government. Regarding his description of the “Crown prosecutor of Russia,” Goldstone clarified that:

[F]ederal prosecutors in England are called “crown prosecutors,” which is how I still refer to them. So when he told me that she was “well-connected,” I made the assumption where she was connected to and that she was probably federal in terms of anything else. When I put “crown,” I was using my English expression for a federal prosecutor. . . . I was inferring that she was working for the government, because when I pushed I was told she’s connected.”²²¹⁷

(U) Goldstone further explained that he described the information as “ultrasensitive” because “if somebody tells me that somebody may have damaging information on a potential presidential candidate, I believe it’s ultrasensitive, no matter what it is.”²²¹⁸

(U) Minutes after Goldstone’s email, Trump Jr. responded, suggesting that he speak with Emin Agalarov directly and writing “if it’s what you say I love it especially later in the summer.”²²¹⁹

²²¹⁵ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 3, 2016 (RG000061).

²²¹⁶ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 167.

²²¹⁷ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 162–163.

²²¹⁸ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 169.

²²¹⁹ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, June 3, 2016 (RG000061).

[REDACTED]

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From: Donald Trump Jr. [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential
Date: June 3, 2016 at 10:53 AM
To: Rob Goldstone [REDACTED]

Thanks Rob I appreciate that. I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back?
Best,
Don

(U) Trump Jr. told the Committee that “I love it” is a colloquial expression he frequently uses to indicate being in favor of something. Trump Jr. stated that he probably wrote “if it’s what you say” because he was skeptical. Trump Jr. stated that “[s]eems we have some time” indicated that he was not in a rush to meet Goldstone. When asked if it was related to the timing of the upcoming general election, Trump Jr. responded, “I don’t recall specifically what I was thinking at the time.” When asked why he indicated that he would love it “especially later in the summer,” Trump Jr. responded that it was “[b]ecause I had too much on my plate to deal with it at this time.” However, Trump Jr. later said, “I don’t recall specifically again what I was thinking.”²²²⁰ Trump Jr. also explained that he wanted to speak with Emin first because he had received “a rather sensational email from Rob, who I know to be a rather sensational kind of guy” and as a result, Trump Jr. “didn’t know what to make of it.”²²²¹

(U) Later that day, June 3, 2016, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov, telling him that Trump Jr. wanted “to speak personally on the issue with you early next week.” Emin Agalarov replied: “Great.”²²²²

(U) At some point likely between June 3, 2016, and June 6, 2016, Paul Manafort, who was serving as the Campaign’s convention manager at the time, recalled that Trump Jr. had told him either “in the hall or on the phone” that he “had been contacted by some people who had worked with the Trump Organization for the Miss Universe Pageant and they had some information that they wanted to share that could be helpful to the campaign.”²²²³ Manafort recalled in his interview with the Committee that Trump Jr. had indicated that the businessmen were from Azerbaijan.²²²⁴ Manafort explained that at the time Trump Jr. informed him of the meeting, he warned Trump Jr. that they “usually have an agenda of their own when they’re

²²²⁰ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 92–95.

²²²¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 91.

²²²² (U) Emails, Goldstone and E. Agalarov, June 3, 2016 (RG000061–62).

²²²³ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Paul Manafort, July 25, 2017, pp. 6–7.

²²²⁴ (U) *Ibid.* Manafort has also said that Trump Jr. told him prior to the meeting that the individuals were coming from Russia, and that they had derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton. See FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.

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coming from that part of the world.”²²²⁵ However, Manafort also recalled that Trump Jr. told him that they had “worked with the Trump Organization and he was comfortable.”²²²⁶

(U) Records and testimony indicate a regularly scheduled “Family Meeting,” which included Trump family members and limited senior Campaign staff.²²²⁷ An entry in Manafort’s calendar indicates that a “Family Meeting” occurred at approximately 9:30 a.m. on the morning of June 6, 2016, on the 25th floor of Trump Tower.²²²⁸ The meeting was scheduled to take place in Trump Jr.’s office.

(U) Rick Gates, who was serving in a senior position on the Campaign, recalled that at a regular morning meeting in the days leading up to the June 9, 2016 meeting, Trump Jr. announced that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation.²²²⁹ Gates recalled that Trump Jr. said that the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.²²³⁰ Gates recalled that in addition to Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Manafort, and Hope Hicks attended the meeting, while Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner joined the meeting late.²²³¹ According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.²²³²

(U) Manafort recalled that, at the Family Meeting on June 6, Trump Jr. reminded Manafort of the upcoming June 9, 2016 meeting.²²³³ Manafort believed that Trump Jr. would not have invited Manafort to attend unless Trump Jr. thought the meeting would potentially be important.²²³⁴

(U) Trump Jr. confirmed that there were regular morning meetings of Trump family members and senior Campaign staff, though the frequency and attendees could vary. Trump Jr. did not recall whether any Family Meeting took place the week of June 6, 2016. Trump Jr. also did not recall discussing the Agalarov-related meeting during any meeting.²²³⁵ Kushner told the

²²²⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²²²⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²²²⁷ (U) Trump Jr. Tr. II, pp. 26-27; Email, Gates to Trump Jr., et al., June 6, 2016 (TRUMPORG_76_002927–2940); *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 115.

²²²⁸ (U) Calendar, Paul Manafort, June 5–11, 2016 (DJTFP00022338).

²²²⁹ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 115.

²²³⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²²³¹ (U) *Ibid.* Gates sent an email at 9:03 a.m. on June 6, 2016, about a “Family Meeting” that morning. The email was sent to Donald Trump Jr., Ivanka Trump, and Eric Trump, and copies Paul Manafort, Corey Lewandowski, Hope Hicks, and Jared Kushner. There are several attachments, including an agenda and items related to convention speeches. Email, Gates to Trump Jr., et al., June 6, 2016 (TRUMPORG_76_002927–2940).

²²³² (U) *Ibid.*

²²³³ (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.

²²³⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²²³⁵ (U) Trump Jr. Tr. II, pp. 25–31.

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Committee he remembered that Trump Jr. invited him to the June 9, 2016 meeting, but when asked if Trump Jr. told him anything about that meeting prior to it, Kushner said that he did not recall.²²³⁶ Hope Hicks told the Committee that she did not recall knowing about the meeting prior to reading about it in the press.²²³⁷

(U) The same day as the Family Meeting, Emin Agalarov emailed Goldstone, asking if there was “any news” related to a possible call with Trump Jr.²²³⁸ Goldstone replied that there was no news yet, explaining that Trump Jr. would likely be available after “Super Tuesday,” when Trump would be “‘crowned’ the official nominee.”²²³⁹ Goldstone told Agalarov he would arrange the call with Trump Jr. at that time.²²⁴⁰

(U) Later that day, on June 6, 2016, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr., asking him to “[l]et me know when you are free to talk with Emin by phone about this Hillary info.”²²⁴¹ Trump Jr. responded, asking “could we speak now?”²²⁴² Goldstone replied that he would try to “track him [Emin] down in Moscow” and asked what phone number Emin could use for the call. At 3:38 p.m., Trump Jr. provided his cell phone number.²²⁴³

(U) At 3:43 p.m., Goldstone wrote to Trump Jr., “ok he’s on stage in Moscow but should be off within 20 Minutes so I am sure can call.”²²⁴⁴ At 4:04 p.m., toll records indicate an incoming call from a Russian phone number associated with Emin Agalarov connecting for two minutes with the phone number Trump Jr. had provided Goldstone.²²⁴⁵ At 4:31 p.m., toll records indicate an outgoing call from the Trump Jr. phone number to the same Russian phone number,

²²³⁶ (U) Kushner Tr. II, p. 32.

²²³⁷ (U) Hicks Tr., p. 47.

²²³⁸ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Goldstone, June 6, 2016 (RG000063).

²²³⁹ (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, June 6, 2016 (RG000064).

²²⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²²⁴¹ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 6, 2016 (RG000065).

²²⁴² (U) Email, Trump Jr., to Goldstone, June 6, 2016 (RG000065).

²²⁴³ (U) Email, Trump Jr., to Goldstone, June 6, 2016 (RG000066).

²²⁴⁴ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 6, 2016 (RG000067).

²²⁴⁵ (U) AT&T toll records, Trump Jr. (DJTJR00855). It is not clear whether this was a voice message or a connected call.

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connecting for three minutes.²²⁴⁶ At 4:38 p.m., Trump Jr. emailed Goldstone, stating only “Rob thanks for the help.”²²⁴⁷ Goldstone responded, “A pleasure.”²²⁴⁸

(U) Trump Jr. told the Committee that he does not recall speaking with Emin Agalarov on the phone in this time period and does not remember either of the calls.²²⁴⁹ Goldstone recalled that Emin Agalarov initially did not remember the calls either, but that Agalarov later remembered that the call did happen and noted that it was short. Regarding the content of the call or calls, Goldstone said that it was his understanding that “they would speak, and logic would tell me that if they would speak they would speak about what the meeting was about,” but he had no specific knowledge of what was said.²²⁵⁰

(U) Emin Agalarov has publicly described the call with Trump Jr.: “I said, ‘Listen, there are some people who want to meet you. They obviously want something that could potentially help them resolve things that you could be interested in, or maybe not. If you can spare five minutes of your time I’d be grateful. If not, no problem.’ Obviously, Don Jr. being Don Jr. said, ‘Of course, I’ll do it if you’re asking me.’”²²⁵¹ Agalarov told the Committee he did not remember this call.²²⁵²

(U) Separately, on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov contacted Kaveladze and asked him to fly to New York the following day for an “important meeting.”²²⁵³ Over the course of several calls, Aras Agalarov instructed Kaveladze to contact Veselnitskaya and to meet her in advance of the meeting at Trump Tower to go over the topics that would be discussed.²²⁵⁴ Following the initial call from Agalarov, Kaveladze called Veselnitskaya to coordinate the date and time of their meeting. Kaveladze told the Committee that, at that point, he had not met or heard of Veselnitskaya.²²⁵⁵

²²⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.* On June 6 at 4:27 p.m., the Trump Jr. phone conducted a four-minute call with a blocked number. Later, at 8:40 p.m., another eleven-minute call with a blocked number took place. Trump Jr. testified that he does not remember the contents of either of the calls with the blocked numbers, or who those calls were with. Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 111–112. The Committee was independently able to determine the identity of the two individuals involved in these calls with Trump Jr., and that the calls were likely unrelated to the meeting requested by Emin Agalarov. See AT&T Response to SSCI Subpoena, December 14, 2018 (ATTSSCI00001).

²²⁴⁷ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, June 6, 2016 (DJTJR00445).

²²⁴⁸ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 6, 2016 (DJTJR00445).

²²⁴⁹ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 100–103, 114.

²²⁵⁰ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 181–182.

²²⁵¹ (U) HBO, “We spoke to Emin Agalarov about a conversation Donald Trump Jr. claimed to have forgotten,” *Vice News*, July 10, 2018.

²²⁵² (U) E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 52–54. Agalarov told the Committee, “I do not deny that it could have happened. And if it happened, this is exactly what I would say.” *Ibid.* p. 54.

²²⁵³ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 52.

²²⁵⁴ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 51–53, 58, 66.

²²⁵⁵ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 52.

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(U) On June 7, at 12:44 p.m., the same Russian phone number previously identified as being associated with Emin Agalarov called Trump Jr. for two minutes.²²⁵⁶ Trump Jr. said he had no recollection of that call.²²⁵⁷

(U) Later on June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. to tell him that “Emin asked that I schedule a meeting with you and The Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow for this Thursday.”²²⁵⁸ Goldstone stated, “I believe you are aware of the meeting - and so wondered if 3pm or later on Thursday works for you?”²²⁵⁹ About an hour later, Trump Jr. replied to Goldstone, offering “3 at our offices” for the meeting.²²⁶⁰ Goldstone replied, stating “Perfect . . . I won’t sit in on the meeting, but will bring them at 3pm and introduce you etc.” Goldstone also noted that he would send the names of “the two people meeting with you for security when I have them later today.”²²⁶¹ Trump Jr. responded that it “will likely be Paul Manafort (campaign boss) my brother in law and me.”²²⁶²

(U) During his calls with Aras Agalarov on the previous day, Kaveladze was told that the meeting would be with “Trump people,” but that he was given no specifics regarding who would attend.²²⁶³ Initially, Kaveladze thought the meeting would be about business, and was surprised when, on June 7, Aras Agalarov called and informed him that the meeting would be about the Magnitsky Act.²²⁶⁴ Kaveladze testified to the Committee that he was further confused after receiving an email from Goldstone explaining that they would be meeting with Trump Jr., as well as Manafort and Kushner, who Kaveladze assessed to be “highly positioned individuals.”²²⁶⁵ Kaveladze recalled suggesting to Aras Agalarov multiple times that because Veselnitskaya is a lawyer, they should be meeting with other lawyers.²²⁶⁶

(U) Kaveladze explained that he was confused by the level at which the meeting was taking place. Because of this confusion, Kaveladze recalled calling Benjaminov on June 7 to find out more information. Kaveladze testified that he asked Benjaminov:

²²⁵⁶ (U) AT&T toll records, Trump Jr. (DJTJR00855).

²²⁵⁷ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 102-103.

²²⁵⁸ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 7, 2016 (RG000068).

²²⁵⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²²⁶⁰ (U) *Ibid.*; Goldstone emailed Irakli Kaveladze and Natalia Veselnitskaya, including Emin Agalarov, to confirm that the meeting was set for June 9, 2016, at 3:00 p.m. See Email, Kaveladze to Veselnitskaya and Emin, June 7, 2016 (RG000070).

²²⁶¹ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 7, 2016 (RG000069).

²²⁶² (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, June 7, 2016 (RG000071).

²²⁶³ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 53.

²²⁶⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53.

²²⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²²⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

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*“Roman, what’s happening? Why are we meeting with these people to discuss Magnitsky law?” [Roman’s] response was he believes there’s some negative information on Hillary Clinton, [Veselnitskaya]’s bringing some negative information on Hillary Clinton. And that was completely inconsistent with what I’d heard before.*²²⁶⁷

(U) Kaveladze told the Committee that this was the first time he had heard that the meeting would be about “negative information” on Clinton, and that it “kind of scared the hell out of me.”²²⁶⁸ According to Kaveladze, Benjaminov had learned this information from Goldstone.²²⁶⁹

(U) Kaveladze said that, on June 7, he strongly suggested to Aras Agalarov, again, that they meet with Donald Trump’s attorneys, rather than the Campaign leadership, but he did not raise the derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton.²²⁷⁰ At some point, on June 7 or June 8, Kaveladze received an email with a four-page document which was a synopsis, in Russian, of what the meeting would be about.²²⁷¹ The document contained a series of allegations regarding the Magnitsky Act, Bill Browder, the Ziff brothers and donations to the Democratic party.²²⁷² According to Kaveladze, the document also contained the allegation that some of these actors could be financing Clinton’s campaign as well. The document was sent to Kaveladze by an associate of Aras Agalarov, potentially a secretary.²²⁷³

(U) Veselnitskaya told the Committee that her primary motivation was to get the U.S. Congress to investigate Browder and the basis for the Magnitsky Act.²²⁷⁴ In that effort,

²²⁶⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²²⁶⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²²⁶⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61. Benjaminov testified that while he did generally hear about the June 9, 2016 meeting from Goldstone prior to it taking place, regarding pre-meeting communications with Kaveladze, Benjaminov said, “I don’t recall any. That is not to say that they didn’t happen. I don’t particularly recall.” Benjaminov Tr., p. 228–229.

²²⁷⁰ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 55–56.

²²⁷¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63.

²²⁷² (U) The Ziff brothers are American investors. See Juliet Chung, “Ziff Brothers Investments Set to Gradually Close U.S. Hedge Fund,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 31, 2013.

²²⁷³ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 62–63. The Committee showed Kaveladze a similar document, written in English and dated May 31, 2016, which was published by *Foreign Policy* just two days before his interview. See Elias Groll, “Here’s the Memo the Kremlin-Linked Lawyer Took to the Meeting with Donald Trump Jr.,” *Foreign Policy*, October 16, 2017. Kaveladze testified: “It sure looks like it. Yes, it’s definitely very close to what I read in Russian.” *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63, 65.

²²⁷⁴ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 31. Kaveladze told the Committee, “The Russian government was trying to repeal the act as well. My understanding was that certain important people got sanctioned under that Act and government was

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Veselnitskaya was looking for help developing contacts in the United States who could assist her campaign. She told the Committee, “In one of those conversations with some other client of mine—the name of the other client was Mr. Aras Agalarov—he mentioned, he said: Well, let’s try.”²²⁷⁵

(U) Veselnitskaya told the Committee:

*I know that Aras Agalarov knows that I’m involved in a number of investigations; that it’s been quite a long time that I’ve been involved in the investigation into Mr. Browder; that those investigations, they are subject to the confidence of some high-level authorities of both the Russian Federation and some other countries. I told to Aras that; I reported about this case and about this story; I reported personally to the prosecutor general of the Russian Federation, that he received me.*²²⁷⁶

(U) Additionally, Veselnitskaya claimed:

*[N]obody told me that I was going to meet Trump campaign,²²⁷⁷ and I never asked anybody for that The point was about a private meeting with a friend of my client’s son, that’s all I don’t know exactly who was the one who agreed the particular date and place. But what I was told, correspondingly, Aras, my client, when he reacted to my request to think about how he might help me, with whom he might introduce me to in the United States, he gave me the contact details of an individual in the United States, Mr. Irakli Kaveladze. He is a Russian speaker.*²²⁷⁸

(U) Veselnitskaya told the Committee that, over the course of several days in late May or early June, she spoke to Kaveladze several times. She stated:

When I was told that there is a chance for a meeting, I prepared a memo four pages long, just in case if I would not be granted a visa and there would be no chance for me to travel or, let’s say, if there would be no need for a personal

trying and lobbying to try to repeal that Act, and she was trying, for [Katsyv], so there was an exchange and cooperation going on.” Kaveladze Tr., p. 81.

²²⁷⁵ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 31.

²²⁷⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70. It is unclear, from the transcript, who “he” refers to in the final sentence of the quote. From context, “he” may refer to Aras Agalarov or Donald Trump Jr.; however the Committee has no further information.

²²⁷⁷ (U) Samochornov recalled in an interview that Veselnitskaya was excited for the meeting and treated it as a special event. FBI, FD-302, Samochornov 7/13/2017.

²²⁷⁸ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 33-34.

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*meeting and it would be just enough to provide the information. For those cases, I prepared kind of a memo. So in principle, I was even willing to just send over the memo.*²²⁷⁹

(U) Early on the morning of June 8, 2016, Kushner emailed his assistant, stating “Lets [sic] try to get time this am to map out how I get my schedule back this week – too many non-essential meetings and I need time to do some things pro-active.”²²⁸⁰ In particular, Kushner asked his assistant to “discuss with me a 130 meeting today at Trump Tower and then a 3pm tom with don jr.”²²⁸¹ When asked if he had discussed the upcoming June 9, 2016, meeting with his assistant Kushner testified that he did not recall.²²⁸²

(U) Later in the day on June 8, Goldstone received an email from Kaveladze, explaining that Kaveladze had spoken to Veselnitskaya and that she was scheduled to be in court on the morning of June 9, and requested that the meeting be moved to 4:00 p.m., so as to not be late.²²⁸³ On June 8, at 10:34 a.m., Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. to request that the meeting be rescheduled for 4:00 p.m. to accommodate the “Russian attorney.”²²⁸⁴ At 11:15 a.m., Trump Jr. responded, “Yes Rob I could do that unless they wanted to do 3 today instead . . . just let me know and ill lock it in either way.”²²⁸⁵ Ultimately, Goldstone and Trump Jr. agreed to meet on June 9, 2016, at 4:00 p.m.²²⁸⁶

(U) Shortly after this exchange, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. again about the Russian social media platform VK. Goldstone wrote that he had been to Moscow recently and had “met with the head of marketing for Russia’s largest social media network VK.”²²⁸⁷ Goldstone stated that “the subject of Russian American voters in the USA came up” and that the VK head of marketing “is keen to set up a Trump Campaign VOTE page on VK” which would be targeted at Russian and CIS voters in the United States and would “surely secure their votes.”²²⁸⁸ Goldstone attached a VK “mock up” page displaying Trump’s image and several of his public comments

²²⁷⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

²²⁸⁰ (U) Email, Kushner to Vargas, June 8, 2016 (NSSCI00000010).

²²⁸¹ (U) Email, Kushner to Vargas, June 8, 2016 (NSSCI00000011).

²²⁸² (U) Kushner Tr., p. 38.

²²⁸³ (U) Email, Kaveladze to Goldstone, June 8, 2016 (RG000072).

²²⁸⁴ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 8, 2016 (RG000073).

²²⁸⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²²⁸⁶ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, June 8, 2016 (RG000074).

²²⁸⁷ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 8, 2016 (RG000075–76).

²²⁸⁸ (U) *Ibid.* CIS likely refers to Commonwealth of Independent States.

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inserted into the profile. Goldstone said he would bring a print out the following day.²²⁸⁹ The Committee did not identify any email response to Goldstone’s message.

(U) After agreeing to move the time of the meeting back one hour at Goldstone’s request, Trump Jr. emailed Kushner and Manafort, forwarding the entirety of his email thread with Goldstone about arranging the meeting.²²⁹⁰

To: Jared Kushner [REDACTED] Paul
Manafort [REDACTED]
From: Donald Trump Jr.
Sent: Wed 6/8/2016 12:02:35 PM
Importance: Normal
Subject: FW: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential
MAIL_RECEIVED: Wed 6/8/2016 12:02:40 PM

Meeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices.
Best,
Don

(U) Kushner told the Committee that he “didn’t have time to read every email” and that he did not recall reading the subject line of the email, which read “FW: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential.”²²⁹¹ Manafort responded to Trump Jr.’s email, writing only “[s]ee you then.”²²⁹² Manafort told the Committee that he did not read the chain of earlier messages between Goldstone and Trump Jr.²²⁹³ Manafort told the Committee:

I never got any of those emails until the last one with the time change, which was all that was relevant to me. If I had read down that I would have told him he shouldn’t do the meeting, or I would have talked to our legal counsel and asked, is this appropriate, something like that. . . . In other words, I don’t know what a “crown prosecutor” is, but I wouldn’t have told him to do a meeting with a government, any government official, unless legal had vetted it.²²⁹⁴

²²⁸⁹ (U) *Ibid.* The introductory nature of Goldstone’s email suggests that the initial connection to Scavino in January 2016 had not progressed. Goldstone’s email again included a basic message from Sidorkov at VK, though this one also contained a sample VK page for Donald Trump that Sidorkov had sent to Goldstone. *Ibid.*

²²⁹⁰ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner and Manafort, June 8, 2016 (NSSCI00000014).

²²⁹¹ (U) Kushner Tr., pp. 40–41; Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, July 24, 2017.

²²⁹² (U) Email, Manafort to Trump Jr., June 8, 2016 (DJTFP00011895).

²²⁹³ (U) Manafort did receive the full chain of emails, but the documents provided to the Committee do not indicate whether or not he read the prior emails. *Ibid.*

²²⁹⁴ (U) Manafort Tr., p. 30.

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(U) The Committee sought to understand the extent of Trump’s foreknowledge of the June 9, 2016, meeting, if any.

(U) On June 7, several days after Goldstone’s offer of information to Trump Jr. and several hours after Trump Jr. confirmed the June 9, 2016 meeting with Goldstone, then-candidate Trump publicly stated, “I’m going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we’re going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons. I think you’re going to find it very informative and very, very interesting.”²²⁹⁵ That speech did not happen as scheduled.

(U) Stephen Miller, who worked on the Campaign, told the Committee that the speech referenced by Trump may have been postponed due to the Pulse nightclub shooting in Florida. According to Miller, the speech that was originally planned for Monday, June 12, later took place at the Trump SoHo hotel.²²⁹⁶ Miller recalled working on the speech, and said that it was heavily based off of the book “Clinton Cash,” and was not based on anything Russia-related.²²⁹⁷ This is consistent with Trump’s written answers to questions from the SCO. The SCO “did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton.”²²⁹⁸

(U) Michael Cohen testified to the Committee that he was present in Trump’s office when Trump Jr. came into the office and, in a manner that was uncommon, walked toward the back of Trump’s desk and leaned over and quietly said, “The meeting. It’s all set.”²²⁹⁹ Cohen recalled that Trump replied, “Okay. Keep me posted.”²³⁰⁰ Cohen has also said that, “Trump Jr. said to Trump that he was setting up a meeting in order to get dirt on Hillary Clinton.” Cohen said that Trump responded with words to the effect of, “That’s great. Let me know.”²³⁰¹

²²⁹⁵ (U) Daniel Halper, “Trump to Give Major Hillary Speech Monday,” *Washington Examiner*, June 7, 2016.

²²⁹⁶ (U) On June 22, 2016, then-candidate Trump delivered a speech at the Trump Soho Hotel that fits Miller’s general description. Benjy Sarlin and Alex Seitz-Wald, “Donald Trump Tries to Reset Race With Hillary Clinton Onslaught,” *NBC News*, June 22, 2016. This topic is additionally addressed in President Trump’s written responses to questions from the SCO. *SCO Report*, Appendix C, C-11–15.

²²⁹⁷ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Stephen Miller, June 15, 2018, pp. 79–80.

²²⁹⁸ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 116. Jared Kushner said that he did not have any information on why the speech was planned at that time, nor did he have any information about how the speech would focus on the Clintons. Kushner also did not recall working on any such speech, but said that if there was a speech like that he probably would have known about it. When asked if the speech had any relationship to Goldstone telling Trump Jr. that he would be receiving incriminating information about Clinton, Kushner said that he did not know. Kushner Tr. II, pp. 39–40.

²²⁹⁹ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 9.

²³⁰⁰ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 9.

²³⁰¹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 8/7/2018.

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(U) Cohen testified to the Committee that he recalled that other people were in the office at the time, but could not recall who, and that it seemed as if Trump Jr. was trying to keep the meeting a secret.²³⁰² Cohen said that, at the time, he did not know what meeting Trump Jr. was referring to, and did not ask because he did not feel it was appropriate.²³⁰³ Cohen testified that it was only after he saw news reports regarding the June 9, 2016 meeting that he made the connection to the exchange between Trump Jr. and Trump. Cohen believed Trump Jr. was referring to the June 9, 2016 meeting, but Cohen referred to his belief as “speculation.”²³⁰⁴ Cohen has stated that the interaction between Trump Jr. and his father took place in early June 2016, but the timing of what Cohen remembers remains somewhat unclear.²³⁰⁵

(U) Trump Jr. told the Committee he did not recall informing his father of efforts by the Agalarovs to arrange a meeting during the campaign, and believed Trump first learned of the June 9, 2016 meeting in July 2017.²³⁰⁶ Kushner testified that he did not have reason to believe that Trump Jr. had informed Trump of the meeting prior to it taking place.²³⁰⁷

(U) Paul Manafort’s calendar for June 9, 2016, shows that he was scheduled to meet with Trump at 10:30 a.m.²³⁰⁸ Similarly, President Trump stated in response to written questions from

²³⁰² (U) Cohen Tr. II, 8–11.

²³⁰³ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 11–12.

²³⁰⁴ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 8.

²³⁰⁵ (U) On August 7, 2018, Michael Cohen told the SCO that the exchange between Trump Jr. and Trump occurred on June 6 or June 7, 2016. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 115. On February 27, 2019, Cohen told the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Reform that the exchange happened “probably in early June 2016.” House Committee on Oversight and Reform Transcript of the Interview with Michael Cohen, February 27, 2019. However, on February 26, 2019, the day before his House testimony, Cohen told this Committee that he did not recall when the interaction took place. Cohen Tr. II, pp. 9–10, 375. The Committee was unable to resolve this discrepancy.

²³⁰⁶ (U) Trump Jr.’s level of insight regarding his father’s knowledge during the campaign is unclear. He told the Committee that during the campaign, contact with Trump “could be anywhere from a couple times a day to not speaking for a week. It really depended. But like I said, once things got into full motion, I wasn’t with him very often. And I didn’t need to speak to him. He’s not a small-talk kind of guy. So I knew what I needed to do, he knew what he needed to do, and we executed those roles. But you don’t call my dad to say ‘Hey, what’s up?’ in the midst of everything that’s going on. That’s just not what he’s into.” Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 26–27. Steve Bannon, who was an informal advisor to the Trump campaign at the time, has been quoted as saying that there was no chance Donald Trump Jr. didn’t take the meeting participants to meet his father while they were in Trump Tower. Tucker Higgins, “Steve Bannon says he’s certain that Trump met with Russians who were at Trump Tower in 2016,” *CNBC*, January 3, 2018. When asked about that statement Bannon did not deny saying it, but told the Committee that he did not know if Donald Trump Jr. made the introduction to his father and had no additional information on the topic. Bannon Tr., p. 36.

²³⁰⁷ (U) Kushner Tr. II, p. 37.

²³⁰⁸ (U) Calendar, Manafort, June 5–11, 2016 (DJTFP00022328).

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the SCO, “My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place.”²³⁰⁹

(U) Manafort told the Committee that he never spoke to Trump about the June 9, 2016 meeting.²³¹⁰ According to the SCO, Manafort also did not recall “anyone informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr.”²³¹¹ Trump’s written responses to questions from the SCO state, “I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton.”²³¹²

(U) The Campaign participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting, who were senior officials on the Campaign, each took the time to participate in the meeting, even after it was rescheduled the day before and despite their purportedly busy schedules. The Committee sought to understand why they prioritized the meeting.

(U) Kushner testified that the campaign was fast-paced, that his schedule was very full, and that the volume of incoming emails and meeting requests was a challenge.²³¹³ Similarly, Manafort told the Committee that his “schedule was totally full, from like 7:00 in the morning to late at night. And there were no meetings setting up meetings. It was me just going from meeting to meeting to meeting based on subject matter.”²³¹⁴

(U) Both Kushner and Manafort testified to the Committee that they attended the meeting on June 9, 2016, because Trump Jr. invited them. Kushner testified that, “If Don asks me, then I would do it, 100 percent,” and said that he would attend all meetings that Don Jr. invited him to.²³¹⁵ Manafort testified that Trump Jr. often set up meetings for the Campaign, “He would typically say, these people might be helpful; let’s meet with them and you figure it out.”²³¹⁶

(U) Manafort told the Committee:

Well, as has been reported, I have some experience in that part of the world [Russia and the former Soviet Union]. If they were going to be coming from Azerbaijan, which is—even though Don said they worked in Moscow, I assumed

²³⁰⁹ (U) SCO Report, Appendix C, C-14.

²³¹⁰ (U) Manafort Tr., p. 27.

²³¹¹ (U) SCO Report, Vol. I, p. 116.

²³¹² (U) *Ibid.*, Appendix C, C-13.

²³¹³ (U) Kushner Tr., pp. 41–42.

²³¹⁴ (U) Manafort Tr., pp. 9–10.

²³¹⁵ (U) Kushner Tr., p. 39; Kushner Tr. II, p. 40.

²³¹⁶ (U) Manafort Tr., p. 7.

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*they were coming from Azerbaijan—they probably had an agenda. What it was I had no idea. But Don vetted them really, as far as I was concerned, when he said that they worked for the [Trump] Organization. So my experience when Don had asked me to meet with people up to that point was very positive. So I—in the end, I didn't know why they'd be coming all the way from Azerbaijan to give us information helpful to the campaign.*²³¹⁷

(U) Despite having advance knowledge of the upcoming meeting with Donald Trump Jr, that meeting was omitted from Paul Manafort's calendar as of the morning of June 9, 2016.²³¹⁸

(U) When asked why the June 9, 2016 meeting warranted the time of three senior members of a Campaign, including its chairman, Kushner testified that it was “not uncommon” for the senior Campaign staff to be in each other's meetings, and to “jump in and out all the time of different meetings.”²³¹⁹ Regarding the day-ahead rescheduling request, Kushner told the Committee that, “My schedule was always something that was in flux. We were always moving. You move something back, you move something forward. That's just how it would happen.”²³²⁰

(U) Despite the Campaign being very busy, and Trump Jr. being unsure of the information, Trump Jr. testified that he thought it was worth it to include Kushner and Manafort in the meeting to hear the Russian lawyer out. Trump Jr. told the Committee that, “if we were in the same place, in the same building at the same time, it would be common practice to say: ‘Hey, this is going on now; maybe drop by.’ Paul obviously had a lot more experience in this stuff than I did.”²³²¹ When asked what “this stuff” referred to, Trump Jr. told the Committee, “Campaigns generally. He was the campaign manager. I thought we should listen and then we could decide what, if anything, to do.”²³²²

(U) Kushner testified to the Committee that the Campaign took many different kinds of meetings:

²³¹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

²³¹⁸ (U) Email, Hagan to Manafort and Gates, June 9, 2016 (DJTFP00022347–22349).

²³¹⁹ (U) Kushner Tr., p. 36.

²³²⁰ (U) Kushner Tr. II, p. 33.

²³²¹ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 123. Michael Cohen told the Committee that, in his opinion: “The reason why Jared and Manafort were in that meeting is because Mr. Trump would never have allowed Junior to be in that meeting by himself. Mr. Trump was very quick to tell everybody that he thinks Don Jr. has the worst judgement of anyone he's ever met in the world. And I can assure you that when that meeting, conversation, took place, that Mr. Trump turned around and said: Make sure that Jared and Paul are part of the meeting. Because he would never let Don Jr. handle that meeting by himself.” Cohen Tr. II, p. 376; Cohen's statement is notable only because of the access he had to the individuals involved, including Trump, at the time of meeting. The Committee did not find information that corroborate's Cohen's statement, and did find information that contradicts it.

²³²² (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 124.

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*Some meetings that we expected would be worthless turned out to be phenomenal and some of the meetings we thought would be phenomenal turned out to be worthless. But we figured it out at the end of the day. And we, I think again, by running a very entrepreneurial campaign, we looked at a lot of different things and then tried to come up with new ways to make things happen.*²³²³

iii. (U) The Events of June 9, 2016²³²⁴

(U) On the morning of June 9, 2016, Anatoli Samochornov, the interpreter, met Veselnitskaya at her hotel in New York. During their drive downtown, Samochornov learned that they would be meeting with Trump Jr. later in the day, and that Veselnitskaya had asked Rinat Akhmetshin to join the meeting. Veselnitskaya, who was on a phone call, handed Samochornov one of her phones and asked him to translate and transcribe a text message, which she dictated, asking that Akhmetshin be added to the meeting. Samochornov did not know to whom the text message was being sent.²³²⁵

(U) Samochornov told the Committee:

*I wasn't told anything. I was only told: I have a meeting with Donald Trump Junior. It was a pretty busy day because between the appellate court and the meeting, that really—there wasn't sort of a lot of time for social chit-chat kind of thing. So it was really busy. And she tended to work on—she had several phones, so she tended to work her phones quite extensively, and calling to Russia. So very often she did her thing and I was with her, but I was on my phone. Kind of we were not engaged in any kind of conversation. So in the car ride, I remember that that was when I learned that there was going to be a meeting, and I remember typing the message to add Mr. Akhmetshin. . . . Sometimes she would tell me what would be the schedule. Other times she would just ask me to come at 9:00 a.m. at the hotel and I would not know the specific agenda. And her schedule changed a lot. That particular day, I was just told to come for a specific time, specific place.*²³²⁶

²³²³ (U) Kushner Tr., p. 37.

²³²⁴ (U) As previously noted, there are significant discrepancies in the memories of the participants in the June 9, 2016, meeting on a range of issues, including basic facts like who was present and what language was spoken. The Committee was often unable to reconcile these numerous discrepancies, in part due to a lack of documentary evidence. Where possible the Committee has endeavored to note the inconsistencies.

²³²⁵ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 44–48.

²³²⁶ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 46–47.

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(U) Samochornov said he was surprised when he was informed that they would be meeting with Trump Jr., and that it was “unusual.”²³²⁷

(U) Separately, on the morning of June 9, Akhmetshin took the Acela Amtrak train from Washington, D.C., to New York City. He told the Committee he planned to be in New York to attend a play. After checking in at his hotel, he remembered receiving a call from Veselnitskaya asking him to join her for lunch.²³²⁸ According to Akhmetshin, “She said, ‘can you come?’ I knew that—she said: ‘I want to discuss something important.’ The fact that she didn’t say it on the phone, I thought that was something that was important and I understood, and I came.”²³²⁹

(U) Samochornov told the Committee that Veselnitskaya wanted to go to a particular restaurant, which is close to Trump Tower, for lunch.²³³⁰ At the lunch they were joined by Irakli Kaveladze and possibly Akhmetshin.²³³¹ It was Samochornov’s understanding that Kaveladze was meeting the other participants for the first time, and that he worked for Russian associates of Trump and Trump’s family.²³³²

(U) Kaveladze’s flight to New York arrived around 7:00 a.m. on June 9, and after checking in at his hotel, he waited for the lunch with Veselnitskaya. The Trump Tower meeting, and the lunch meeting prior to it, was the only purpose for Kaveladze’s trip to New York. At the lunch, Kaveladze was primarily concerned with reviewing the updated meeting materials that had been emailed to him by an associate of Aras Agalarov. He recalled:

[Veselnitskaya] was I believe 40 minutes late. She was pretty late for the meeting [at the restaurant]. . . . I know we had a very limited amount of time because, according to Mr. [Aras] Agalarov, she would have some more detailed presentation and I needed time to study it. . . . So I was a bit nervous that we’re not going to have much time to read it because she was running late. Eventually she showed up. She showed up with a translator, which was news to me. I thought I would be a translator during the meeting. A gentleman named Anatoli Samochornov. Then she gave me some documents and pages and gave me 10 minutes to 15 minutes to study it, which I studied, and it was a detailed version of

²³²⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²³²⁸ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 24–25.

²³²⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²³³⁰ (U) Multiple participants recalled the lunch meeting taking place at Nello, a restaurant in New York.

²³³¹ (U) Kaveladze had a specific memory of meeting Akhmetshin after lunch, on the way to Trump Tower, but not at the restaurant. However, Akhmetshin had a specific memory of meeting the group at the restaurant.

Akhmetshin’s recollection is consistent with Samochornov’s.

²³³² (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 48–50.

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*that initial. There was no new information, which kind of calmed me down because I realized there's none of those bad things which I was afraid of.*²³³³

(U) Kaveladze said that the “bad things” that he was concerned about related to the “negative information on Hillary Clinton” that he had heard of from Beniaminov. However, Kaveladze said the updated document was about the Magnitsky Act and contained more details about William Browder, not about Clinton.²³³⁴ Kaveladze recalled that the document he reviewed was 10-11 pages and was written in Russian.²³³⁵

(U) Akhmetshin remembered arriving at the restaurant as the others were finishing, and spent approximately 20 minutes there. He recalled an interaction with Veselnitskaya at the restaurant:

*And she tells me: “Guess what? I’m going to see Trump Junior.” I said: “Wow.” I was surprised that she was able to get it. Then she said: “What do you think I should tell him?” And I tell her this whole—throughout the primaries there’s a big—already the issue of U.S.-Russia relations, and there was a lot of—Hillary was obviously very negative about this stuff, and then he seems to say good things. I said that Magnitsky is perfect for this. I thought that to make Magnitsky as a campaign issue would be interesting. It really wouldn’t take—it took me a few hours to figure this out. Just anyone could start looking at how this whole thing came together and figure it out, that it’s a fabrication. And it would be easy, low-hanging fruit—adoption.”*²³³⁶

(U) Akhmetshin felt that he did not need to review the documents that Veselnitskaya brought with her because he assumed that they covered issues that he had heard Veselnitskaya discuss previously, and believed he was already familiar with the documents’ contents.²³³⁷ He believed that the documents were written in English. It was Akhmetshin’s assumption that Veselnitskaya planned to distribute these documents at the upcoming meeting.²³³⁸

²³³³ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 68–70.

²³³⁴ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 70, 72.

²³³⁵ (U) Senate Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with Irakli Kaveladze, November 3, 2017.

²³³⁶ (U) Although Akhmetshin seemed to suggest that the linkage between Clinton and Magnitsky themes originated with him at the lunch, this is inconsistent with timing of the meeting materials prepared on May 31, 2016, which already mentioned the Clinton Campaign. Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 50–51.

²³³⁷ (U) Regarding the source of Veselnitskaya’s information, Akhmetshin told the Committee: “I assume that she used professional help in obtaining this information. There are numerous—I believe that she used—there are many, many private intelligence, due diligence firms. My understanding is the majority of information comes from cyber, so there are firms who just specialize in cyber, cyber and corporate entities. So I don’t think she’s capable, although I learned not to assume anything these days.” Akhmetshin Tr., p. 115.

²³³⁸ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 53–54, 57–58.

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(U) Samochornov recalled that because everyone at the lunch spoke Russian, he was not needed as an interpreter, but participated in the conversation. He and Akhmetshin both remembered that Browder was a focus of the lunch.²³³⁹ Following lunch the group walked to Trump Tower.²³⁴⁰

(U) At Trump Tower the group met Goldstone.²³⁴¹ Goldstone was meeting Veselnitskaya, Akhmetshin, and Samochornov for the first time. Kaveladze and Goldstone knew each other because Kaveladze worked for Aras Agalarov and Goldstone worked for Emin Agalarov, but they were not close. Kaveladze said that Goldstone had previously spoken of Goldstone's relationship with, and access to, the Trump family. Given Goldstone's role in arranging the 2013 Miss Universe contest in Moscow, which Trump was involved in, Kaveladze believed Goldstone. Kaveladze stated, "Besides, after that email [to Donald Trump Jr.], after what I saw, the three key figures of the Republican Party electoral campaign attending a meeting with some strange lawyer, yes, that definitely made me believe in the power of Rob Goldstone, believe me."²³⁴²

(U) After very brief introductions in the lobby of Trump Tower, the group, led by Goldstone, went through security and up to the 25th floor. Only Goldstone's identification was requested.²³⁴³ Goldstone did not intend to stay for the meeting, but recalled that after Trump Jr. arrived and Goldstone made introductions, "I said: 'I'm leaving.' And he looked at me and he goes: 'You don't need to leave; just sit, and you'll take them out at the end,'" and Goldstone agreed.²³⁴⁴

(U) According to Samochornov:

There is a lobby and it's kind of a glass wall that separates the lobby from the conference room. We were met there in the lobby and ushered into the conference room pretty much straightaway. . . . I remember that the room had a glass wall and it is a corner room that overlooks Fifth Avenue and 57th Street.

²³³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 53; Samochornov Tr., p. 50.

²³⁴⁰ (U) Kaveladze recalled Akhmetshin joining the group during the walk from lunch to Trump Tower. Kaveladze had previously been unaware that Samochornov and Akhmetshin would be joining the meeting, and attempted to notify Goldstone of the additions to the group not knowing that Veselnitskaya had already communicated these requests to Goldstone directly. Kaveladze Tr., pp. 70–71, 87.

²³⁴¹ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 191–192.

²³⁴² (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 58, 73–74.

²³⁴³ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 88; Goldstone Tr., p. 193; Samochornov Tr., p. 54. Akhmetshin also remembers not presenting any identification; however, he remembers meeting Goldstone after taking the elevator up. Akhmetshin Tr., p. 65.

²³⁴⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 194.

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*And I believe there was a table either throughout the perimeter of the room or it was kind of a . . . horseshoe table. But it was square. There were no corners. And there were two entrances into the room, the left and the right. I recall us entering through the left side, and we were met by Donald Trump Junior and I believe Mr. Manafort, and exchanged cards, exchanged pleasantries, and we were sat down . . . Mr. Akhmetshin, Ms. Veselnitskaya, and myself sat to the left side, facing—with our backs to the wall, facing 57th Street and the other side of the table. Mr. Donald Trump Junior and Mr. Manafort were at the head of the table.*²³⁴⁵

(U) Samochornov recalled that Kushner sat across the table.²³⁴⁶

(U) According to Goldstone:

*[W]e were introduced there [in the large conference room at Trump Tower]. I'd never met Jared Kushner or Paul Manafort before, so we were introduced and seated. And I sat next to Jared Kushner on one side, the Russian grouping sat on the other side, and at the head of the table was Don and Paul Manafort. . . . At first it was "How do you do" and nods, and then the Russian grouping introduced themselves and who they are and what they are.*²³⁴⁷

(U) Irakli Kaveladze recalled that Goldstone and he were not introduced to the group. He also said that the Trump Campaign participants were not introduced. Veselnitskaya "introduced herself as a private attorney," Akhmetshin was introduced "as a lobbyist and proponent of the anti-Magnitsky Act actions," and Samochornov was introduced "as a translator."²³⁴⁸

(U) Several participants, on both sides of the meeting, told the Committee they were surprised by the size of the group. Akhmetshin had only expected Trump Jr., and not Manafort and Kushner.²³⁴⁹ On the other side, Trump Jr., who had not received an updated attendance list from Goldstone, was surprised by the number of attendees who arrived with Veselnitskaya.²³⁵⁰

²³⁴⁵ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 57–58. While in some respects Samochornov's memory is specific, the Committee notes that he also stated, "I do not remember Mr. Kaveladze or Mr. Goldstone at that meeting. I do remember that there were other people there. My recollection was that there were eight, maybe more, people." *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²³⁴⁶ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 57–58.

²³⁴⁷ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 195.

²³⁴⁸ (U) Senate Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with Irakli Kaveladze, November 3, 2017, pp. 39–42.

²³⁴⁹ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 71.

²³⁵⁰ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 131.

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(U) Akhmetshin told the Committee that after the introductions and some brief small talk, which included congratulations on securing the nomination, the meeting got underway. Trump Jr. remembered that the 4:00 p.m. meeting generally started on time.²³⁵¹ Akhmetshin recalled that Trump Jr. “was very courteous, very polite, I would say. He asked Ms. Veselnitskaya: So, what brings you here? We hear you have some important information for the campaign.”²³⁵²

(U) According to Samochornov:

Then Ms. Veselnitskaya took the floor and she delivered a speech which I interpreted, which I think lasted for maybe three or four minutes.²³⁵³ And she talked about the research that she had uncovered as part of her research in Mr. Browder, and her allegation was that the Ziff brothers, who are U.S. investors who I believe now are U.K. investors, that they were Mr. Browder’s investors and that they laundered money and did not pay taxes in Russia and the United States.²³⁵⁴ She said that they were contributors either to the Democratic National Committee or to Hillary Clinton.²³⁵⁵

(U) Samochornov told the Committee that he had heard Veselnitskaya present this information previously, to the law firm Cozen O’Connor, and that Samochornov found it to be “completely unconvincing.”²³⁵⁶ Trump Jr. told the Committee:

She started talking about—again, it was a little hard to tell because it wasn’t making all that much sense to me. And I don’t know if that’s because there wasn’t much there or because it was being lost in translation. But she started talking essentially about some people who are American businesspeople, that were large contributors to either Hillary Clinton or the DNC, and how they were also doing business in Russia and somehow managing to avoid paying taxes, something to that effect, in either location, in Russia and-or the United States.²³⁵⁷

²³⁵¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 147.

²³⁵² (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 76.

²³⁵³ (U) Kaveladze told the Committee that Veselnitskaya spoke for no more than 15 minutes, which with translation was 22 or 23 minutes. Kaveladze Tr., p. 98.

²³⁵⁴ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 57. Goldstone recalled Veselnitskaya “reading from something or looking at some notes” during her presentation, and Veselnitskaya told the Committee, “I prepared the Russian text on May 31, 2016 . . . this document dated May 31, it very clearly states every single word that I was sharing verbally.” The May 31 document referenced by Veselnitskaya was provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Goldstone Tr., p. 201.

²³⁵⁵ (U) Samochornov Tr., p. 58. There was inconsistency among some of the participants regarding what language Veselnitskaya was speaking. *See ibid.*, pp. 19, 58; Kaveladze Tr., p. 201; Kushner Tr., p. 45.

²³⁵⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²³⁵⁷ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 133.

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(U) Though Trump Jr. didn't recall specific questions being asked by the Campaign participants in the meeting, he told the Committee that, "I do imagine there were questions asked to say, what exactly are you getting at or saying?"²³⁵⁸

(U) Akhmetshin told the Committee that, regarding Veselnitskaya's presentation, "Junior said: 'That's very interesting, but so could you show how money goes to Hillary's campaign? Do you think it goes to Hillary's campaign or just DNC?' He said: 'Could you show us how the money goes to Hillary's campaign?'"²³⁵⁹ Veselnitskaya recalled that Trump Jr., "asked a clarifying question, whether I had the financial records indicating that the particular funds that were obtained . . . in the United States were transferred directly to Clinton Foundation."²³⁶⁰ When Veselnitskaya said that she did not have more information to share, and suggested that the Campaign continue its own research on the topic, Akhmetshin recalled, "I could tell the light kind of went out of their eyes. They said, 'ah,' and kind of like they checked out from this whole thing."²³⁶¹

(U) Multiple participants described a growing level of both frustration and disengagement from the Campaign participants over the course of the meeting.

(U) Kaveladze told the Committee:

*I was sitting between Mr. Kushner and Mr. Manafort and at some point of time Mr. Kushner looked very aggravated, very unhappy he was present there. He asked a question. I don't know exactly how the question sounded, but the purpose of the question was: 'Why are we here? Why are we listening to this Magnitsky Act story?' So she then produced this whole Ziff Brothers, and she continued with this vertical of ownership and they might be funding Hillary Clinton's campaign as well; 'I know they're strong supporters and donors of Democratic Party.'*²³⁶²

(U) Similarly, Goldstone recalled:

Then Jared said: 'I have no idea what you're talking about,' or words to that effect. 'What are you saying? Can you be more specific? I don't understand.'

²³⁵⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²³⁵⁹ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 77–78.

²³⁶⁰ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 57.

²³⁶¹ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., pp. 77–78. Kaveladze recalled that Akhmetshin, rather than Veselnitskaya, suggested that the Campaign continue researching the topic. Senate Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with Irakli Kaveladze, November 3, 2017, p. 45.

²³⁶² (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 89. Veselnitskaya did not recall Kushner saying anything during the meeting. Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 43.

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*And she began the exact same presentation again, as if almost reading off a script . . . The exact same thing . . . The first bit, the alleged information she had about Hillary or funding. We just heard what she was now saying again.*²³⁶³

(U) Samochornov has stated that Veselnitskaya believed the information about donations could act as a “carrot.” Samochornov believed that Veselnitskaya wanted to provide information of benefit to both parties that could also advance her advocacy against the Magnitsky Act. Samochornov said Veselnitskaya’s focus at the meeting was on the Magnitsky Act, not adoptions.²³⁶⁴

(U) Manafort has said that Veselnitskaya suggested that Trump call for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act, which she said hurt U.S.-Russia relations. Manafort also said that Veselnitskaya offered to push to lift the Russian restriction on adoptions in exchange for Trump calling for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act.²³⁶⁵

(U) Samochornov recalled that Manafort seemed unimpressed by Veselnitskaya’s allegation regarding the Ziff brothers being donors to either Clinton or to the DNC. Samochornov told the Committee, “Mr. Manafort said that ‘this is nothing; people give money to all kinds of people.’ Here [Veselnitskaya] kind of stumbled and she didn’t know how to continue. I remember Mr. Manafort pretty much tuning out of the meeting, and I think was looking at his phone. But he was seated sort of half-turned around to her.”²³⁶⁶

(U) Akhmetshin recalled that Veselnitskaya then changed topics: “Then she said: ‘But you know, because of that, adoptions.’ And then she goes through another five minutes on adoption stuff.”²³⁶⁷

(U) Sensing that the meeting was not going well, Akhmetshin stepped in.²³⁶⁸ “Then I felt like already people are uncomfortable, people checking their phones, typing on things. And I feel like I need to just cut in this thing.”²³⁶⁹ Samochornov told the Committee:

Then Mr. Akhmetshin took the floor and [in English] he talked about the foundation [HRAGI] and the fact that there is this chance. If there is an

²³⁶³ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 198.

²³⁶⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Samochornov 7/12/2017.

²³⁶⁵ (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.

²³⁶⁶ (U) Samochornov Tr., p. 59. Veselnitskaya did not recall Manafort saying anything during the meeting. Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 59.

²³⁶⁷ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 78.

²³⁶⁸ (U) See Samochornov Tr., p. 59 (recalling Akhmetshin speaking for 10 or 15 minutes); Akhmetshin Tr., p. 78 (recalling speaking for 90 seconds). But see Goldstone Tr., p. 204 (not recalling Akhmetshin speaking).

²³⁶⁹ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 78.

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*independent review, then there is a possibility that the Russians would release those children that they are taking hostage, and that there could be a thaw in the relationship.*²³⁷⁰

(U) Trump Jr. recalled this shift in direction:

*That's sort of again when they went into, transitioned into: "Well, you may be aware that you can't adopt Russian children anymore and that's a big thing for American people." . . . It was sort of—it was: "Well, okay, forget about that; you should really help with this because it's a sentimental thing that affects many American families; you may have heard of it."*²³⁷¹

(U) At 4:26 p.m., Kushner sent Manafort a text message, writing only "Waste of time."²³⁷² At 4:27 p.m., Kushner emailed one of his assistants with only the subject line, "Pls call my cell." Shortly after that, at 4:29 p.m., Kushner emailed a different assistant, this time with the subject line, "Can u pls call me on my cell? Need excuse to get out of meeting."²³⁷³ Kushner told the Committee:

*It wasn't because they were discussing anything that was inappropriate. Just again we were operating at that point in time with more things to do than time to do it. So when you get to something that didn't seem like it was productive, I just tried to bail out so I could get to a lot of the other responsibilities that I had.*²³⁷⁴

Trump Jr. said Kushner left a little more than halfway through the meeting to take a phone call.²³⁷⁵

(U) Manafort told the Committee that he was also considering leaving the meeting early once it shifted from Veselnitskaya's initial presentation, but felt he could not after Kushner departed. He recalled that, on the way out, Kushner said to him, "This is a waste of time."²³⁷⁶

²³⁷⁰ (U) Samochornov Tr., p. 59.

²³⁷¹ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 135.

²³⁷² (U) Text message Kushner to Manafort, June 9, 2016 (NSSCI00000145). Manafort replied to Kushner, "Yes." Text message Manafort to Kushner, June 9, 2016 (NSSCI00000145).

²³⁷³ (U) Email, Kushner to Vargas, June 9, 2016 (NSSCI00000019-00000020).

²³⁷⁴ (U) Kushner Tr., p. 35.

²³⁷⁵ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 137, 151. Kaveladze did not recall Kushner leaving early. Kaveladze Tr., p. 97.

²³⁷⁶ (U) Manafort Tr., p. 14.

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(U) Manafort said the meeting continued for five to ten minutes after Kushner left.²³⁷⁷ Kaveladze recalled how the meeting concluded:

*I remember the ending, Donald Trump Junior basically saying that: “Look, we’re at the electoral stage; we’re not there yet; we don’t know if we’ll ever win this campaign; if we win the campaign, we could get back to the topic and continue this topic, continue discussion; but at this point we’re busy with other things, we’re in the electoral campaign.” So he politely stopped the meeting.*²³⁷⁸

(U) Trump Jr. told the Committee:

*I think it became pretty apparent to me once they made that transition that this was a way for them to lobby me about some sort of policy. We listened for a few minutes, said it has nothing to do with us, we left. Rob Goldstone apologized to me on the way out. . . . The meeting really wasn’t about anything that he said it was going to be about.*²³⁷⁹

(U) It is not clear what time the meeting ended, though based on the memories of the participants it likely lasted about 30 minutes.²³⁸⁰ The participants in the meeting had inconsistent memories regarding what portion of the meeting was dedicated to Veselnitskaya’s presentation

²³⁷⁷ (U) Manafort took notes on his phone during the meeting. The iCloud file associated with Manafort’s notes was last modified at 4:28 p.m. on June 9, 2016. Manafort told the Committee, “I stopped taking notes when they started talking about Russian adoptions.” Manafort Tr., pp. 14, 21, 36; Manafort’s notes from the meeting consisted of the following: “Bill Browder / Offshore – Cyprus / 133m shares / Companies / Not invest – loan / Value in Cyprus as inter / Illici [should be “Illicit,” according to Manafort] / Active sponsors of RNC / Browder hired Joanna Glover [Should be, “Juleanna Glover,” according to Manafort] / Tied into Cheney / Russian adoption by American families.” Notes, Manafort (PJM-SSCI-00000306-307).

²³⁷⁸ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 99. Veselnitskaya recalled, “He [Trump Jr.] said: Your story is very interesting. It can be very exciting. And when or if we come to power, maybe we will get back to that exciting story. But at the current phase, there is nothing that I can help you with and there is nothing that I can recommend to you. That was all. That was how the meeting ended, and we exchanged the very common pleasantries and we parted.” Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 62–63.

²³⁷⁹ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 138–139.

²³⁸⁰ (U) Samochornov had a specific memory of when the meeting ended. He told the Committee, “I remember—here’s a funny thing. I don’t typically wear a watch, but that day I did. And I remember that when we went down [to the lobby after the meeting] it was 25 minutes after the hour [4:25 p.m.], and I remember the reason it stuck in my mind is I thought that was quick.” Samochornov Tr., p. 60. This recollection does not align with the timing of Kushner’s emails to his assistants, and may be incorrect. Veselnitskaya told the Committee the meeting could have gone as long as 30 to 40 minutes, due to the simultaneous translation. Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 60. Kaveladze has also estimated the total meeting time, with translation, being in that range. Kaveladze Tr., p. 97; FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017.

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on the Ziff brothers, the DNC, and Clinton, and what portion was taken by the Magnitsky Act, Browder, and Russian adoptions.²³⁸¹

(U) Despite the documents that Veselnitskaya brought with her to the lunch, which she may have read from during her presentation, the meeting participants did not recall any documents being distributed or received at the meeting.²³⁸²

(U) Kaveladze recalled that, as the group was leaving the conference room, they ran into Ivanka Trump by chance: “We walk out into reception area. We’re being greeted by Ivanka Trump. She said hello to everybody. We said hello to her. . . . She was just there. She said hello. So we passed by her, go to elevator, go downstairs. . . .”²³⁸³

(U) Participants on both sides of the meeting felt the meeting had not met expectations.

(U) Goldstone immediately called Emin Agalarov to tell him that the meeting was embarrassing and that it had been about adoption, which surprised Agalarov.²³⁸⁴ Goldstone recalled apologizing to Trump Jr. as they were walking out of the meeting. Goldstone said that “allegedly there [was] going to be some big smoking gun,” and that “I’d been told by my client that this person had damaging information, basically, about Hillary Clinton and funding and the DNC,” but the meeting failed to deliver that, which embarrassed Goldstone.²³⁸⁵

(U) Kaveladze, in an email to a family member several days later, stated that “[the] meeting was boring. The Russians did not have any bad info [on] Hillary.”²³⁸⁶ Kaveladze said he believed repeal of the Magnitsky Act was the “true agenda” of the meeting, not adoption issues.²³⁸⁷ Kaveladze told the Committee, “Look, [the Campaign participants] certainly were not

²³⁸¹ (U) Trump Jr. estimated that it was about evenly divided. Trump Jr. Tr., p. 148. Manafort recalled, “It was a very disconcerting—dysfunctional conversation. Every one of these points until the last point related to Browder, and they were attacking Browder. Most of the conversation was attacking the character of Browder. They were trying to make him into a criminal businessman and therefore the Magnitsky Act was created to protect a lawyer for a criminal.” Manafort Tr., pp. 20–21.

²³⁸² (U) See, e.g., Manafort Tr., p. 28; Samochornov Tr., p. 66; Trump Jr. Tr., p. 148.

²³⁸³ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 105.

²³⁸⁴ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 208–209.

²³⁸⁵ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 207–208. Despite Goldstone being embarrassed, as the meeting participants were walking out of the room, Goldstone recalled approaching Trump Jr. and Manafort again regarding VK. Goldstone said, “By the way, I have a friend who works for VK [VKontakte], which is Russia’s version of Facebook, wants to know who the best person to send a project idea for Mr. Trump would be.” According to Goldstone, he was told Dan Scavino was the best point of contact. *Ibid.*, p. 211. Trump Jr. told the Committee he does not recall this interaction. Trump Jr. Tr., p. 385–389.

²³⁸⁶ (U) Email, Kaveladze to [A. Kaveladze], June 14, 2016. (KAVELADZE00227).

²³⁸⁷ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 123–124.

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interested in the Magnitsky law. I think the reason they were present in that room was Rob Goldstone's [email]. They were certainly expecting something else, which they didn't get."²³⁸⁸

(U) Manafort and Kushner both recalled speaking to Trump Jr. after the meeting. Manafort told the Committee, "at some point, either that night or the next day, I told Don: That was a total waste of time. And he agreed."²³⁸⁹ Kushner, who also characterized the meeting as a "waste of time" recalled, "Don and I joked about it after. We said, 'hey, that was kind of funny.' But then you just move forward."²³⁹⁰ Kushner told the Committee, "Sometimes you take high-probability meetings and sometimes you take low-probability meetings. Sometimes things come in, sometimes they don't."²³⁹¹

(U) Akhmetshin recalled, "I felt a little awkward there [at the meeting]. Everyone, I think they expected something and she expected something, and none of their expectations materialized."²³⁹² Regarding the Campaign participants' motivations, he said, "I think they wanted to hear about the money. I don't think they cared a bit about this whole adoption stuff."²³⁹³

(U) Samochornov told the Committee, "Ms. Veselnitskaya did not get what she came there for."²³⁹⁴ Veselnitskaya echoed that assessment: "I've come to a pre-scheduled meeting with Mr. Donald Trump Junior. And in my memory, everything that still remains in my memory from that meeting is only absolute and total disappointment with the meeting."²³⁹⁵

(U) Goldstone recalled that, following the meeting, he spoke to Kaveladze and said: "'This was really embarrassing.' And he was like: 'I know Mr. A [Agalarov] wanted it.' . . . Emin and he both said the same continually: 'I know you didn't want to do this, I know you didn't want to set it up, but Mr. A[agalarov] really wanted it, and it's fine.'"²³⁹⁶ Goldstone also recalled, "I'd said either pre-or post-meeting to Emin, probably Emin, that: 'This is a pretty big favor; I hope it was worth it to your father. Whether that was a favor for us to ask or somebody asking him a favor, it was a pretty big favor.'"²³⁹⁷

²³⁸⁸ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 100.

²³⁸⁹ (U) Manafort Tr., p. 14.

²³⁹⁰ (U) Kushner Tr., p. 43.

²³⁹¹ (U) Kushner Tr. II, p. 45.

²³⁹² (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 80.

²³⁹³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²³⁹⁴ (U) Samochornov Tr., p. 86.

²³⁹⁵ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 38.

²³⁹⁶ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 214.

²³⁹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 217.

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(U) Once the meeting was over, the participants generally parted ways. Goldstone went home. Veselnitskaya, Samochornov, Akhmetshin, and Kaveladze went briefly to a bar in Trump Tower for a drink. Samochornov told the Committee:

*Ms. Veselnitskaya was very disappointed in the meeting. She said something along the lines: 'That was it?' Mr. Akhmetshin and Mr. Kaveladze were trying to tell her: 'Well, you informed them about the issue; this is good; they know about the issue.' So they were kind of telling her something comforting and conciliatory. We had a couple of drinks, and Mr. Kaveladze left first and Mr. Akhmetshin left second. Then I believe that was the end of that drink situation.*²³⁹⁸

(U) Kaveladze also recalled the visit to the bar after the meeting:

*So we had like a maybe 15-minute conversation, during which I received a call from Mr. [Aras] Agalarov and he asked me, 'how did it go?' And I said 'it went well.' And she said—and Natalia asked me if I could hand her the phone, and so I handed her the phone, and she thanked him. She said: 'Thank you, thank you, great; it was wonderful; it's all good information, good news.' Later I'm going to have a second call with Mr. Agalarov without Natalia present and tell him 'this whole thing was a disaster and a loss of time,' so I was more open. Obviously, with them in the picture I couldn't say those things.*²³⁹⁹

(U) That night, Akhmetshin, Samochornov, and Veselnitskaya attended a Russian play in New York that featured one of Akhmetshin's relatives.²⁴⁰⁰ Kaveladze had already seen the play in Moscow and highly recommended it.²⁴⁰¹

6. (U) Subsequent Events and Communications

(U) On June 10, 2016, Goldstone emailed Rhona Graff to inform her that "Emin and Aras have a fairly sizable birthday gift for Mr. Trump" and asked how it should be delivered. Graff responded that it would likely have to be delivered through the basement for security screening.²⁴⁰²

²³⁹⁸ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 69–70.

²³⁹⁹ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 106. Kaveladze has said that Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin seemed "kind of happy" after the meeting. Kaveladze did not tell the Committee this, and it is not consistent with accounts from other witnesses. FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017.

²⁴⁰⁰ (U) Veselnitskaya Tr., p. 42.

²⁴⁰¹ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 106.

²⁴⁰² (U) Emails, Goldstone and Graff, June 10, 2016 (RG000082).

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(U) Roman Benjaminov told the Committee that Aras Agalarov instructed him to deliver the gift, a painting, with Goldstone’s assistance.²⁴⁰³ Emin Agalarov’s personal assistant arranged for the painting and two others to be brought into the United States from Russia in a “giant box.”²⁴⁰⁴ Jason Tropea told the Committee that the Agalarovs using staff to carry packages into the United States is not typical, and that, “We’ve never flown paintings in before.”²⁴⁰⁵ Benjaminov recalled that the painting was “pretty big” and measured four or five feet tall.²⁴⁰⁶ The box containing the paintings did not fit in the vehicle that had initially been rented to transport it and ultimately required a larger rental truck for the delivery.²⁴⁰⁷

(U) On June 13, 2016, Benjaminov emailed Graff, copying Goldstone and Tropea to coordinate the delivery of one of the paintings.²⁴⁰⁸ Shortly thereafter, Benjaminov and Tropea delivered the painting, depicted below, to Trump Tower.²⁴⁰⁹ Emails between Graff and a U.S. Secret Service agent on June 13 indicate that the painting was to be held in the sub-cellar after delivery so that it could be screened by security later that night or the following morning.²⁴¹⁰ Benjaminov told the Committee that he delivered the painting directly to Graff in her office.²⁴¹¹

²⁴⁰³ (U) Benjaminov Tr., p. 48.

²⁴⁰⁴ (U) Benjaminov Tr., p. 266. Benjaminov believed the painting was delivered as part of checked luggage, explain that “[t]here’s no way you could bring that on board. You’d probably have to strap it to the top of the plane.” Benjaminov Tr., p. 267.

²⁴⁰⁵ (U) Tropea Tr., p. 106.

²⁴⁰⁶ (U) Benjaminov Tr., p. 267.

²⁴⁰⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Benjaminov 1/6/2018.

²⁴⁰⁸ (U) Email, Benjaminov to Graff, et al., June 13, 2016 (RG000084).

²⁴⁰⁹ (U) Image (DJTJR00500); Tropea Tr., p. 104.


²⁴¹⁰ (U) Email, Graff to [REDACTED], et al., June 13, 2016 (TRUMPORG_16_000274-275).

²⁴¹¹ (U) Benjaminov Tr., pp. 263–264. Benjaminov’s communications support this. Several months after the delivery, Benjaminov texted Goldstone to say that he had “brought the painting into her [Graff’s] office...In to the actual office on the top floor, around the corner from Mr Trumps.” See Texts messages, Goldstone and Benjaminov, October 11, 2016 (RB001153–1154). Graff only had a vague recollection of the painting being delivered after reviewing documents related to it. Alan Garten, the General Counsel of the Trump Organization, informed the Committee that he later “commandeered” the painting. Graff Tr., pp. 63–65.



(U) A personal note from Emin and Aras Agalarov was attached to the back of the painting.²⁴¹²

²⁴¹² (U) Handwritten note (DJTJR00501); Tropea Tr., p. 104.




(U) Benjaminov told the Committee that the painting was part of a series of three paintings that made up a complete set. Benjaminov recalled Aras Agalarov calling him to identify the painting to be delivered first and instructing him to hold the remaining paintings, saying that “the following birthday we’ll give [Trump] the next one, and the following birthday we’ll give the next one.”²⁴¹³ The two additional paintings, depicted below, were never delivered to Trump.²⁴¹⁴

²⁴¹³ (U) Benjaminov Tr., pp. 267–268.

²⁴¹⁴ (U) Email, Scott Balber to SSCI, April 30, 2018; Tropea Tr., pp. 105–106.

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(U) Goldstone told the Committee that he believed the paintings were purchased in Russia, and that he was told the value of the three paintings was \$100,000.²⁴¹⁵

(U) On June 14, 2016, Goldstone emailed Graff, writing that he trusted that his colleagues “were able to deliver the birthday painting for Mr. Trump today” and asking her to “[p]lease pass on my sincere birthday good wishes along with those of Emin and Aras and as always thank you for all your help.”²⁴¹⁶ Graff responded to Goldstone by confirming the painting’s delivery, describing the painting as “truly quite magnificent.” Graff relayed to Goldstone that although Trump had been in meetings all day, she hoped to show it to him before he left for a campaign trip, stating that he “will be very pleased with it.” Graff also told Goldstone that she would “make sure to have it displayed in a very prominent location.”²⁴¹⁷

(U) Also on June 14, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov and Kaveladze and attached a CNN article titled, “Russian hackers stole Dems’ Trump files, firm says.”²⁴¹⁸ Goldstone wrote:

From:	Rob Goldstone [REDACTED] on behalf of Rob Goldstone
Sent:	Tuesday, June 14, 2016 10:09 AM
To:	emin agalarov; lke
Subject:	Breaking news
Attachments:	image1.PNG; _.txt

Top story right now - seems eerily weird based on our Trump meeting last week with the Russian lawyers etc

(U) Later on June 14, at 10:22 a.m., Kaveladze replied, only to Goldstone, writing, “Very interesting.”²⁴¹⁹

(U) Goldstone told the Committee:

²⁴¹⁵ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 276. Goldstone told the Committee that he believed that Benjaminov told him the value of the paintings. Benjaminov told the Committee that he did not know the value of the painting that was delivered. Benjaminov Tr., p. 265.

²⁴¹⁶ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, June 14, 2016 (RG000086). Other emails between Graff and Benjaminov indicate that the painting may have been delivered on June 13. Email, Graff to Taddoni, et al., June 13, 2016 (TRUMPORG_16_000275).

²⁴¹⁷ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, June 14, 2016 (RG000086). Graff told the Committee that she did not think that Trump hung the painting in his office. Graff Tr., p. 65.

²⁴¹⁸ (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov and Kaveladze, June 14, 2016 (KAVELADZE00027-00028); Tal Kopan, “Russian hackers stole Dems’ Trump files, firm says,” CNN, June 14, 2016.

²⁴¹⁹ (U) Email, Kaveladze to Goldstone, June 14, 2016 (KAVELADZE00224).

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I was watching a CNN broadcast and suddenly they flash up something about Russia and hacking and emails and the DNC. And I look at CNN and I see "Russia" and the "DNC." And I think: Well, that's odd. Didn't I just organize a meeting where allegedly somebody was going to talk about Russia? But my one talked about adoption, so I think that's eerily weird. So the person I sent that to was Ike. I think I sent something similar to Emin as well at some point. I may have sent him a text that said: This is so odd, that a couple of weeks or a week after we have a meeting, now this is on, Russia, DNC. Odd.²⁴²⁰

(U) Goldstone did not recall any follow up from this exchange, nor did he learn additional information regarding any possible linkage between the two events.²⁴²¹

(U) In this same time period following the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower, Rob Goldstone had a series of communications with Shugart.

(U) Shugart told the Committee that around June 13, 2016, Goldstone called her and came up to her office.²⁴²² This was not unusual. During their conversation, Shugart asked Goldstone if he had seen Trump Jr. recently, and Goldstone told her that several days earlier he had had a meeting with Trump Jr. at Trump Tower. Shugart told the Committee:

He did say that he saw Don at a ridiculous meeting, where he went and they supposedly had emails from the Democrats and dirt on Hillary and then it turned out to be something about adoptions; and it was just ridiculous and it was just stupid. That's what he said to me. That was distilling down about 45 minutes of conversation.²⁴²³

(U) When asked, Shugart confirmed that Goldstone had specifically mentioned emails. She said that it was difficult to recall what Goldstone had said about the emails, but that:

He said 'emails.' I don't know if he identified them as 'Democrat' emails. The word 'Democrat' was in there, because there was something about Russian donors to Hillary, and I believe that was where the word 'Democrat' came. . . .

²⁴²⁰ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 218–219.

²⁴²¹ (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 218–219; Kaveladze Tr., pp. 108–110.

²⁴²² (U) Shugart noted that she did not remember the date of the interaction with Goldstone, she simply remembered that it was the day before she saw new reports regarding the hacking of the DNC. Shugart Tr., pp. 185-186; That story was first published on June 14, 2016. Ellen Nakashima, "Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2016.

²⁴²³ (U) Shugart Tr., p. 184.

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*But it was basically that was the dirt, was going to be Russian donors to Hillary's campaign that they had through emails.*²⁴²⁴

(U) The following day, Shugart recalled seeing reports regarding the hack of the DNC and connected the news with what Goldstone had said at their meeting the day before. Shugart called Goldstone. She told the Committee, “After I saw the news report, I called Rob in 2016 and said: This sounds like what you were talking about. At which point he said: Oh, no; that meeting about the adoption, it was all—that’s what it was; it was a stupid meeting. So at that point, I was led [by Rob] to believe that I didn’t hear what I thought I heard.”²⁴²⁵

(U) Shugart told the Committee that, “I just dropped it at that point.” She and Goldstone continued to see each other regularly, but they did not have further discussions of the meeting in Trump Tower. Then, in June 2017, Alan Garten, a lawyer for the Trump Organization, contacted Goldstone and asked about the June 9, 2016, meeting. Goldstone told Shugart about Garten’s outreach. Shugart recalled, “At that point I asked Rob: ‘Okay, what was this meeting?’ And he mentioned the adoption again. I said: ‘Who was at the meeting? Why was this such a big deal?’” It was at that point, for the first time, that Goldstone told Shugart that Manafort and Kushner had participated, as well as Veselnitskaya, and Goldstone described the focus on Browder, who he had not mentioned previously. Shugart recalled, “And that’s when I said to him: This sounds much bigger than what you said a year ago.” Shugart confirmed her sense that Goldstone’s story had changed, including from their discussion in June of 2016 when he mentioned emails, to the 2016 phone call the following day when he said the focus was on adoptions, to the 2017 phone call when he mentioned the focus on Browder.²⁴²⁶

(U) On June 17, 2016, Trump sent a personal note of thanks to Emin and Aras Agalarov regarding the painting.²⁴²⁷ Goldstone appeared to transmit the letter to Emin Agalarov on June 18, 2016.²⁴²⁸

²⁴²⁴ (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 199-200.

²⁴²⁵ (U) The Committee notes this exchange because it is the only time that the Committee was told that emails were discussed as derogatory information at the June 9, 2016 meeting. It is noteworthy that Shugart recalls the emails being mentioned by Goldstone prior to the news of the DNC hack becoming public, and that she made the connection between the news of the DNC hack and Goldstone’s account of the meeting at the time. Nevertheless, Shugart herself was not present at the meeting and noted that Goldstone is an “over-the-top personality, sometimes hard to follow.” The Committee found no other evidence indicating that emails were discussed at the June 9, 2016 meeting. The Committee was ultimately not able to reconcile this discrepancy. Shugart Tr., pp. 188, 191, 197.

²⁴²⁶ (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 188, 191, 197.

²⁴²⁷ (U) Letter, Trump to E. Agalarov and A. Agalarov, June 17, 2016 (TRUMPORG_18_000034).

²⁴²⁸ (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, June 18, 2016 (RG000087).

DONALD JOHN TRUMP

June 17th, 2016


Dear Emin & Aras:

There are few things better than receiving a sensational gift from someone you admire and that's what I've received from you. The painting you sent me is truly fantastic and a very thoughtful gesture!

I greatly appreciate your friendship— this is one birthday that I will always remember.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,



(U) Following the June 9, 2016, meeting in Trump Tower and the birthday painting delivery, Goldstone continued to contact Trump Jr. and others on a range of topics. For example, on June 24, 2016, Goldstone wrote to Trump Jr. after seeing that Trump was in Scotland, stating that the Brexit vote that day “should boost your dad’s campaign big time.”²⁴²⁹

(U) Goldstone also attempted additional outreach to the Campaign about VK. On June 29, 2016, Goldstone emailed Dan Scavino, copying Trump Jr., Graff, and Sidorkov, reiterating

²⁴²⁹ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., June 24, 2016 (DJTJR0453).

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his previous offers to create a “VOTE Trump 2016” page on the Russian social networking site. In the email, Goldstone stated that Paul Manafort “had said he would welcome it.”²⁴³⁰

(U) Goldstone told the Committee that Sidorkov had been very persistent in wanting a connection with the Trump Campaign. Sidorkov had previously been helpful to Emin Agalarov, and Goldstone now wanted to be helpful to him. Goldstone was not aware of Sidorkov being directed by anyone to pursue the Trump connection, and Goldstone was unaware of Sidorkov having any connection to the Russian Government or intelligence services.²⁴³¹

(U) On July 20, 2016, after Trump Jr.’s speech at the Republican National Convention, Goldstone emailed him: “Greetings from Moscow where we all watched your great speech tonight[.] Congratulations to you and of course to your father.”²⁴³² On July 27, Trump Jr. replied, “Thank you very much my friend,” briefly described the experience of giving his speech, and said he hoped to hear more from Goldstone soon.²⁴³³ Later that day, Goldstone responded by telling Trump Jr. that the Agalarovs were being inundated with press requests regarding their relationship with Donald Trump, but that they were declining requests to comment. Trump Jr. thanked Goldstone and commented that he was unconcerned about the press inquiries.²⁴³⁴

(U) On October 7, 2016, Goldstone again reached out, this time to Graff, to transmit a letter and a book from Aras Agalarov. Goldstone informed Graff via email that Aras Agalarov wanted Goldstone to deliver the letter and book that same day, “ahead of Sunday’s debate.”²⁴³⁵ Graff advised Goldstone that once the package was received she would hand it to Trump.²⁴³⁶ Later on October 7 Goldstone wrote to Graff, “The package was delivered very late, so as promised here is the scan and Roman will deliver the original along with the book from Aras to Mr. Trump on Monday.”²⁴³⁷ In the attached scanned letter from Aras Agalarov, which was addressed to “Donald,” Agalarov wrote that “[w]ith great interest I follow your electoral campaign and cheer for your victories.”²⁴³⁸ Agalarov’s letter then made a series of economic and trade observations and recommendations, including suggesting that Trump should promote a

²⁴³⁰ (U) Email, Goldstone to Scavino et al., June 29, 2016 (DJTJR0454). Goldstone’s email to Scavino included a PDF of a Trump VK page that Sidorkov sent Goldstone. Email, Sidorkov to Goldstone, June 23, 2016 (RG000089).

²⁴³¹ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 269.

²⁴³² (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., July 20, 2016 (DJTJR0457).

²⁴³³ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, July 27, 2016 (DJTJR0457).

²⁴³⁴ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., July 27, 2016 (DJTJR0489); Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, July 27, 2016 (DJTJR0489).

²⁴³⁵ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff and Beniaminov, October 7, 2016 (DJTJR00229). Aras Agalarov’s request that the materials be delivered prior to “Sunday’s debate” is likely a reference to the presidential debate that took place on October 9, 2016.

²⁴³⁶ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, October 7, 2016 (DJTJR00230).

²⁴³⁷ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, October 7, 2016 (DJTJR00230–231).

²⁴³⁸ (U) Letter, A. Agalarov to Trump, October 5, 2015 (DJTJR00232–00233).

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“Made in USA” promotion campaign to target international markets.²⁴³⁹ Agalarov suggested that international trade exhibits “could become an important element of such [a] strategy” and stated that with his “27 years of trade show management experience,” that a properly designed trade show strategy could “bring significant economic results.”²⁴⁴⁰ To accomplish this, Agalarov suggested that a “new organization with worldwide representation for the purpose to promote American goods and services could be formed.”²⁴⁴¹ In a post-script, a handwritten note added, “November 8th is the day of my birthday. Your victory would be the best birthday present I have ever received.”²⁴⁴²

(U) On the morning of October 14, following a number of emails between Graff, Goldstone, and Benjaminov regarding logistics and delivery timing, the book from Aras Agalarov, which was written in Russian, and the original letter, were delivered to Trump Tower via FedEx.²⁴⁴³ Benjaminov recalled that the book and letter from Aras Agalarov had been flown to the United States from Russia, couriered by Kaveladze.²⁴⁴⁴

(U) On October 27, 2016, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. with the subject line, “Mazal Tov on the new Hotel opening – looks amazing” and no text in the body of the email. Later that day, Donald Trump Jr. responded, writing “Thanks Rob.”²⁴⁴⁵ Goldstone’s email was likely a reference to the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C., which opened the day before.

(U) On November 5, 2016, Konstantin Sidorkov from VK again reached out to the Trump Campaign, replying to Goldstone’s email to Scavino from June 29.²⁴⁴⁶ The Committee identified no response to this email. Despite Graff and Scavino’s positive initial responses regarding VK, the Committee found no evidence to indicate that any Trump Campaign action was taken on the proposal.

(U) On November 7, 2016, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. requesting an invitation to attend an election night party with a mutual friend of Lara and Eric Trump.²⁴⁴⁷ Later that day,

²⁴³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴² (U) *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴³ (U) Email, Benjaminov to Graff, October 14, 2016 (DJTJR00235–00238).

²⁴⁴⁴ (U) Benjaminov told the Committee that, due to Aras Agalarov’s limited English, the letter was likely translated or dictated, but that the handwriting at the end of the letter matched Aras Agalarov’s handwriting. Benjaminov Tr., p. 272.

²⁴⁴⁵ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., October 27, 2016 (RG000140); Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone, (RG000140).

²⁴⁴⁶ (U) Email, Sidorkov to Scavino, Trump Jr., Graff, and Goldstone, November 5, 2016 (RG000143).

²⁴⁴⁷ (U) Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr., November 7, 2016 (RG000145).

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Trump Jr. responded, “Sure Rob. CC’ing my asst Lindsay to coordinate for you.”²⁴⁴⁸ Trump Jr.’s assistant then added Goldstone to a VIP list as a guest.²⁴⁴⁹ Goldstone told the Committee that he did not attend the event.²⁴⁵⁰

(U) On November 8, 2016, Election Day, Graff replied to an earlier email from Goldstone asking if the book and letter from Aras Agalarov had been received. Graff confirmed that the book and letter were received, and apologized for the delay in responsiveness due to it being an unusual time. She asked that Goldstone, “Please explain this to Mr. Agalarov and that Mr. Trump greatly appreciates his thoughtfulness and good wishes.”²⁴⁵¹

(U) Also on Election Day, Goldstone sent Trump Jr. a text message, writing “What an amazing night so far and you deserve a massive pat on the back for your incredible campaigning – looks like it’s gonna pay off big tonight.”²⁴⁵² At 2:42 a.m. the following morning, Goldstone texted Trump Jr.: “Mazal Tov!”²⁴⁵³

(U) On November 9, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone to inform him that Aras Agalarov wanted to send a congratulatory note to Trump and asked Goldstone to review a draft of the letter.²⁴⁵⁴ Later on November 9, Yana Gorokhova from the Crocus Group emailed Goldstone the final signed letter.²⁴⁵⁵ Goldstone transmitted the scanned letter to Graff, asking that she “kindly pass this letter from Aras and Emin Agalarov to Mr. Trump.”²⁴⁵⁶

²⁴⁴⁸ (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone and Santoro, November 7, 2016 (RG000145).

²⁴⁴⁹ (U) Email, Santoro to Dumbauld, et al., November 7, 2016 (DJTJR00127).

²⁴⁵⁰ (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 295.

²⁴⁵¹ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, November 8, 2016 (DJTJR00125).

²⁴⁵² (U) Text message, Goldstone to Trump Jr., November 8, 2016 (RG000146).


²⁴⁵³ (U) Text message, Goldstone to Trump Jr., November 9, 2016 (RG000146).

²⁴⁵⁴ (U) Email, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 9, 2016 (RG000149).

²⁴⁵⁵ (U) Email, Gorokhova to Goldstone, Benjaminov, Tropea, and Kaveladze, November 9, 2016 (RG000151).

²⁴⁵⁶ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff and Trump Jr., November 9, 2016 (DJTJR00164).

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(U) On November 10, Emin Agalarov sent a text message to Trump Jr:

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Don!!! Amazing run and a glorious victory!!!! Congratulations to you and your dad, we are proud and happy for you !!!!! Always at your disposal her [sic] in Russia) Emin and Aras Agalarov@²⁴⁵⁷

(U) On November 13, Goldstone and Kaveladze exchanged text messages in which Goldstone wrote, “So it seems we are all now in the President’s inner circle!! So shocking.” Kaveladze responded, “I know. Unbelievable! We are all very excited,” and indicated that Aras Agalarov was receiving a lot of outreach from Russian media regarding Trump.²⁴⁵⁸

(U) On November 20, 2016, Graff forwarded the November 9 congratulatory letter from Aras and Emin Agalarov, previously sent by Goldstone, to an assistant at the Trump Organization. Graff wrote, “Can you please print this out and hand it to me. Important.”²⁴⁵⁹

(U) Graff told the Committee that Trump responded to the Agalarov’s November 9 letter with a note written in black pen.²⁴⁶⁰ Although the communication referenced by Graff was not produced in response to Committee requests, an image of the Agalarov’s November 9 letter, with what appears to be a note from Trump, is visible in public press reporting.²⁴⁶¹


²⁴⁵⁷ (U) Text message, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., November 10, 2016 (DJTJR00866). Separately, also on November 10, Kelly Ridgway from the firm WMA, which was contracted on Emin Agalarov’s behalf, sent an email to Ric Salmon, who was helping to represent Agalarov. Ridgway outlined the potential benefits and risks of re-releasing Agalarov’s music video featuring Trump. Ridgway suggested that, if Goldstone and others wanted to proceed, they could be “more strategic online in [the video’s] rollout; i.e. potentially geo-target it to the extremely pro-Trump States on his socials, per the above electoral map, where it would be received more positively. Potentially even as a ‘dark post’ promoted to those specific fans of Trump in those States only?” The Committee is not aware of any information indicating that such an effort was operationalized on behalf of Agalarov. Email, Ridgway to Salmon, et al., November 10, 2016 (RG000169-170).

²⁴⁵⁸ (U) Text message, Goldstone to Kaveladze, November 13, 2016 (RG000191); Text message, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 13, 2016 (RG000191).

²⁴⁵⁹ (U) Email, Graff to Macchia, November 20, 2016 (DJTJR00164). Graff told the Committee it was “not unusual” to present documents in hard copy to show to Trump. Graff Tr., p. 76.

²⁴⁶⁰ (U) Graff Tr., p. 74.

²⁴⁶¹ (U) HBO, “We spoke to Emin Agalarov about a conversation Donald Trump Jr. claimed to have forgotten,” *Vice News*, July 10, 2018. The date of reply from Trump is unknown.



i. (U) Repeated Requests for a Follow-up to the June 9, 2016 Meeting in Trump Tower

(U) Following the election, Aras Agalarov’s interest in influencing U.S. policy continued. In mid-late November, 2016, following the election, Aras Agalarov and Veselnitskaya made an attempt to get a second meeting with Trump representatives. This request was transmitted through Kaveladze and Goldstone.²⁴⁶²

(U) On November 23, Veselnitskaya sent Kaveladze an email with the subject line “From RF,” which likely refers to “Russian Federation.”²⁴⁶³

²⁴⁶² (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, November 28, 2016 (DJTJR00118).


²⁴⁶³ (U) The Committee does not have specific information regarding the meaning of “RF” in this context, but notes that “RF” also appears in the document that was attached to that email, and is used in the following way: “The US Department of Justice was informed of this as well as of other circumstances in July 2016 by the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and by the RF Ministry of Interior under US-Russia MLAT.” Email, Veselnitskaya to Kaveladze, November 23, 2016 (KAVELADZE00040, 00042).

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(U) The document attached to the email was marked, “Confidential: November 22, 2016,” and deals with the Magnitsky Act, William Browder and the Ziff brothers. The fourth page of the document, which is otherwise blank, simply states, “NV iPad.” The document attached to the email is similar to, but not the exact same as, the May 31, 2016, document believed to have been used at the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower.²⁴⁶⁴

(U) The document sent by Veselnitskaya to Kaveladze on November 23 was emailed to Goldstone the same day.²⁴⁶⁵



(U) The initial email from Kaveladze to Goldstone on November 23 resulted in a series of emails and text messages in which Kaveladze sought to get the meeting scheduled while Veselnitskaya was in New York. Goldstone made the request for the meeting, but was generally skeptical that it would be accepted.²⁴⁶⁶

(U) Kaveladze told the Committee:

I spoke with Ms. Veselnitskaya sometime in November of 2016 when she was trying to initiate a second meeting with Trump people. I basically requested a synopsis of that second meeting, and she sent me pretty much the same thing she sent the first time. . . . She basically was referring to that statement of Mr. Trump Junior saying that: If we win, then we'll be glad to discuss. So pretty much immediately, like two weeks after the win, she started to try. We politely—Rob

²⁴⁶⁴ (U) Email, Veselnitskaya to Kaveladze, November 23, 2016 (KAVELADZE00041–00044) (with attachment).

²⁴⁶⁵ (U) Email, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 23, 2016 (RG000182).

²⁴⁶⁶ (U) Emails, Kaveladze and Goldstone, November 23, 2016 (RG000186–000189); Text messages, Kaveladze and Goldstone, November 27 and 28, 2016 (RG000195-196).

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Goldstone told me that it's absolutely unrealistic to arrange a meeting now. People are unpacking, people are leaving for Washington, D.C. It was pre-Thanksgiving, and in every possible way they're not interested in this topic right now, obviously, so there's no way. So we politely kind of gradually tried to explain to her that the meeting is not going to happen, because she's like: I'm here, but then I have to go to Moscow, and then I'm willing to come back; if they confirm a meeting I would definitely come back, and stuff like that. So eventually I'm telling her [Veselnitskaya] that the meeting is not going to happen.²⁴⁶⁷

(U) While this account is generally supported by documents provided to the Committee, it does not fully capture the extent to which Aras Agalarov and Veselnitskaya pushed for the meeting.²⁴⁶⁸

(U) On November 23, 2016, Kaveladze, having already been met with skepticism from Goldstone about a second meeting, indicated to Goldstone that Veselnitskaya was willing to change her flight if needed.²⁴⁶⁹ Several days later, on November 27, Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, apologizing for bothering him on a Sunday, and said that Veselnitskaya “called again asking about the meeting with T [Trump] people.”²⁴⁷⁰ Goldstone replied that he had reached out but that there had been no response so far, and reiterated his skepticism that the meeting request would be accepted.²⁴⁷¹ The following day, November 28, Kaveladze again followed up with Goldstone, writing, “Hello Rob, Any news regarding the meeting? Mr. A [Agalarov] just called me re this.”²⁴⁷²

(U) On November 28, having not received a response regarding scheduling the second meeting, Goldstone sent Veselnitskaya’s document directly to Rhona Graff.^{ff.2473}

²⁴⁶⁷ (U) Kaveladze Tr., pp. 111–112.

²⁴⁶⁸ (U) Emails, Kaveladze and Goldstone, November 23, 2016 (RG000186–000189); Text messages, Kaveladze and Goldstone, November 27 and 28, 2016 (RG000195-196).

²⁴⁶⁹ (U) Email, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 23, 2016 (RG000188).

²⁴⁷⁰ (U) Text message, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 27, 2016 (RG000195).

²⁴⁷¹ (U) Text message, Goldstone to Kaveladze, November 27, 2016 (RG000195).

²⁴⁷² (U) Text message, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 28, 2016 (RG000195). It is not clear, from document production or interviews who, exactly, Veselnitskaya was hoping to meet with. In her interview with the Committee, Veselnitskaya claimed not to remember Aras Agalarov’s efforts to arrange a second meeting for her in November. Veselnitskaya Tr., pp. 82–83, 92. Veselnitskaya’s recollection is inconsistent with statements by other witnesses and documents obtained by the Committee.

²⁴⁷³ (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, November 28, 2016 (DJTJR00160).

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From: Rob Goldstone [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 28, 2016 11:49 AM
To: Rhona Graff [REDACTED]
Subject: For Mr Trump

Hi Rhona
Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team.
If needed, a lawyer representing the case is in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team.
Best
Rob

(U) Goldstone confirmed that the request to send the document came from Aras Agalarov.²⁴⁷⁴ Goldstone believed that the request was important to the Agalarovs because “they’d asked again, and I didn’t know why it was important to them, but I knew it must be important to them or they wouldn’t have made the ask.” Goldstone told the Committee that, to the best of his knowledge, neither Aras nor Emin Agalarov had any particular interest in adoption issues.²⁴⁷⁵

(U) Later that day, Graff forwarded the email, and the attached document, to Steve Bannon. She wrote.²⁴⁷⁶

From: Rhona Graff [REDACTED]
Sent: 11/28/2016 4:34:09 PM
To: Steve Bannon [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: For Mr Trump
Attachments: 2016.11.22_Tr.doc

Hi Steve:

The PE knows Aras well. Rob is his rep in the US and sent this on. Not sure how to proceed, if at all.

R

²⁴⁷⁴ (U) Goldstone said that Aras Agalarov would not ask him to do things directly, but such requests would be relayed through Aras Agalarov’s assistant or Emin Agalarov’s assistant. Goldstone Tr., pp. 221–222.

²⁴⁷⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 224–225.

²⁴⁷⁶ (U) Email, Graff to Bannon, November 28, 2016 (DJTJR00160). Graff told the Committee that it was unusual for her to email Bannon, but given that Trump had a relationship with Agalarovs, she was unsure what to do with the request. She said that Bannon never responded, and she does not know what he did with the document. Graff Tr., pp. 80–81.

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(U) Bannon said that he did not remember receiving this email, and also did not remember reading the Veselnitskaya document that was attached. In turn, Bannon did not remember what, if anything, he did with the document.²⁴⁷⁷

(U) On November 28, Kaveladze, who was in Moscow and had not received a response from Graff regarding the requested meeting, recommended to Veselnitskaya that she return to Moscow.²⁴⁷⁸

(U) Separately, at least one message following the election appeared to deal with overlapping business interests between the Agalarovs and the Trump Organization. On December 13, 2016, Emin Agalarov sent Trump Jr. a text message about partnering with “the Trump furniture producers from Turkey.”²⁴⁷⁹

Hi Don! Hope all is well, quick question for you. I've been in duscissuion [sic] with Trump furniture producers from Turkey to open a store and a distribution Chanel [sic] in Moscow. Just wanted to check with you if you are ok with us partnering up with them and launching the project. Wanted to check with you before committing) thank you, Emin (Moscow)@²⁴⁸⁰

(U) Trump Jr did not recall what this message referred to, but that to his knowledge the Trump Organization did not have additional business with the Agalarovs beyond what has been covered.²⁴⁸¹

(U) Following the election, Aras Agalarov showed signs of continued interest in demonstrating his relationship with Trump. On February 15, 2017, Goldstone emailed Graff requesting that she help Goldstone find a copy of Aras Agalarov’s previous correspondence with Trump.²⁴⁸² Goldstone explained that Aras Agalarov asked Goldstone to find a note from Trump the prior year, but Goldstone could not locate it. It is not clear if a copy of the letter was ever located.²⁴⁸³

ii. (U) Additional Communications Following the June 9, 2016 Meeting in Trump Tower

²⁴⁷⁷ (U) Bannon Tr., p. 45; The withholding of Transition communciations due to claims by the White House of potential executive privilege limited the Committee’s insight into what, if anything, was done with this document.

²⁴⁷⁸ (U) Text message, Kaveladze to Goldstone, November 28, 2016 (RG000196).

²⁴⁷⁹ (U) Text message, E. Agalarov to Trump Jr., December 13, 2016 (DJTJR00867).

²⁴⁸⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸¹ (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 39–41.

²⁴⁸² (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff, February 15, 2017 (RG000200).

²⁴⁸³ (U) Email, Graff to Goldstone, February 24, 2017 (RG000209).

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(U) In mid-2017, shortly prior to and following initial public reporting on the June 9, 2016 meeting, there were a number of communications between participants, and in some cases their associates, regarding the meeting. Lawyers for the Trump Organization, Trump Jr., and others also contacted a number of the meeting participants. In most cases these communications did not meaningfully contribute to the Committee’s understanding of the meeting, and many are not itemized in this Report.

(U) On July 14, 2017, Jason Tropea sent Roman Benjaminov a screen shot of a conversation that Tropea had with Rob Goldstone “two weeks” earlier. In that conversation Goldstone stated, regarding the June 9, 2016 meeting, “It’s being made public apparently next week[.] So will be lovely for us also[.] They want to know why [A]ras asked for it and who was it a favor for[.] That will be lovely[.]” Tropea responded, “We can consider that relationship done[.]” Goldstone then replied, “I would think so. I begged him not to do the meeting at the time and [E]min also[.] Said it was a huge favor that wasn’t worth it[.] But maybe it was worth it for [A]ras—we don’t know who asked the favor!! Could have been the BIG man.”²⁴⁸⁴

(U) Additionally, some witnesses suggested that they felt that others were not giving accurate public statements about the meeting, or felt that they were being pressured to shape their comments in exchange for financial support with legal fees.

(U) Anatoli Samochornov has stated that he was contacted by Robert Arakelian, the president of HRAGI, offering to cover his legal expenses if he was willing to confine his comments regarding the June 9 meeting to public statements already made by Veselnitskaya. Samochornov said he did not believe that Arakelian knew what he was doing, but was “shocked” that Arakelian would propose this over the phone, and declined to take money from HRAGI because Samochornov did not want to be “ beholden to them.”²⁴⁸⁵ Samochornov said that he would not perjure himself just because HRAGI was a good client, would represent himself and would be transparent.²⁴⁸⁶

(U) Kaveladze has said that he believed that Trump Jr.’s public statements regarding the June 9, 2016, meeting in Trump Tower were not accurate. In particular, Kaveladze felt that the statement the meeting focused on adoptions was not correct, and that the meeting had been primarily about the Magnitsky Act, with only a few sentences in which adoptions were mentioned. Additionally, Kaveladze felt that Trump Jr. had represented the meeting as being shorter than it was, and that it was 30-40 minutes, rather than 20 minutes.²⁴⁸⁷

²⁴⁸⁴ (U) Text message, Tropea to Benjaminov, July 14, 2017 (RB000459).

²⁴⁸⁵ (U) The SCO found that the offer was for \$90,000 of legal fees. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 122; *see also* FBI, FD-302, Samochornov 7/12/2017; FBI, FD-302, Samochornov 7/13/2017.

²⁴⁸⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017.

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(U) The Committee notes several arrangements related to participants or associates of the participants. Emin Agalarov, Irakli Kaveladze, and Jason Tropea all shared the same legal representation, Scott Balber. Tropea acknowledged that Emin Agalarov was covering his legal fees.²⁴⁸⁸ Balber had represented Donald Trump in at least one matter in 2013.²⁴⁸⁹

(U) Information obtained by the Committee also indicates an effort by Agalarov to pay for Goldstone’s legal representation. On July 13, 2017, Benjaminov sent Tropea a text message, writing: “When you get a chance, need to find out the balance on Emins [funds] here. Ike called me, said he spoke with Emin and that he wants us to pay for Robs attorney [sic].”²⁴⁹⁰ Tropea told the Committee, “I don’t know if I physically made the check out or if it was paid in another manner, but I do recall talking about this.”²⁴⁹¹ Benjaminov said that he did not know whether Goldstone’s legal fees were ultimately covered by Emin Agalarov, but stated that his own were not.²⁴⁹²

(U) Additionally, some of the participants have had continuing relationships following the June 9, 2016 meeting. For example, Kaveladze and Veselnitskaya remained in contact and Kaveladze facilitated at least two additional meetings between Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov. The first of those meetings likely took place on December 3, 2016, and the second was likely in late January 2017. Text messages between Veselnitskaya and Kaveladze do not provide meaningful additional information regarding these meetings with Agalarov. Kaveladze also facilitated an introduction between Veselnitskaya and the Agalarovs’ lawyer, Scott Balber.²⁴⁹³

(U) Balber met with Veselnitskaya at least twice in early 2017. In text messages with Kaveladze, Veselnitskaya rejected a proposed café for a meeting with Balber because there were “too many ears,” and advocated for a more private location. Veselnitskaya indicated that she regretted not meeting with Balber earlier because she would have hired “them,” referring to Balber and his team, to work on her case, but she noted that this would have prevented Balber and his team from working on the “government task” or “state assignment.” Additionally, Veselnitskaya expressed a desire to coordinate her briefings to the Russian Prosecutor General’s office with Balber’s strategy. She noted that she had previously attempted to do what Balber was doing, but had not had sufficient resources. The text messages between Veselnitskaya and

²⁴⁸⁸ (U) Tropea Tr., p. 98.

²⁴⁸⁹ (U) Kevin Cirilli, “Trump, Maher ‘birther’ feud” *Politico*, January 9, 2013.

²⁴⁹⁰ (U) Text message, Benjaminov to Tropea, July 13, 2017 (RB000456).

²⁴⁹¹ (U) Tropea Tr., p. 98.

²⁴⁹² (U) Benjaminov Tr., p. 244.

²⁴⁹³ [REDACTED] Text messages, Veselnitskaya and Kaveladze, December 2016 to February 2017

(KAVELADZE01148-01170); Kaveladze Tr., p. 114; [REDACTED]

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Kaveladze do not offer additional information regarding the nature of Balber’s work or his interactions with Veselnitskaya.²⁴⁹⁴

(U) On January 20, 2017, Rinat Akhmetshin and Veselnitskaya attended an inauguration party in Washington, D.C., hosted by Dana Rohrabacher.²⁴⁹⁵ Kaveladze told the Committee that he met with Veselnitskaya, Akhmetshin, and Samochornov, at a dinner in New York for Veselnitskaya’s birthday, likely in February of 2017. At the dinner the Magnitsky Act was discussed, and the others updated Kaveladze on their work.²⁴⁹⁶

(U) Samochornov said that he has met Akhmetshin five or six times since the June 9, 2016, meeting.²⁴⁹⁷ Samochornov also visited Veselnitskaya in Russia in April 2017, related to their work on the Prevezon case.²⁴⁹⁸

(U) Akhmetshin told the Committee that he met with Kaveladze in Moscow in June 2017, where they discussed the June 9, 2016 meeting, which had not yet been made public, and Akhmetshin unsuccessfully suggested that, “we should tell the story on our terms” and that they should find friendly news outlets through which to tell the story.²⁴⁹⁹ Akhmetshin told the Committee that when he suggested publicly acknowledging the June 9, 2016, meeting to Kaveladze, Kaveladze said, “Look, it’s not my decision,” and that, “I’m just an employee.”²⁵⁰⁰

(U) Goldstone spoke with Emin Agalarov, Kaveladze, Trump Organization counsel Alan Garten, and counsel for Trump Jr. Alan Futerfas regarding the June 9, 2016 meeting.²⁵⁰¹ Kaveladze testified that Futerfas reached out to him in June 2017, to “collect information” about the meeting and to “know what [Kaveladze’s] recollection was.”²⁵⁰² Outreach to Goldstone from Garten happened as early as June 2, 2017.²⁵⁰³ On July 9, 2017, Garten and Futerfas copied

²⁴⁹⁴ [REDACTED] Text messages, Veselnitskaya and Kaveladze, December 2016 to February 2017 (KAVELADZE01148–01170); [REDACTED]

²⁴⁹⁵ [REDACTED] Text messages, Veselnitskaya and Kaveladze, January 20, 2017 (KAVELADZE01158); Craig Timberg, et al., “In the crowd at Trump’s inauguration, members of Russia’s elite anticipated a thaw between Moscow and Washington,” *The Washington Post*, January 20, 2018; [REDACTED]

²⁴⁹⁶ (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 114.

²⁴⁹⁷ (U) Samochornov Tr., pp. 84.

²⁴⁹⁸ (U) FBI, FD-302, Samochornov 7/13/2017.

²⁴⁹⁹ (U) Akhmetshin Tr., p. 113.

²⁵⁰⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 113–114

²⁵⁰¹ (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov and Kaveladze (RG000263); Email, Futerfas to Goldstone, July 10, 2017 (RG000275); Email, Goldstone to Garten, June 2, 2017 (RG000257); Text message, Goldstone to Kaveladze, June 2, 2017 (RG000280).

²⁵⁰² (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 126–127.

²⁵⁰³ (U) Email, Goldstone to Garten, June 2, 2017 (RG000257).

[REDACTED]

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Kaveladze on emails with Goldstone to coordinate and draft a public statement related to what happened at the June 9, 2016 meeting.²⁵⁰⁴

(U) On July 23, 2017, incoming White House Communications Director Anthony Scaramucci wrote to Goldstone saying that Scaramucci officially started in August but that his door was open, and that “Obviously there is still pressure on all sides, but if we remain consistent and united I don’t envisage any issues we can’t ride out.”²⁵⁰⁵

(U) The Committee did not find specific evidence that the relationships and communications outlined above resulted in inaccurate or incomplete testimony, but the Committee’s insight on this topic is limited.

7. (U) Artem Klyushin, Konstantin Rykov, and Associates

(U) During the 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant, two Agalarov employees, Artem Klyushin and his then-wife Yulya Klyushina, spent time with Donald Trump. In particular, on Saturday, November 9, 2013, the day of the Miss Universe pageant, publicly available information indicates that Klyushina and Klyushin had some interaction with Trump at several points throughout the day. The Committee has little insight into the nature of these interactions.²⁵⁰⁶

(U) According to Roman Benjaminov, “they [Klyushin and Klyushina] were an outside firm that handled social media for Emin around the time of the contest.”²⁵⁰⁷ Klyushina used a signature block in some emails that indicated she was the General Manager of an entity called the “Innovation & Development Agency.”²⁵⁰⁸ Klyushin and Klyushina were included on a number of Emin Agalarov and Rob Goldstone’s emails prior to, and following, the Miss Universe pageant. Some of those emails related to Trump.²⁵⁰⁹

²⁵⁰⁴ (U) Emails, Futerfas, Alan Garten, Goldstone, and Kaveladze, July 9–10, 2017 (KAVELADZE00121–00123).

²⁵⁰⁵ (U) Email, Scaramucci to Goldstone, July 23, 2017 (RG000247). Additionally, the Committee notes the existence of purported Joint Defense Agreements (JDA) between parties to the June 9, 2016 meeting. While JDA arrangements are not inherently inappropriate, they do have the potential, along with other incentives, to influence candor in testimony. For more on the Committee’s experience with JDAs, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. II.C.3.

²⁵⁰⁶ (U) On November 9, 2013, Klyushina posted a photo of herself sitting with Donald Trump and Phil Ruffin, noting that Trump was, “talking...Again and again about Obama.” Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, November 9, 2013.

²⁵⁰⁷ (U) Benjaminov Tr., pp. 175–177; Klyushina later changed her last name to Alferova. Benjaminov was unaware of Klyushin or Klyushina being responsible for anything other than social media. *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰⁸ (U) Email, Klyushina to E. Agalarov and Goldstone, November 21, 2013 (RB0000629).

²⁵⁰⁹ (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Klyushina, Klyushin, Goldstone et al., June 19, 2013 (RB0000606); Email, E. Agalarov to Goldstone, Klyushin, Klyushina, et al., June 21, 2013 (RB0000021); Email, E. Agalarov to Klyushin, Klyushina, et al., January 29, 2014 (RB0000601).

[REDACTED]

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(U) Klyushin and Klyushina, along with Klyushin’s associate Konstantin Rykov, were active regarding the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.²⁵¹⁰

(U) In his interview with the Committee, Emin Agalarov sought to distance himself from Klyushin and Klyushina. Agalarov said that he terminated his work with them following the Miss Universe pageant because they were focused on self-promotion and Trump, rather than on the work for which they were originally hired. However, in mid-January 2014 remarks for an award ceremony, Emin Agalarov planned to thank Klyushin and Klyushina, among others, calling them part of his “Moscow ‘family.’”²⁵¹¹ Agalarov told the Committee he has no ongoing relationship with either of them, and that a 2019 photo with Klyushin was just a courtesy.²⁵¹²

i. (U) Artem Klyushin

(U) Apart from his work for the Agalarovs during the 2013 Miss Universe pageant, the Committee has significant concerns regarding Klyushin.

(U) The Committee assesses that Klyushin is a Kremlin-linked bot developer who has supported Russian influence operations on social media. Klyushin has publicly stated that he works for the Russian Presidential Administration and has also been affiliated with the Russian Duma. The Committee assesses that he has provided social media influence expertise to the Kremlin, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Starting in approximately 2010, Klyushin and Klyushina co-owned the Innovation & Development Agency, also known as the Agency for Development of Innovative Technologies (APRIT). In 2015, Klyushin said that APRIT had received Russian government contracts.²⁵¹⁴ Klyushin’s current company states that it is able to produce and amplify social media content through more than 1,000 accounts and millions of subscribers on social media.²⁵¹⁵

²⁵¹⁰ [REDACTED] Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, January 22, 2014. On January 22, 2014, Klyushina wrote on social media that, “I’m sure @realDonaldTrump will be great president! We’ll support you from Russia! America needs an [] ambitious leader!”; On January 28, 2015, Klyushina announced on Twitter that Trump would be running for President of the United States. Tweet, @AlferovaYulyaE, January 28, 2015. The Committee has no insight into the nature of Klyushina’s knowledge of these matters or what prompted these statements. [REDACTED]

²⁵¹¹ (U) Email, Wilson to E. Agalarov, Goldstone, et al., January 14, 2014 (RB00000986); Email, E. Agalarov to Wilson, Goldstone, et al., December 6, 2013 (RB00001567).

²⁵¹² (U) E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 34–35; Tweet, @ARTEM KLYUSHIN, May 3, 2019.

²⁵¹³ [REDACTED]

²⁵¹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁵¹⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

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Klyushin has also publicly stated that he “makes corrections to reality” and “changes emotional and logical perceptions of situations.”²⁵¹⁶

(U) In 2014, less than a year after working to promote Emin Agalarov during the Miss Universe pageant, Klyushin played a central role in Russia’s efforts to flood Ukraine’s social media platforms with pro-Kremlin propaganda. Klyushin associate and Kremlin-linked “chief troll” Konstantin Rykov was also centrally involved in these efforts.²⁵¹⁷

[REDACTED] A May 2014 Department of State cable noted that the Kremlin had “unleashed an unprecedented social media propaganda campaign to shore up domestic support for President Vladimir Putin’s policy and to support anti-Kyiv protest activity on the streets of southern and eastern Ukraine.” The cable noted that both “official and allegedly unofficial social media accounts have spewed forth an unceasing stream of disinformation and gained more and more online followers.”²⁵¹⁸ In particular, the cable noted that accounts including Klyushin (@artem_klyushin) and Konstantin Rykov (@Rykov) tweeted “pro-Kremlin patriotic propaganda about events in Ukraine nearly 24 hours a day to tens of thousands – or in Klyushin’s case, 1.4 million – followers.” The cable noted that all the messaging is similar: filled with hatred for the Ukrainian government, the United States and its policies, and Western values.²⁵¹⁹

²⁵¹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁵¹⁷ (U) [REDACTED] European Union Institute for Security Studies, “Hacks, leaks and disruptions: Russian cyber strategies,” October 2018, Chaillot Paper 148, p. 78.

²⁵¹⁸ [REDACTED]

²⁵¹⁹ [REDACTED] In June 2014 a U.S. diplomat working on Ukraine and Russia issues emailed a news article detailing Russia’s use of social media “trolls” to colleagues within the Department of State. The U.S. diplomat described the article, titled “Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America,” as a “must read” about “how the Kremlin is attempting to use [social media] to manipulate public opinion.” The U.S. diplomat observed that Russia, “may be swaying people through sheer volume (or at least discouraging people from engaging).” That message and the accompanying article were then forwarded by a senior State Department official to a smaller, more senior, group close to the Department’s leadership. The senior official indicated that the article captured “[w]hat we’re up against,” and lamented that the mainstream media was not covering the growing social media threat from Russia.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Klyushin previously served as an aide to Ilya Kostunov, who currently runs a pro-Kremlin school and training program funded by U.S.-sanctioned and indicted oligarch and influence operative Yevgeniy Prigozhin.²⁵³¹ The school, which is in St. Petersburg, focuses on co-opting young Russians. It offers political training as well as media and social media skills training.²⁵³²

[REDACTED] Klyushin began using U.S.-related hashtags in early 2016, was active on social media regarding the 2016 U.S. election, and participated in a U.S. election night party in Moscow with other Russian supporters of Donald Trump. On September 28, 2017, Klyushin claimed on social media that the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election would not have happened “without my interference.”²⁵³³ The Committee is not able to corroborate this claim.

[REDACTED] The Committee assesses that Klyushin is linked to other Kremlin allies with direct ties to the Russian Government who have been involved in foreign influence campaigns through social media. Like Klyushin, several of these individuals claimed involvement in, or were active during, the 2016 U.S. election.

ii. (U) Konstantin Rykov

(U) Klyushin is associated with a number of Kremlin-linked online influencers that are of concern to the Committee. Some of the individuals in this network have been involved in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Russian foreign influence operations targeting the elections of U.S. allies, have attempted to undermine U.S. allies by inflaming domestic tensions, and have claimed involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

[REDACTED] Konstantin Rykov, who has been referred to as the “chief troll,” is a known close associate of Klyushin and has engaged with Klyushin in running influence operations on social media.²⁵³⁴ The Committee assesses that Rykov has played a significant role in the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic influence efforts, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Rykov claims to have knowledge of the involvement of hackers, WikiLeaks, and Cambridge Analytica in the 2016 U.S. election.²⁵³⁶ He also claims to have been in direct contact over Twitter with Donald Trump in 2012.²⁵³⁷ The Committee obtained information that calls at least one of these claims into significant doubt, most notably regarding the alleged Twitter contact.²⁵³⁸ Nevertheless, Rykov’s level of access within the Russian government, his connections to online influence operatives, and his historical involvement in Kremlin influence operations, make him a significant concern.

[REDACTED] Rykov began receiving Russian government support in 2003, primarily to expand the scope of online influence efforts targeting a domestic audience by working with Kremlin-linked organizations to fill the Russian internet with pro-Kremlin content and social media commentary.²⁵³⁹

[REDACTED] However, more recently, Rykov’s influence work has taken on a wide range of foreign targets that align with Russian government interests, intelligence activities, and messaging from state media outlets involved in propaganda efforts.²⁵⁴⁰ [REDACTED] Rykov and members of his network have been involved in efforts targeting the [REDACTED]

²⁵³⁴ [REDACTED] European Union Institute for Security Studies, “Hacks, leaks and disruptions: Russian cyber strategies,” October 2018, Chaillot Paper 148, p. 78.

²⁵³⁵ [REDACTED]

²⁵³⁶ [REDACTED]

²⁵³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁵³⁸ (U) Twitter, @rykov, (direct messaging metadata).

²⁵³⁹ [REDACTED]

²⁵⁴⁰ (U) This transition is consistent with other networks of Kremlin backed influence operatives that developed their tradecraft domestically, refined it in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, and then eventually expanded its reach to Western Europe, the United States, and now Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. *See infra* Vol. 2.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] United States and elsewhere. These efforts have targeted elections and sought to sow discord by amplifying societal divisions.²⁵⁴¹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Committee assesses that Rykov is friendly with Russian Presidential Administration official Timur Prokopenko, who managed the Kremlin's media influence activities from 2012-2014 and who requested that a Kremlin-controlled institute finance Rykov's influence operations.²⁵⁴⁶

[REDACTED] The Committee assesses that, in 2014, Rykov likely collaborated with the Russian Presidential Administration regarding a Russian influence operation targeting France, in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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support of the French National Front and Marine Le Pen. Rykov has also claimed involvement in the 2017 French presidential election.²⁵⁴⁷

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Committee assesses that as of 2014, Rykov has also been significantly involved in Russian influence operations targeting Ukraine, likely at the Kremlin's request.²⁵⁵⁰

[REDACTED]

²⁵⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*
²⁵⁴⁸

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Rykov has received payments from the Presidential Administration to develop Kremlin internet projects.²⁵⁵⁵

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Aleksey Goreslavskiy, a Rykov associate and former colleague, has political oversight of online media in Russia's Presidential Administration.²⁵⁵⁷

- [REDACTED] Rykov operates many websites, some of which are funded and controlled by Russia's Presidential Administration.²⁵⁵⁸

[REDACTED] In addition to Klyushin, Rykov has ties to a number of other individuals outside of the Kremlin who are associated with Russian intelligence services or pro-Kremlin political parties, such as Leonid Reshetnikov, Aleksey Kondratyev, Aleksey Zhuraviev, German Klimenko, Aleksey Chesnakov and Aleksandr Dugin.²⁵⁵⁹

- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁵⁵⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Kondratyev is the Chair of the Security and Defense Committee in the Russian Federation Council.
- [REDACTED] Klimenko is an adviser to President Putin and pro-Kremlin social media expert.²⁵⁶²

[REDACTED]

(U) Dugin met with Steve Bannon in Rome in 2018. Bannon claimed that the meeting in 2018 was their first interaction, and that the 2016 U.S. election was not discussed.²⁵⁶⁵

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁵⁶⁵ (U) SSCI Bannon Tr., pp. 416–417; Treasury, “Treasury Announces New Designations of Ukrainian Separatists and their Russian Supporters,” March 11, 2015.

[REDACTED]

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(U) As previously noted, Rykov was also active during the 2016 U.S. election, though the full nature and scope of his activity are difficult to verify or disprove. Rykov began to show interest in, and support for, Donald Trump shortly after Trump’s campaign was announced. Vzglyad is a pro-Kremlin news website founded in 2005 by Konstantin Rykov, and is funded and controlled by the Russian government.²⁵⁶⁷ On August 18, 2015, a representative from Vzglyad reached out to Hope Hicks requesting an interview with Trump.²⁵⁶⁸ No interview took place.²⁵⁶⁹ However, two months later, on October 17, a *Washington Examiner* story titled “Putin loves Donald Trump,” prominently featured Rykov and his Kremlin ties.²⁵⁷⁰ The same day the story was published, Trump tweeted a link to it, writing, “Russia and the world has already started to respect us again!”²⁵⁷¹

[REDACTED] In addition to his connection to Klyushin, Rykov maintains contact with a network of anti-U.S. and pro-Kremlin bloggers and trolls, many of whom responded to calls by Rykov to participate in U.S. election-related efforts online in 2016. Following the election, many of those actors took steps to hide their activities.²⁵⁷²

[REDACTED] Rykov, who owns the official domain for Putin’s 2018 re-election campaign putin2018.ru, as well as marinelepen.ru, registered a media aggregation website, trump2016.ru, in August 2015.²⁵⁷³ Rykov distributed polling data and memes, was active on social media, and organized election-related events, at least one of which was attended by Klyushin.

[REDACTED] Another one of Rykov’s election events was attended by Anton Korobkov-Zemlyanskiy, a pro-Kremlin social media operative and bot developer whose activities have targeted foreign countries including the United States. Zemlyanski was involved in Ukraine with Klyushin and Rykov, and was removed from Twitter after he made an online death threat toward a U.S. official in Moscow. Zemlyanski’s removal reportedly only provoked more threats from his associates.²⁵⁷⁴

2567 [REDACTED]

2568 (U) Email, Georgi Asatryan to Hope Hicks, August 18, 2015 (DJTFP00005700).

2569 (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 66.

2570 (U) David M. Drucker, “Putin loves Donald Trump,” *Washington Examiner*, October 17, 2015.

2571 (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, October 17, 2015.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) In addition to Klyushin and Zemlyanski, Rykov’s gatherings in Moscow for the 2016 U.S. election and inauguration were also attended by a range of other individuals such as pro-Kremlin propagandist Maria Katasonova, Duma member Aleksey Zhuravlev, and Jack Hanick, an American media consultant who is associated with U.S.-sanctioned oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev and the pro-Kremlin propaganda media outlet Tsargrad TV.²⁵⁷⁵

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Following the 2016 U.S. election, Russian political elites congratulated Rykov regarding the results of the U.S. election. Among others, Rykov was congratulated by the Kremlin’s Aleksey Zharich.²⁵⁷⁷ On social media, Rykov was told that “we are waiting for the victory of Le Pen.”²⁵⁷⁸

[REDACTED] Following Le Pen’s 2017 defeat in the French presidential election, Rykov told a journalist that he was disappointed that his support for Le Pen “did not work out the same way that it did with the US President.”²⁵⁷⁹

²⁵⁷⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

D. (U) Trump Tower Moscow

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, Donald Trump and the Trump Organization pursued a business deal in Russia. Michael Cohen, then an executive vice president at the Trump Organization and personal attorney to Trump, primarily handled and pursued these efforts.

(U) The Trump Organization had repeatedly sought a deal in Russia for decades, but no deal had advanced beyond initial negotiations. In September 2015, approximately three months after Trump declared his candidacy for president, Cohen received two offers from businessmen with connections to Russia to build a “Trump Tower” in Moscow.²⁵⁸⁰ One proposal came from Felix Sater, a longtime business associate of Trump who had worked closely with the Trump Organization on and off for over a decade. A second proposal came from Giorgi Rtskhiladze, another previous business partner of the Trump Organization and who had years before worked with Cohen on building a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia.

(U) Both proposals envisioned the construction of a Moscow skyscraper to be known as Trump Tower Moscow, which would pair Russia-based developers and businessmen with the Trump Organization in a licensing deal. This licensing deal would require the Russian developer to finance and build the tower, while the Trump Organization, as the licensee, would receive an assortment of fees and payments for the use of the Trump brand.

(U) In September 2015, Trump authorized Cohen to pursue the Sater-related deal. Cohen, through Sater, began negotiations with a Russia-based developer, Andrey Rozov and Rozov’s company, I.C. Expert. By late October 2015, Sater, Cohen, and I.C. Expert had agreed on terms for a detailed Letter of Intent (LOI). The LOI laid out the main terms of a licensing deal that promised to provide the Trump Organization millions of dollars upon the signing of a deal, and hundreds of millions of dollars if the project advanced to completion. By early November 2015, Trump and Rozov co-signed the LOI.

(U) Cohen kept Trump updated on the progress of the deal. While these negotiations were ongoing, Trump made positive public comments about Putin in connection with his presidential campaign. Cohen and Sater sought to leverage Trump’s comments, as well as subsequent comments about Trump by Putin, to advance the deal. Both Cohen and Sater at various times understood that both Putin’s and Trump’s comments could be useful in advancing the deal.

²⁵⁸⁰ (U) A third proposal, provided to Eric Trump, also arrived from individuals associated with the Moscow city government through Boris Epshteyn. This proposal is described *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.D.3.v.

(U) Sater told Cohen about high-level outreach to Russian businessmen and officials that Sater claimed to have undertaken related to the deal. While Sater almost certainly inflated some of these claims, the Committee found that Sater did, in fact, have significant senior-level ties to a number of Russian businessmen and former government officials, and was in a position, through intermediaries, to reach individuals close to Putin.

(U) Cohen and Sater also made plans for Cohen and Trump to travel to Russia as a predicate to finalizing a deal. Cohen instructed Sater to plan a trip for Cohen first; after Cohen's trip, the plan was for Trump to travel to Russia to meet with Putin in relation to the deal. Cohen also contacted Dmitri Klokov, a Russian individual who had reached out about the deal and the possibility of a meeting between Trump and Putin. While little is known about Klokov, the nature of the outreach and Klokov's ties to the Russian government suggest that his outreach may have been sanctioned by the Russian government. Cohen ultimately declined Klokov's offers.

(U) By the end of 2015, Cohen had become frustrated that the deal with Sater was not progressing fast enough and began reaching out to the Kremlin directly to solicit the Russian government's assistance. Cohen eventually made contact in January 2016 with a Russian Presidential Administration aide to Dmitri Peskov, a senior Kremlin official and key advisor to Putin. Cohen discussed the project in detail and reported to Trump that he had done so. As a result of this direct outreach to the Russian Presidential Administration and Sater's separate efforts to conduct outreach to individuals in Russia, the Committee found that senior Russian government officials including almost certainly President Vladimir Putin were aware of the deal by January 2016.

(U) Cohen and Sater continued negotiations into the spring of 2016. Their effort primarily focused on efforts to travel to Russia to advance the deal, but the Committee found no evidence of other concrete steps they took during this time. By June 2016, Sater, through his contacts in Russia, had helped organize an invitation for Cohen to attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). Cohen initially agreed to travel to Russia and forwarded passport information to Sater. However, on June 14, 2016, Cohen and Sater met in person in Trump Tower, and Cohen likely relayed that he would not be able to travel to Russia at that time. Around that time, attempts to advance the deal stopped.

2. (U) Past Efforts to Conduct a Real Estate Deal in Russia with Felix Sater

(U) Donald Trump and the Trump Organization's pursuit of a real estate deal in Russia extended over several decades and involved a variety of potential partners, including Felix Sater. In the 1990s, Trump pursued developments in Russia with various American businessmen, including Bennett LeBow, Howard Lorber, and others (described *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.I.4). From approximately late 2013 to late 2014, the Trump Organization sought a separate licensing

[REDACTED]

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deal in Russia with the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate company owned and managed by the Agalarov family (described *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.3.v).

(U) However, the most persistent effort involved Sater. Starting in the early 2000s, the Trump Organization and Donald Trump repeatedly sought assistance from Sater to close a real estate deal in Russia. For more than a decade, Sater sought to connect the Trump Organization with Russian developers and investors in pursuit of real estate opportunities in Russia, particularly in Moscow. Sater relied on an expansive network of personal and professional contacts with Russian businessmen, senior Russian government officials (including from the intelligence services), and individuals connected to Eurasian organized crime. Most recently, during the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, Sater was involved in efforts to build a real estate development commonly known as Trump Tower Moscow.

i. (U) Felix Sater’s Background and Ties to the Russian Government

(U) In 1998, prior to his work with the Trump Organization, Sater came under federal criminal investigation along with several other individuals for money laundering and stock manipulation. At the time, Sater was in Russia working on a business deal to rent a transatlantic cable from AT&T.²⁵⁸¹

[REDACTED] Sater was indicted in the Eastern District of New York in April 1998 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In an interview with the Committee, Sater recalled that he knew he was being surveilled “all the time” in Moscow.²⁵⁸⁴

(U) According to Sater, in an effort to generate goodwill with the FBI in anticipation of a U.S. prosecution, Sater began providing information to [REDACTED], an individual Sater met in Russia and who told Sater that he worked for the [REDACTED].²⁵⁸⁵

²⁵⁸¹ (U) Transcript of Sentencing Before the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, *United States v. Felix Sater*, Case No. 98-CR-1101-ILG (E.D.N.Y. October 23, 2009), p. 6; SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Felix Sater, April 4, 2018, p. 58.

²⁵⁸² [REDACTED]
²⁵⁸³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

²⁵⁸⁴ (U) Sater Tr., p. 70. Sater recalled being followed by a car and in coffee shops. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²⁵⁸⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63; Benton Campbell, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, August 27, 2009, p. 3.

[REDACTED]

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(U) Sater recalled that in the course of his routine social interactions, which included dining and consuming alcohol with Russian associates, he met [REDACTED] Sater recalled [REDACTED] approaching him during one such social occasion with approximately 20 individuals at a dinner:

*I go to the bathroom, the guy follows me to the bathroom, [REDACTED]. He says: I'd like your phone number; I'd like to talk to you tomorrow. I said: Sure. The next day, I met him at an Irish pub. That's when he proceeded to tell me that I'm sitting with very serious intelligence guys.*²⁵⁸⁶

[REDACTED]

(U) Sater began using his existing network, largely in Russia, to establish a network of contacts including intelligence officers, military operatives, and personnel at military research facilities in various countries.²⁵⁸⁸ Sater explained that he was in contact with “mostly GRU [Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate] guys.”²⁵⁸⁹

(U) One of Sater’s primary contacts providing information at this time was Evgeny Shmykov.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁵⁸⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸⁷

[REDACTED]

²⁵⁸⁸ (U) Sater Tr., p. 9.

²⁵⁸⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 61. Sater explained that he knew these GRU-affiliated individuals “because they were in control of the telecommunications” and further explained that they “were all retired or semi-retired. Who the hell knows?”

[REDACTED]

(U) In November 1998, Sater returned to the United States and surrendered to the FBI. Sater pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering enterprise and, as part of his plea, began serving as a government cooperator. Over the course of approximately a decade, Sater was a prolific cooperator for the U.S. Government, providing information on “the most elusive and dangerous” individuals of interest to U.S. law enforcement.²⁵⁹³ Sater also served as a source of “valuable foreign intelligence” in a variety of national security areas.²⁵⁹⁴

(U) Sater’s cooperation reveals a number of connections and accesses related to high-level national security information. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), Sater’s

²⁵⁹² [REDACTED]

²⁵⁹³ (U) Memorandum & Order, *United States v. Felix Sater*, Case No. 98-CR-1101-ILG (E.D.N.Y. July. 22, 2019), p. 1.

²⁵⁹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

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cooperation was “extraordinary.”²⁵⁹⁵ Sater’s cooperation covered a “depth and breadth rarely seen,” and included the provision of information on cyber crime, al-Qa’ida, Russian military and defense matters, and Russian organized crime.²⁵⁹⁶ Some of these topics included the U.S. Government’s highest priority national security matters. For example, Sater acquired satellite phone numbers associated with Usama Bin Laden and information on Bin Laden’s whereabouts following September 11, 2001; the whereabouts of then-Taliban leader Mullah Omar; al-Qa’ida’s internal structuring and financial capabilities; and ground reports related to battle damage assessments during Operation Enduring Freedom.²⁵⁹⁷ Sater also provided information about a variety of organized crime matters inside the United States, a number of which directly contributed to high-profile prosecutions of organized crime figures.²⁵⁹⁸ At Sater’s sentencing, a DOJ representative told a federal judge that “[t]here was nothing [Sater] wouldn’t do. No task was too big. He . . . was the key to open a hundred different doors that [the FBI] couldn’t open prior to that time.”²⁵⁹⁹

(U) Sater’s accesses came from his continued connections to Russian individuals and criminal groups. Sater used his “connections with several high-ranking Russian military or former military and KGB officers” as the source for the information he provided to the U.S. Government, including much of the information described above.²⁶⁰⁰ In addition, Sater provided information about Russian organized crime leaders in Russia, including their identities, roles, and U.S.-based operations.²⁶⁰¹ He also participated in FBI undercover operations in Cyprus and Turkey targeting Russian criminals.²⁶⁰² In addition to the Russian government information listed

²⁵⁹⁵ (U) Transcript of Sentencing Before the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, *United States v. Felix Sater*, Case No. 98-CR-1101-ILG (E.D.N.Y. October 23, 2009), p. 4. During the confirmation process for her appointment as Attorney General, Loretta Lynch addressed the issue of Sater’s cooperation, particularly as it related to the sealing of certain records in Sater’s case pertaining to his cooperation and sentencing. Lynch described the information provided by Sater as a result of his cooperation with the government as “valuable and sensitive” and noted that the court had twice upheld its order to seal much of the record. Letter, Lynch to Grassley and Leahy, February 9, 2015. Nearly all of the record in Sater’s case was unsealed by Judge Leo Glasser in 2019. Memorandum & Order, *United States v. Felix Sater*, Case No. 98-CR-1101-ILG (E.D.N.Y. July. 22, 2019).

²⁵⁹⁶ (U) Benton Campbell, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, August 27, 2009.

²⁵⁹⁷ (U) Leslie R. Caldwell and Kelly A. Moore, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, October 19, 2009; Benton Campbell, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, August 27, 2009.

²⁵⁹⁸ (U) Benton Campbell, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, August 27, 2009.

²⁵⁹⁹ (U) Transcript of Sentencing Before the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, *United States v. Felix Sater*, Case No. 98-CR-1101-ILG (E.D.N.Y. October 23, 2009), p. 12; SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Felix Sater, April 4, 2018, p. 13.

²⁶⁰⁰ (U) Benton Campbell, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, August 27, 2009, p. 8.

²⁶⁰¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰² (U) *Ibid.*; Transcript of Sentencing Before the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, *United States v. Felix Sater*, Case No. 98-CR-1101-ILG (E.D.N.Y. October 23, 2009).

[REDACTED]

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above relating to Shmykov, Sater also provided information about a number of Russian oligarchs and their ties to organized crime.²⁶⁰³

ii. (U) Sater’s Relationship with the Trump Organization

(U) Sater first began working with the Trump Organization in the early 2000s while he was an executive at Bayrock, a New York-based real estate and development company. Sater managed Bayrock; his partner was Tefvik Arif, a former Soviet government trade official.²⁶⁰⁴

(U) Arif has connections to Russia and Turkey, and information obtained by the Committee suggests he was involved in Russian organized crime, money laundering, and human trafficking dating back to at least 2000.

- (U) In 2010, Arif was arrested along with a group of others while aboard a luxury yacht in Turkey as part of prostitution sting.²⁶⁰⁵ The charges were eventually dropped.²⁶⁰⁶
- (U) Sater, Arif’s longtime business partner, suggested to the Committee that he believed Arif engaged in human trafficking in the United States and elsewhere.²⁶⁰⁷ According to Sater, Arif brought “thousands” of women into the United States, primarily from Ukraine.²⁶⁰⁸

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

²⁶⁰³ (U) Benton Campbell, Letter to the Honorable I. Leo Glasser, Re: *United States v. Felix Sater*, August 27, 2009.

²⁶⁰⁴ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 81-92; Craig Shaw, *et al.*, “World leaders, mobsters, smog and mirrors,” *The Black Sea*, December 20, 2016.

²⁶⁰⁵ (U) Craig Shaw, *et al.*, “World leaders, mobsters, smog and mirrors,” *The Black Sea*, December 20, 2016.

²⁶⁰⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰⁷ (U) Sater Tr., p. 258.

²⁶⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.* [REDACTED]

²⁶¹⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶¹¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Open source reporting indicates that Bayrock is connected to Mashkevich and the Eurasian Group, a company controlled by Chodiev and Ibragimov.²⁶¹⁵

[REDACTED]

(U) In approximately 2000, Bayrock, led by Sater and Arif, leased office space on the 24th floor of Trump Tower in New York, which ultimately led to Sater’s introduction to Trump. Trump’s offices were on the 26th floor of Trump Tower, above Bayrock.²⁶¹⁷

(U) Sater and Bayrock’s projects with the Trump Organization included a development in Ft. Lauderdale and the Trump SoHo development in New York. Throughout this time, Sater interacted with, and reported to, Donald Trump on deals.²⁶¹⁸

(U) In 2007, *The New York Times* revealed Sater’s 1998 sealed indictment and his cooperation with the U.S. Government.²⁶¹⁹ Sater appeared to cut ties with Bayrock in response.

(U) In late 2009 or early 2010, Sater and another associate, Daniel Ridloff, were provided office space on the 26th floor of Trump Tower in return for their efforts to source international deals.²⁶²⁰ Several Trump Organization senior officers recalled that Sater had been

²⁶¹² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁶¹³ [REDACTED]

²⁶¹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶¹⁵ (U) Richard Behar, “Trump and the Oligarch ‘Trio,’” *Forbes*, October 25, 2016. [REDACTED]

²⁶¹⁶ (U) [REDACTED]

²⁶¹⁷ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 26, 39.

²⁶¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.

²⁶¹⁹ (U) Charles V. Bagli, “Real Estate Executive With Hand in Trump Projects Rose From Tangled Past,” *The New York Times*, December 17, 2007.

²⁶²⁰ (U) Sater described his mandate as “the world except Africa.” Sater Tr., p. 35.

[REDACTED]

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successful in two separate deals and had “proven himself” as being able to deliver licensing opportunities of a significant size.²⁶²¹ Sater was given the title of “Senior Advisor to Donald Trump.”²⁶²² Sater was not paid a salary, but was promised a share of proceeds from successful business deals he brought in. Sater used business cards with the Trump Organization logo and traveled on behalf of the Trump Organization, meeting developers and other investors.²⁶²³ This arrangement, and Sater’s office space on the 26th floor of Trump Tower only several office’s away from Trump, gave Sater greater access to Trump, allowing Sater the ability to see Trump frequently and “pitch” business opportunities to him.²⁶²⁴ During this time, Trump would see Sater every day, generally more than once.²⁶²⁵ In general, Sater recalled that he had interacted with Trump “hundreds” of times over the course of their relationship.²⁶²⁶ After less than a year, Sater left his advisory role to the Trump Organization without completing any new deals.²⁶²⁷

iii. (U) Sater’s History of Trump Development Work in Russia

(U) Sater recalled working on a Trump project in Moscow as early as 2003 or 2004 when he took an “exploratory trip” to Russia to meet with real estate developers about potentially building a Trump Tower.²⁶²⁸ By 2004 or 2005, Sater had undertaken negotiations related to a former pencil factory in the Moscow area. Sater explained that he had taken three or four trips related to the Moscow project and would provide updates to Trump upon his return.²⁶²⁹

(U) Sater continued these efforts in the following years with a variety of different developers and locations, including an opportunity involving a location in Moscow City slated for a high-rise building.²⁶³⁰ Sater recalled making a licensing deal proposal to Russian oligarch

²⁶²¹ (U) See, e.g., SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Donald J. Trump, Jr., December 13, 2017, p. 267.

²⁶²² (U) Sater Tr., p. 26.

²⁶²³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 37–38.

²⁶²⁴ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 174; Sater Tr., p. 26. A number of individuals associated with the Trump Organization sought to distance themselves and the Trump Organization from Sater. For example, Keith Schiller, Trump’s longtime chief of security who had an office on the 26th floor in close proximity to Trump’s office, claimed that he had interacted with Sater “once, maybe twice.” SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Keith Schiller, February 7, 2018, p. 127. Sater told the Committee that he interacted with Schiller “a couple times a day, a couple times a week, a couple times a month, depending if I was there. But yes, I know Keith very well. . . . I’ve met him more than a hundred times. . . . and he’s always around, so I would always bump into him, whether it was outside the elevator, by the waiting room, downstairs getting coffee. Many, many occasions I’ve met with Keith.” Sater Tr., pp. 38–39. Rhona Graff, Trump’s longtime assistant who maintained an office immediately adjacent to Trump’s on the 26th floor, told the Committee that she recalled meeting Sater a “handful of times.” Graff Tr., p. 190.

²⁶²⁵ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 173–174. At that time, Cohen also worked out of an office on the 26th floor of Trump Tower.

²⁶²⁶ (U) Sater Tr., p. 260.

²⁶²⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁶²⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁶²⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 91–92.

²⁶³⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96.

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Sergei Polonsky related to a “Federation Tower Trump.” Polonsky was the head of Mirax Group, a large Russian real estate and development company, during that time. Sater recalled Polonsky telling him, “I’m the Trump of Russia; why doesn’t he pay me?”²⁶³¹ Sater recalled personally introducing “a few of Polonsky’s partners or directors” to Trump as part of these discussions.²⁶³² Sater ultimately became involved in Mirax. Sater also recalled discussing a potential Trump project in Russia from approximately 2005-2008 with Pavel Fuks. Sater stated that he knows Fuks “really well” and that they had “numerous” discussions “in Moscow, then in New York” over several years about a potential Trump deal.²⁶³³ Sater was eventually given a one-year exclusivity deal with the Trump Organization for potential deals in Russia.²⁶³⁴

(U) Sater explained that he pursued a large number of international deals which he pitched to Trump and the Trump Organization. As a result, he believed that there was not a “special affinity” to Russia, but that a variety of factors made the prospect of a Russia deal “interesting.”²⁶³⁵

*Was there a specific affinity to Russia? No. But [the Russians] were rich, they had money, and it would have been a good opportunity to make money, and thus Russia was very much an interesting city. And because I speak Russian, because I have relationships there, and because we knew developers there, it was quite interesting.*²⁶³⁶

(U) Sater’s interest in pursuing a deal in Russia, however, did not occur in complete isolation. For example, in 2007, Donald Trump wrote a letter to Putin congratulating him on Putin’s being named “Person of the Year” by *Time*.²⁶³⁷

²⁶³¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶³² (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 98.


²⁶³³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 97.

²⁶³⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.

²⁶³⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²⁶³⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶³⁷ (U) Letter, Trump to Putin, December 19, 2007 (TRUMPORG_18_000046). The Committee did not obtain a clear explanation as to why this letter was sent, or whether any response was provided.



(U) While Trump was Sater's primary point of contact in the Trump Organization, Sater also worked with Donald Trump Jr., Ivanka Trump, and Jason Greenblatt at various times during his efforts.²⁶³⁸ For example, in approximately 2006, Sater recalled traveling to Russia on Trump's request because both Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. would be traveling there, in part to research potential deals. Sater recalled accompanying both Trump children during this trip:

[Trump] said: My kids are going there; I'd feel a lot more comfortable if you were there looking after them. There's still a concern; they're young. Do you think you could go there? I said: No problem. And I flew there from Europe, because I didn't fly there with them, and I met them there. We stayed at the

²⁶³⁸ (U) Sater Tr., p. 93.

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*National Hotel together, and I did what their dad asked me, keep an eye on them. . . . They were actually talking to other people about potential deals. He just wanted me there to sort of keep an eye on them, literally. I don't know about protection, but—well, yes, I guess he wanted somebody that he knows and trusted there to look after his kids.*²⁶³⁹

(U) On that trip Sater facilitated a tour of the Kremlin which Sater later referenced in communications with Cohen during the 2016 presidential campaign. Sater told the Committee:

*I contacted a very close friend of my partner Teyfik [Arif] and told them -- told him that I needed to impress the Trump kids. And he made the arrangements for a private tour of the Kremlin, where it was just me, [Ivanka Trump], I think it was the curator for the Kremlin, and one security person, I guess somebody the equivalent of their Secret Service, and a translator, I remember. But then afterwards the curator and translator, once we finished going through some of the Newseum-quality rooms, as we're passing, the security guard says: That's the boss's room. And he opens it and he shows an office. [Ivanka Trump] said: Can I sit down behind the chair? I said: Let her. And he's like: You're out of your mind. I said: No, no; let her; just trust me; she's the daughter of a VIP from the U.S.; what's she going to do, steal his pen? You're standing right here." And I convinced him to let her sit in the chair. She sat in the chair, spun around two or three times, said "Wow," walked out, and that was it. Then later we went to dinner.*²⁶⁴⁰

[REDACTED] Sater stated that the "close friend" of Arif was Telman Ismailov. Sater recalled having been previously introduced to Ismailov by Arif and understood that at the time he was "very influential" in Moscow.²⁶⁴¹ [REDACTED]² Sater further explained that years later Ismailov had a "major falling out" with Putin "because he was asked to build a hotel for the Sochi Olympics and he refused and then built a major hotel in Turkey, and that was the beginning of his end."²⁶⁴³

3. (U) Trump Tower Moscow Projects During the 2016 Presidential Campaign

(U) During the 2016 election cycle, at least three proposals for a Trump Tower project in Moscow came to senior employees of the Trump Organization.

²⁶³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100.

²⁶⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.

²⁶⁴¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 104.

²⁶⁴² [REDACTED]

²⁶⁴³ (U) Sater Tr., p. 106.

[REDACTED]

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(U) Two of these proposals came to Michael Cohen, then an executive vice president at the Trump Organization and personal attorney to Trump, from individuals with strong connections in Russia who had done business with Trump and the Trump Organization in the past. The first of these proposals involved Felix Sater. The second involved Giorgi Rtskhiladze, another businessman who had previously worked to build a Trump Tower in Batumi, Georgia, and who also has significant ties to Russia. Both were offered to Cohen in September 2015, shortly after Cohen's efforts to setup a meeting between Putin and Trump in New York. While there is no direct evidence linking these proposals to Cohen's Kremlin outreach, the timing of the proposals suggests there may be some link between the two.

(U) In the spring of 2016, Boris Epshteyn, a Trump Campaign surrogate and later employee, brought a third proposal to Eric Trump. The Epshteyn proposal, which came through individuals connected to the Moscow city government, involved construction of a smaller hotel in Russia.

(U) Also during the 2016 elections, an individual named Dmitri Klokov contacted Cohen to set up a potential Trump-Putin meeting, possibly in relation to the Trump Tower Moscow discussions.

i. (U) Attempts to Broker a Meeting Between Trump and Putin during the 2015 United Nations General Assembly.

(U) On September 15, 2015, Cohen appeared on a radio program with conservative media personality Sean Hannity. On the program, Cohen claimed that there is a "better than likely chance" that Trump would meet with Putin during Putin's upcoming trip to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.²⁶⁴⁴ Cohen initially told the Committee that he was "just throwing it out there in order to have fun." However, Cohen later admitted that prior to the Hannity show, he had engaged in efforts to arrange such a meeting. According to Cohen, before his Hannity interview, he had conducted an internet search for the Kremlin, found a phone number, and called that number.²⁶⁴⁵ The woman who answered spoke both English and Russian. Cohen recalled that he asked the woman if there was "[a]ny chance when President Putin is in New York at the General Assembly he'd like to come by and have a burger with Mr. Trump at the [G]rille?"²⁶⁴⁶ Cohen claimed the Kremlin representative responded by stating that she didn't think "protocol" would allow it, but that she would "let you know if we can."²⁶⁴⁷

²⁶⁴⁴ (U) Andrew Kaczynski, "Trump's Lawyer: 'Better Than Likely Chance Trump May Even Meet With Putin' During U.N.," *BuzzFeed News*, September 17, 2015.

²⁶⁴⁵ (U) SSCI Interview of the Transcript with Michael Cohen, October 25, 2017, pp. 29–30.

²⁶⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.* Cohen was referring to Trump Grille, a restaurant in Trump Tower in New York.

²⁶⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

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Cohen provided the woman his phone number to follow-up. Cohen initially claimed to the Committee that he never told Trump or anyone else in the Trump Organization or Trump Campaign about the outreach or the idea for the meeting.²⁶⁴⁸

(U) Cohen admitted in subsequent testimony with the Committee that much of this original account was false. Cohen had, in fact, discussed the potential Putin meeting with Trump “two or three” times and Cohen’s outreach had been supported by Trump.²⁶⁴⁹ Cohen recalled Trump seeing press articles which suggested that then-President Obama would not meet with Putin during UNGA.²⁶⁵⁰ Cohen recalled Trump rhetorically asking him “[h]ow stupid is our President not to meet with Putin when he’s here?”²⁶⁵¹ Cohen recalled telling Trump that it would be “really cool” if “we can get [Putin] to come here and have a burger with you over at the Trump Grille.”²⁶⁵² Trump directed Cohen to “see if you can make it happen.”²⁶⁵³ Cohen subsequently conducted the initial outreach to the Kremlin.²⁶⁵⁴

(U) On September 10, 2015, after Cohen’s initial outreach to the Kremlin but prior to the Hannity appearance, a reporter with *The New York Times* reached out to Hope Hicks about the possibility that Trump would meet with Putin in New York.²⁶⁵⁵ Hicks immediately forwarded the inquiry to Cohen and copied Corey Lewandowski, writing only “Michael?” in the body of the email.²⁶⁵⁶ Cohen recalled that he informed Hicks and Lewandowski of his efforts to arrange a meeting between Putin and Trump at this time.²⁶⁵⁷

²⁶⁴⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31. Cohen later told the SCO that he had discussed this outreach with the then-President Trump’s attorney prior to his testimony before the Committee and that the President’s attorney discussed keeping Trump out of the narrative. In particular, the President’s attorney expressed his belief that the story was not relevant, and that the story should not be included in his statement to the Committee. Cohen further recalled that he understood from this interaction that if he stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back. *SCO Report*, Vol. II, p. 142.

²⁶⁴⁹ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 314.

²⁶⁵⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵² (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵³ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 317.

²⁶⁵⁵ (U) Email, Haberman to Hicks, September 10, 2016 (DJTFP00005761).

²⁶⁵⁶ (U) Email, Hicks to Cohen and Lewandowski, September 10, 2016 (DJTFP00005761).

²⁶⁵⁷ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 317. Cohen’s admission that he told Hicks and Lewandowski, which is consistent with Hick’s email to Cohen, conflicts with what Hicks told the Committee. Hicks claimed that she didn’t recall any discussion of a potential meeting between Trump and Putin. Hicks further explained Cohen’s public comments on Hannity by claiming Cohen was fabricating the possibility that a Trump-Putin meeting might occur, stating that “Michael says a lot of things publicly that aren’t accurate.” Hicks Tr., p. 23. Cohen recalled Trump’s reaction to media attention to the issue was to simply “[j]ust let them keep writing.” Cohen Tr. II, p. 318.

[REDACTED]

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(U) As noted, Cohen recalled speaking to Trump several times about the proposed meeting.²⁶⁵⁸ Sometime after the September 15, 2015 Hannity radio interview, Cohen initiated a second call with the representative of the Russian government.²⁶⁵⁹ Cohen was told that “protocol” would not allow the meeting to occur.²⁶⁶⁰ Cohen was under the impression that Putin was informed of the outreach.²⁶⁶¹ Cohen ultimately informed Trump that the meeting would not happen.²⁶⁶²

(U) In late September 2015, Cohen received two seemingly independent offers to build a Trump Tower Moscow. The offers, one from Giorgi Rtskhiladze and one from Felix Sater, arrived within days of each other.²⁶⁶³ Cohen admitted that he had never before received two separate offers for the same building location at approximately the same time.²⁶⁶⁴ Cohen claimed that he did not believe that either offer was in any way connected to his outreach to the Kremlin earlier in the month.²⁶⁶⁵ Sater claimed that his outreach was undertaken at his own initiative.²⁶⁶⁶ Rtskhiladze claimed that his outreach was undertaken at the behest of a business associate.²⁶⁶⁷

ii. (U) Felix Sater: Michael Cohen’s First Trump Tower Moscow Line of Effort During the Campaign

In September 2015, Sater and Cohen began discussing the possibility of building a Trump Tower in Moscow. Efforts to move the deal forward continued until at least June 2016.

²⁶⁵⁸ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 314.

²⁶⁵⁹ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. II, p. 141.

²⁶⁶⁰ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 315.

²⁶⁶¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶² (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. II, pp. 141–142.

²⁶⁶³ (U) Sater Tr., p. 93; Rtskhiladze Tr., 97–98

²⁶⁶⁴ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 118.

²⁶⁶⁵ (U) Both Rtskhiladze and Sater have contacts connected to the Kremlin, particularly the office of Dmitri Peskov. For example, Sater claimed that one of his close contacts, Emin Iskenderov, had access to Peskov and that he had used Iskenderov to conduct outreach to Peskov. Sater Tr., p. 191; *see also* FBI, FD-302, Sater 12/15/2017; FBI, FD-302, Sater 9/19/2017. Rtskhiladze has privately claimed that Peskov is his “good friend.” Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen, March 12, 2017 (RTSKHILADZE-0000245). Furthermore, a similar contact progression involving Peskov’s office likely occurred separately during the course of the Trump Moscow project. In that case, the day after Cohen unilaterally made contact with Peskov’s assistant in mid-January 2016, Sater contacted Cohen, stating that it was “about Putin” and that “they called today,” suggesting that Cohen’s outreach did prompt Kremlin involvement. Text message, Sater to Cohen, January 21, 2016 (FSS00131).

²⁶⁶⁶ (U) Sater Tr., p. 108. Sater claimed that Trump’s campaign created “a lot of good noise” which served as a “PR campaign to get a Trump Tower Moscow built.”

²⁶⁶⁷ (U) Written Responses, Rtskhiladze, August 23, 2019. Rtskhiladze claimed that he reached out to Cohen after his business associate, Simon Nizharadze, asked him to facilitate a deal between Trump and Vladimir Mazur, a Russian businessman. *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

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a. (U) Origins of the Sater Proposal

(U) In late September 2015, Sater called Andrei Rozov, the head of the Russian real estate development firm I.C. Expert, to present Rozov with the concept for a Trump Tower Moscow.²⁶⁶⁸

(U) A body of information suggests Rozov’s personal and professional network likely has at least some ties to individuals associated with Russian influence operations. For example, Rozov’s associate Stalbek Mishakov has significant ties to Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who the Committee assesses undertakes a wide variety of Russian government influence operations.

- (U) Sater said that he knew Mishakov and that Sater had met him a “bunch of times.”²⁶⁶⁹ Sater at first stated that Rozov and Mishakov were “friends,” before claiming that they were “business associates” or “acquaintances.”²⁶⁷⁰ Open source reporting corroborates the connections between Mishakov and Rozov. For example, Mishakov and Rozov have shared board positions at the same company.²⁶⁷¹
- [REDACTED] For years, Mishakov has maintained a series of board and senior executive positions with several of Deripaska’s companies, including as serving as Advisor to the General Director at RUSAL Global Management BV CJSC.²⁶⁷³ Sater also recalled that Mishakov had managed at least one project for Deripaska in Moscow.²⁶⁷⁴

²⁶⁶⁸ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 107–109. The Committee did not have a record of the call in order to determine the specific timing with certainty. Sater explained to the Committee that he had a longstanding relationship with Rozov. Sater and Rozov were both involved with Mirax Group since approximately 2007 or 2008. Sater stated that he and Rozov developed a very close friendship and had conducted business together in the past. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

²⁶⁶⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 121.

²⁶⁷⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷¹ (U) “JSC ‘1 MPZ IM. V.A. Kazakova,’ General Meeting Decision,” *Interfax*, September 17, 2007.

²⁶⁷² [REDACTED]

²⁶⁷³ (U) “People: GMK Noril’skiy Nikel PAO, Stalbek Mishakov,” *Reuters*, undated.

²⁶⁷⁴ (U) Sater Tr., p. 121.

²⁶⁷⁵ [REDACTED]

²⁶⁷⁶ (U) *Ibid.* For information on [REDACTED] see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.i and Vol. 5, Sec. III.J.4.

(U) After contacting Rozov, Sater called Cohen and presented the idea for a Trump Tower Moscow.²⁶⁸⁰ According to Cohen, he and Sater were not in close contact prior to the initial Trump Tower Moscow outreach.²⁶⁸¹ Sater and Cohen discussed an initial concept for the project involving a skyscraper, one that would seek to be the tallest tower in Europe.²⁶⁸² Sater believed that a deal this large would require approval from the city government of Moscow and further suggested that approval from Putin would be necessary.²⁶⁸³ Sater recalled that after bringing the proposal to Cohen, Cohen sought and obtained approval from Trump to initiate the negotiations.²⁶⁸⁴ Sater recalled:

*I came to Michael and said: Michael, I have a potential Trump Tower deal in Moscow that we could do; I have a good developer; I want to speak to Mr. T. He said: Sure. He came back to me and said: Let's go.*²⁶⁸⁵

(U) Cohen recalled that in his initial discussion with Trump about Sater's concept for a Trump Tower Moscow, Trump approved moving forward with the project but told Cohen to closely monitor Sater.

After the conversation with Mr. Sater, I told Mr. Trump that there's an opportunity to develop the tallest building in the world in Moscow. He asked me who it was with. I told him Felix is bringing the proposal, and he was like: Oy, Felix! And I said to him: But you have to understand, Felix is not the partner in

²⁶⁷⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸⁰ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 118–119.

²⁶⁸¹ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 168. Cohen described his contact with Sater in the years prior to this as “very infrequent” contact.

²⁶⁸² (U) Email communications at least as late as October show that Cohen and Sater were still focused on building a tower designed to be among the tallest buildings in Europe. Email, Cohen to Sater, October 13, 2015 (TRUMPORG_MC_000164).

²⁶⁸³ (U) Sater Tr., p. 147.

²⁶⁸⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁶⁸⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

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*this. He's just the licensee's representative. And he's not involved. And Mr. Trump said: Okay, keep him tight. Meaning, keep him on a tight leash.*²⁶⁸⁶

(U) After receiving Trump's approval to proceed, Cohen, Sater, and Rozov moved quickly to agree to basic deal parameters. On September 25, 2015, Cohen, Rozov, and Sater participated in a conference call with Sater translating.²⁶⁸⁷ Shortly thereafter, Cohen forwarded architectural renderings for the project directly to Rozov.²⁶⁸⁸

(U) Several days later, Rozov's "right hand man", Dmitry Chizhikov, sent Cohen a letter from Rozov, attaching a presentation describing Rozov's company, IC Expert.²⁶⁸⁹ In the letter, Rozov wrote that "the tallest building in Europe should be in Moscow, and I am prepared to build it."²⁶⁹⁰ Rozov said that he was "optimistic" that the co-venture would become "a shining example of business creating opportunities and significant good will between Russia and the U.S."²⁶⁹¹

b. (U) Signing of a Letter of Intent

(U) By October 5, 2015, Cohen had drafted a Letter of Intent (LOI) which set forth terms of a license agreement between Trump Acquisition, LLC and I.C. Expert Investment Company, which was wholly-owned by Rozov.²⁶⁹² The LOI called for a 120-story residential tower to be built in Moscow and outlined a license fee structure that included a \$4 million up-front fee to be paid in various installments, followed by a percentage of fees to be paid to Trump Acquisition,

²⁶⁸⁶ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 182–183.

²⁶⁸⁷ (U) While Cohen initially claimed he never spoke to Rozov on the phone, he later admitted speaking to him on the phone once, which largely required Sater to act as a translator. Cohen Tr. II, p. 188. Documentary evidence and Rozov's statements to the SCO suggest that a conference call happened on Friday, September 25, 2015. Email, Chizhikov to Cohen, September 29, 2015 (MDC-S-000601–602) (attaching a letter to Cohen from Rozov); FBI, FD-302, Rozov 1/25/2018. Also later that evening Cohen forwarded to Sater the architectural renderings that Cohen had previously sent to Rtskhiladze. Email, Cohen to Sater, September 25, 2015 (MDC-S-000673–680). For more on Cohen's effort with Rtskhiladze, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.D.3.iii.

²⁶⁸⁸ (U) Email, Cohen to Rozov, September 25, 2015 (MDC-S-000681–688). This email was sent to an email address associated with RAV Investments, which Sater described as the "Swiss family office at the time that [Rozov] used as his sort of investment arm." Sater Tr., p. 116.

²⁶⁸⁹ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 115–116; Email, Chizhikov to Cohen, September 29, 2015 (MDC-S-000601–602) (attaching a letter to Cohen from Rozov).

²⁶⁹⁰ (U) Email, Chizhikov to Cohen, September 29, 2015 (MDC-S-000601–602) (attaching a letter to Cohen from Rozov). Sater recalled, "Actually, we were debating on trying to figure out maybe the tallest building in the world. But we didn't want to put that in the letter so as not to spook anyone. . . . It would make it ten times harder to build." Sater Tr., p. 123.

²⁶⁹¹ (U) Email, Chizhikov to Cohen, September 29, 2015 (MDC-S-000601–602) (attaching a letter to Cohen from Rozov).

²⁶⁹² (U) Email, Cohen to Sater, October 5, 2015 (MDC-S-000641–651).

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inter alia, gross sales fees, rental fees, and revenue fees.²⁶⁹³ Subsequent revisions to Cohen’s initial draft would eliminate the 120-story requirement and change the building to a multi-use facility that included residences, a hotel, office space, and other related amenities.²⁶⁹⁴ The revisions also modified some license fees by providing for a reduction of sales fees in a cascading percentage as sales increased; a hotel management provision that would allow Trump International Hotels Management, LLC to operate the hotel for 25 years, collecting a percentage of gross operating revenue, with the option to manage food and other services.²⁶⁹⁵

(U) On October 9, 2015, Sater emailed Cohen to tell Cohen that Sater would be meeting with Russian billionaire Andrey Molchanov in the coming days.²⁶⁹⁶ Sater noted that Molchanov’s stepfather was in the St. Petersburg city government and that Putin had “worked for him” in the past.²⁶⁹⁷ Sater sent a link to LSR Group, one of Russia’s largest construction companies and a major real estate developer.²⁶⁹⁸ Sater explained that Molchanov plans to “do Trump Tower Moscow on his site.”²⁶⁹⁹

- (U) Molchanov is affiliated with LSR Group.²⁷⁰⁰ Sater later told the Committee that he met Molchanov in approximately 2008 and that while he knew Molchanov “is one of the largest developers in Russia. . . . [h]e’s also a friend.”²⁷⁰¹
- [REDACTED] Sater knew Molchanov had previously served in the Russian government as a state senator and believed that Molchanov was well connected.²⁷⁰² Sater further said that

²⁶⁹³ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹⁴ (U) Email, [Office scanner] to Cohen, November 2, 2015 (MDC-S-000618–636) (attaching a scan of a signed LOI).

²⁶⁹⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹⁶ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, October 9, 2015 (MDC-S-000595).

²⁶⁹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹⁸ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, October 9, 2015 (MDC-S-000593).

²⁶⁹⁹ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, October 9, 2015 (MDC-S-000595).

²⁷⁰⁰ (U) Tatiana Voronova and Katya Golubkova, “Main Shareholder in Russian homebuilder LSR to keep control,” *Reuters*, May 29, 2019.

²⁷⁰¹ [REDACTED] Sater Tr., p. 128. Sater recalled that he was introduced to Molchanov through a very close mutual friend, Maxim Temikov, who also served with Sater on the Mirax board. He explained that Temikov’s first wife was now married to Molchanov. Sater explained this network as the “St. Petersburg group” who “all know each other. . . . this is a socially close, connected group of people.” *Ibid.*, pp. 131–132. [REDACTED]

²⁷⁰² (U) Sater Tr., p. 130.

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he believed Molchanov was “a phone call away from anybody he needs to be in contact with.”²⁷⁰³ [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Sater said that while he had not conducted business with Molchanov in the past, they had frequently discussed real estate together.²⁷⁰⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Committee has no further information about this planned meeting.

[REDACTED] Sater told the Committee that the Molchanov site Sater had referenced in his October 9, 2015 email to Cohen was the ZiL factory, a defunct automobile and heavy equipment manufacturing facility, which Sater described as the largest development project in Moscow. Sater told the Committee that the meeting with Molchanov referenced in his email to Cohen did, in fact, take place.²⁷⁰⁸ Sater explained that he subsequently “spoke to [Molchanov] on a number of occasions” about the Trump deal.²⁷⁰⁹ According to Sater, Molchanov reacted positively to the Trump project, but he and Molchanov never arrived at a completed agreement.²⁷¹⁰ [REDACTED]

(U) On October 12, 2015, Sater emailed Cohen to inform him that Andrey Kostin, whom Sater described as “Putin’s top finance guy and CEO of 2nd largest bank in Russia,” was “on board and has indicated he would finance Trump Moscow.”²⁷¹² Sater attached a Wikipedia entry for Kostin to his email.²⁷¹³

- [REDACTED] Andrey Kostin is the chairman of Vneshtorgbank (VTB), Russia’s state-owned bank and one of the largest banks in Russia. [REDACTED]

2703 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 131.

2704 [REDACTED]

2705 (U) Sater Tr., p. 128.

2706 [REDACTED]

2707 (U) *Ibid.*

2708 (U) Sater Tr., p. 129–130.

2709 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 130

2710 (U) *Ibid.*

2711 [REDACTED]

2712 (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, October 12, 2015 (MDC-S-000638–640).

2713 (U) *Ibid.*

2714 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- (U) In 2014, the U.S. Government imposed economic sanctions on VTB Bank pursuant to the Ukraine-related sanctions program.²⁷¹⁸

(U) Sater told the Committee that although he never had direct communication with Kostin, Kostin was indirectly contacted about the project “through people in Moscow.”²⁷¹⁹ Sater recalled that a contact in Moscow, whom he identified only as “Danny,” “indicated that he [Danny] spoke to people at VTB and that they would be on board.”²⁷²⁰ Sater also told the Committee that he used Evgeny Shmykov, the former Russian intelligence officer, as a conduit to VTB.²⁷²¹

(U) In his email to Cohen, Sater described VTB’s support as “major for us” because of Kostin’s “position in Russia,” where Kostin was “extremely powerful and respected.”²⁷²² Sater also told Cohen that the next step was to get Putin “on board.”²⁷²³ To accomplish this, Sater claimed he had set up a tentative meeting with “Putin and [his] top deputy” two days later.²⁷²⁴ Sater recalled that his contact had told Sater with the identity of the top deputy, but Sater claimed to the Committee that he couldn’t remember the deputy’s name.²⁷²⁵ Sater told the Committee that the meeting was initially delayed, and ultimately never took place.²⁷²⁶

[REDACTED]

²⁷¹⁸ (U) Treasury, “Announcement of Additional Treasury Sanctions on Russian Financial Institutions and on a Defense Technology Entity,” July 29, 2014.

²⁷¹⁹ (U) Sater Tr., p. 150–151.

²⁷²⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140.

²⁷²¹ (U) Staff notes, SSCI Interview with Felix Sater, April 4, 2018.

²⁷²² (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, October 12, 2015 (MDC-S-000638–640).

²⁷²³ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷²⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷²⁵ (U) Sater Tr., p. 140.

²⁷²⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 141.

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(U) On October 13, 2015, the day after his email to Cohen discussing Kostin and Putin’s top deputy, Sater sent Cohen an LOI with Rozov’s signature.²⁷²⁷ In the email, Sater linked the project to relations between the United States and Russia.²⁷²⁸


*Lets [sic] make this happen and build a Trump Moscow. And possibly fix relations between the countries by showing everyone that commerce & business are much better and more practical than politics. That should be Putins [sic] message as well, and we will help him agree on that message. Help world peace and make a lot of money. I would say that’s a great lifetime goal for us to go after.*²⁷²⁹

(U) Approximately two weeks later, Trump countersigned the LOI. The Committee was unable to determine the exact day the LOI was countersigned by Trump. However, on October 31, 2015, at 1:01 p.m. EDT, Sater emailed Cohen and asked Cohen to email the “signed LOI” because Sater hadn’t yet received it. Cohen eventually transmitted a signed LOI to Sater on November 2, 2015.²⁷³⁰

Provided you are in agreement with these terms, please countersign this LOI in the space provided below and return a copy to my attention. We look forward to your timely response.

Very truly yours,

TRUMP ACQUISITION, LLC

By: 

Name:
Title:

THE ABOVE IS ACKNOWLEDGED,
CONSENTED TO AND AGREED TO BY:

I.C. EXPERT INVESTMENT COMPANY

By: 

Andrey Rozov
CEO

²⁷²⁷ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, et al., October 13, 2015 (MDC-S-000545).

²⁷²⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷²⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷³⁰ (U) Email, Cohen to Rozov, Chizhikov, and Sater, November 2, 2015 (MDC-S-000652–670).

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(U) Also on October 31, 2015, at approximately the same time that Sater was emailing Cohen and asking for the signed LOI, Trump conducted a campaign rally in Norfolk, Virginia designed to announce his policy plans for veterans. During the rally, and seemingly unprompted, Trump made positive comments about Putin. Trump stated:

*You know, I've made a lot of money. Deals are people, deals are people. And you have got to analyze people, and I can look at people. I can tell you, I'll get along with Putin. I was on 60 Minutes with Putin. He was my stablemate three weeks ago. We got the highest ratings in a long time on 60 Minutes. You saw that, right? He was my stablemate. I believe I'll get along with him. It was Trump and Putin, Putin and Trump. I'd even let him go first if it makes us friendly. I'll give up the name. I'll give up that place. But I was on 60 Minutes three weeks ago. I'll get along with him.*²⁷³¹

(U) Shortly thereafter, on November 3, 2015, Trump made similar comments at a press conference.

*I think our relationship with Russia will be very good. Vladimir Putin was on 60 Minutes with me three weeks ago, right? Putin. And they have one of the highest ratings they had in a long time. So I'm going to give him total credit. But we will have a very good relationship, I think, with Russia. Now maybe we won't, but I believe we will have a very good relationship with Russia. I believe that I will have a very good relationship with Putin.*²⁷³²

(U) According to Cohen, Sater told Cohen that Putin was aware of the Trump Tower Moscow project and was supportive of it, a claim that Cohen relayed to Trump.²⁷³³ Cohen stated that he told Trump that Putin was “interested” in the project and that if there was a groundbreaking ceremony, Trump and Putin would be expected to be there.²⁷³⁴

*I told [Trump] that obviously Vladimir Putin, President Putin, would need to approve the project, as I was told by Mr. Sater that Putin's people knew of that project. That he supposedly is interested and would approve it.*²⁷³⁵

²⁷³¹ (U) YouTube, Trump Campaign rally, October 31, 2015, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=sl8BGvALQgQ (beginning at 1:01:38).

²⁷³² (U) C-SPAN, Presidential Candidate Donald Trump News Conference, November 3, 2015 (beginning at 24:23).

²⁷³³ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 34, 212. The Committee does not have direct evidence which reliably determines whether Putin knew of the Trump Tower.

²⁷³⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁷³⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

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(U) Cohen further believed that the Trump Moscow project, and particularly the signing of the LOI, affected Trump's thinking and rhetoric toward Russia and Putin on the campaign trail.²⁷³⁶ Cohen believed that Trump's public comments about Russia could have been influenced by Cohen informing Trump that Putin was aware of, and had approved of, the project.²⁷³⁷ When asked if Cohen had coordinated Trump's public comments about Putin, Cohen stated that he hadn't, but pointed to the fact that he had conveyed Putin's awareness to Trump and believed it was a factor in Trump's statements.²⁷³⁸

*We had just executed the letter of intent. Mr. Trump goes out the same exact day and he starts talking about what a great relationship that he can have with Russia. What a great relationship I could have with Putin. He had Russia on his mind because we just executed the LOI.*²⁷³⁹

(U) Sater said that the connection between the project and the campaign was so obvious that he didn't think the connection needed to be verbalized. He further understood that Cohen was aware of the obvious connection.²⁷⁴⁰ Sater told the Committee that what Trump was saying on the campaign trail could "help" the project move forward.²⁷⁴¹ Cohen's communications at the time and subsequent testimony to the Committee reveal that he similarly connected Putin's public comments about Trump to the project.²⁷⁴² Cohen recalled linking Trump's comments about Putin on the campaign trail to the Moscow project and he believed that Trump had as well.²⁷⁴³ Cohen also recalled that the project was designed with the theme of improved relations between the United States and Russia, and included a "Friendship Square" in the design plans.²⁷⁴⁴ According to Cohen, Trump called his campaign "the greatest infomercial in the history of politics," which to Cohen suggested that the project's potential profitability was the priority.²⁷⁴⁵ Cohen explained that the project would be a financially lucrative deal for everyone involved and would be so for years beyond Trump's political candidacy.²⁷⁴⁶ As a result, even though he didn't believe Trump was going to win the election, Cohen wanted to proceed with the deal.²⁷⁴⁷

²⁷³⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²⁷³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷³⁸ (U) *Ibid.* Cohen also recalled that he told Trump about Sater's proposal to offer the penthouse suite to Putin personally in order to "drive up the numbers." According to Cohen, Trump responded, "Yeah, that's Felix, I mean he's crazy." *Ibid.*, p. 213.

²⁷³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²⁷⁴⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Sater 12/15/2017.

²⁷⁴¹ (U) Sater Tr., p. 153.

²⁷⁴² (U) Email, Cohen to Sater, December 17, 2015 (MDC-S-000689); Cohen Tr., p. 150.

²⁷⁴³ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 259–260.

²⁷⁴⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 9/12/2018; Email, Cohen to Sater, October 5, 2015 (MDC-S-000641–651).

²⁷⁴⁵ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 254.

²⁷⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 226.

²⁷⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

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(U) Approximately 40 minutes after Trump’s positive comments about Putin on November 3, 2015, Sater sent Cohen an email asking for a clip of Trump’s statements, and linking the Moscow deal and the U.S. presidential election.

*Loved Putin/Russia reference. I need that part of the press conference cut into a short clip to be played for Putin. Please get it done . . . [Andrey] wants to send it to the Kremlin. . . . I will get Putin on this program and we will get Donald elected . . . our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of Putins [sic] team to buy in on this. . . . Get me that clip I will get it to Putin and his people quickly and it will help our cause and process.*²⁷⁴⁸

(U) Minutes later, Sater sent a second message to Cohen reiterating this point:

*GET THAT CliP. Micheal [sic] we can own this story. Donald doesn’t stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin only want [sic] to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. “Business, politics, whatever it all is the same for someone who knows how to deal” I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference. If he says it we own this election. Americas [sic] most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald is a good guy to negotiate. ISIS, oil, Middle East, etc etc. we can own this election. . . . Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is good really good.*²⁷⁴⁹

(U) Cohen told the Committee that he couldn’t recall sending the clip to Sater.

(U) In addition to linking the project to the election, Sater’s November 3, 2015, email suggested that he was seeking to engage individuals close to Putin on the project.

*[A] very close person & partner to Putins [sic] closest friend, partner and advisor who has been with Putin ever since teenage years his friend and partner (on the largest shopping center in Moscow) is flying in to the private island in the Bahamas Andrey [Rozov] rented next week. Everything will be negotiated and discussed not with flunkies but with people who will have dinner with Putin and discuss the issues and get a go ahead.*²⁷⁵⁰

²⁷⁴⁸ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, November 3, 2015 (MDC-S-000451).

²⁷⁴⁹ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, November 3, 2015 (MDC-S-000692).

²⁷⁵⁰ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, November 3, 2015 (MDC-S-000451).

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(U) In his follow-on message to Cohen minutes later, Sater added that his “next steps are very sensitive with Putins [sic] very very close people.”²⁷⁵¹ Sater told the Committee that this was a reference to the Rotenbergs, a family extremely close to Putin.²⁷⁵² Sater further stated that the Rotenbergs’ “friend and partner” with whom he was meeting in the Bahamas was Mikhail Zayats (alternately, *Ziats*), who had partnered with the Rotenbergs on the Aviapark mall in Moscow, the largest shopping mall in Europe.²⁷⁵³

(U) A body of information supports Sater’s assertion that the Rotenbergs maintain an close personal relationship with Putin. This information further indicates the Rotenbergs handle special projects for Putin.

- (U) According to open source information, Arkady Rotenberg has been lifelong friends with Putin. The two reportedly joined the same judo club at a young age and have been friends since childhood.²⁷⁵⁴
- (U) The Rotenbergs have amassed their wealth largely through obtaining lucrative Russian government contracts. According to Department of the Treasury information, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg’s personal wealth increased by billions of dollars after Putin awarded them large contracts related to Gazprom and the Sochi Winter Olympics.²⁷⁵⁵
- (U) The Rotenbergs have financed Russian state projects, including projects of special interest to Putin.²⁷⁵⁶ Open source information suggests that some of these projects involve covert or obscured funding for Russian state-directed projects. For example, press reporting indicates that in 2013, companies affiliated with Arkady Rotenberg transferred \$231 million in loans to an offshore company with no repayment terms and with no clear business purpose.²⁷⁵⁷

- [REDACTED]

²⁷⁵¹ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, November 3, 2015 (MDC-S-000692).

²⁷⁵² (U) Sater Tr., p. 155. This appears to include brothers Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, as well as Arkady Rotenberg’s son, Igor. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²⁷⁵³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 157–158. Open source information confirms that Amma Development, controlled by Zayats, built the over 500-store mall and that the Rotenbergs were the main investor. Anton Filatov, “Owners of Aviapark can sell half of the complex,” *Vedomosti*, August 9, 2016 (Russian language).

²⁷⁵⁴ (U) Jo Becker and Steven Lee Myers, “Putin’s Friend Profits in Purge of Schoolbooks,” *The New York Times*, November 1, 2014.

²⁷⁵⁵ (U) Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Member Of The Russian Leadership’s Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The Situation In Ukraine,” March 20, 2014.

²⁷⁵⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵⁷ (U) Joshua Yaffa, “Putin’s Shadow Cabinet and the Bridge to Crimea,” *New Yorker*, May 22, 2017.

(U) Sater also discussed Zayats as providing a potential pathway to the Rotenbergs, a relationship that Sater called his “ace in the hole.”²⁷⁶³ Sater relayed that his process in approaching Zayats was similar to other tactics he used during the Trump Tower Moscow efforts. Sater recalled:

Mikhail Ziats joined us [Sater and Rozov] in the Bahamas. So in answer to many of the questions today, how would I get to anybody or how would I know, Mikhail Ziats' partner was Arkady [Rotenberg] on one of the largest shopping malls in Moscow. He's friend[s] with Andrei [Rozov]. They're flying in, we're hanging out for a week, fishing and diving together, me, Mikhail, and Andrei. Getting to them to push the agenda forward, that would be an example of how I would get that agenda pushed forward. And this email describes who he is and what his relation is to Putin. But Ziats didn't hear about this deal or have any real conversations with me until he came to the Bahamas. When I told him about it, he was like: Yeah, definitely; when you guys get a little closer, I'll push it, I'll speak to them. And he was also enthusiastic because he would have gotten cut in.²⁷⁶⁴

(U) Sater said that his efforts primarily involved contacting individuals who could put him in touch with people with Kremlin access, which he felt was necessary to advance the project. Sater claimed to have the ability to contact approximately a dozen individuals, who,

[REDACTED]

²⁷⁵⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

²⁷⁶³ (U) Sater Tr., p. 196.

²⁷⁶⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[REDACTED]

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within “one or two degrees of separation,” “have Putin’s ear.”²⁷⁶⁵ Sater explained that he used this professional and personal network in Moscow to conduct outreach to those with sufficient Kremlin access to elevate the deal.²⁷⁶⁶ He further explained that “because Moscow’s a small place literally for people of that caliber. . . . [e]verybody knows somebody who they can call.”²⁷⁶⁷

(U) In addition to Shmykov (described above) and Zayats, both of whom represented a pathway to Kremlin insiders, Sater described or partially identified several other potential pathways to the Kremlin. For example, Sater stated that among these contacts he used was Emin Iskenderov, a Russian developer whom Sater said had access to Kremlin insiders like Peskov.²⁷⁶⁸ Iskenderov’s work in France developing large mixed use towers had previously brought him in contact with Putin.²⁷⁶⁹

(U) Cohen recalled that there was “constant conversation and-or communication between myself and Mr. Sater” during this time, particularly in efforts to locate land in order to move the deal forward.²⁷⁷⁰ Cohen also recalled that he spoke with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka Trump about the project.

*I spoke with Don and Ivanka, and Ivanka did not want John Fotiadis Design on the property. Her feeling was with a project of this magnitude and importance, you want what’s called a Starchitect. A star architect. And she wanted me to put out an RFP, request for proposal, but the one who she really wanted, thought could do the best job on it, would be Zaha Hadid. The very famous architect. Plus Ivanka was going to be involved in the project because there was going to be a spa inside the hotel that would be named after her.*²⁷⁷¹

(U) As a result, on November 24, 2015, Ivanka Trump received a response from Zaha Hadid Architects to notify her that the firm intended to submit a “proposal for the new Trump Moscow.”²⁷⁷² After receiving this via email, she forwarded it to Cohen and Jerry Piro, then-Senior Vice President for Design and Construction at the Trump Organization.²⁷⁷³

²⁷⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 149–151.

²⁷⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 141.

²⁷⁶⁸ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 141–142, 191–192.

²⁷⁶⁹ (U) *See, e.g.*, Hermitage.fr., “Emin Iskenderov.”

²⁷⁷⁰ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 146.

²⁷⁷¹ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 201.

²⁷⁷² (U) Email, Ceccato to I. Trump, et al., November 24, 2015 (MDC-S-000598).

²⁷⁷³ (U) Email, I. Trump to Cohen and Piro, November 24, 2015 (MDC-S-000598); “Jerry Piro,” LinkedIn.com profile.

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(U) Sater continued to push Cohen to travel to Russia. On December 1, 2015, Sater emailed Cohen, asking for a copy of Cohen’s passport “for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”²⁷⁷⁴ Cohen responded to Sater the next day, attaching a scan of the identification page of his passport.²⁷⁷⁵

c. (U) Continued Efforts to Arrange Travel to Russia to Advance the Deal

(U) On December 17, 2015, Putin made positive public comments about Trump. Cohen forwarded news alerts of press articles that relayed that Putin had called Trump “talented” and “very colorful” to Sater. In the body of the email to Sater, Cohen stated: “Now is the time. Call me.”²⁷⁷⁶

(U) In response to Cohen’s email, Sater again worked to schedule a trip, this time asking for passport scans for both Cohen and Trump.²⁷⁷⁷ On December 19, 2015, Sater emailed and sent a text message to Cohen requesting that Cohen call him because he had “Evgeny on the other line.”²⁷⁷⁸ Sater told the Committee in his interview prior to the release of the *SCO Report* that his references to Evgeny were, to his recollection, Evgeny Shmykov. According to the SCO, however, Sater’s reference to “Evgeny” on the December 19 message was a reference to Evgeny Dvoskin, who at the time was associated with a Russian bank operating in Crimea.²⁷⁷⁹ Through counsel, Sater later represented to the Committee that he may have used both Shmykov and Dvoskin at varying times.²⁷⁸⁰ As a result, while this particular outreach appears to involve Dvoskin, the identity behind Sater’s other references to “Evgeny” remains unclear.

(U) Dvoskin is strongly connected to Russian organized crime and the Russian intelligence services, particularly the FSB.²⁷⁸¹

²⁷⁷⁴ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, December 1, 2015 (MDC-S-000592).

²⁷⁷⁵ (U) Email, Cohen to Sater, December 2, 2015 (TRUMPORG_MC_000166–168) (attaching a scan of Cohen’s passport). Cohen did not produce this document until after pleading guilty to misleading the Committee. Sater never produced this document to the Committee.

²⁷⁷⁶ (U) Email, Cohen to Sater, December 17, 2015 (MDC-S-000689).

²⁷⁷⁷ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, December 19, 2015 (MDC-S-000600).

²⁷⁷⁸ (U) *Ibid.*; Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 19, 2015 (FSS00097–98).

²⁷⁷⁹ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 76.

²⁷⁸⁰ (U) Subsequently, Sater told the Committee through counsel that at some point he applied a “scorched earth” policy in attempting to reach out to anyone possible to assist with the Trump project—potentially also including Dvoskin. Sater suggested through counsel that given the records obtained by the SCO, Sater could have used Dvoskin to obtain an invitation letter from a Russian bank (described below), but believed he used Shmykov for other unspecified outreach.

²⁷⁸¹ (U) For open source reporting on Dvoskin, see, e.g., Evgeny Zhuravlev and Elena Nizovaya, “Controversial Russian Bankers Target Crimea,” *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project*, June 3, 2015; Evgenia

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- 2784 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 2785 (U) *Ibid.*
- 2786 (U) *Ibid.*
- 2787 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 2788 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 2789 (U) *Ibid.*
- 2790 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 2791 (U) *Ibid.*
- 2792 (U) *Ibid.*
- 2793 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

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- (U) In 2015, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control added GenBank to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list for as part of its Ukraine-related sanctions program.²⁷⁹⁶

(U) In his December 19, 2015 messages to Cohen, Sater explained that the meetings in Moscow he was working to setup related to the Trump project should not appear overtly political, but the meetings would be with Putin and other Kremlin insiders.

*Invitations & Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower Moscow. Politically neither Putins [sic] office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue [the] invite, so they are inviting commercially/business. VTB is Russia’s 2[nd] biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite & have visa issued.*²⁷⁹⁷

(U) Later that day, Cohen sent Sater images of every page of his passport.²⁷⁹⁸ Once Cohen sent the photos of his passport, Sater recalled that he sent the images on to “Evgeny” along with a copy of his own passport in order to apply for a visa to Russia.²⁷⁹⁹ Soon thereafter, Sater told Cohen that “[t]hey” needed a copy of Trump’s passport.²⁸⁰⁰ Cohen responded by telling Sater that sending Trump’s passport was “premature” and that he would do so only after his own successful trip to Moscow and the setting of a specific date for the meeting between Trump and Putin.²⁸⁰¹

²⁷⁹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁷⁹⁵ [REDACTED] Similarly, according to open source reporting, Dvoskin was a key player in the money laundering market and had close ties to the FSB. “The Rise and Fall of an FSB-Run Money Laundering Empire,” *The Moscow Times*, August 3, 2019. Dvoskin’s GenBank opened its first branch in Crimea two weeks after Russia’s 2014 invasion and rapidly expanded to 175 branch locations to become one of the largest banks in the region. Evgenia Pismennaya and Irina Reznik, “The Russian Ex-Con With a Thriving Banking Business in Crimea,” *Bloomberg*, April 7, 2016.

²⁷⁹⁶ (U) Treasury, “Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications,” December 22, 2015.

²⁷⁹⁷ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, December 19, 2015 (MDC-S-000600).

²⁷⁹⁸ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 19, 2015 (FSS00099–110).

²⁷⁹⁹ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 173–174.

²⁸⁰⁰ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 21, 2015 (FSS00110).

²⁸⁰¹ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 21, 2015 (FSS00111).

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(U) On December 29, 2015, Cohen sent a message to Sater asking if there was any response “from Russia.”²⁸⁰² Sater responded that “they” would be sending invitations, which Sater anticipated would arrive after the New Year’s holiday.²⁸⁰³ When the invitations didn’t immediately arrive, Cohen became agitated with Sater. The following day, December 30, Cohen told Sater that he had lost the deal, and that Cohen would be contacting his “alternate,” presumably a reference to Rtskhiladze.²⁸⁰⁴ Cohen expressed his frustrations over the pace of the deal and his disappointment that Sater couldn’t deliver on his promise on an “invitation from a banker.”²⁸⁰⁵

(U) Cohen’s messages to Sater reveal one potential cause for Cohen’s sense of urgency—Cohen’s efforts to please Trump. Cohen told Sater that he was going to terminate the LOI and cease working with Sater, telling Sater that “[n]ot you or anyone you know will embarrass me in front of Mr. T when he asks me what is happening.”²⁸⁰⁶ Sater, for his part claimed that he had kept his “mouth shut for you and your team” despite negative press articles written about him personally.²⁸⁰⁷ Further, Sater told Cohen that he had “played my hand with people I make money with and you telling me scrap it. Really upsetting, really.”²⁸⁰⁸

(U) Sater told the Committee that he called Shmykov to find a solution. Sater recalled telling Shmykov that Cohen was “freaking out” and that as a result, Sater “need[ed] an invitation.”²⁸⁰⁹ By the morning of December 31, Sater had produced a letter on GenBank letterhead purporting to be an invitation for Cohen to come to Russia.²⁸¹⁰ According to Sater, these efforts with Shmykov resulted in the GenBank letter being generated quickly, even though it was the holiday period.²⁸¹¹ Shmykov told Sater that the letter was a “placeholder.”²⁸¹² At the time, Sater told Cohen that the letter had been sent “3 days ago but went to my spam,” even though, in reality, the letter had just been produced.²⁸¹³

²⁸⁰² (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 30, 2015 (FSS00112).

²⁸⁰³ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 30, 2015 (FSS00112).

²⁸⁰⁴ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 30, 2015 (FSS00113).

²⁸⁰⁵ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 30, 2015 (FSS00116–117).

²⁸⁰⁶ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 30, 2015 (FSS00119–120).

²⁸⁰⁷ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 30, 2015 (FSS00118).

²⁸⁰⁸ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 30, 2015 (FSS00116).


²⁸⁰⁹ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 188–189, 191.

²⁸¹⁰ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 31, 2015 (FSS00123).

²⁸¹¹ (U) Sater Tr., p. 189.

²⁸¹² (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸¹³ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 31, 2015 (FSS00123).



(U) Sater’s recollection of Shmykov’s involvement in this letter may not be accurate. As described *infra*, Sater repeatedly recalled in his interview with the Committee that Evgeny Shmykov was involved in his outreach on the Trump Moscow project. Sater later admitted to the Committee that he may have also contacted Evgeny Dvoskin, and the SCO determined on the basis of call records that Dvoskin was, in fact, the individual involved in the outreach at that time. Dvoskin himself is an owner and executive at GenBank, which suggests he was involved in the production of this letter.²⁸¹⁴

(U) At the same time that he sent the GenBank letter to Cohen, Sater told Cohen that the planned meetings would be held with senior Russian government officials. Sater claimed that the invitation was “thru Putins [sic] administration, and nothing gets done there without approval

²⁸¹⁴ (U) Evgenia Pismennaya and Irina Reznik, “The Russian Ex-Con With a Thriving Banking Business in Crimea,” *Bloomberg*, April 7, 2016.

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from the top.”²⁸¹⁵ Sater further said that the planned meetings in Moscow with Cohen would be to discuss “goals, meeting agenda and meeting time between Putin & Trump” with “Ministers – in US that’s cabinet level and with Putins [sic] top administration people,” which “most likely will include” Dmitry Peskov.²⁸¹⁶ Sater later explained to the Committee that Emin Iskenderov, a Russian developer known for his efforts to develop a multi-billion dollar project in Paris, “had access” to Peskov.²⁸¹⁷ As a result, Sater believed he had the ability to arrange a meeting between Peskov and Cohen.²⁸¹⁸

(U) Cohen questioned Sater as to why the letter had come from GenBank and not from VTB Bank, telling Sater that he thought Sater was “speaking to VTB.”²⁸¹⁹ Sater explained that GenBank was “owned 50% by Government and is run as a junior for VTB.”²⁸²⁰ Sater further explained that the VTB Bank Chairman was away until January 11, and this letter was sent in an effort to obtain a letter before his return.²⁸²¹ Cohen again became agitated with Sater, complaining that the invite didn’t come from VTB Bank directly and was written by “some no name clerk at a 3rd tier bank.”²⁸²² Cohen explained to the Committee, “Each conversation I had with [Sater], he keeps touting VTB Bank. VTB Bank. VTB Bank. And then all of a sudden you get this bank.”²⁸²³ Cohen told Sater to stop working on the project, stating that Cohen would “handle this myself.”²⁸²⁴

d. (U) Cohen’s Outreach to the Kremlin to Advance the Project

(U) On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed Peskov’s office at pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru, a typographic error that apparently caused the email to not be delivered.²⁸²⁵ It is unclear how Cohen acquired this email address. In the request, Cohen asked to speak with Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s chief of staff.²⁸²⁶ The following day, a media contact of Cohen’s emailed him a phone

²⁸¹⁵ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 31, 2015 (FSS00124).

²⁸¹⁶ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 31, 2015 (FSS00124–125).

²⁸¹⁷ (U) Sater Tr., p. 191.

²⁸¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸¹⁹ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 31, 2015 (FSS00125).

²⁸²⁰ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 31, 2015 (FSS00125).

²⁸²¹ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, December 31, 2015 (FSS00125–126).

²⁸²² (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 31, 2015 (FSS00129).

²⁸²³ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 231. As noted *infra*, both VTB Bank and GenBank were sanctioned by the U.S. Government under its Ukraine-related sanctions program targeting Russian government-connected entities. Cohen was unaware of these sanctions targeting either bank, and stated that, in addition, it “didn’t matter to me” whether the banks were sanctioned. Cohen explained that he believed the Russian developer, not the Trump Organization, would be responsible for financing the deal, and thus Cohen did not think that any sanctions “would have been a problem.” *Ibid.*, pp. 233–234.

²⁸²⁴ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, December 31, 2015 (FSS00130).

²⁸²⁵ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 74.

²⁸²⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

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number for Peskov's office.²⁸²⁷ Cohen told the Committee that he conducted an internet search for Peskov's office and obtained the email address info@prpress.gov.ru.²⁸²⁸ Cohen emailed the below request addressed to Peskov:

Dear Mr. Peskov,

Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City. Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has stalled. As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance.

*I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon.*²⁸²⁹

(U) Peskov is a high-level Kremlin insider and a key advisor to Putin.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

(U) Two days later, on January 16, 2016, Cohen also emailed the corrected email address from his initial request, Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, with a request to speak with Ivanov.²⁸³³

²⁸²⁷ (U) Email, Santucci to Cohen, January 12, 2016 (MDC-S-000450).

²⁸²⁸ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 204; Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru, January 14, 2016 (MDC-S-000690).

²⁸²⁹ (U) Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru, January 14, 2016 (MDC-S-000690).

²⁸³⁰ [REDACTED]

²⁸³¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸³² (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸³³ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 74; Email, Cohen to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, January 16, 2016 (COHEN_MICHAEL-ORG-00249332).

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(U) Cohen did not initially produce either email to the Pr_peskova email account to the Committee, nor did he acknowledge their existence.²⁸³⁴ Cohen also initially testified, falsely, that there was no reply to his email to the info@prpress.gov.ru account.²⁸³⁵

(U) However, Cohen would later admit that several days after his initial email, on January 20, 2016, he received a response from Elena Poliakova, Peskov's Chief of Staff.²⁸³⁶ In the email, which was written from her personal account, Poliakova said that she had been trying to get in touch with Cohen and requested that Cohen contact her at a phone number which she provided.²⁸³⁷

(U) Poliakova, in her role as Peskov's Chief of Staff, has exceptional access within the Kremlin.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

²⁸³⁴ (U) After his guilty plea, Cohen eventually produced the second email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru. See Email, Cohen to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, January 16, 2016 (COHEN_MICHAEL-ORG-00249332).

²⁸³⁵ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 74.

²⁸³⁶ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 287-288.

²⁸³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸³⁸ [REDACTED]

²⁸⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴² [REDACTED]

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(U) After receiving the email from Poliakova, Cohen recalled dialing the number Poliakova provided him and speaking with Poliakova for approximately 20 minutes.²⁸⁴³ During the call, Cohen recalled discussing the Trump Moscow project with Poliakova.²⁸⁴⁴ Cohen described Poliakova as “extremely professional” and “very detailed in her questions regarding the project.”²⁸⁴⁵ Specifically, Cohen recalled Poliakova asking about the property, including the area, size, and square footage.²⁸⁴⁶ Cohen did not have a specific memory of speaking with Poliakova about other details of the project, such as a proposed Friendship Square, but presumed he did so.²⁸⁴⁷ Cohen stated that Poliakova had “really done her homework,” and while Cohen was not certain, his recollection was that, at the time of the call, Poliakova already “knew about I.C. Expert [Rozov’s development company] and she knew about the deal.”²⁸⁴⁸ Cohen recalled that Poliakova stated she would assemble notes on the information Cohen relayed and “pass them along,” which Cohen understood to mean pass the notes on to Peskov or someone else in the Russian government who would handle the project.²⁸⁴⁹ Poliakova told Cohen that they would be in touch with Cohen or with I.C. Expert.²⁸⁵⁰

(U) On January 21, 2016, the day after the phone call with Peskov’s assistant Poliakova, Sater contacted Cohen via telephone call and text message.²⁸⁵¹ Sater told Cohen that he needed to speak with him about an “important” matter, stating: “It’s about Putin they called today.”²⁸⁵² Sater later recalled that this reference to Putin was not a specific reference to any outreach directly from Putin’s inner circle. Sater left open the possibility that his comments were prompted by some other event or indirect outreach, stating that he did not “really remember what triggered it, whether it was a call from Emin [Iskenderov], Evgeny [Shmykov or Dvoskin], Andrei [Rozov], whoever.”²⁸⁵³ Cohen, however, linked Sater’s renewed outreach to the call with Peskov’s aide. Cohen recalled that at the time, Sater gave him the impression that a Russian

²⁸⁴³ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 287–288.

²⁸⁴⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²⁸⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 290.

²⁸⁴⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 9/12/2018.

²⁸⁴⁸ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 290, 293.

²⁸⁴⁹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 9/12/2018.

²⁸⁵⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵¹ (U) The Committee has no record of communications between the two from the previous disagreement on December 31, 2015, when Cohen told Sater he should stop working on the project, until these communications on January 21, 2016.

²⁸⁵² (U) Text messages, Sater to Cohen, January 21, 2016 (FSS00131).

²⁸⁵³ (U) Sater Tr., p. 194. Sater claimed to the Committee that his comment was “bullshit”—which he defined as exaggeration or puffery and which in his view was acceptable as part of business efforts. Sater said however, that his comment was not a “lie.” Sater repeatedly claimed that he would never “intentionally lie” to Cohen. Sater suggested his comments could have been in reaction to a call from Evgeny or any other event. Given Evgeny’s connections, including his reported ties to Peskov, it is possible outreach from Peskov through an intermediary occurred. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

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government person reached out to Sater.²⁸⁵⁴ Cohen thought the phone call with Poliakova had an effect.²⁸⁵⁵

(U) Later that day, Sater and Cohen exchanged a number of calls and texts. They discussed a draft invitation for Cohen to come to Moscow. Sater asked Cohen to review the draft invitation letter and “make whatever changes you want. . . . [t]ry to take a look tonight I want to get it to them so they have it for the morning.”²⁸⁵⁶ Later that evening, Cohen and Sater exchanged drafts of the invitation letter, which included the following draft text:

*In furtherance of our previous conversations regarding the development of the Trump Tower Moscow project, we would like to respectfully invite you to Moscow for a working visit. During this historic meeting, we wish to discuss further the needs to create this five star, one of a kind and world class project. Your visit will help to acquaint you with Moscow through “round table discussions” devoted to analysis, and the prospects of development and the construction business in Russia. While in Moscow, we intend to visit and discuss with you the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower as well as to give you the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump.*²⁸⁵⁷

(U) Several days later, on January 25, 2016, Sater sent a signed letter from an individual named Andrey Ryabinskiy on letterhead from a Russian company called MHJ.²⁸⁵⁸ Sater claimed that this was “another group from Evgeny.” Sater stated that Evgeny was “excited about it and he was speaking to various other people.”²⁸⁵⁹ The text of the letter was identical to that of the last draft of the request edited by Cohen several days earlier. Minutes after Sater sent the letter to Cohen, Sater sent a follow-up email to Cohen asking for travel dates for Cohen and Trump because Sater had received “another call this morning asking for it.”²⁸⁶⁰ Cohen responded, “will do.”²⁸⁶¹

(U) At some point shortly after Cohen’s call with Peskov’s assistant, Cohen told Trump about the call. Cohen recalled telling Trump that he had spoken with “someone from the

²⁸⁵⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 9/12/2018.

²⁸⁵⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵⁶ (U) Text messages, Sater to Cohen, January 21, 2016 (FSS00134).

²⁸⁵⁷ (U) *See* Emails, Cohen and Sater, January 22, 2016 (MDC-S-000691).

²⁸⁵⁸ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, January 25, 2016 (MDC-S-000541–542) (attaching a signed letter to Cohen from Ryabinskiy).

²⁸⁵⁹ (U) Sater Tr., p. 197.

²⁸⁶⁰ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, January 25, 2016 (MDC-S-000540); Text message, Sater to Cohen, January 25, 2016 (FSS00135).

²⁸⁶¹ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, January 25, 2016 (FSS00135).

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Kremlin” about the Trump Tower Moscow project.²⁸⁶² Cohen also recalled making a comment to Trump about the assistant’s professionalism, adding that he wished some of the Trump Organization’s assistants “would be this prepared.”²⁸⁶³ Cohen recalled that at some point in this approximate time period he also discussed the possibility of traveling to Russia with Trump.²⁸⁶⁴ Cohen recalled that Trump did not express concerns about traveling to Russia while a presidential candidate if it would aid the deal.²⁸⁶⁵ According to Cohen, Trump instructed Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski about dates for potential travel to Russia.²⁸⁶⁶ Cohen recalled speaking with Lewandowski shortly thereafter.²⁸⁶⁷ Cohen also requested a copy of Trump’s passport from Trump’s primary assistant, Rhona Graff.²⁸⁶⁸ Cohen recalled Graff bringing him Trump’s passport, but no records or testimony obtained by the Committee indicate that Trump’s passport was ever transmitted to Sater.²⁸⁶⁹

(U) After speaking with Lewandowski, Cohen recalled receiving proposed dates for the trip to Russia.²⁸⁷⁰ As noted below, text messages between Sater and Cohen on January 26, 2016, suggest that Cohen had already provided Trump proposed travel dates by that time.²⁸⁷¹

(U) On January 26, 2016, Sater asked Cohen if he would speak directly on the phone “with the guy coordinating to arrange all the calls so you can speak first person to everyone.”²⁸⁷² Cohen replied, “Now,” to which Sater responded, “Ok 2 minutes.”²⁸⁷³ It is unknown if a call took place, although later that day Sater sent a text to Cohen about the Russia travel plans:

I think you should make it a bit more flexible for yourself 1st week of Feb is this Monday. Since you gave DT dates, you can do anytime that’s good for you in February or March. Completely your call, either way it’s set they are waiting

²⁸⁶² (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. II, p. 136.

²⁸⁶³ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 289.

²⁸⁶⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 269-270.

²⁸⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 78.

²⁸⁶⁶ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 269.

²⁸⁶⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 268.

²⁸⁶⁸ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 76.

²⁸⁶⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

²⁸⁷⁰ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 273. Lewandowski claimed that “there was never a discussion that I’m aware of, that I was privy to, inside the campaign of ever going to Russia in any way, shape, or form.” Lewandowski Tr., p. 52. Other documentary records about separate proposed trips suggest Lewandowski’s recollection of this topic was not accurate.

²⁸⁷¹ (U) Text messages, Cohen and Sater, January 26, 2016 (FSS00137-138). According to the messages, Cohen appears to have suggested dates occurring after March 2016.

²⁸⁷² (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, January 26, 2016 (FSS00136).

²⁸⁷³ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, January 26, 2016 (FSS00137).

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*and will walk you into every office you need to make sure you are comfortable for DT trip.*²⁸⁷⁴

(U) Cohen recalled that he and Sater continued to have “many” conversations and that he had pressed Sater to identify a property for the project.²⁸⁷⁵ Sater recalled that there was a “lull” in the project, with less activity, but Sater was unable to explain why this occurred.²⁸⁷⁶

e. (U) Revitalized Efforts in 2016

(U) Later that spring, however, Cohen and Sater resumed their activity around the project and the possibility of traveling to Russia. On April 20, 2016, Sater texted Cohen that “[t]he People wanted to know when we are coming?”²⁸⁷⁷ Cohen responded, “I need to talk to you.” Several days later, Sater sent a text to Cohen describing an additional conversation “with Moscow”:

*I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that[] it's probably after the convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert. I explained that ONLY you will be negotiating all the details. I want to make sure no one tries to go around us, that's why I said that. Michael it's completely in your hands, probably a quick trip by you would be the perfect move, that locks it in and no one else can elbow in at that point. Let me know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to speak to them and possibly fly over.*²⁸⁷⁸

(U) Cohen responded to Sater, stating: “My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention.”²⁸⁷⁹ Sater responded that he was “on it.”²⁸⁸⁰ Sater told the Committee that he “absolutely” understood that the Moscow project was still active at this time.²⁸⁸¹ According to Sater, he and Cohen had agreed that Cohen would travel with Sater to Russia first, and that “right on the heels” of their trip, Trump would travel to Russia.²⁸⁸²

²⁸⁷⁴ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, January 26, 2016 (FSS00137–138).

²⁸⁷⁵ (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 9/12/2018.

²⁸⁷⁶ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 203–204.

²⁸⁷⁷ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, April 20, 2016 (FSS00140); *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 77.

²⁸⁷⁸ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, May 4, 2016 (FSS00141–143).

²⁸⁷⁹ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, May 4, 2016 (FSS00143).

²⁸⁸⁰ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, May 4, 2016 (FSS00143).

²⁸⁸¹ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 206–207.

²⁸⁸² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 171.

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(U) The following day, May 5, 2016, Sater again messaged Cohen. In his message, Sater indicated that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to attend a high-profile economic forum in Russia called the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).²⁸⁸³

*Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there. This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss.*²⁸⁸⁴

Sater recalled that at some point, he and “Evgeny” had discussed the matter and decided that it was best to make the visit more about business and appear less political.²⁸⁸⁵ As a result, Sater and Evgeny worked to arrange an invitation for Cohen to SPIEF.²⁸⁸⁶ SPIEF, according to its website, has been held since 2006 “under the auspices of the President of the Russian Federation, who has also attended each event.”²⁸⁸⁷

(U) Cohen responded to Sater the following day, stating, “[w]orks for me.”²⁸⁸⁸ Sater later explained to the Committee that he believed Peskov was the “perfect” fit with whom to work on the project because Sater wanted to have a large media event and ribbon cutting, and that Peskov, as press secretary, would be the best Kremlin insider to work with.²⁸⁸⁹ Sater claimed that he had had discussions with “Evgeny” to this effect.²⁸⁹⁰ Sater recalled “Evgeny” telling him that “[o]f course we’ll get Dimitri [Peskov].”²⁸⁹¹

(U) Sater responded to Cohen, describing his rationale for why Cohen should attend SPIEF:

²⁸⁸³ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, May 5, 2016 (FSS00143-145). In late 2015 and again in March 2016, Trump was separately invited to SPIEF by then-Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 78–79. A draft response to Prikhodko declining the offer was prepared for Trump’s signature by Graff in late March 2016. The letter stated that Trump had existing commitments related to his Campaign, and that “[o]therwise, I would have gladly given every consideration to attending such an important event.” Email, Graff to Macchia, March 31, 2016 (TRUMPORG_16_000133–134) (attaching an unsigned letter from Trump to Prikhodko).

²⁸⁸⁴ (U) Text messages, Sater to Cohen, May 5, 2016 (FSS00143–145).

²⁸⁸⁵ (U) Sater Tr., p. 174. Sater told the FBI that Shmykov said Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to SPIEF. FBI, FD-302, Sater 12/15/2017.

²⁸⁸⁶ (U) Sater Tr., pp. 143–144.

²⁸⁸⁷ (U) Forumspv.com, “About the Forum.”

²⁸⁸⁸ (U) Text message, Cohen to Sater, May 5, 2016 (FSS00145).

²⁸⁸⁹ (U) Sater Tr., p. 208.

²⁸⁹⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹¹ (U) *Ibid.*

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Not only will you probably sit with #1 or #2 but the whole biz community is there I'll be running around setting nice \$100 mill deals [smiling emoji] And you will come back and the whole campaign team can kiss your ass. Keep this very very close to the vest, otherwise half a dozen idiots will try to jump on your coat tails. If it goes great you are a hero, if it doesn't all you did was go to an economic forum to check out the business. Bro this is why you got me working in the shadows. I will make sure you are clean as a whistle either way. For you 0 downside. But I know this is going to turn into 1. A major win for Trump, makes you the hero who bagged the elephant and 2. Sets up a stream of business opportunities that will be mind blowing. All from 1 short trip. I couldn't have dreamed of a better situation with no downside.²⁸⁹²

(U) In early June 2016, Cohen and Sater continued discussing plans for attending SPIEF. In a June 9, 2016 text message, Sater relayed to Cohen that he was filling out paperwork for their “badges” for the conference and that Cohen should receive an email invite soon.²⁸⁹³ Sater told Cohen that “Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well.”²⁸⁹⁴ Sater later explained to the Committee that his offers to Cohen related to high-level meetings, including potentially with Putin, were real and attainable.²⁸⁹⁵ Sater believed he could, in fact, obtain a very high level meeting for Cohen or Trump if either traveled to Russia.²⁸⁹⁶

(U) On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen a formal electronic invitation to SPIEF addressed to Cohen, along with login instructions to access information about the conference.²⁸⁹⁷ Sater also forwarded a blank Russian visa application form to Cohen.²⁸⁹⁸ Sater had separately reached out to a SPIEF official in charge of “official delegations” to request assistance to expedite his and Cohen’s visas.²⁸⁹⁹ In response, Sater was sent letters asking that he and Cohen be provided visas to attend SPIEF; Sater was told that obtaining the visas should only take one day.²⁹⁰⁰

²⁸⁹² (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen (FSS00146–148). The exact date of this message is unknown, but it occurred after May 5, 2016, and before June 9, 2016.

²⁸⁹³ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, June 9, 2016 (FSS00149).

²⁸⁹⁴ (U) Text message, Sater to Cohen, June 9, 2016 (FSS00149).

²⁸⁹⁵ (U) Sater Tr., p. 213.


²⁸⁹⁶ (U) *Ibid*.

²⁸⁹⁷ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, June 13, 2016 (FSS00081–84).

²⁸⁹⁸ (U) Email, Sater to Cohen, June 13, 2016 (FSS00086–94).

²⁸⁹⁹ (U) Email, Sater to Lemondzhava, June 14, 2016 (FSS00091).

²⁹⁰⁰ (U) Email, Lemondzhava to Sater, June 14, 2016 (FSS00091–94).



f. (U) Deal Efforts Cease

(U) Text messages from Sater to Cohen suggested that, as of the morning of June 14, 2016, Sater continued to believe that Cohen would be traveling to Russia with him and continued to ask Cohen to respond to him regarding visas.²⁹⁰¹ Messages and testimony from both Sater and Cohen indicate that on the afternoon of June 14, 2016, Cohen and Sater met in the atrium of Trump Tower in New York.²⁹⁰²

(U) Neither Cohen nor Sater claimed to have a specific memory of the June 14, 2016, meeting in the Trump Tower atrium. Sater claimed that he and Cohen possibly discussed the Trump Tower Moscow deal and what the next steps would be, but didn't have a clear recollection.²⁹⁰³ Sater recalled that Cohen backed out of the trip after he received his invite to SPIEF and after the passport photos were filed with "Evgeny," but could not recall with certainty

²⁹⁰¹ (U) Text messages, Sater to Cohen, June 13-14, 2016 (FSS00151).

²⁹⁰² (U) Text messages, Sater and Cohen, June 14, 2016 (FSS00153); Sater Tr., pp. 221-222.

²⁹⁰³ (U) Sater Tr., p. 222.

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when this occurred.²⁹⁰⁴ Sater recalled: “[Cohen] turned around and said: I can’t go. At the last minute he said: I can’t go; let’s wait until after Cleveland.”²⁹⁰⁵ Cohen also did not recall the specifics of the June 14, 2016 meeting, but similarly recalled that he decided not to go to Russia at the last minute. Cohen recalled deciding not to go because he felt the invitation did not come from the highest level in Moscow:

[A]ccording to Felix, I was supposed to be receiving the invite from again, I forget who, but it was somebody of tremendous significance in this. Again, it was plane tickets and the hotel and meetings and everything. And next thing, I receive from Mr. Sater is a hyperlink to the application. To log on, put in your credit card, in order to go to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum.²⁹⁰⁶

(U) Through at least June 2016, Cohen said that Trump viewed the Moscow project the same way Cohen did, as an “opportunity that was active.”²⁹⁰⁷ Cohen came to this understanding because Trump would, on a “regular basis,” ask Cohen about the status of the Russia project.²⁹⁰⁸ Cohen recalled:

In other words, Mr. Trump is out there on the rally, in the public, stating there’s no Russian collusion, there’s no involvement, there’s no deals, there’s no connection. And yet, the following day, as we’re walking to his car, he’s asking me, “How’s things going with Russia?”²⁹⁰⁹

(U) Cohen understood that Trump was “interested in the project” and recalled that he had spoken to Trump “ten to twelve” times during the course of the negotiations, which lasted from September 2015 to at least until June 2016.²⁹¹⁰

²⁹⁰⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 177.

²⁹⁰⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰⁶ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 308. For image, see FSS00238.

²⁹⁰⁷ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 71.

²⁹⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁹¹⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 266. Cohen initially told the Committee that he spoke to Trump about the project only three times, and that the last of these conversations occurred just before the Iowa caucus. Cohen later admitted that this was an intentionally false statement. As with other instances where he previously misled the Committee, Cohen claimed that he did so “[b]ecause I was staying on message, which was, again: There’s no Russian involvement. Minimal/no business dealings. No collusion. No contacts. That was the messaging. I was staying on it.” Cohen stated that although he was never explicitly ordered to lie, Cohen understood that by making these statements to him, Trump wanted Cohen to stick to Trump’s own message relating to Russia. Cohen said: “I knew exactly what he [Trump] was saying. And he knew exactly what he was saying.” *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 36.

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(U) After the Republican National Convention in July 2016, Sater stated that it became obvious that there was “just no way that a presidential candidate could build a tower in a foreign country.”²⁹¹¹ As a result, efforts on the project ceased.²⁹¹²

iii. (U) Giorgi Rtskhiladze: Michael Cohen’s Second Trump Tower Moscow Line of Effort During the Campaign

(U) In addition to Cohen’s attempts at a Trump Tower Moscow project with Felix Sater, Cohen also communicated with Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a businessman with whom he had previously worked, about a similar project proposal in Moscow. Rtskhiladze had previously worked with the Trump Organization, and Cohen in particular, on at least two other business projects.²⁹¹³

(U) The first of those past projects involved a licensing deal between the Trump Organization and Silk Road Group, a company headquartered in Tbilisi, Georgia. The project involved a potential real estate development in Batumi, Georgia. As part of the project, Cohen traveled to Georgia several times in 2012, including one trip with Trump. While the Batumi project was never completed, the Trump Organization received approximately \$1 million from George Ramishvili of the Silk Road Group in connection with the project.²⁹¹⁴ Cohen said that he had heard that the Silk Road Group was “very well connected” to the Georgian government, and that he had witnessed this personally, including Ramishvili’s interactions with then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.²⁹¹⁵ Cohen noted that despite the foreign nature of the company and its foreign government ties, Cohen conducted only “very minimal” due diligence on the company, which amounted to “Google searches, just to see whether or not there was anything that popped out at us that would make the deal not palatable.”²⁹¹⁶

(U) The second project with Rtskhiladze involved a possible development in Kazakhstan in approximately 2011. Cohen and Rtskhiladze traveled to Kazakhstan as part of initial efforts on the project.²⁹¹⁷ Cohen and Rtskhiladze contacted John Fotiadis, a U.S.-based architect, and had Fotiadis create architectural renderings for a skyscraper. This project failed to materialize, but the Fotiadis building design would ultimately be revisited by Cohen in September 2015 as part of a potential Trump Tower Moscow project.²⁹¹⁸

²⁹¹¹ (U) Sater Tr., p. 202.

²⁹¹² (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹¹³ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 103.

²⁹¹⁴ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 143–144.

²⁹¹⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 144–150.

²⁹¹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 145.

²⁹¹⁷ (U) Cohen Tr., pp. 108–109.

²⁹¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 111.

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(U) Over the course of their relationship, Cohen recalled introducing Rtskhiladze to Trump on multiple occasions, both in Trump’s office in New York and in Georgia during Trump’s trip there in connection with the Batumi deal.²⁹¹⁹ Cohen stated that he and Rtskhiladze were friends and that he spoke to, and spent time with, Rtskhiladze on a “regular basis.”²⁹²⁰

(U) In approximately late September 2015, Cohen received a call from Rtskhiladze, who called to offer Cohen a potential business deal in Russia for the Trump Organization.²⁹²¹ According to Cohen, on the call, Rtskhiladze said he “had a group that he wanted to talk to about doing a Trump Tower Moscow.”²⁹²² According to Rtskhiladze, Simon Nizharadze, a business associate of Rtskhiladze’s, had requested he contact Cohen to facilitate a potential licensing deal between Vladimir Mazur and the Trump Organization.²⁹²³

(U) After receiving the offer from Rtskhiladze, Cohen recalled that he reached out to Fotiadis and requested the previous renderings done for the skyscraper planned for Kazakhstan.²⁹²⁴ On September 22, 2015, Cohen received updated architectural renderings from Fotiadis.²⁹²⁵ The plans were updated with a new site location of “Moscow City Site 20.”²⁹²⁶ Later that day, Fotiadis sent updated site renderings using “Site 22,” and further updated the renderings the following day with what Fotiadis envisioned as the iconic feature at the top of the building that could house “[t]he Tallest Restaurant in Moscow.”²⁹²⁷ Cohen forwarded these renderings to Rtskhiladze.²⁹²⁸

[REDACTED] On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze emailed Cohen a draft document in Russian. Rtskhiladze wrote that it was a letter to the mayor of Moscow, who at the time was Sergey Sobyenin.²⁹²⁹ Rtskhiladze described Sobyenin as the “second guy in Russia.”²⁹³⁰

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²⁹¹⁹ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 141.

²⁹²⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 158.

²⁹²¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 160.

²⁹²² (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 160–161.

²⁹²³ (U) Written Responses, Rtskhiladze, September 16, 2019.

²⁹²⁴ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 160–161.

²⁹²⁵ (U) Email, Fotiadis to Cohen, September 22, 2015 (MDC-S-000452-455).

²⁹²⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹²⁷ (U) Email, Fotiadis to Cohen, et al., September 22, 2015 (MDC-S-000472); Email, Fotiadis to Cohen, et al., September 23, 2015 (MDC-S-000463).

²⁹²⁸ (U) Email, Cohen to Rtskhiladze, September 22, 2015 (MDC-S-000493-498); Email, Cohen to Rtskhiladze, September 22, 2015 (MDC-S-000499-506).

²⁹²⁹ (U) Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen, September 24, 2015 (MDC-S-000507).

²⁹³⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

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(U) Rtskhiladze told Cohen that Sobyenin was “aware of the potential project and will pledge his support.”²⁹³⁴ Rtskhiladze explained that with Sobyenin’s support, the only spot remaining in Moscow City will be “dedicated to Trump tower and financed.”²⁹³⁵ At Cohen’s request, Rtskhiladze provided a translation of the draft letter.²⁹³⁶ According to Rtskhiladze’s translation, the letter noted that the Trump Organization had been “approached by the Global Prospect LLC a Moscow based real estate development company co-founded by one of legendary Russian architects, developer and statesman Mr. Michael Posokhin.”²⁹³⁷ The translation of the letter also claimed the project would be of “monumental proportions” and would be “housed in the heart of the Moscow City development.”²⁹³⁸ The project would “act as a symbol of stronger economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore the United States and the Russian Federation.”²⁹³⁹ In an effort to pursue a “close dialogue with you and your administration,” the letter invited Sobyenin to New York. Rtskhiladze noted that he and Cohen should discuss the letter later that day.²⁹⁴⁰

(U) On September 27, 2015, Rtskhiladze emailed Cohen to relay information about the proposed development. In the email, Rtskhiladze told Cohen that Mikhail Posokhin and Simon Nizharadze would be the two primary individuals involved in the venture.²⁹⁴¹ Mikhail Posokhin is a widely-known Russian architect and developer who has completed a large number of Russian government projects, including renovations of many Kremlin offices and residences, as well as the residence of the Russian President (Kremlin Building Number 1), according to Posokhin’s personal website.²⁹⁴² Posokhin has also designed the tallest building in Russia and worked on projects for the Moscow city-level government in Russia.²⁹⁴³

(U) In his email to Cohen, Rtskhiladze also described the project’s design, which would have two parts—a Trump residential building and Trump World Tower—both located at the

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²⁹³⁴ (U) Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen, September 24, 2015 (MDC-S-000507).

²⁹³⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹³⁶ (U) Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen, September 24, 2015 (MDC-S-000567–568).

²⁹³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹³⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴¹ (U) Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen, September 27, 2015 (MDC-S-000471).

²⁹⁴² (U) Posokhin.ru, “Mikhail M. Posokhin.”

²⁹⁴³ (U) *Ibid.*

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Moscow City site.²⁹⁴⁴ Rtskhiladze further informed Cohen that a “project presentation” for the Trump residential building will be ready in several days and that the Trump World Tower project concept “is being shared with the presidents [sic] cabinet and Moscow mayor.”²⁹⁴⁵ Cohen told the Committee that he recalled that Rtskhiladze was planning to provide a briefing to officials in Moscow, but that Cohen was not involved in that briefing.²⁹⁴⁶

(U) Cohen ultimately decided to not pursue a Moscow project with Rtskhiladze and instead pursued the project with Sater.²⁹⁴⁷

iv. (U) Dmitry Klokov

(U) In addition to communicating with both Sater and Rtskhiladze in the fall of 2015, Cohen also had contact with another Russian national, Dmitry Klokov, in the same timeframe. Cohen believed that Dmitry Klokov was a weightlifter who had previously represented Russia at the Olympics.²⁹⁴⁸ According to information obtained by the SCO, the individual who contacted Cohen was not the Olympic weightlifter, but was the director of external communications for a large Russian energy company. In addition, Klokov previously served as the press secretary to Russia’s Minister of Energy.²⁹⁴⁹

(U) On November 16, 2015, Ivanka Trump received an email from Klokov’s wife.²⁹⁵⁰ According to Cohen, Ivanka Trump called Cohen and told him that she had received an email about the Trump Tower Moscow project.²⁹⁵¹ Ivanka instructed Cohen to contact Klokov, and to “[b]e nice,” and report back to her on the outcome of the outreach.²⁹⁵² According to Cohen, Ivanka Trump also forwarded the initial outreach from Klokov’s wife.²⁹⁵³ When asked if Ivanka Trump’s instruction to Cohen was about the Trump Tower Moscow project or about a potential meeting between Putin and Trump, Cohen said that it was a “combination of the two.”²⁹⁵⁴

²⁹⁴⁴ (U) Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen, September 27, 2015 (MDC-S-000471).

²⁹⁴⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴⁶ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 121.

²⁹⁴⁷ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 161.

²⁹⁴⁸ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 169.

²⁹⁴⁹ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 72–73; “Russia & CIS: Business and Financial Daily,” Vol. XX, Issue 241, *Interfax*, December 27, 2011 (stating that Dmitry Klokov is an advisor to Sergei Shmatko); “Russian Energy Minister Elected Chief of CIS Electric Power Council,” *Interfax*, May 25, 2012 (stating that Dmitry Klokov was the press officer to Alexander Novak).

²⁹⁵⁰ (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 242; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 72.

²⁹⁵¹ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 242, 251.

²⁹⁵² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 251.

²⁹⁵³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 242.

²⁹⁵⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 251–252.

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(U) Shortly thereafter, Cohen spoke to Klokov on the phone. Cohen stated that Klokov already knew about the project in Moscow.²⁹⁵⁵ While Cohen didn't have specifics on how Klokov knew of the Trump Moscow project, Cohen suggested that Klokov could have known about the project because "people were talking about it in Moscow."²⁹⁵⁶ Cohen told the Committee that Klokov claimed he had "relationships with the government," that he could "help with this Trump Moscow proposal, and it would be great if all parties were able to meet and to develop this property in Moscow."²⁹⁵⁷ Cohen claimed that Klokov was "adamant about me coming to Moscow and to bring Mr. Trump to Moscow for the two to meet."²⁹⁵⁸

(U) The following day, November 18, 2015, Klokov emailed Cohen to emphasize a "few important aspects" of the phone conversation between Klokov and Cohen.²⁹⁵⁹ In the email, Klokov claimed that he was not affiliated with any business, but was instead a "trusted person" focused on "political synergy."²⁹⁶⁰ Klokov stated that "our person of interest" is "ready to meet your candidate."²⁹⁶¹ Cohen understood that our person of interest referred to Putin.²⁹⁶² To facilitate the meeting between Putin and Trump, Klokov told Cohen that he would introduce Cohen to "the close person" during Cohen's trip to Moscow, which Klokov would facilitate.²⁹⁶³ Klokov claimed that the "close person" had spoken to Putin about the potential meeting with Trump.²⁹⁶⁴ Klokov said that "we" would facilitate all aspects of the Putin-Trump meeting, including the security, transportation, and accommodation, but that the meeting "has to be informal."²⁹⁶⁵ Further, Klokov told Cohen that Cohen's business development efforts should be separated from the proposed "informal" meeting between Putin and Trump.²⁹⁶⁶ Klokov emphasized that although these would be bifurcated, ultimately the meeting would yield even larger business opportunities which would have "the most important support."²⁹⁶⁷

(U) Cohen quickly responded to Klokov's email, copying Ivanka Trump. In his response, Cohen reemphasized that the Trump Organization had signed an LOI with a local developer and that it was his intention to travel to Russia related to that project.²⁹⁶⁸ Cohen told

²⁹⁵⁵ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 167.

²⁹⁵⁶ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 245; Cohen Tr., 167.

²⁹⁵⁷ (U) Cohen Tr., pp. 165–166.

²⁹⁵⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 169–170.

²⁹⁵⁹ (U) Email, Klokov to Cohen, November 18, 2015 (MDC-S-000597).

²⁹⁶⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶² (U) Cohen Tr., p. 174.

²⁹⁶³ (U) Email, Klokov to Cohen, November 18, 2015 (MDC-S-000597).

²⁹⁶⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶⁸ (U) Email, Cohen to Klokov and I. Trump, November 18, 2015 (MDC-S-000492).

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Klokov that he would “gladly meet with you and your contact” during this trip.²⁹⁶⁹ Cohen, however, advised Klokov that he would advise Trump to not travel to Russia except in the context of an “official visit.”²⁹⁷⁰ Cohen said that he was scheduled to speak with the local developer later that day and would contact Klokov thereafter.²⁹⁷¹

(U) Klokov responded to Cohen the following day, November 16, 2015, and reemphasized that his focus was not on the immediate business project, but rather arranging an informal meeting between Putin and Trump.²⁹⁷² Klokov again stated that the meeting “has already been discussed” with Putin, who Klokov claimed was “knowledgeable about it and would gladly meet your client.”²⁹⁷³ Klokov focused again on his goal of creating “synergy on a government level,” but made clear that the Putin meeting would have lucrative business outcomes.²⁹⁷⁴

Now, your client is a candidate and hardly any other political move could be compared to a tete-a-tete meeting between them. If publicized correctly the impact of it could be phenomenal, of course not only in political but in a business dimension as well. I don't have to tell you that there is no bigger warranty in any project than consent of the person of interest.

(U) Cohen again responded to Klokov in an email in which he continued to focus on the business project with I.C. Expert. Cohen further recalled in his testimony that it was “always” about the project, and that political considerations were not the driving force.²⁹⁷⁵ In particular, Cohen told Klokov that “our LOI developer” was “in talks” with Putin’s “Chief of Staff” to arrange the formal invite for Putin and Trump to meet.²⁹⁷⁶ Cohen stated that he had been invited to Moscow by the developer prior to Trump’s travel to “view 3 potential sites and to meet with the Chief of Staff.”²⁹⁷⁷ Cohen said that he would be “honored” to meet with Klokov while in Moscow “to discuss any thoughts you might have that could enhance the project.”²⁹⁷⁸

²⁹⁶⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷¹ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷² (U) Email, Klokov to Cohen and I. Trump, November 19, 2015 (MDC-S-000671).

²⁹⁷³ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷⁵ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 191.

²⁹⁷⁶ (U) Email, Cohen to Klokov and I. Trump, November 19, 2015 (MDC-S-000671). At that time, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Executive Office was Sergei Ivanov. Cohen later sought to contact Ivanov directly in January 2016.

²⁹⁷⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

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• [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

█ [REDACTED]

Tarazov and Standik were later declared *persona non grata* in 2018 by the United States.²⁹⁸⁸

█ [REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

2984 [REDACTED]

2985 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 42.

2986 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

2987 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

2988 (U) “Russian Trade Representative among diplomats expelled from the United States,” *Tass*, March 29, 2018;

2989 [REDACTED]

2990 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50; rs.gov.ru, “About Rossotrudnichestvo.”

2991 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) The panel Epshteyn participated in included representatives of the Moscow city government, including Sergey Cheremin, a minister in the Moscow city government in charge of external relations and investment.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

(U) In early 2016, these same individuals affiliated with the Moscow city government reengaged Epshteyn about a potential Trump deal in Russia, ultimately sending him blueprints for a hotel.²⁹⁹⁸ According to the email chain produced by Epshteyn, the blueprints originated with a secretary for Cheremin in April 2016. Cheremin’s secretary forwarded the plans to an email address that included the name Shutenko, likely affiliated with Oleg Shutenko, Cheremin’s deputy in the Moscow city government.²⁹⁹⁹

(U) Epshteyn recalled sharing these blueprints with Eric Trump and discussing the offer with him.³⁰⁰⁰ According to Epshteyn, Eric Trump said that he would “take a look” and that the

²⁹⁹² [REDACTED]

²⁹⁹³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁹⁹⁴ [REDACTED]

²⁹⁹⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

²⁹⁹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.

²⁹⁹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁹⁹⁸ (U) Epshteyn Tr., pp. 18–19.

²⁹⁹⁹ (U) Emails, Shutenko and Klementieva, April 22, 2016 (BF.Epshteyn.SSCI.Prod.113018.000002–3).

³⁰⁰⁰ (U) Epshteyn Tr., p. 36.

[REDACTED]

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opportunity “[c]ould be interesting,” but that his overall reaction was “extremely tepid.”³⁰⁰¹ Epshteyn claimed that nothing ever came of the offer.³⁰⁰²

(U) The Committee did not seek to interview Eric Trump. The Committee does not have further information related to what action, if any, was taken by the Trump Organization on the proposal.

4. (U) Efforts to Mislead the Public and Congress about Trump Tower Moscow

(U) A number of individuals, particularly Michael Cohen, engaged in efforts to mislead, minimize, or otherwise hide the details and scope of efforts to build a Trump Tower Moscow during the 2016 presidential campaign.

(U) As described by Cohen in his testimony to the Committee and elsewhere, Cohen believed that there was a discrepancy between then-candidate Trump’s public statements on the campaign trail stating that he had no business deals related to Russia, and the approximately nine-month effort to build Trump Tower Moscow in 2015 and 2016. During the campaign, Cohen also undertook efforts to maintain the secrecy of the negotiations.³⁰⁰³

(U) After the election, Cohen was part of an alleged joint defense agreement (JDA) with an unknown number of other Trump-affiliated individuals, including Trump himself, the Trump Organization, Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Felix Sater, and others. A number of issues arose as the Committee sought testimony and documents from Cohen that likely related to the functioning of this alleged JDA, including the withholding of documents and intentionally false statements made by Cohen to the Committee and released publicly.³⁰⁰⁴

(U) One such issue involved outreach related to Dmitry Klokov. Cohen initially told the Committee that a communication came into the Trump Organization requesting that Cohen speak with Klokov.³⁰⁰⁵ Cohen’s then-attorney, Stephen Ryan, told the Committee that the communications were privileged and therefore not produced. Ryan stated:

Let me make a representation on the record about it. There’s a communication from Lana Alexander,³⁰⁰⁶ who wrote to the Trump Organization and she

³⁰⁰¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 36.

³⁰⁰² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³⁰⁰³ (U) Email, Cohen to Rozov, Chizhikov, and Sater, November 2, 2015 (MDC-S-000652–670) (“It is extremely important that the nature and content of the attached LOI not be disclosed until such time as the parties have either concluded the definitive agreement documents or have agreed to a mutual statement.”).

³⁰⁰⁴ (U) *See also infra* Vol. 5, Sec. II.C.3.

³⁰⁰⁵ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 164.

³⁰⁰⁶ (U) A/k/a Lana Erchova.

[REDACTED]

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*represented that she is Mr. Klovov's wife, and it's in a trail of documents about two or three pages long that there's privileged communication in and so it's not been produced to you yet.*³⁰⁰⁷

(U) Cohen later told the Committee that Ryan claimed that the communication was privileged at the request of Abbe Lowell, who at the time served as attorney to Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.³⁰⁰⁸ Cohen also told the Committee that the communication was not, in fact, privileged and testified about its contents in his second interview with the Committee. It is unclear why Ryan ever considered the communication privileged.

(U) On other matters, multiple emails between Michael Cohen and Russian government officials—which were responsive to the Committee's document request—were never produced to the Committee. The withheld emails included outreach to the Kremlin's press office seeking to speak with Putin's chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, as well as a response from Dmitri Peskov's assistant seeking to discuss the Trump Moscow project. During Cohen's initial interview, Cohen's then-counsel Stephen Ryan told the Committee that Cohen was not involved in the production of documents to the Committee.³⁰⁰⁹ Ryan stated that Cohen's emails from his Trump Organization account were produced to Cohen and his counsel by the Trump Organization "off the Trump [Organization] server."³⁰¹⁰ During that same interview, Cohen made false statements to the Committee about these communications with Russian government officials.³⁰¹¹ Cohen also transmitted his false statements about his outreach to the Kremlin on the project to the press and to the public generally, giving the false impression that Cohen had not communicated in a substantive way with the Russian government regarding the project.³⁰¹²

(U) Cohen eventually pleaded guilty to making intentionally false statements to this Committee and to the HPSCI related to the Trump Tower project.³⁰¹³ Cohen eventually admitted to receiving an email response from a Russian government employee; ultimately, he admitted contacting her and conducting a substantive conversation about the Trump Moscow project in January 2016.³⁰¹⁴ Cohen told the Committee that the email response, which he never produced to the Committee, was never provided to him by the Trump Organization, another member of the alleged JDA.³⁰¹⁵ The Committee was unable to determine the accuracy of this claim. However,

³⁰⁰⁷ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 164.

³⁰⁰⁸ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 244–245.

³⁰⁰⁹ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 128.

³⁰¹⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰¹¹ (U) Criminal Information, *United States v. Michael Cohen*, Case No: 18-CRIM-850 (S.D.N.Y. November 29, 2018).

³⁰¹² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰¹³ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰¹⁴ (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 287–288.

³⁰¹⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

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if true, this lends support to the conclusion that Cohen’s initial false statements to the Committee were aided by other members of the alleged JDA, namely the Trump Organization.

(U) Furthermore, drafts of Cohen’s prepared statement that included this and other false or misleading statements was “circulated through all of the various individuals” who read it and, according to Cohen, these individuals “knew the information was false.”³⁰¹⁶ Cohen “suspect[ed]” that Trump had seen the statement.³⁰¹⁷ He further said that he believed Trump knew that the statement was false because “my conversations with him took place for several months after the January date that’s referenced in this statement.”³⁰¹⁸ Cohen also said that, after he was indicted in the Southern District of New York, he discussed a potential pardon for himself with Jay Sekulow “more than a half dozen times.”³⁰¹⁹ Cohen further stated that he understood that the pardon discussions had come from Trump through Sekulow.³⁰²⁰

³⁰¹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³⁰¹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

³⁰¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁰¹⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

³⁰²⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 378.

E. (U) George Papadopoulos

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) In early March 2016, following a short stint working for the Ben Carson campaign, George Papadopoulos asked Trump Campaign advisor Sam Clovis about joining the Trump foreign policy team. On March 21, 2016, Trump publicly announced his foreign policy team, which included Papadopoulos and four others.³⁰²¹ Throughout the campaign and following the election, Papadopoulos proffered himself as a conduit between the Trump team and foreign governments, including Russia, Egypt, and Greece.

(U) During his initial conversations with Clovis in early March, Papadopoulos learned that “a principal foreign policy focus of the Campaign was an improved U.S. relationship with Russia.”³⁰²² Papadopoulos, on his own initiative, met and communicated repeatedly with individuals throughout 2016 to advance the Campaign’s relationship with Russia, including London-based Professor Joseph Mifsud and Mifsud associates Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. Papadopoulos believed Mifsud, Polonskaya, and Timofeev were connected to the Russian government, and worked with them on ways for the Campaign to engage with the Russian government.

[REDACTED]

³⁰²¹ (U) Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, “Politics: Trump questions need for NATO, outlines noninterventionist foreign policy,” *The Washington Post*, March 21, 2016.

³⁰²² (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017; Statement of the Offense ¶4, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. October 5, 2017).

³⁰²³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) The Committee found that the Trump Campaign’s rush to name and assemble the foreign policy team—without thorough vetting—resulted in their recruitment of inexperienced advisors, over whom they exerted little control. Ultimately, the foreign policy team exposed the Trump Campaign to significant counterintelligence vulnerabilities.

(U) Papadopoulos used multiple avenues to pursue a face-to-face meeting between Trump and President Putin. Papadopoulos believed that he was operating with the approval—or at least not the explicit disapproval—of senior Campaign leadership, who he kept apprised of his efforts. Papadopoulos never successfully scheduled a meeting between Putin and Trump.

(U) Most Campaign staff ignored Papadopoulos’s engagements with foreign governments, although some encouraged his efforts. The Committee did not find any evidence that the Campaign ever asked Papadopoulos to cease these engagements. However, on several occasions, the Campaign asked him to stop his interactions with the foreign press on its behalf, and in October 2016, several senior Campaign staffers discussed ending Papadopoulos’s role with the Campaign, but never did so. Papadopoulos continued to work with the Campaign through the presidential Transition, during which time he assisted several foreign governments—though not Moscow—in establishing contact with campaign officials.

[REDACTED] Papadopoulos’s contacts with Mifsud and Sergei Millian, the President of the Russia-American Chamber of Commerce (RACC), are highly suspicious. [REDACTED] Millian is a Belarusian-born American citizen, and as of 2018 was the president of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce and a real estate broker in New York City. Furthermore, Millian has had a working relationship with Trump since 2007. [REDACTED]

Both Mifsud and Millian exhibited behavior consistent with intelligence tradecraft, and both have significant ties to Russian government and business circles. Papadopoulos did not seem to consider himself a target for foreign intelligence services, despite being associated with a presidential campaign and his ongoing interactions with foreign government officials.

- (U) Mifsud’s use of Polonskaya as a proxy to further induce contact with Papadopoulos is consistent with intelligence tradecraft.
- (U) Millian’s connections to the virtually non-existent RACC, combined with the odd nature of his request that Papadopoulos pursue a job with the Trump administration, are also consistent with intelligence tradecraft.

3024 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) The Committee found Mifsud was aware of an aspect of Russia’s active measures campaign in the 2016 election and that Mifsud told Papadopoulos what he knew. The timing of Mifsud’s visit to Moscow and his subsequent conversation with Papadopoulos are consistent with the timeline of the GRU’s cyber penetration of the DNC and DCCC, several weeks before any information about that activity was public. Furthermore, the information Mifsud conveyed to Papadopoulos was consistent with the GRU’s information disclosure operations intended to damage the candidacy of Hillary Clinton.³⁰²⁵

[REDACTED]

For further information on the FBI’s counterintelligence investigation, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.

[REDACTED]

(U) Papadopoulos held a purely advisory role on the Campaign—he was never formal Campaign staff nor was he part of Trump’s inner circle—and most Campaign staff and other advisors he interacted with were dismissive of his efforts. Some senior members of the Campaign viewed Papadopoulos as a liability, particularly in his interactions with foreign governments and press outlets.

³⁰²⁵ (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.B.

[REDACTED]

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(U) The Committee notes that Papadopoulos engaged with more than just the Russian government. He also communicated with government officials from Egypt,³⁰²⁶ Israel,³⁰²⁷ Japan,³⁰²⁸ and the United Kingdom.³⁰²⁹ However, Papadopoulos's interactions to engage Russia occurred through non-government interlocutors.

(U) Papadopoulos never sought to conceal his efforts to make contact with Russian officials; on the contrary, he sought opportunities to demonstrate his networking to high-ranking Campaign officials, like Corey Lewandowski and Steve Bannon. Papadopoulos wanted to maintain his own identity as a conduit; he never put Mifsud or Timofeev directly in contact with the Campaign, or vice-versa.

(U) Although the Committee's insights are substantially limited by incomplete document production and witness testimony, the Committee assesses that Papadopoulos was not a witting cooptee of the Russian intelligence services, but nonetheless presented as a prime intelligence target and potential vector for malign Russian influence.

2. (U) Limitations on the Committee's Investigation

(U) The FBI first interviewed Papadopoulos on January 27, 2017, in connection with its counterintelligence investigation. On July 27, 2017, FBI agents arrested him for making false statements during this January 2017 interview. Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to making these false statements on October 5, 2017.³⁰³⁰ The FBI made some relevant records available to the

³⁰²⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Elshemy, September 15, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000617); *see also* Emails, Papadopoulos and Bannon, September 16–18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000621–627). Between September 16, 2016, and September 18, 2016, Papadopoulos and Bannon exchanged dozens of messages relating to a potential engagement between President El-Sisi of Egypt and Trump, ultimately confirming a dinner meeting at 9:00 p.m. on Monday, September 19, 2016. During this email exchange, Bannon asked Papadopoulos to email a briefing in advance of the meeting with President El-Sisi, which Papadopoulos sent noting that “while in Athens over dinner with Greek defense minister last May, he personally introduced me to the Egyptian defense minister and the rest became monthly consultations with the Egyptians in DC.” There are an additional two email messages related to this conversation that were redacted when produced to the Committee. Bannon told the Committee that he mistook Papadopoulos for a separate Campaign staffer and never meant to engage with Papadopoulos on this issue. Bannon Tr., pp. 95–98.

³⁰²⁷ (U) Email, Leibovich to Papadopoulos, June 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000703).

³⁰²⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, September 15, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000615).

³⁰²⁹ (U) Email, Goshko to Papadopoulos, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000643).

³⁰³⁰ (U) Plea Agreement, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. October 5, 2017). During the course of its investigation, the FBI discovered that Papadopoulos also possessed a valid Greek passport. *See* FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Committee, including: notes from its interviews with Papadopoulos,³⁰³¹ as well as a detailed timeline of Papadopoulos's activities from March 2016 through August 2017.³⁰³²

(U) The Committee tried several times to interview Papadopoulos. In discussing a potential appearance before the Committee, Papadopoulos insisted certain topics be outside the scope of the interview, a condition which the Committee rejected. Ultimately, the Committee received two separate document productions from Papadopoulos. The first tranche of documents, produced on June 19, 2017, was incomplete. That production also appeared to be curated and annotated by Papadopoulos, and painted a misleading representation of the facts related to his activities. Papadopoulos included with the documents a written statement that included numerous false or misleading statements similar to those he originally made to the FBI.³⁰³³ The second tranche of documents, produced on June 6, 2019, was more comprehensive, but still omitted non-email communications, including text messages and social media messages, that the Committee believes Papadopoulos may still possess.³⁰³⁴ The Committee also reviewed public transcripts of Papadopoulos's testimony to other congressional committees.

(U) The Committee tried several times to contact and interview Mifsud, to no avail. These efforts included a letter sent to Mifsud on March 22, 2018, inviting him to appear for an interview with the Committee. While the letter resulted in several exchanges with Mifsud's alleged legal counsel, those attempts ultimately ended in November 2018, when his attorneys claimed to have lost contact with their client.

3. (U) Joseph Mifsud and Other Central Figures

(U) Mifsud played a central role in Papadopoulos's attempts to engage the Russian government on behalf of the Trump Campaign. The Committee's awareness of Mifsud's activities is limited to document production and testimony from other witnesses, information from the Executive Branch, and open source research, in the absence of Mifsud's documents and testimony.

[REDACTED]

³⁰³¹ (U) These documents included some redactions.

³⁰³² (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]. The timeline was used during September 2017 FBI interviews of Papadopoulos.

³⁰³³ (U) Schedule A Response, Papadopoulos (GP-000038–GP-000040).

³⁰³⁴ (U) The Committee makes this assessment based on other document productions, testimony from other witnesses, and other information available to the Committee. For example, Papadopoulos testified to the U.S. House of Representatives about his communications with Mifsud using Facebook, but did not produce any communications transmitted via Facebook to the Committee. *See* House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, pp. 159–160.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos to Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. Polonskaya is a Russian citizen who Mifsud used as a proxy for his activities.³⁰³⁸ Polonskaya communicated with Papadopoulos up until, and after, the 2016 election.³⁰³⁹ Papadopoulos also mistakenly thought Polonskaya was Putin’s niece.³⁰⁴⁰ Timofeev is another member of the Valdai Discussion Club with whom Papadopoulos communicated through at least July 2016.³⁰⁴¹ Papadopoulos engaged both Polonskaya and Timofeev, along with Mifsud, as part of his outreach to Russia.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to FBI records and documents produced to the Committee, Papadopoulos and Polonskaya remained in contact through the election.³⁰⁴⁵ On a single day in October 2016, Papadopoulos and Polonskaya exchanged nearly seventy messages.³⁰⁴⁶ During

3035 [REDACTED]
3036 (U) *Ibid.*
3037 [REDACTED]
3038 (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 17; Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos and Timofeev, April 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000863).
3039 (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]
3040 (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 17.
3041 (U) *See, e.g.*, Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, June 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001002).
3042 [REDACTED]
3043 (U) *Ibid.*
3044 (U) *Ibid.*
3045 (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000980); FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]
3046 (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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this conversation, Polonskaya demonstrated an awareness of Papadopoulos's intent to run for public office.³⁰⁴⁷

(U) Simona Mangiante, an Italian attorney who worked for the European Parliament until 2016, first interacted with Papadopoulos in approximately September 2016, when he sent her a LinkedIn message, noting that he had previously worked for the organization that Mangiante had just joined, the London Center of International Law Practice (LCILP).³⁰⁴⁸ Mangiante and Papadopoulos initially communicated via Skype or WhatsApp, until Papadopoulos met Mangiante in person at the airport in New York in the spring of 2017.³⁰⁴⁹ Mangiante married Papadopoulos on March 2, 2018.³⁰⁵⁰ Mangiante has an independent, separate connection to Mifsud.

(U) According to Mangiante, she was introduced to Mifsud at some point between 2009 and 2016 through Gianni Pittella, the former head of a political group within the European Union.³⁰⁵¹ Mangiante described Pittella as "someone I am very close to," and further stated that Pittella was "someone who is very close to Mifsud."³⁰⁵² Mangiante characterized Mifsud as being affiliated with a number of universities in Europe, including the Link Campus University in Rome, Italy; the University of East Anglia; and the University of Stirling in the United Kingdom; as well as serving as the Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy.³⁰⁵³ During Mangiante's three month employment at the LCILP, which ended in late October 2016, Mifsud also became a director at the LCILP.³⁰⁵⁴

4. (U) Papadopoulos Engages with Foreign Governments, Inflating Campaign Role

(U) The Committee used limited document production and interviews to evaluate interactions Papadopoulos had throughout 2016 with foreign officials, Mifsud, and members of the Trump Campaign, and the corresponding counterintelligence threats those activities represented.³⁰⁵⁵

³⁰⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.* According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filing, Papadopoulos filed a Statement of Candidacy (FEC Form 2) to run for the 25th District in the State of California on October 29, 2019.

³⁰⁴⁸ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Simona Mangiante, March 11, 2019, p. 82.

³⁰⁴⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 81–82.

³⁰⁵⁰ (U) Kim Janssen, "Mueller witness George Papadopoulos weds Italian sweetheart at Chicago's City Hall," *Chicago Tribune*, March 6, 2018.

³⁰⁵¹ (U) Mangiante Tr., pp. 15–16.

³⁰⁵² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁰⁵³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 20–21.

³⁰⁵⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26; Email, Mangiante to Mifsud, Idris, et al., October 22, 2016 (SSCI-SMP-0010–11).

³⁰⁵⁵ (U) This does not purport to be an exhaustive list of Papadopoulos's activities, many of which remain unknown to the Committee.

i. (U) Papadopoulos Seeks a Role on a Campaign

(U) Papadopoulos first reached out to the Trump Campaign in the summer of 2015, and was referred to Michael Glassner, the National Political Director for the Trump Campaign, by Corey Lewandowski, the Trump Campaign manager at the time.³⁰⁵⁶ Papadopoulos expressed that he was seeking “an advisory role to Mr. Trump on matters of energy security and U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.”³⁰⁵⁷ In September 2015, Glassner told Papadopoulos that the Trump Campaign was not hiring policy advisors.³⁰⁵⁸

(U) From late 2015 until February 2016, Papadopoulos held a paid position with the Ben Carson campaign.³⁰⁵⁹ After leaving, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the LCILP to ask if LCILP was hiring, noting that he had finished his role with the Carson campaign.³⁰⁶⁰ By early February 2016, he agreed to join LCILP and began working in London.³⁰⁶¹

(U) Around the same time, Papadopoulos sent messages to Lewandowski and Glassner, again expressing interest in joining the Trump Campaign.³⁰⁶² On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner another email message, reiterating his interest.³⁰⁶³ The same day, a representative from the Trump Campaign responded to Papadopoulos with the subject line, “follow up from Michael Glassner,” to confirm that Papadopoulos would like to be introduced to Sam Clovis, who was the National Co-Chair and Chief Policy Adviser for the Trump Campaign and was at that time charged with forming a foreign policy team for the Trump Campaign. Papadopoulos said yes.³⁰⁶⁴

(U) Clovis told the Committee that the goal for creation of the foreign policy team was to alleviate pressure the Trump Campaign was receiving regarding the candidate’s foreign policy and national security experience. In Clovis’s words:

[W]e were desperate to try to get the press off our backs . . . these were people who had approached the campaign at one time or another and had enough rank or enough street cred or I should say at least had credentials that looked like we could possibly put them together on this national advisory team. . . . My job was

³⁰⁵⁶ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Glassner, August 4, 2015 (B&P GP File 2018 000695).

³⁰⁵⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵⁸ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 81.

³⁰⁵⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 81–82.

³⁰⁶¹ (U) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 82.

³⁰⁶² (U) *Ibid.* Papadopoulos did not produce these communications to the Committee.

³⁰⁶³ (U) *Ibid.* Papadopoulos did not produce this communication to the Committee.

³⁰⁶⁴ (U) Emails, Lutes and Papadopoulos, March 2–3, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000701–702).

[REDACTED]

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*to put that list together, put it together, get a press release that let Hope, Hope Hicks, put a press release out on it, those kinds of things. Essentially, that was it. Once we had done that, the press backed off and I moved on to other things, and I never worried about cultivating that group ever again.*³⁰⁶⁵

(U) Hicks also said that in March 2016, then-candidate Trump was “repeatedly asked about who [was] advising him on foreign policy. So we were as a campaign feeling pressure to put something together.”³⁰⁶⁶

(U) Clovis and Papadopoulos spoke on March 6, 2016, about Papadopoulos joining the foreign policy team, and they may have discussed Russia. According to an August 2017 interview with the FBI:

*Papadopoulos recalled having a telephone interview with Sam Clovis . . . on or about March 6, 2016, during which the topic of Russia came up. Clovis noted the importance of Russia to the foreign policy team. Papadopoulos remembered telling Clovis he did not have any Russian contacts during that call.*³⁰⁶⁷

(U) This is in contrast to what Clovis stated in his interview with the Committee, during which he stated, “I think my advice to George [Papadopoulos] has always been: No to Russia.”³⁰⁶⁸

(U) On March 6, 2016, Clovis wrote an email update to senior Campaign members, including Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Corey Lewandowski, Michael Glassner, and Stephen Miller, explaining that he had “made contact with everyone in the matrix . . . I have already had lengthy discussions with Walid [Ph]ares and George Papadopoulos. Both are on board.”³⁰⁶⁹ According to a “Policy Team Matrix” document attached to the email, Papadopoulos was to support foreign policy issues and was the sole individual assigned to support energy issues.³⁰⁷⁰

(U) Clovis sent another email, entitled “National Security Advisory Committee,” to Ivanka Trump, Kushner, and Glassner on March 16, 2016: “As you asked for today, find

³⁰⁶⁵ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Sam Clovis, September 28, 2017, pp. 14–16.

³⁰⁶⁶ (U) Hicks Tr., pp. 9–10.

³⁰⁶⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 8/11/2017.

³⁰⁶⁸ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 78–79.

³⁰⁶⁹ (U) Email, Clovis to Kushner, I. Trump, Lewandowski, Glassner, and S. Miller, March 6, 2016 (DJTFP00009899–9900). The Committee understands “on board” to indicate that the individuals had expressed their desire, and perhaps commitment, to joining the national security/foreign policy advisory team the Campaign was seeking to establish.

³⁰⁷⁰ (U) “Policy Team Matrix,” March 6, 2016 (DJTFP00009911).

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attached the list of those from whom I have commitments to the team.”³⁰⁷¹ Papadopoulos is listed in the attachment as “Oil and Energy Consultant; Hudson Institute; Expert on Mediterranean, Caspian, and Middle Eastern energy and Israel; degrees from University College London, DePaul University and Universite Catholique de Louvain.”³⁰⁷²

(U) On March 21, 2016, Trump announced some of the foreign policy team during a meeting with the editorial board of the *The Washington Post*. During this meeting, Trump characterized Papadopoulos as, “an energy and oil consultant, excellent guy.”³⁰⁷³

ii. (U) Papadopoulos Meets Joseph Mifsud and Olga Polonskaya

(U) On March 14, 2016, around the same time that he joined the Trump Campaign, Papadopoulos first met London-based professor Joseph Mifsud (also known as Joseph di Gabriele) while traveling in Rome, Italy. According to statements to the FBI, Papadopoulos said that he had traveled to Rome from approximately March 12 to March 17, 2016, with several other members of LCILP, in order to meet with individuals at the Link Campus University.³⁰⁷⁴ The LCILP had arranged the trip and invited Papadopoulos, who accepted because he “just wanted to go to Rome.”³⁰⁷⁵ An individual named Nagi Idris, another director at LCILP, facilitated the introduction between Papadopoulos and Mifsud while they were in Rome.³⁰⁷⁶ Although Mifsud worked for LCILP, Papadopoulos had not previously met him.³⁰⁷⁷

(U) Mifsud’s interest in Papadopoulos appeared entirely reliant on Papadopoulos’s association with the Trump Campaign. According to the statement of offense for Papadopoulos’s guilty plea:

Initially, [Mifsud] seemed uninterested in defendant Papadopoulos. However, after defendant Papadopoulos informed [Mifsud] about his joining the [Trump] Campaign, the Professor appeared to take great interest in defendant Papadopoulos. Defendant Papadopoulos was interested in [Mifsud] because, among other reasons, [Mifsud] claimed to have substantial connections with

³⁰⁷¹ (U) Email, Clovis to I. Trump, Kushner, Lewandowski, and Glassner, March 16, 2016 (DJTFP00009953–9956).

³⁰⁷² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷³ (U) Post Opinions Staff, “A transcript of Donald Trump’s meeting with *The Washington Post* editorial board,” March 21, 2016.

³⁰⁷⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 8/10/2017.

³⁰⁷⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

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*Russian government officials, which defendant Papadopoulos thought could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Campaign.*³⁰⁷⁸

(U) Papadopoulos similarly told the FBI:

*Papadopoulos’[s] first impression was that Mifsud was arrogant. His negative attitude towards Papadopoulos continued until Mifsud found out Papadopoulos was part of the Trump campaign. Mifsud then began to turn on the charm with Papadopoulos and tried to impress him. Mifsud told Papadopoulos he was a former diplomat with access to European leaders. Mifsud offered to help introduce Papadopoulos to the right people through his contacts.*³⁰⁷⁹

(U) FBI technical analysis of Papadopoulos’s cell phone indicates that Mifsud sent Papadopoulos a text message on March 22, 2016, writing: “My number: joseph.”³⁰⁸⁰

(U) Papadopoulos told the House Judiciary Committee that Mifsud subsequently sent him an email stating that “it’s very important for us to meet in London. I have to introduce you to somebody very important.”³⁰⁸¹ According to Papadopoulos’s statement of offense, Mifsud introduced Polonskaya to Papadopoulos as a relative of Vladimir Putin and as someone who had connections to senior Russian government officials.³⁰⁸² Papadopoulos testified to the House of Representatives: “[M]y understanding was I was talking to a very senior level diplomat’s family member from Russia.”³⁰⁸³ He also testified that Idris reiterated Mifsud’s claim, stating “[t]his is Putin’s niece or the Russian President’s niece.”³⁰⁸⁴ On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud and Olga Polonskaya,³⁰⁸⁵ a Russian-national, at the Holborn Hotel.³⁰⁸⁶

(U) Papadopoulos recalled that they discussed U.S.-Russia trade issues during the meeting, and noted that Polonskaya was escorted by an unknown male who did not join them.³⁰⁸⁷

³⁰⁷⁸ (U) Statement of the Offense ¶5, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. October 5, 2017).

³⁰⁷⁹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 8/10/2017.

³⁰⁸⁰ (U) FBI, FD-1057, “George Papadopoulos,” August 14, 2018. Papadopoulos provided the mobile phone he had used in the United Kingdom to the FBI for technical analysis.

³⁰⁸¹ (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 17.

³⁰⁸² (U) Statement of the Offense ¶7, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. October 5, 2017).

³⁰⁸³ (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 17. Papadopoulos did not produce this email to the Committee.

³⁰⁸⁴ (U) *Ibid.* Papadopoulos did not produce the referenced email to this Committee.

³⁰⁸⁵ (U) Documents produced to the Committee show Polonskaya also used the name “Olga Vinogradova,” which the Committee believes is Polonskaya’s maiden name. Olga Polonskaya may also be spelled “Polonskaia.”

³⁰⁸⁶ (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 17.

³⁰⁸⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

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Papadopoulos's wife, Mangiante, told the Committee that Papadopoulos thought Polonskaya was President Putin's niece because of the way Mifsud introduced her to Papadopoulos.³⁰⁸⁸

(U) Papadopoulos later explained that Polonskaya, who could barely speak English during their in-person meeting, then began communicating with him via electronic means in more fluent English. Papadopoulos characterized a transition in their relationship, shifting from "seemingly obscure girl . . . to now the interlocutor with Mifsud to the Russian Government for me."³⁰⁸⁹

[REDACTED] On the same day, March 24, 2016, almost certainly after his meeting with Mifsud and Polonskaya, Papadopoulos performed internet searches for the following terms:³⁰⁹⁰

- "russian president"
- "russian president niece"
- "russian president niece olga"
- "russian president brother and sister"
- "joseph mifsud"
- "next Vietnam prime minister"
- "russian ambassador uk"
- "putin's niece"
- "putin's niece, olga"
- "medvedev's niece, olga"
- "olga putin"
- "vladimir putin's brother and sister"
- "Olga Medvedev"

(U) This is the first example of a pattern the Committee observed in Papadopoulos's behavior, where after a meeting he spent time conducting internet research on individuals he met, or, presumably, the topics discussed at the meeting. While several of Papadopoulos's searches are focused on finding additional information on Polonskaya, Papadopoulos later noted in documents produced to the Committee that "[a] quick google search will demonstrate that Putin has no siblings."³⁰⁹¹

³⁰⁸⁸ (U) Mangiante Tr., pp. 109–110. The March 24, 2016, meeting between Papadopoulos, Mifsud, and Polonskaya occurred prior to Mangiante's first encounter with Papadopoulos.

³⁰⁸⁹ (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, pp. 17–19.

³⁰⁹⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³⁰⁹¹ (U) Schedule A Response, Papadopoulos (GP-000038–GP-000039).

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(U) On the same day, March 24, 2016, following his meeting with Mifsud and Polonskaya, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump foreign policy team with the subject “Meeting with Russian leadership—including Putin,” stating:

I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the director of the London Academy of Diplomacy -- who introduced me to both Putin's niece and the Russian Ambassador in London -- who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.

The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a “neutral” city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving forward with this very important issue.

Furthermore, Mifsud is good friends with the soon to be next prime minister of Vietnam. He asked for me to join him on a trip there to meet with the next leader--perhaps this is of interest to the rest of the campaign team as well?³⁰⁹²

(U) Papadopoulos testified to the House Judiciary Committee that he lied to the Trump Campaign about being introduced to the Russian Ambassador in London, clarifying that he “never met the Russian ambassador, just to make that completely clear.”³⁰⁹³

(U) Minutes after Papadopoulos's email to other Campaign advisers and staff, Clovis replied to the entire group, stating:

George,

This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we see how this plays out. My thought is that we should not go forward with any meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, especially France, Germany, and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page.

More thoughts later today. Great work.

³⁰⁹² (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Page, Clovis, Harrell, Kellogg, Misazawa, Kubic, Schmitz, Phares, and Glassner, March 24, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000649).

³⁰⁹³ (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 19.

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*Sam*³⁰⁹⁴

[REDACTED] FBI records indicate that on March 26, 2016, Papadopoulos performed internet searches for “Andrei Klimov” and “Ivan Timofeev.”³⁰⁹⁵ This search occurred more than three weeks prior to Papadopoulos’s April 18, 2016, introduction to Timofeev through Mifsud, suggesting that Mifsud may have raised Klimov or Timofeev, or both, during his engagement with Papadopoulos.

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iii. (U) The Foreign Policy Team Meets

(U) Clovis sent an email to the newly-established Trump Campaign’s foreign policy advisory team on March 28, 2016, stating: “I just got off the phone with Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama. He passed along that a meeting is being scheduled for 10 am eastern on Thursday, the 31st. Location to follow. Please let me know if you are going to be able to attend.”³⁰⁹⁸ Papadopoulos wrote back to the group thirty minutes later, “Sam, I will be there too. Flying in on the 30th.”³⁰⁹⁹

(U) Papadopoulos stated that at the March 31, 2016, national security meeting of then-candidate Trump’s foreign policy advisors held at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C., he proposed the idea of arranging a meeting between Putin and Trump.³¹⁰⁰

(U) Papadopoulos recalled telling the group in attendance that “Putin wants to meet” and that the response to his suggestion from Trump was something to the effect of “I like the

³⁰⁹⁴ (U) Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos, Page, Harrell, Kellogg, Misazawa, Kubic, Schmitz, Phares, and Glassner, March 24, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000649).

³⁰⁹⁵ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³⁰⁹⁶ (U) Valdaiclub.com, “Andrey Klimov.”

³⁰⁹⁷ [REDACTED]

³⁰⁹⁸ (U) Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos, Page, Glassner, et al., March 28, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000475).


³⁰⁹⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, Page, Lewandowski, S. Miller, Glassner, et al., March 28, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000475).

³¹⁰⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

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idea³¹⁰¹ who subsequently asked Sessions for his opinion of the proposal.³¹⁰² Papadopoulos believed that Trump and Sessions were somewhere between tacitly supportive of his idea and very supportive of his idea, and he left the meeting with the impression that “these guys wanted this.” Papadopoulos also told the FBI that he did not recall anyone at the meeting objecting to the proposal and that he rather felt he had received a “thumbs up.”³¹⁰³

(U) A picture of the meeting published on Trump’s Instagram account showed that Sessions and members of the foreign policy advisory team, including J.D. Gordon, Papadopoulos, and Joseph Schmitz attended the meeting.³¹⁰⁴



(U) Clovis told the Committee that his first in-person encounter with Papadopoulos was at the March 31, 2016, meeting:

That’s where I really got the sense, at that meeting, that he was there for himself and not for the campaign, and I felt like it was a mistake that we had included him. . . . I just thought he was very self-serving, very much on the make. I just

³¹⁰¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁰² (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁰³ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁰⁴ (U) Instagram, @realDonaldTrump, March 31, 2016 (“Meeting with my national security team in #WashingtonDC. #Trump2016”).

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*never—I never trusted him after that. . . . Everything he did, he did on his own, and we always had to go back and correct him afterwards. It got to the point, really, it got bad quickly, so we essentially cut him loose quickly in my view. I never trusted him with anything.*³¹⁰⁵

(U) Gordon told the Committee that he did not recall Papadopoulos proposing any outreach to the Russian government or Russian individuals, but did confirm that Papadopoulos was fully on board with Trump’s desire to have a better relationship with Russia.³¹⁰⁶

(U) Papadopoulos referenced his proposal again with two of the other foreign policy advisors. On April 5, 2016, Phares sent an email message to Papadopoulos, in which he wrote “Let’s think about how to engage your Arab and Mideast contacts either in London or in DC.”³¹⁰⁷ Papadopoulos replied from Tel Aviv, Israel, “And of course the Russians, as I mentioned during our meeting.”³¹⁰⁸ On April 10, 2016, Papadopoulos also sent an email message to Carter Page, another foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign, in which he asked if Page was available for a phone call “to discuss the outreach to Russia and the Caucasus,” noting that they “both have experience dealing in that part of the world, so also wanted to look into any synergies.”³¹⁰⁹ Page responded with an attempt to schedule a Skype conversation.³¹¹⁰

(U) Papadopoulos recalled having a Skype call with Page, and in particular recalled Page telling him to “stop showing off.”³¹¹¹ Although Papadopoulos did not remember exactly why Page had told him that, he surmised that “it was likely a result of Papadopoulos’ efforts to coordinate with the Russians in late March 2016.”³¹¹² When Page testified to the Committee, he recalled speaking with Papadopoulos “once on the phone.”³¹¹³

iv. (U) Papadopoulos’ Contact with Polonskaya and Mifsud Accelerates

(U) As an apparent follow-up to the March meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos e-mailed Polonskaya on April 10, 2016, stating:

³¹⁰⁵ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 70–71.

³¹⁰⁶ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with J.D. Gordon, July 14, 2017, p. 69.

³¹⁰⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³¹⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁰⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Page, April 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001057).

³¹¹⁰ (U) Email, Page to Papadopoulos, April 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001057).

³¹¹¹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 11/7/2017.

³¹¹² (U) *Ibid.*

³¹¹³ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Carter Page, August 21, 2017, pp. 146–147.

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*This is George Papadopoulos, Donald Trump's advisor. We met with Joseph in London. The reason for my message is because he sent an email that you tried contacting me. I never received your sms. I was in Israel for business and now I am back in London. Are you still in London? If you are it would be a pleasure to meet again. If not, we should have a call and discuss some things.*³¹¹⁴

Polonskaya responded the next day, April 11, 2016, copying Mifsud on the email and stating “I am now back in St. Petersburg. I thank you for our meeting. I would be very pleased to support your initiatives between our two countries and of course I would be very pleased to meet you again.”³¹¹⁵

(U) Papadopoulos responded back to Polonskaya on the same day, April 11, 2016, stating, “I think a good step would be for me to meet with the Russian Ambassador in London sometime this month. . . . I would like to discuss with him, or anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia.”³¹¹⁶ Papadopoulos included a link in the email to a *Jerusalem Post* opinion article that he characterized as “beneficial to send around.”³¹¹⁷ The opinion article summarized Papadopoulos’s remarks at an April 2016 luncheon with research associates at an Israeli think tank which included:

- (U) “Unlike President Barack Obama, who weakly attempted to ‘reset’ relations with Russia and then spent the latter part of his tenure isolating and sanctioning Russia, Donald Trump would ‘overtly seek’ serious engagement with Russia on a range of common concerns.”
- (U) “Trump . . . sees Russian President Vladimir Putin as a responsible actor and potential partner.”
- (U) “The US and Russia must work to counter Chinese expansionism in Asia and the Middle East. . . . Therefore, a policy of isolating Russia is ‘not sustainable.’”³¹¹⁸

(U) In response to Papadopoulos’s email, Mifsud wrote back to Papadopoulos on the same day, April 11, 2016, that “[t]his is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th

³¹¹⁴ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya, April 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000975). The Mifsud email referenced by Papadopoulos was not produced to the Committee.

³¹¹⁵ (U) Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos and Mifsud, April 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000967).

³¹¹⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya and Mifsud, April 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000967).

³¹¹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹¹⁸ (U) David M. Weinberg, “Know Comment: The Donald’s Foreign Policy,” *Jerusalem Post*, April 7, 2016.

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for a Valdai meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow.”³¹¹⁹ The Committee does not know what, specifically, Mifsud meant by “[t]his is already been agreed.” Papadopoulos wrote back to Mifsud and Polonskaya eight minutes later, “Excellent. See you tomorrow.”³¹²⁰

(U) On April 12, 2016, Papadopoulos appears to have had breakfast with Mifsud, based on his last April 11, 2016, email and information made available from the FBI’s timeline.

- (U) Papadopoulos’s schedule had a calendar entry for April 12, 2016, at 9:30 a.m. for one hour, for “Andaz hotel breakfast Liverpool St (9:30).”³¹²¹
- (U) The same day, at 9:44 a.m., Mifsud emailed Papadopoulos and Nawaf Obaid regarding “Libya CONFIDENTIAL.”³¹²² Papadopoulos also had another calendar entry for April 13, 2016, for one hour, for “1 pm Lunch at Four Seasons,” with Nawaf Obaid.³¹²³

(U) Polonskaya added to Mifsud’s response the following day, April 12, 2016, that she:

*already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request. The Embassy in London is very much aware of this. As mentioned we are all very excited by the possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump. The Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature [sic] would be officially announced.*³¹²⁴

The Committee does not have any insight into Polonskaya’s connection to the Russian Embassy in London.

v. (U) Mifsud Introduces Papadopoulos to Ivan Timofeev

(U) On April 18, 2016, the same day that Mifsud had told Papadopoulos he was flying to Moscow, Mifsud introduced Ivan Timofeev, Director of Programs at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC),³¹²⁵ to Papadopoulos via email. Timofeev has led the “Euro-Atlantic

³¹¹⁹ (U) Email, Mifsud to Polonskaya and Papadopoulos, April 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000967–968).

³¹²⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud and Polonskaya, April 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000968).

³¹²¹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³¹²² (U) *Ibid.*

³¹²³ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹²⁴ (U) Email, Polonskaya to Mifsud and Papadopoulos, April 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000971).

³¹²⁵ (U) According to the Kremlin’s website, the RIAC was established by a Russian presidential decree on February 3, 2010, as a non-profit partnership by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia to “organise interaction between Russian scientific organisations and foreign think

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Security” program at the Valdai Discussion Club since 2015 and has served as a professor at the Academy for Military Science in Russia since 2013, according to open source information.³¹²⁶ In the initial introductory message, Mifsud wrote:

Dear George, Ivan,

As promised I had a long conversation today in Moscow with my dear friend Ivan from RIAC about a possible meeting between the two of you. Ivan is ready to meet with you in London (or USA or Moscow). I am putting the two of you in touch to discuss when and where this potential meeting can actually take place.

Best wishes for your endeavours...

Kind regards,

Joseph³¹²⁷

(U) According to the Valdai Discussion Club’s website, Mifsud appeared as part of a panel discussion in Moscow in April 2016, alongside Stephan Roh.³¹²⁸ Timofeev moderated the discussion, which focused on the geopolitical and oil market implications after a recent gathering of oil-producing nations.³¹²⁹

(U) Papadopoulos responded the same day, April 18, 2016, suggesting that he and Timofeev meet in London later in the month.³¹³⁰ In a series of email messages, Timofeev and Papadopoulos scheduled a Skype call for Friday, April 22, 2016.³¹³¹

tanks on matters of international relations.” The RIAC is founded by and receives funding from the Russian government. Kremlin.ru, “Dmitry Medvedev signed an order to create a non-profit partnership, the Russian Council for International Affairs,” February 4, 2010 (Russian-language version dated February 3, 2010).

³¹²⁶ (U) RussianCouncil.ru, “Ivan Timofeev.”

³¹²⁷ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos and Timofeev, April 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000863).

³¹²⁸ (U) Valdaiclub.com, “Valdai Club Discusses Main Trends and Scenarios of Global Energy Development,” April 19, 2016. Mifsud later introduced Papadopoulos to Roh, in August 2016, as described *infra*.

³¹²⁹ (U) *Ibid*. The recent gathering of oil producing nations referred to a summit held in Doha, Qatar, which failed to produce an agreement on oil output and pricing among the leaders of the world’s largest oil producers. Javier David, “Oil producers send crude reeling after output deal fails in Doha,” *CNBC*, April 18, 2016.

³¹³⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud and Timofeev, April 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000863).

³¹³¹ (U) Emails, Timofeev and Papadopoulos, April 18–21, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000863–866).

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(U) On April 21, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email message to Mifsud with the subject “Meeting tomorrow,” in which he asked if the professor was “[f]ree to meet tomorrow for a follow up?”³¹³²

(U) During an interview with the FBI, Papadopoulos recalled:

*[H]aving a Skype call with Timofeev on April 22, 2016 which he believed was the first of two Skype calls he had with Timofeev in total. Papadopoulos could not remember any details about what was discussed during the call; however he surmised the two likely discussed relations between Russia, Israel, Cyprus, and China. The two may also have discussed setting up a potential meeting between Timofeev and Papadopoulos; however, Papadopoulos could not recall that with any certainty. Papadopoulos then reiterated he had been pushing hard for a meeting with the Russians after his initial conversation with Clovis on March 6, 2016.*³¹³³

(U) Following the Skype call, Timofeev wrote, “George, thank you for an extensive talk! I propose to meet in London or in Moscow. What do you think?”³¹³⁴ Papadopoulos responded:

*Regarding a meeting - how about we set one up here in London with the Ambassador as well to discuss a process moving forward? Can you come next week? It's my objective to set the groundwork for a potential trip and to understand the U.S.-Russia relationship before I submit to my team.*³¹³⁵

(U) Timofeev responded to Papadopoulos on April 24, 2016, stating, “Next week is totally impossible, for I have to renew my visa. I shall also need to consult with Minister Ivanov.”³¹³⁶ The next day, April 25, 2016, Timofeev wrote to Papadopoulos:

Dear George,

I have just talked to Igor Ivanov—the President of RIAC and former Foreign Minister of Russia. His advise [sic] is to start preparation of the Moscow visit via

³¹³² (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, April 21, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000867).

³¹³³ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017. In an earlier email, Timofeev noted that “we” are online waiting to connect via Skype, suggesting another individual may have been on the call with Papadopoulos and Timofeev. Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos April 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000959).

³¹³⁴ (U) Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos, April 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000960).

³¹³⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, April 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000960).

³¹³⁶ (U) Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos, April 24, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000960).

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the Russian Embassy in Washington, for the issue is of political kind. Would you be available for a quick talk today?

Keep in touch,

*Ivan.*³¹³⁷

(U) According to FBI records, Papadopoulos searched LinkedIn for “alisher usmanov” on April 24, 2016.³¹³⁸ The Committee has no indication as to why Papadopoulos would conduct this search, but based on Papadopoulos’s previous behavior, it would be logical to assume that Timofeev may have raised Usmanov in conversation. According to Forbes, Usmanov is an Russian business magnate, who was estimated to have a net worth of \$12.6 billion in March 2020.³¹³⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Between April 25, 2016, and April 27, 2016, Papadopoulos and Timofeev exchanged emails to coordinate another Skype call to discuss Timofeev’s email from April 25, 2016, regarding Igor Ivanov’s advice to plan the Moscow visit via the Russian Embassy in Washington. The email exchange concluded with a message from Papadopoulos, noting, “I have a couple of minutes to talk now before Mr. Trump’s speech, I am on [S]kype.”³¹⁴³

³¹³⁷ (U) Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos, April 25, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000961).

³¹³⁸ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³¹³⁹ (U) Forbes profile, “#106 Alisher Usmanov.”

³¹⁴⁰ [REDACTED]

³¹⁴¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁴² [REDACTED]

³¹⁴³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, April 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000964).

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(U) Papadopoulos recalled speaking with Timofeev via Skype on April 27, 2016.³¹⁴⁴ Papadopoulos characterized the interaction as “strange,” as he remembered Timofeev being overly formal during the call.³¹⁴⁵ Papadopoulos also described hearing static noises on the call, which Papadopoulos thought suggested that someone was recording the call.³¹⁴⁶

vi. (U) Other Relevant Papadopoulos Meetings in April

(U) On April 19, 2016, Papadopoulos met an individual named Oleg Lebedev. In an email sent the same day, Papadopoulos wrote, “Was very nice meeting you tonight. I am sending you my recent piece and linkedin profile. See you tomorrow.”³¹⁴⁷ In response, Lebedev wrote back to Papadopoulos, “Great meeting you, and look forward to seeing you tomorrow. Lets [sic] make Byzantium great again. Good to connect on LinkedIn, could not find you on Facebook.”³¹⁴⁸ According to FBI interviews, Papadopoulos met Lebedev at the Byzantium Café in London, through Lebedev’s wife, Maria Alexopoulou.³¹⁴⁹ Papadopoulos recalled that Lebedev was a big Trump supporter in Russia and had told Papadopoulos that Russia is a friend of Trump.³¹⁵⁰ Lebedev claimed to have contacts in the Russian government.³¹⁵¹ Papadopoulos thought Lebedev was in the oil business in Moscow but had a house in London with his wife.³¹⁵²

vii. (U) Papadopoulos Meets with Mifsud in London, Discusses “Dirt” on Clinton

(U) Papadopoulos met with Mifsud on the morning of April 26, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in London, for breakfast. During the breakfast, Mifsud, who had just returned from a trip to Moscow where he had met with high-level Russian government officials, stated that the Russians had dirt—in the form of emails—on Hillary Clinton.³¹⁵³ Papadopoulos described Mifsud as

³¹⁴⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

³¹⁴⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.* [REDACTED]

³¹⁴⁸ (U) *Ibid.* [REDACTED]

³¹⁴⁹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 8/11/2017.

³¹⁵⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

³¹⁵¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁵² (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁵³ (U) Statement of the Offense ¶14, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. October 5, 2017). By April 26, 2016, the GRU had already penetrated and collected information from the DNC and DCCC networks, as well as John Podesta’s email account. For a discussion of the GRU’s hack-and-leak campaign, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.B.

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“giddy . . . like he had something he wanted to get off his chest” prior to his conveying the information about the Clinton emails.³¹⁵⁴

(U) When asked by the FBI to explain what Mifsud told him about the Russians having dirt on Clinton, Papadopoulos told the FBI the following:

Mifsud had just returned from a trip to Moscow where he met with the Duma [Russian Parliament], attended a forum, and had meetings related to academics. When referring to the dirt, Mifsud told Papadopoulos “they have her emails” and specifically mentioned they had “thousands” of them. Papadopoulos could not recall if Mifsud mentioned the names of the individuals he met with in Russia. . . .

When asked what Papadopoulos thought when he heard the information from Mifsud, Papadopoulos recalled it being “a strange thing to hear.” Papadopoulos inquired of Mifsud how he could know such information, to which Mifsud stated, “they told me.” When Papadopoulos referred to Mifsud’s statement of “they told me,” Papadopoulos extended both of his hands and pointed at himself with both index fingers.³¹⁵⁵

[REDACTED] Following the breakfast meeting, around noon on April 26, 2016, Mifsud emailed Papadopoulos an article titled, “US-Russian relations; the middle cannot hold.”³¹⁵⁶ The article, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies on April 14, 2016, criticized President Obama’s approach to geopolitical relations between the United States and Russia following the invasion of Crimea, noting the Obama’s administration approach was the “middle way.”³¹⁵⁷ In response to Mifsud’s email, approximately four hours later, Papadopoulos replied, “Thank you for this, Joseph. Very informative.”³¹⁵⁸

[REDACTED]

³¹⁵⁴ (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, p. 21.

³¹⁵⁵ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

³¹⁵⁶ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, April 26, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000933–935).

³¹⁵⁷ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, April 26, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000933–935).

³¹⁵⁸ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED] Papadopoulos did not produce this email to the Committee.

³¹⁵⁹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 8/11/2017 (“Papadopoulos stated to the best of his recollection he remembers Clovis being upset after Papadopoulos said, ‘Sam, I think they have her emails.’ Papadopoulos then reiterated he was not certain if that event actually happened or if he was wrongfully remembering an event which did not occur.”).

viii. (U) Papadopoulos Meets Australian Diplomats

(U) On April 19, 2016, Christian Cantor, a Political Counsellor at the Embassy of Israel to the United Kingdom in London, introduced Papadopoulos to Erika Thompson, a Political Counsellor at the Australian High Commission in London.³¹⁶⁰ The introduction occurred via email, in which Cantor stated “George is a current Tr[u]mp advisor ... I’m sure you’ll find very interesting things to talk about.”³¹⁶¹ Papadopoulos testified to the House Judiciary Committee that he had been introduced to Cantor via one of his friends who was an economic counselor at the Embassy of Israel to the United States, and that he understood Thompson to be Cantor’s girlfriend.³¹⁶²

(U) On April 20, 2016, Thompson replied to Cantor’s email, suggesting that she and Papadopoulos meet following President Obama’s visit to the United Kingdom.³¹⁶³ Papadopoulos replied to Thompson the next day, suggesting that the two meet on Tuesday, April 26, 2016.³¹⁶⁴ The Committee assesses that Papadopoulos and Thompson met on April 26, 2016, as previously coordinated, sometime following Papadopoulos’s breakfast engagement with Mifsud.

(U) On May 9, 2016, Thompson wrote Papadopoulos, thanking him for “meeting on Friday” and checking to see if Papadopoulos would be “still be up for a meeting with [her] boss, Alexander Downer.”³¹⁶⁵ She suggested grabbing “a drink with him tomorrow? Maybe around 6?”³¹⁶⁶ Thompson proposed the Kensington Wine Rooms, located in the Kensington Borough in London, for the engagement, as her boss, Sir Alexander Downer, Australia’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, lived nearby.³¹⁶⁷ Papadopoulos agreed.³¹⁶⁸

- (U) Documents publicly released by the Government of Australia show a calendar appointment on Downer’s calendar for May 10th titled, “6.00 pm - Meeting with George Papadopolous [sic], Adivsor [sic], Donald J Trump for President,” which included a link to Papadopoulos’s LinkedIn profile as well as a heavily redacted

³¹⁶⁰ (U) Email, Cantor to Papadopoulos and Thompson, April 19, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000428).

³¹⁶¹ (U) *Ibid.* (Ellipses in original). Cantor also sent a similar introductory email to an individual at the Embassy of Poland to the United Kingdom on April 20, 2016. Email, Cantor to Papadopoulos, et al., April 20, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000431).

³¹⁶² (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, pp. 31–32.

³¹⁶³ (U) Email, Thompson to Papadopoulos and Cantor, April 20, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000427).

³¹⁶⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Cantor and Thompson, April 21, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000428).

³¹⁶⁵ (U) Email, Thompson to Papadopoulos, May 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000435).

³¹⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁶⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁶⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Thompson, May 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000436).

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diplomatic cable prepared by Downer on May 11, 2016, to Canberra titled, “UK: US: Donald Trump - Views from Trump’s Adviser.”³¹⁶⁹

(U) Although the email between Thompson and Papadopoulos indicates they met on Friday, May 6, 2016, the Committee does not have any indications as to where they met or what was discussed.

[REDACTED] Just after midnight on the morning of May 10, 2016, Papadopoulos searched for the following terms on the internet: “australian high comm. london,” “current australian government,” prime minister of australia,” “malcolm turnbull conservative,” “kensington wine rooms,” “erika thompson,” and “erika thompson australia.”³¹⁷⁰ Papadopoulos also visited the LinkedIn site for an individual named Erika Thompson.³¹⁷¹

[REDACTED] In the late-afternoon on May 10, 2016, and prior to the meeting with Downer, Papadopoulos again searched the internet for “Kensington Wine Rooms,” “australian high comm. london,” and “alexander downer.”³¹⁷² Later that evening, at approximately eleven o’clock, Papadopoulos performed an internet search for “The Waterway.”³¹⁷³

(U) On May 10, 2016, Thompson and Downer met with Papadopoulos. After the engagement, Papadopoulos sent Thompson an email stating, “[g]reat time tonight. Thanks for the introduction. See you soon.”³¹⁷⁴

(U) There are some inconsistencies in the stories surrounding the evening of May 10, 2016.³¹⁷⁵ Papadopoulos told the FBI that he recalled the encounter occurring at the Waterway Pub rather than the Kensington Wine Rooms.³¹⁷⁶ One possibility is that the FBI and Papadopoulos may have conflated the reference to the May 10, 2016, meeting at the Kensington Wine Rooms with the April 26 or May 6 meetings the Committee surmises occurred between Papadopoulos and Thompson. An alternative hypothesis is that Papadopoulos and Thompson departed the Kensington Wine Rooms on May 10, 2016, and met up later at the Waterway Pub, which would be consistent with Papadopoulos’s internet search for the Waterway at 11:07 p.m.

³¹⁶⁹ (U) Mark Di Stefano, “Australia Says It’s ‘Ready To Confirm’ A Key Meeting That Led to the Investigation Into Trump’s Russia Links,” *BuzzFeed News*, April 18, 2019.

³¹⁷⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³¹⁷¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁷² (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁷³ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁷⁴ (U) Email, Thompson to Papadopoulos, May 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000425).

³¹⁷⁵ (U) The serial ambiguities and inconsistencies attached to Papadopoulos’s activities on May 10, 2016, might have been mitigated or even explained away, had the Committee benefitted from the testimony of either Downer or Papadopoulos—both of whom declined the Committee’s invitation to be interviewed.

³¹⁷⁶ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

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Papadopoulos told the FBI that he recalled having several drinks with the Australians, specifically “three drinks, made with gin.”³¹⁷⁷ Papadopoulos also recalled being intoxicated after those three drinks.³¹⁷⁸ When specifically asked, Papadopoulos stated he did not recall telling the Australians about the Clinton-related emails.³¹⁷⁹

- (U) The Kensington Wine Rooms describes itself as having “a reputation as one of London’s best wine bars” and offers numerous wine tastings, either through self-serve dispensers or by the glass.³¹⁸⁰ The drinks menu for the Waterway notably includes a section labeled “Gin & Things.”³¹⁸¹
- (U) Papadopoulos testified to Congress that he and Downer “had one drink” and was “certainly not drunk” during the May 10, 2016, meeting, which seems to contradict the three gin drinks described above.³¹⁸²
- (U) Downer stated during a televised interview that he, along with another individual, met Papadopoulos at the “Kensington Wine Bar” at 6:00 P.M., for about an hour.³¹⁸³

³¹⁷⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁷⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁷⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁸⁰ (U) Winerooms.london, “Kensington Wine Rooms.”

³¹⁸¹ (U) Thewaterway.co.uk, “The Waterway Drinks Menu.”

³¹⁸² (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, pp. 41–42.

³¹⁸³ (U) *Sky News Australia*, Interview with Alexander Downer, May 9, 2019, available at [youtube.com/watch?v=ygckFL8m2Ws](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygckFL8m2Ws) (beginning at 4:50).

³¹⁸⁴ (U) FBI, FD-1057, “Dissemination of Investigation Opening,” July 31, 2016.

³¹⁸⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³¹⁸⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

ix. (U) Papadopoulos Edits Trump’s Mayflower Speech

(U) While Papadopoulos was engaged with Timofeev and Mifsud in London, he also consulted on preparations for an upcoming Trump foreign policy speech. On April 23, 2016, Stephen Miller, senior policy advisor for the Trump Campaign, sent an email only to Papadopoulos with the subject “confidential—close hold,” which attached the “outline of remarks for wed.”³¹⁹⁰ Six minutes later, Papadopoulos wrote back to Miller, “Looks solid. If needed, I have some input/bullet points I can add this weekend.”³¹⁹¹ Miller replied one minute later stating, “Thanks. Whatever works for you.”³¹⁹²

³¹⁸⁷ (U) *Ibid.* The *SCO Report* states that Papadopoulos suggested that the Russian government may assist the Trump Campaign to a representative of a foreign government on May 6, 2016. The Committee cannot determine why the SCO believed this occurred on May 6, 2016. A DOJ Office of the Inspector General report also indicates that the interaction between Papadopoulos and a friendly foreign government occurred in May 2016. DOJ, Office of the Inspector General, “*Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation*,” December 2019 (TS/SCI version) (hereinafter *DOJ OIG FISA Report*, December 2019), p. 52.

³¹⁸⁸ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [REDACTED], July 30, 2018, p. 41.

³¹⁸⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

³¹⁹⁰ (U) Email, S. Miller to Papadopoulos, April 23, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000503).

³¹⁹¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller, April 23, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000503).

³¹⁹² (U) Email, S. Miller to Papadopoulos, April 23, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000503).

[REDACTED]

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(U) After a series of back and forths, Papadopoulos sent Miller his edited version of the outline on April 25, 2016, stating, “Please find my edits attached. Look forward to your thoughts. I’ll stay up. Should I send to anyone else on the team? I.e. Sam or Paul.”³¹⁹³ Miller and Papadopoulos then exchanged a series of emails in short succession regarding Papadopoulos’s availability for surrogacy opportunities, during which Papadopoulos stated:

*I was recently hosted by the Israeli government after I delivered a talk at an energy and security conference there. They are ready to host Mr. Trump when the time is right for him (and have also invited him to a big conference the largest newspaper there is hosting in July that Netanyahu will also be speaking at). The Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready as well. The advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in “neutral” cities.*³¹⁹⁴

(U) Miller told the Committee that he did not recall this email exchange until the SCO showed it to him. He further stated that “it’s possible that I didn’t even reply to it—or that I gave sort of a flip reply. But I certainly didn’t engage on it substantively.”³¹⁹⁵

(U) On the same day, April 25, 2016, Papadopoulos also sent Clovis his edits for the foreign policy speech.³¹⁹⁶ Clovis testified to the Committee that he (Clovis) did not have any role with the foreign policy speech delivered at the Mayflower Hotel, nor did he have any role in consolidating or relaying comments received on the speech.³¹⁹⁷

(U) A comparison of Papadopoulos’s edits to the outline that Miller sent to Lewandowski on April 25, 2016, show that Papadopoulos’s suggested edits to the speech outline were largely rejected.³¹⁹⁸

(U) On April 27, 2016, after Trump delivered the foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel,³¹⁹⁹ Papadopoulos sent the following message via email to Miller, “Great speech today from Mr. Trump. If you have a chance for a [S]kype session tomorrow or Friday, let me know.

³¹⁹³ (U) Emails, S. Miller and Papadopoulos, April 23 and 25, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000503–508).

³¹⁹⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller, April 25, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000506).

³¹⁹⁵ (U) Miller Tr., pp. 56–57.

³¹⁹⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, April 25, 2016 (DJTFP00011104–11109) (attaching one document).

³¹⁹⁷ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 74–75. Lewandowski testified to the Committee that “if somebody wanted to have input on a foreign or domestic policy speech, that person would be routed directly to Stephen Miller.” Lewandowski Tr., p. 47.

³¹⁹⁸ (U) Email, S. Miller to Lewandowski, April 25, 2016 (DJTFP00011110–11114) (attaching two documents).

³¹⁹⁹ (U) For additional information regarding candidate Trump’s foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.G.

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Have some interesting messages coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right.”³²⁰⁰ Papadopoulos told the FBI that the “interesting messages” did not pertain to what Mifsud had told him one day prior.³²⁰¹ The subsequent seven messages exchanged relating to this email conversation were redacted by Papadopoulos when produced to the Committee.³²⁰²

(U) Also on April 27, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote Lewandowski an email message with the subject “Messages from Russia” in which he wrote:

*Great speech today by Mr. Trump. Glad I could assist. The reason for my message is because I wanted to ask if you are free for a call tomorrow or Friday to discuss Russia’s interest in hosting Mr. Trump. Have been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host him and the team when the time is right.*³²⁰³

(U) Lewandowski and Papadopoulos exchanged three messages in an attempt to schedule a call, though the Committee does not believe the two discussed the matter at that time. Papadopoulos resurrected this particular email thread again on June 1, 2016, which is described below.³²⁰⁴

x. (U) Papadopoulos Uses the Speech to Encourage a Meeting with Russian Leaders

(U) Following the April 27, 2016, foreign policy speech, Papadopoulos re-initiated contact with Mifsud and Polonskaya in an apparent effort to coordinate a meeting between the Trump Campaign and officials with the Russian Federation. The day after the speech, Papadopoulos asked them separately if they had heard Trump’s Mayflower speech.³²⁰⁵ Polonskaya replied on April 29, 2016, that she had seen Trump’s speech and told Papadopoulos, “I agree with many things. . . . And I like the fact that his (your) position towards Russia is much softer than many of the Republicans and Democrats.”³²⁰⁶ Papadopoulos responded later on April 29, “I am now in the process of seeing if we will come to Russia. Do you recommend I get in touch with a minister or embassy person in Washington or London to begin organizing the

³²⁰⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller, April 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000507).

³²⁰¹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

³²⁰² (U) See B&P GP File 2018 000507–508.

³²⁰³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski, April 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001036).

³²⁰⁴ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Lewandowski, April 27–28, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001036–1037).

³²⁰⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya, April 28, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000985); Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, April 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000877).

³²⁰⁶ (U) Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000985).

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trip?”³²⁰⁷ Polonskaya replied later that day, stating, “I think it would be better to discuss this question with Josef [Mifsud].”³²⁰⁸

(U) Possibly in response to Polonskaya’s suggestion, Papadopoulos wrote to Mifsud on April 29, 2016: “I haven’t heard from the Russian embassy or anyone about sending an invitation. I need an answer by next weds for my campaign.”³²⁰⁹ Mifsud replied two minutes later, asking if he should call Papadopoulos.³²¹⁰ The Committee cannot confirm whether Papadopoulos and Mifsud spoke and, if they did, exactly what was discussed. However, on April 29, 2016, three hours after Polonskaya suggested that Papadopoulos speak with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote to her indicating that he had called Mifsud.³²¹¹

(U) Papadopoulos also got back in touch with Timofeev. Between April 27, 2016 and April 30, 2016, Papadopoulos and Timofeev exchanged five email messages to “Follow up” and discuss specifics. Timofeev, minutes after Papadopoulos’s likely call with Mifsud, wrote to Papadopoulos: “Please, do send me a draft letter to the Ambassador. I will look through it and propose my followup [sic].”³²¹² Papadopoulos replied six minutes later, stating:

*The draft letter I send cannot be better than Mr. Trump’s precise speech on his intentions to repair U.S.-Russia ties. I assume the speech was widely covered. We have already been invited by four countries to visit in the summer and our schedule is moving at a very fast pace. For this reason, I have until Weds to give my team an update on the potential trip to meet Mr. Putin. I am supposed to be in Greece on Monday to meet with officials there, but can come back to London next week to arrange a meeting with people here in a “neutral” city. The message should be, we are keen to meet and discuss U.S.-Russia ties and where they can be improved.*³²¹³

(U) Possibly as a follow-up to their conversation on April 29, Mifsud wrote Papadopoulos an e-mail on April 30, 2016, with the subject line “RUSSIAN REPLY” in which he stated:

I have discussed this opportunity with Min. Ivanov. He proposed to start with the Russian Ambassador in Moscow. George (you will need to draft a letter (Ivan is

³²⁰⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000989).

³²⁰⁸ (U) Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000989).

³²⁰⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000878).

³²¹⁰ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000878).

³²¹¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00991).

³²¹² (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Timofeev, April 27–30, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00965–966).

³²¹³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00965–966).

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*ready to help you...please contact him urgently) and he will provide his follow up to you. As for the contacts, Ivan (and others – through Olga) will make an enquiry in Moscow how to proceed.*³²¹⁴

(U) The “RUSSIAN REPLY” email from Mifsud started a discussion as to whether the Trump Campaign needed to ask for an invitation to Moscow. Papadopoulos noted for Mifsud that “Mr. Trump’s speech should have been the signal to meet” and that “My campaign won’t be interested in asking to visit Moscow. Guests are either invited or they are not.”³²¹⁵ Mifsud agreed and told Papadopoulos that he had “just spoken to them” and that “[t]hey will let you know who to meet to organise it with an invite.”³²¹⁶ Papadopoulos responded, “Excellent, thank you for your critical help on this, [J]oseph. It’s history making if it happens.”³²¹⁷

(U) Timofeev wrote to Papadopoulos and Mifsud four days later on May 4, 2016, stating he had spoken with his colleagues at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and that they are “open for cooperation.”³²¹⁸

(U) Papadopoulos forwarded Timofeev’s May 4, 2016, email to Lewandowski on the same day, with the subject “Fwd: (Russian outreach)” and asked, “What do you think? Is this something we want to move forward with?”³²¹⁹ Lewandowski forwarded the message from Papadopoulos to Clovis five minutes later.³²²⁰ Clovis responded back to Lewandowski less than one hour later: “I think there are some legal issues we will have to mitigate, meeting with foreign officials as a private citizen. Let me check and I will get back to you today.”³²²¹ Papadopoulos forwarded the same May 4, 2016, email from Timofeev to Clovis on May 5, 2016, with the text, “Russia updates.”³²²²

(U) The Committee did not obtain any communications in which Clovis or other Campaign leadership telling Papadopoulos to cease his interactions with Timofeev or Mifsud regarding Russia.

(U) On May 7, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to Timofeev’s May 4 email, stating that the delay in responding was due to “shuffling that has occurred since Mr. Trump clinched the

³²¹⁴ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, April 30, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00915) (ellipses in original).

³²¹⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, April 30, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00916).

³²¹⁶ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, April 30, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00916).

³²¹⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, April 30, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00917).

³²¹⁸ (U) Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos, May 4, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 00997).

³²¹⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski, May 4, 2016 (DJTFP00011398).

³²²⁰ (U) Email, Lewandowski to Clovis, May 4, 2016 (DJTFP00011399–11400).

³²²¹ (U) Email, Clovis to Lewandowski, May 4, 2016 (DJTFP00011401).

³²²² (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, May 5, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000997).

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nomination. I will get back to you and Joseph soon on this. Glad the MFA is interested.”³²²³ In response to Papadopoulos’s May 7, 2016, email, Mifsud replied five minutes later, asking Papadopoulos to call him.³²²⁴ Papadopoulos and Mifsud exchanged several emails to coordinate a phone call via Skype.³²²⁵ Although the Committee cannot confirm whether Papadopoulos and Mifsud spoke, the Committee believes they did based on the emails exchanged.³²²⁶

(U) On May 13, 2016, Mifsud wrote a long proposal to Papadopoulos for the way ahead, including his first offer of serving as a surrogate for the Campaign and a liaison of sorts to Europe:

Further to our recent conversations, I am pleased to give you an update of what we discussed.

- 1. We will continue to liaise through you with the Russian counterparts in terms of what is needed for a high level meeting of Mr. Trump with the Russian Federation.*
- 2. I will set up interviews for you with IL Giornale and Corriere della Sera in Italy focusing on Mr. Trump’s foreign policy perspectives.*
- 3. If provided with key speaking/highlighted points I will use them in the next European Council on Foreign Relations meeting to be held in June in The Hague.*
- 4. I will liaise with the European Parliament about the possibility of an invitation to Brussels for Mr. Trump.*
- 5. Once updated, I can use specific points during the campaign to be turned into articles in the European media – I can also be a central point if you wish to sustain key agreed foreign policy and diplomatic points for the campaign in Europe and the Middle East (I am often asked to chair important debates e.g. the Doha Forum and other fora in Morocco/Bahrain etc.)*
- 6. I am extremely keen to support Mr. Trump’s campaign in foreign policy issues with Europe, the Middle East and North Africa – and wish to do so from*

³²²³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev and Mifsud, May 7, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000997).

³²²⁴ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, May 7, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000997–998).

³²²⁵ (U) Emails, Mifsud and Papadopoulos, May 7, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000998).

³²²⁶ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Mifsud, May 7–13, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000891–893, 997–1004).

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Europe and also with my links inside the USA (e.g. the Washington Diplomatic community and publications).

7. *If needed, I can also prepare and sign op-eds sustaining Mr. Trump's campaign.*
8. *Once the campaign gets started – I would be keen to be on any shows as a 'neutral' opinion maker and expert in support of Mr. Trump vis-à-vis global issues.*
9. *I am also extremely interested in following Mr. Trump throughout some of his campaign trail and reporting back to European media as an 'independent' opinion maker.*
10. *I am open to any suggested action plans which the team might wish to make now and the future and to contribute with my knowledge to the campaign – from the inside or the outside.*

*I will be getting back to you by telephone or for a meeting next week when I am in London.*³²²⁷

(U) The Committee has no indication that Papadopoulos pursued Mifsud's proposal to act as a Campaign surrogate or liaison.

(U) Separately, Papadopoulos wrote an email message to Lewandowski on May 14, 2016, providing updates on European security and energy topics. In his email, Papadopoulos also stated that "[t]he Greek and Cypru governments, the EU Parliament and Russian governments have also relayed to me that they are interested in hosting Mr. Trump."³²²⁸ The next day, on May 15, 2016, Lewandowski forwarded the message to Clovis.³²²⁹ Later that day, Clovis wrote an email message with the subject, "Update, Part II" to Lewandowski, copying Glassner and Hicks, in which he included as the third bullet of the message: "-Still working on the ins and outs of going to Russia as a candidate."³²³⁰ When asked whether the bullet point within Clovis's update related to Papadopoulos's effort, Clovis stated:

No, no. It was a discussion that we had had in the campaign about a foreign trip. . . . The trip—Russia was going to be an add-on because we were going to go to

³²²⁷ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, May 13, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000891).

³²²⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski, May 14, 2016 (DJTFP00011535).

³²²⁹ (U) Email, Lewandowski to Clovis, May 15, 2016 (DJTFP00011536).

³²³⁰ (U) Email, Clovis to Lewandowski, et al., May 15, 2016 (DJTFP00011537–11538).

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*the U.K., Germany. We'd have done a European swing and maybe an Israel swing as a foreign trip, and Russia would have been only after we had considered whether it was legal and all the other aspects of it.*³²³¹

When Lewandowski was asked about the same point, he told the Committee:

*To the best of my recollection we knew from day one we weren't doing any overseas travel. . . . there was never a discussion that I'm aware of, that I was privy to, inside the campaign of ever going to Russia in any way, shape, or form.*³²³²

(U) The Committee notes the discrepancy between the contemporaneous email communication written by Clovis and the later testimony of Clovis and Lewandowski. The Committee gives greater credibility to the written records, which suggest that the Campaign was at least open to the idea of a foreign trip.

xi. (U) Papadopoulos Conducts High-Level Meetings in Greece

(U) Papadopoulos used a trip to Greece to burnish his credentials on the campaign, but he also took the opportunity to repeat Mifsud's information about Clinton's emails. Papadopoulos informed the Campaign that he was travelling to Greece. On May 18, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email message to Lewandowski relaying that he had been "invited to meet with the Greek foreign minister later this week in Athens (he is an old acquaintance of mine)" and asked Lewandowski if there was "[a]ny message you want me to send Greece from the campaign? (they are hoping Mr. Trump wins and are planning to extend an invite to Mr. Trump when I see the foreign minister)."³²³³ The Committee has no record of a Lewandowski response.

(U) The next day, May 19, 2016, Papadopoulos sent a similar message to Clovis, once again asking, "is there any message from the campaign you would like for me to send Greece? I was told they are going to extend an invitation to Mr. Trump when I see the foreign minister."³²³⁴ Clovis responded, "No, just keep your counsel and report back."³²³⁵

(U) Papadopoulos then wrote Paul Manafort, then the Trump Campaign's convention coordinator, on May 21, 2016, stating that he was in Athens, Greece to meet with the Greek Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, and that the Greek government would be sending an

³²³¹ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 76.

³²³² (U) Lewandowski Tr., p. 52.

³²³³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski, May 18, 2016 (DJTFP00021405).

³²³⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, May 19, 2016 (DJTFP00021409).

³²³⁵ (U) Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos, May 19, 2016 (DJTFP00021409).

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“official invitation for Mr. Trump to visit Greece sometime should his schedule allow.”³²³⁶ Papadopoulos also stated that “[r]egarding the below message, Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have [sic] been reaching out to me to discuss. I thought it would be prudent to send to you. . . . I am free to discuss if you are free.”³²³⁷ The message included the May 4, 2016, email from Timofeev to Papadopoulos.³²³⁸

(U) Manafort sought to quell Papadopoulos’s efforts. He forwarded the May 21, 2016, message to Rick Gates the same day and added, “Lets [sic] discuss. We need someone to communicate that DT is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the campaign so as not to send any signal.”³²³⁹ Gates responded to Manafort on May 21, 2016, and suggested having the Campaign’s correspondence coordinator handle the communication, noting “This is the person responding to all mail of non-importance. It would be a general letter.”³²⁴⁰ The Committee is not aware of any further actions by Manafort or Gates on this issue. For more on Paul Manafort, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.

(U) Three days later, on May 24, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote Timofeev and asked if the Trump Campaign had communicated with him.³²⁴¹ When Timofeev stated that he had not received any communication, Papadopoulos began to coordinate a phone call with him.³²⁴² Between May 29, 2016, and June 2, 2016, six email messages were exchanged between the two individuals, though the Committee cannot confirm if the two spoke.³²⁴³

(U) Papadopoulos told the FBI that during his May 2016 trip to Athens, he told Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotsias (also spelled Kotzias) what Mifsud had told him on April 26, 2016, regarding the Russians having emails related to Secretary Clinton.³²⁴⁴ Papadopoulos recalled Kotsias’s reaction:

Kotsias told him in Greek, “don’t tell this to anyone,” as if Kotsias had already known that information. Papadopoulos assessed Kotsias’ response was too swift and Kotsias was not shocked when Papadopoulos told him that information. Papadopoulos never discussed that topic with the Greeks again. . . . When asked

³²³⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort, May 21, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001013). Papadopoulos appeared to be resending a nearly identical email he had attempted to send minutes earlier. *See* Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort, May 21, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000999).

³²³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³²³⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³²³⁹ (U) Email, Manafort to Gates, May 21, 2016 (DJTFP00011621–DJTFP00011622).

³²⁴⁰ (U) Email, Gates to Manafort, May 21, 2016 (DJTFP00011621–DJTFP00011622).

³²⁴¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, May 24, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000999).

³²⁴² (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Timofeev, May 26–29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000999–1000).

³²⁴³ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Timofeev, May 29–June 2, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001000–1001).

³²⁴⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

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*why Papadopoulos told Kotsias about the Russians having Clinton’s emails, Papadopoulos [said he] had a nervous reaction and blurted the information out to Kotsias.*³²⁴⁵

(U) As noted previously, the Committee has no reliable indication that Papadopoulos shared this same information with anyone on the Campaign. Furthermore, the Committee has no additional information as to why Papadopoulos would share the information with the Greek Foreign Minister.

(U) Papadopoulos was in Greece from at least May 17, 2016, through May 27, 2016, according to press reporting analyzing Papadopoulos’s social media accounts.³²⁴⁶ During his visit, Papadopoulos met with Kotsias, and with the Greek Minister of Defense, Panagiotis “Panos” Kammenos.³²⁴⁷ Vladimir Putin traveled to Greece on May 27, 2016; Kammenos greeted Putin upon his arrival in Athens, on what appears to be the same day Kammenos met with Papadopoulos.³²⁴⁸

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³²⁴⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁴⁶ (U) Mitch Prothero and Vera Bergengruen, “Key Trump Officials Met with a Putin Ally During Inauguration Weekend,” *BuzzFeed News*, March 26, 2018.

³²⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁴⁸ (U) *Ibid.*; Griff Witte, “For Trump adviser at center of Russia probe, a rapid rise and dramatic fall in his ancestral land,” *The Washington Post*, December 10, 2017.

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(U) On May 29, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Clovis that Kammenos was “willing to make a private trip to NY to meet Mr. Trump (or in Athens)” and that Kotsias “wants to invite Mr. Trump to Athens for an official trip.”³²⁵³ On May 31, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to Hicks with the subject, “Messages from Athens for Mr. Trump,” in which he wrote:

*Wanted to send you some messages I received from ministers/president of Greece. I just met with the Greek president. They are all very excited for Mr. Trump, hope he wins and if he passes through Athens anytime, all doors here are open for him.*³²⁵⁴

(U) Months later, on the evening prior to the inauguration, Kammenos was photographed with Papadopoulos at the St. Regis Hotel in Washington, DC.³²⁵⁵ Separately, Kammenos was also photographed with Reince Preibus at the St. Regis Hotel on January 19, 2017 and with both Bannon and Preibus at the Hay Adams Hotel on January 21, 2017.³²⁵⁶

(U) On June 7, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Hope Hicks, offering to brief Trump on his recent travel and interactions with Israeli, Egyptian, Greek, and Cypriot officials.³²⁵⁷ Hicks suggested Papadopoulos engage with Miller, who suggested that he and Papadopoulos speak by telephone the following weekend, June 10–12, 2016.³²⁵⁸ On June 10, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Miller: “Tried calling, couldn’t get through, I’ll be free for the next hour or I’ll try tomorrow same time.”³²⁵⁹ The Committee does not know whether Miller and Papadopoulos ultimately spoke by telephone.³²⁶⁰

xii. (U) Papadopoulos Plans a Campaign Staff Visit to Moscow

(U) In June, Papadopoulos reinitiated his push for Campaign interactions with Moscow, reaching out to senior Campaign officials and to Mifsud and his contacts. Papadopoulos started this renewed effort by resuming the April 27, 2016, email conversation between himself and Lewandowski, in which Papadopoulos suggested the Campaign follow the Mayflower speech

³²⁵³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, May 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000741). In the same email, Papadopoulos wrote that he was “invited to Cairo to meet with the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister (after a call was put in by the Greek defense minister).”

³²⁵⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Hicks, May 31, 2016 (DJTFP00022220).

³²⁵⁵ (U) Mitch Prothero and Vera Bergengruen, “Key Trump Officials Met with a Putin Ally During Inauguration Weekend,” *BuzzFeed News*, March 26, 2018.

³²⁵⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁵⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Hicks, June 7, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000509).

³²⁵⁸ (U) Emails, Hicks, Papadopoulos, and S. Miller, June 7, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000509–510).

³²⁵⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller, June 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000510).

³²⁶⁰ (U) See B&P GP File 2018 000510–511. The Committee notes that three messages component to the email conversation were redacted when produced to the Committee.

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with a meeting between Trump and Putin. On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Lewandowski: “Do you want to have a call about this topic with Russia or is it off the table for the time being? Wasn’t sure if we were following up with it.”³²⁶¹ Responding that day, Lewandowski wrote: “Can you connect with Sam Clovis? He is running point.”³²⁶² Papadopoulos subsequently wrote Clovis an email on June 1, with the subject line “Messages from Russia” in which he stated: “I have the Russian MFA asking me if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point. Wanted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what’s best to do with it and what message I should send (or to ignore).”³²⁶³

(U) When Clovis was specifically asked about Papadopoulos’s June 1, 2016, email during an interview with the Committee and Papadopoulos’s outreach related to outreach to Russia in this time period, Clovis could not recall Papadopoulos reaching out to him about the Russia topic.³²⁶⁴ He further suggested Lewandowski told Papadopoulos that he (Clovis) was “running point” because: “Corey [Lewandowski] didn’t want to deal with anybody. So anybody that he didn’t want to deal with, I dealt with.”³²⁶⁵

(U) When asked about Papadopoulos’s efforts to arrange a meeting between Trump and Putin, Clovis told the Committee that he told Papadopoulos “it was a bad idea . . . I think it’s a really bad idea, George.”³²⁶⁶ The Committee did not identify any written communications in which Clovis expressed this view to Papadopoulos.

(U) Shortly thereafter, Papadopoulos turned back to his conversations with the Russians, reiterating his own interest in a visit in a series of emails. He wrote Timofeev on June 11, 2016: “Dear Ivan, I am free to come visit Russia if there is interest.”³²⁶⁷ Timofeev replied back to Papadopoulos the following day, stating: “Just landed from Beijing, Visit to Moscow is an excellent idea. Will be at [S]kype on Tuesday [June 14, 2016].”³²⁶⁸ Papadopoulos replied back two minutes later, writing: “I am going on holiday tomorrow until morning of June 21, [2016,] but will do my best to get online. In the meantime, if you see who is interested in meeting in Moscow I can begin preparations to come visit Moscow by the end of the month directly from Thessaloniki.”³²⁶⁹ Four minutes later, Papadopoulos sent an additional email to Timofeev in which he wrote: “I am open to meeting everyone even at the highest level. I think it would be

³²⁶¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski, June 1, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001036).

³²⁶² (U) Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos, June 1, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001036).

³²⁶³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, June 1, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001023).

³²⁶⁴ (U) Clovis Tr., p. 78–79.

³²⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.

³²⁶⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, June 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001001).

³²⁶⁸ (U) Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos, June 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001001).

³²⁶⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, June 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001002).

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most productive especially before the debates begin.”³²⁷⁰ Papadopoulos also separately noted: “I need to let my boss know who wants to meet with me in Moscow to confirm that’s why I ask.”³²⁷¹ Timofeev responded: “I have got a good reaction from the US desk at the MFA as I told you. . . . But to get higher level the best option would be to have a letter from Mr. Trump about your visit, asking for such meetings.”³²⁷²

(U) A few days later, Papadopoulos returned to pitching Lewandowski on a trip. On June 19, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote an email message to Lewandowski with the subject line “New message from Russia” in which he wrote:

*The Russian ministry of foreign affairs messaged and said that if Mr. Trump is unable to make it to Russia, if a campaign rep (me or someone else) can make it for meetings? I am willing to make the trip off the record if it’s in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people. I’m currently in Greece so not far. Or if someone else wants to go, just wanted to pass this along so I know who to forward the message to.*³²⁷³

Lewandowski wrote back six minutes later: “I am almost certain that he [Trump] won’t be able to make it.”³²⁷⁴

(U) Meanwhile, Carter Page, another member of the foreign policy team encouraging Trump to visit Russia, was about to depart for his own trip to Moscow. According to FBI records, on July 5, 2016, Oleg Lebedev sent Facebook messages to Papadopoulos, informing him that Page would be in Moscow and might have unofficial meetings with the Russian MFA.³²⁷⁵ The Committee does not know how Lebedev was aware of Page’s impending presence or activities in Moscow, or how Papadopoulos responded. Page spent July 4 to 9, 2016, in Moscow, speaking at the New Economic School and engaging in limited government meetings.³²⁷⁶

³²⁷⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, June 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001002).

³²⁷¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev, June 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001002).

³²⁷² (U) Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos, June 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001002).

³²⁷³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski, June 19, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001035).

³²⁷⁴ (U) Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos, June 19, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001035).

Lewandowski was fired from the Campaign the next day.

³²⁷⁵ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017. The Committee understands this to be the same Lebedev that Papadopoulos met on April 19, 2016, in London.

³²⁷⁶ (U) For more information on Page’s trip to Moscow, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.F.4.iii.

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(U) On July 15, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email message to Timofeev proposing a Trump Campaign staff trip to London to meet with President Putin's office and the Russian MFA.³²⁷⁷ The FBI discussed this email with Papadopoulos:

*Papadopoulos was advised he had sent Timofeev an email, stating "Because of the time difference I will email you what I have in mind. A meeting for August or September in the UK (London) with me and my national chairman, and maybe one other foreign policy advisor and you, members of president putin's office and the mfa to hold a day of consultations and to meet one another. It has been approved from our side. Kindly let me know what else you need and dates that work for everyone." Papadopoulos confirmed he was referring to Clovis and Phares when he referenced the national chairman and the other foreign policy advisor in his email.*³²⁷⁸

(U) Papadopoulos did not produce the email to Timofeev to the Committee. However, Papadopoulos sent a very similarly worded email to Mifsud on July 14, 2016, suggesting a meeting in "[A]ugust or September between you, me, Ivan, my two colleagues, members of president putin's office and the mfa to meet and greet and hold a day of consultations."³²⁷⁹

(U) In 2018, Timofeev spoke with journalists about his interactions with Papadopoulos, stating: "We did not close the door to the guy, but we did not take it seriously. . . . He was very enthusiastic. He was very interested in Russia and improving relations, but he seemed to be so unprofessional and so unprepared for a serious conversation."³²⁸⁰ Timofeev further stated that Papadopoulos never sent a formal request for a visit to Russia, outlining particulars such as who would attend or what topics would be discussed.³²⁸¹

(U) Throughout this timeframe, Papadopoulos continued frequent contact with Mifsud on a variety of issues, from press inquiries to a potential role for Mifsud on the Campaign.

- (U) Mifsud sent Papadopoulos an email on June 16, 2016, with the subject line "urgent contact."³²⁸² Mifsud wrote that he would like to "touch base and have a catch up" with Papadopoulos, particularly pertaining to answering some queries from Italian

³²⁷⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

³²⁷⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁷⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, July 14, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000814).

³²⁸⁰ (U) Marshall Cohen, "'Unprofessional' Papadopoulos couldn't deliver on promises, his Russian contact says," *CNN*, June 7, 2018. The Committee did not attempt to interview Timofeev.

³²⁸¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁸² (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, June 16, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000873).

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newspapers, one of which Mifsud included in the message.³²⁸³ Mifsud also wrote, “On the 27/28 I am at the Hague for the high level internal annual meeting of the ECFR and on the topic is [sic] the US presidential elections. I would like to have a briefing from you on Mr. Trump’s foreign policy to be able to argue ‘your’ corner.”³²⁸⁴

- (U) Between July 5, 2016, and July 17, 2016, Papadopoulos and Mifsud exchanged over a dozen email messages to coordinate a phone call.³²⁸⁵ The Committee does not know whether a conversation ultimately took place.
- (U) Between July 25, 2016, and July 27, 2016, Papadopoulos and Mifsud exchanged nine email messages to coordinate a phone call.³²⁸⁶ The Committee cannot confirm whether a conversation took place, but surmises one did based on a subsequent July 27, 2016, email.³²⁸⁷
- (U) On August 22, 2016, Papadopoulos offered Rick Dearborn, a Campaign official, “other information” on Russia and Libya.³²⁸⁸ When Dearborn replied that he would like to see it, Papadopoulos stated he would “talk to some contacts of mine in the ministry of foreign affairs of Italy . . . and Russia to get you some primary sources and information.”³²⁸⁹ Papadopoulos then sent an email message to Mifsud on the same day, August 22, 2016, in which he asked, “Dear Joseph, Do you have any updates on Libya you can send my way?”³²⁹⁰ Mifsud sent Papadopoulos a file titled “The current situation and the main priorities for Libya.docx.”³²⁹¹ The Committee does not have any evidence that Papadopoulos sent the document or any derivative information regarding Libya to the Campaign.³²⁹²

(U) On July 27, 2016, Papadopoulos told Clovis and Walid Phares, via email, that Mifsud was willing to host “us with the UK officials and other governments for consultations—

³²⁸³ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁸⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

³²⁸⁵ (U) Emails, Mifsud and Papadopoulos, July 5–17, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000813–817).

³²⁸⁶ (U) Emails, Mifsud and Papadopoulos, July 25–27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000819–821).

³²⁸⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, July 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001168).

³²⁸⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, August 22, 2016 (DJTFP00031906).

³²⁸⁹ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Dearborn, August 22, 2016 (DJTFP00031906).

³²⁹⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, August 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000831).

³²⁹¹ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, August 23, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000831).

³²⁹² (U) Papadopoulos sent at least four follow-up emails to Dearborn between August 22 and August 31, 2016, which addressed a range of topics including natural gas issues in Russia, Greece, and the United States and geopolitical issues in the Baltics, but the topic of Libya was conspicuously absent. Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, August 23, 2016 (DJTFP00031908); Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, August 24, 2016 (DJTFP00031910); Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, August 24, 2016 (DJTFP00032025); Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, August 31, 2016 (DJTFP00033641).

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in Europe and Russia.” He called Mifsud his “colleague” and said Mifsud’s organization, the London Academy of Diplomacy, works closely with Boris Johnson’s office.³²⁹³ The Committee has no indication that is true. Papadopoulos then wrote to Mifsud:

*Excellent call. We are looking forward to the letter detailing that the London Academy of Diplomacy would like to host the trump team, and officials from the UK and Russia (separately). Confirmed participants from our side include: Walid Phares, foreign policy advisor, Sam Clovis, head of policy and George Papadopoulos, foreign policy advisor.*³²⁹⁴

(U) On July 31, 2016, Mifsud wrote to Papadopoulos, again suggesting that Mifsud be given a formal role with the Campaign, including organizing meetings on behalf of Trump’s Campaign (emphasis in original):

As mentioned, I wish to be officially accredited and invited to follow Mr. Trump’s campaign (with an on the ground – US trail – for a period to be defined with the aim of presenting the European (the extended EU – UK, Balkans, etc.), Russian and Mediterranean media, think tanks, institutions, and public opinion (blogs, etc.) with an [sic] realistic view of your campaign, with particular reference to Foreign Policy (and all the other pertinent issues. I would also need to be briefed periodically on all foreign affairs issues pertinent to this role. This would justify my academic and professional interest. An agreement on this must precede all other actions.

*I will organize in London and in other European capitals meetings with individuals, think tanks, media and foreign policy advisors from countries in Europe (wider Europe), UK, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Russian Federation (the meeting that we have discussed would be under this umbrella—the focus to these meetings would be the clear and specific Foreign Policy issues being put forward by Mr. Trump during his campaign.*³²⁹⁵

(U) The Committee has no indication that Papadopoulos passed on Mifsud’s request to the Campaign, or that Mifsud ever procured greater access to Campaign officials.

(U) On August 8, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote an email message to Dearborn stating that he “was invited to Russia’s largest energy conference of the year to talk about global energy market dynamics. . . . If Mr. Trump believes it’s in the US interest to cooperate with Russia,

³²⁹³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis and Phares, July 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018-000726).

³²⁹⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, July 27, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001168).

³²⁹⁵ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, July 31, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000829).

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something I wholeheartedly believe as well, I'm happy to represent the campaign's ideas as well."³²⁹⁶ Dearborn replied the next day: "George, I can't authorize you to go on behalf of the campaign."³²⁹⁷

(U) Mifsud sent an email on August 10, 2016, introducing Papadopoulos to Stephan Roh, whom Mifsud described as "a Swiss Lawyer with offices in Germany, Switzerland, Russia, the Gulf and China, with whom I have been collaborating for some time on major international projects including Link Campus that you have visited this year."³²⁹⁸ It is unclear why Mifsud sought to make this introduction. As part of the nine-message exchange, Roh wrote to Papadopoulos on August 15, 2016, "Joseph reminded me that you might want to speak about a trip to Moscow . . . it would be my pleasure to give some advice."³²⁹⁹ The Committee does not know if the two ever connected for a conversation on the phone or in person.

(U) Papadopoulos wrote an email to Clovis on August 15, 2016, with the subject, "Trip abroad (you and I)" in which he stated:

*Have had requests from UK, Greek, Italian and even Russian government for closed door workshops/consultations abroad. . . . I wanted to know if there is still interest for the two or three of us to go on that trip? If not I'll let them know and we can potentially hold a private [S]kype call. All meetings can potentially be done in London at the London Academy of Diplomacy.*³³⁰⁰

The same day, Clovis responded to Papadopoulos: "I just don't see any way for me to travel before the election. I have too much to do that requires me to be in the states. I would encourage you and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible."³³⁰¹

(U) On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos responded to Mifsud's July 31, 2016, email stating "[u]nfortunately, our national co-chairman, Sam Clovis, informed me today he cannot travel abroad at this stage of the election. However, will now see if Walid [Phares] can make it and he is supposed to tell me today."³³⁰² Phares engaged with Papadopoulos on the potential travel, noting to Clovis that he would "reach out to George to discuss possibilities for us," and told Papadopoulos that he was open to engagements at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.,

³²⁹⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, August 8, 2016 (DJTFP00030553).

³²⁹⁷ (U) Email, Dearborn to Papadopoulos, August 9, 2016 (DJTFP00030553).

³²⁹⁸ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos and Roh, August 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000833).

³²⁹⁹ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos, Mifsud, and Roh, August 10–15, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000833–835).

³³⁰⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, August 15, 2016 (DJTFP00014224).

³³⁰¹ (U) Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos and Phares, August 15, 2016 (DJTFP00014224). This document, among others, evidence Clovis's at least tacit support for Campaign engagements with foreign governments, including Russia's. This stands in contrast to representations Clovis made during his testimony to the Committee.

³³⁰² (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, August 15, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000830).

[REDACTED]

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prior to the potential trip.³³⁰³ Phares did not mention the potential trip to London with Papadopoulos during his interview with the Committee, though he indicated some familiarity with Papadopoulos's other travel to Israel and Greece during the Campaign.³³⁰⁴

xiii. (U) Papadopoulos's Interactions with Sergei Millian

(U) Sergei Millian, the President of the RACC, initially reached out to Papadopoulos via LinkedIn on July 15, 2016. His message to Papadopoulos stated that he had "insider knowledge and direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics (president circle, ministers, governors level)."³³⁰⁵ Because both Sergei Millian and Papadopoulos refused to participate in an interview with the Committee, there is scant information on how the two men connected or the scope of their interactions. However, by August 5, 2016, Papadopoulos had sent an email to Anthony Livanios, the CEO of U.S. Energy Stream, and copied Millian, proposing to Livanios that they have a Skype call with Papadopoulos's "friend," Sergei Millian.³³⁰⁶ The Committee does not know whether the call took place.

(U) On August 8, 2016, Millian sent Papadopoulos an agenda and details of an energy-sector conference in Moscow. In the message he wrote, "I would need your bio as the conference organizers requested it."³³⁰⁷ Less than one hour later, Papadopoulos wrote, "Thanks my friend. Let me talk to the campaign and get back to you tomorrow."³³⁰⁸

(U) After the presumed Skype call with Millian and Livanios, Millian sent an email message to Papadopoulos on August 9, 2016, in which he stated:

It will be my pleasure and honor to arrange energy meetings, extensive briefings from top energy experts in Russia and Europe (including top executives and government decision makers), scheduling your speaking arrangements and anything else that is within my scope of connections and business experience. Nevertheless, handling NATO documentation is outside of my expertise and interests. If your Boss held the office, it would be a reasonable request if authorized by [the White House].

³³⁰³ (U) Email, Phares to Papadopoulos and Clovis, August 15, 2016 (DJTFP00014282).

³³⁰⁴ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Walid Phares, August 16, 2017, p. 88.

³³⁰⁵ (U) LinkedIn message, Millian to Papadopoulos, July 15, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001175).

³³⁰⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Livanios and Millian, August 5, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001102).

³³⁰⁷ (U) Emails, Millian to Papadopoulos, August 8, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001100).

³³⁰⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Millian, August 8, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001100).

[REDACTED]

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*I am willing and confident that I can be of great assistance to you in your private or public goals in Russia. Hope you understand me and my concerns.*³³⁰⁹

(U) The Committee does not have any additional context regarding Millian's reference to "handling NATO documentation," though it assumes the topic was discussed during the Skype call.

(U) Millian wrote Papadopoulos an email with the subject line "US Russia relations" on August 22, 2016, in which he provided Papadopoulos a link to a U.S. Department of State website, commenting that "this is a good link to start reviewing regarding the topics of political, security, and energy relationship."³³¹⁰ The link is to the 2013 Joint Report of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission.

(U) On September 12, 2016, Millian was scheduled to pick Papadopoulos up at New York's LaGuardia airport for a meeting.³³¹¹ Although the Committee does not know what the two discussed, on September 13, 2016, Millian wrote an email to Trump attorney Michael Cohen: "I'm friends with Greek American George Papadopoulos, who says he is now your official campaign [sic] advisor on foreign policy from Ben Carson group. He asks questions about you. Do you know George?"³³¹² The Committee has no record of a response from Cohen.

(U) On November 5, 2016, Millian forwarded Papadopoulos an email message that he had originally sent to Hicks on November 2, 2016, rebutting the purported falsehoods contained within an October 31, 2016, *Financial Times* article written about Millian, titled, "The shadowy Russian émigré touting Trump."³³¹³ Millian included the following note to Papadopoulos:

I just wanted you to know that I wrote this for Mr. Trump. I have no doubt that forces that invested so much into H will try to steal the elections. Otherwise, all the money they paid will go to waste.

*Please be very cautious these last few days. Even to the point of not leaving your food and drinks out of eye sight. I saw you in my dream with two men in black with angry faces hiding behind your back.*³³¹⁴

³³⁰⁹ (U) Email, Millian to Papadopoulos, August 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001102).

³³¹⁰ (U) Email, Millian to Papadopoulos, August 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001104).

³³¹¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Epshteyn, September 12, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000603–608).

³³¹² (U) Email, Millian to Cohen, September 13, 2016 (DJTFP00018152–DJTFP00018155).

³³¹³ (U) Email, Millian to Papadopoulos, November 5, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001088).

³³¹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

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In the original note to Hicks—which itself was a message Millian said he had sent to Michael Cohen—Millian offered to hold a press conference to correct the record regarding this relationship with Trump, but noted he would not do so unless the Campaign approved.³³¹⁵ Millian had no official title or role with the Campaign. The Committee does not know why Millian forwarded the note or why Millian included the warning to Papadopoulos.

(U) Millian and Papadopoulos stayed in touch past the election and as late as August 2017. According to an interview with the FBI, Papadopoulos met with Millian in November 2016.³³¹⁶ Papadopoulos stated that he thought the meeting was strange because Millian was throwing out “crazy numbers” for a potential business deal with Papadopoulos, who was not paid by the Trump campaign nor paid by the Trump Transition Team.³³¹⁷ According to the FBI interview with him, Papadopoulos further recalled:

*While the two spoke of potential business ideas, Millian encouraged Papadopoulos to concurrently pursue attempts to obtain employment in the administration. When Papadopoulos told Millian he was not interested in a job in the administration, “the meeting kind of stopped.” Papadopoulos felt as if Millian’s composure was different after that moment and Millian went from cordial to a completely different person.*³³¹⁸

(U) Simona Mangiante, Papadopoulos’ wife, told the Committee that Millian offered Papadopoulos a salary of \$30,000 per month as part of the business proposal.³³¹⁹

(U) On August 10, 2017, Millian forwarded an email message to Papadopoulos from a *Washington Post* reporter who had asked Millian about his interactions with Papadopoulos.³³²⁰ Millian forwarded the message with the comment, “FYI: I will not comment. These folks are hatchet job writers and are sponsored by Amazon owner.”³³²¹ This is the last record of contact the Committee has between Millian and Papadopoulos. For additional information on Millian, see *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B.

xiv. (U) Papadopoulos Meets [REDACTED]

³³¹⁵ (U) Email, Millian to Hicks, November 5, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001088–1089).

³³¹⁶ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017.

³³¹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³³¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³³¹⁹ (U) Mangiante Tr., pp. 133–134.

³³²⁰ (U) Email, Millian to Papadopoulos, August 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 001074).

³³²¹ (U) *Ibid.*

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) According to Papadopoulos’s testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, he received an unsolicited email from [REDACTED] in early September 2016.³³²³ According to Papadopoulos, [REDACTED] offered to fly Papadopoulos to London, and pay him \$3,000 to write a paper for him.³³²⁴

[REDACTED]

(U) On September 20, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote Clovis an email message with the subject line “[REDACTED]” in which he wrote:

Had a very productive meeting with [REDACTED] in [L]ondon. We talked strategy among other things. He liked what I had to say about US policy in the Middle East/eastern Mediterranean and wants to help on China briefs. He said you two met as well and talked about similar issues.³³²⁶

(U) According to an August 2017 interview with the FBI:

Papadopoulos authored a paper for [REDACTED] in London and traveled to London in September of 2016 to meet with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. During that meeting, [REDACTED] asked Papadopoulos about the hacking of the DNC, which Papadopoulos found to be odd. Papadopoulos relayed to [REDACTED] that he did not know anything about the topic and was taken aback by his questioning. Papadopoulos felt as if [REDACTED] may have been trying to set him up. That meeting was also [REDACTED] a bit of an antagonistic meeting.

3322 [REDACTED]

3323 (U) House Judiciary Committee Transcript of the Interview with George Papadopoulos, pp. 101, 108.

3324 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 101.

3325 [REDACTED]

3326 (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, September 20, 2016 (DJTFP00023908).

[REDACTED]

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*[REDACTED] financed the writing of that paper and paid for Papadopoulos' flight and his hotel.*³³²⁷

[REDACTED]

(U) The Committee received written responses from [REDACTED] on February 28, 2020.³³²⁹

xv. (U) Campaign Officials Attempt to Restrain Papadopoulos

(U) As mentioned above, Clovis claimed to the Committee that, as early as March, he was concerned that including Papadopoulos on the foreign policy advisory team had been a mistake.³³³⁰ The first explicit negative feedback from senior Campaign staff to Papadopoulos seems to have come in May, after Papadopoulos gave an interview in the British press. On May 4, 2016, *The Times of London* published comments from Papadopoulos, identifying him as “a foreign policy adviser to the Republican frontrunner,” in which he called upon the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, to apologize to Trump and noted that an invitation for Trump to visit the United Kingdom had not yet been extended.³³³¹ On May 5, 2016, Clovis sent an email to Papadopoulos with the subject “Call Me ASAP,” in which he wrote:

*You are in real hot water with the campaign over your comments to the British press. You need to call me asap. No more discussion with any press until you hear otherwise or have spoken to me about your current situation. Nothing goes out without approval of New York. Period.*³³³²

(U) While the content of Papadopoulos’s remarks seems to have surprised the Campaign, the Committee notes that Papadopoulos was keeping the Campaign’s communication director generally informed of his interactions with the press:

³³²⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 8/10/2017 (redactions in original as produced by DOJ). The Committee assesses the redacted name in this text to be [REDACTED].

³³²⁸ [REDACTED]

³³²⁹ (U) Letter, SSCI to [REDACTED] April 3, 2019; Letter, SSCI to [REDACTED] July 30, 2019; Written Responses, [REDACTED], February 28, 2020.

³³³⁰ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 70–71.

³³³¹ (U) Francis Elliott, “Say Sorry to Trump or risk special relationship, Cameron told,” *The Times (London)*, May 4, 2016.

³³³² (U) Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos, May 5, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000750).

[REDACTED]

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- (U) On April 29, 2016, Papadopoulos sought permission from Hope Hicks, the Campaign’s communications director, to accept an interview with a different media outlet, the *BBC*.³³³³ Hicks replied in the affirmative three minutes afterwards.³³³⁴
- (U) On May 7, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote two emails to Hicks asking if he could participate in an interview with *Bloomberg* and explaining the context surrounding the interview with *The Times of London*.³³³⁵ Papadopoulos noted that “the [U.K. Prime Minister]’s office wants to host me next week for them to let me know when they hope to expect Mr. Trump to visit the UK.”³³³⁶ Hicks responded to Papadopoulos, “All good!”³³³⁷

(U) Papadopoulos continued to pursue public speaking opportunities on behalf of the Campaign, and senior staff continued to show their concern. On July 7, 2016, Papadopoulos forwarded an email message to Dearborn from the American Jewish Committee asking him to participate as a panelist at a July 20, 2016, event in Cleveland, Ohio.³³³⁸ Dearborn subsequently forwarded the message to Mashburn and Gordon and noted: “I don’t know that I trust him to speak for the campaign -- thoughts?”³³³⁹

(U) On August 2, 2016, in an email conversation about press engagements and Carter Page, Dearborn wrote, “Carter Page and George Papadopoulos are problematic with the press. I’ve been clear with George he can’t jump without asking. I don’t know Carter.”³³⁴⁰

(U) On August 16, 2016, Hicks, Stephen Miller, and other Campaign staff exchanged emails in response to a negative press inquiry about a separate national security advisory team member, in which Hicks stated, “Do we need to do some cleaning up of our original advisers? This, carter page, Papadopoulos?”³³⁴¹ Miller responded, “Yes. Several of the clovis names should be removed.”³³⁴² When Hicks responded by asking how “we go about this swiftly and quietly” and adding then-Campaign chairman Paul Manafort, Miller responded, “The best solution is to constitute a new fp team with the names we want.”³³⁴³

³³³³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Hicks, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000748).

³³³⁴ (U) Email, Hicks to Papadopoulos, April 29, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000748).

³³³⁵ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos to Hicks, May 7, 2016 (DJTFP00021356).

³³³⁶ (U) *Ibid*.

³³³⁷ (U) Email, Hicks to Papadopoulos, May 7, 2016 (DJTFP00021356).

³³³⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00030089–30092).

³³³⁹ (U) Email, Dearborn to Mashburn and Gordon, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00030089–30092).

³³⁴⁰ (U) Email, Dearborn to Hicks, S. Miller, and J. Miller, August 2, 2016 (DJTFP00013777).

³³⁴¹ (U) Email, Hicks to S. Miller, et al., August 16, 2016 (DJTFP00014394).

³³⁴² (U) Email, S. Miller to Hicks, et al., August 16, 2016 (DJTFP00014394).

³³⁴³ (U) Email, Hicks to S. Miller, Manafort, et al., August 16, 2016 (DJTFP00014394); Email, S. Miller to Hicks, Manafort, et al., August 16, 2016 (DJTFP00014394).

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(U) Hicks told the Committee that by August 2016, her position on the contributions of Page and Papadopoulos was fairly clear:

*My general feeling on them [Page and Papadopoulos] was that it was not worth keeping up appearances of some foreign policy committee. We had enough problems and I didn't need any more with people that we had no control over, no knowledge of their activities and, frankly, their positions on things. They weren't making contributions, so I didn't see the point in trying to field these media inquiries that had nothing to do with us. It wasn't as if we were benefiting from their participation or lack thereof. I felt strongly about ending their involvement, which there wasn't any.*³³⁴⁴

(U) Although Campaign staff told the Committee, with the benefit of hindsight, that they had ongoing concerns about Papadopoulos, they were inconsistent in their contemporaneous written evaluations. On July 25, 2016, Clovis sent an email message to Paul Manafort, copying Dearborn, Kushner, Trump supporter Elliott Broidy, and Donald Trump Jr., in which he included a policy document.³³⁴⁵ Under the “Energy” section of the document, Clovis wrote, “I have made contact with a number of energy folks, but we already have two energy experts on tether. Carter Page and George Papadopoulos [sic] are great assets.”³³⁴⁶ When asked whether Clovis agreed with his July 25, 2016 assessment that Page and Papadopoulos were great assets to the Campaign, Clovis told the Committee, “No, not at all. . . . I don't know how I ever would have said that, but I guess I did.”³³⁴⁷

(U) Papadopoulos also attempted to involve himself as a more formal surrogate for the Campaign, probably in an attempt to have some travel expenses compensated. On August 20, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk, asking to have travel expenses covered for campaign-related events with Greek-American donors.³³⁴⁸ Denysyk noted that “[t]he campaign does not normally cover expenses for someone who is not formally on the surrogate list of speakers,” but offered to see if Papadopoulos could be vetted as a formal surrogate.³³⁴⁹ When Denysyk subsequently checked with others on the Trump Campaign, Clovis responded: “George is an advisor but is not officially with the campaign. This has been the case from the beginning.”³³⁵⁰ Papadopoulos also asked Bryan Lanza, deputy communications

³³⁴⁴ (U) Hicks Tr., pp. 17–18.

³³⁴⁵ (U) Email, Clovis to Manafort, Dearborn, Kushner, Broidy, and Trump Jr., June 25, 2016 (DJTFP00012689–DJTFP00012695) (attaching one document). Broidy was using the address [REDACTED]

³³⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³³⁴⁷ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 80–81.

³³⁴⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk, August 20, 2016 (DJTFP00023546).

³³⁴⁹ (U) Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos, August 20, 2016 (DJTFP00023545).

³³⁵⁰ (U) Email, Clovis to Denysyk and Cobb, August 22, 2016 (DJTFP00023544).

[REDACTED]

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director for the Trump Campaign, on August 22, 2016, whether the Campaign had a “weekly call for the surrogates to keep everyone updated on the issues.”³³⁵¹ Lanza then told an associate: “Please add Mr. Papadopoulos to the daily call and talking points.”³³⁵²

(U) Lanza also endorsed Papadopoulos speaking to the press, long after Hicks expressed her opinion that he should stop. On September 9, 2016, Papadopoulos asked Lanza what he thought about “a request from interfax Russian news agency with ksenia baygarova on US-Russia ties under a president trump. . . . If the campaign wants me to do it, can answer similar to the answers I gave in April while in Israel.”³³⁵³ The next day, Lanza told Papadopoulos: “You should do it. The Russia/US Syria agreement is a good example of why we want a partnership with Russia.”³³⁵⁴

(U) Steve Bannon, who starting in mid-August served as the CEO of the Trump Campaign, also told the Committee he saw Papadopoulos as a non-factor on the Campaign, but his assertions in his interview often did not match the documentary record. For example, Bannon engaged in a lengthy email exchange with Papadopoulos related to scheduling a meeting between Trump and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.³³⁵⁵ Bannon, however, told the Committee that he did not remember obtaining Papadopoulos’s email address and that he did not mean to email Papadopoulos.³³⁵⁶ Instead, he explained that during the entire exchange with Papadopoulos, he thought he was emailing George Gigicos, the Campaign’s head of advance.³³⁵⁷ Bannon also briefly communicated with Papadopoulos regarding the Japanese government in September 2016 and regarding the Greek government in January 2017.³³⁵⁸

xvi. (U) Attempts to Separate Papadopoulos from the Campaign

(U) Papadopoulos’s second big misstep in the press led to the clearest direction to stop associating himself publicly with the Campaign from Campaign senior leadership. On September 30, 2016, *Interfax* published an interview with Papadopoulos—likely the one Lanza

³³⁵¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza, August 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000472).

³³⁵² (U) Email, Lanza to Papadopoulos and Spoletti, August 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000472).

³³⁵³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza, September 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000469–470).

³³⁵⁴ (U) Email, Lanza to Papadopoulos, September 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000469–470).

³³⁵⁵ (U) *See, e.g.*, Emails, Bannon and Papadopoulos, September 16–18, 2016 (SKB_SSCI_0000605–608).

³³⁵⁶ (U) Bannon Tr., pp. 89, 96.

³³⁵⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 95–98. Bannon’s explanation for the mistake was that his email must have autopopulated Papadopoulos’s email, despite the fact that Bannon said he could not remember ever emailing Papadopoulos before. Although it is impossible for an email application to autopopulate an address that is not in the contacts and has never been emailed before, Bannon had no theory as to how he could have emailed Papadopoulos, and agreed that, in light of how autopopulate works, he understood how the Committee might find his explanation unbelievable. *Ibid.*

³³⁵⁸ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Bannon, September 15, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000615); Emails, Papadopoulos, Bannon, and Flynn, January 4–6, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000635).

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had authorized.³³⁵⁹ In an October 3, 2016 email conversation, several members of the Trump Campaign, including Clovis, Alan Cobb, Dearborn, Denysyk, and John Mashburn discussed how to respond to the interview.³³⁶⁰ As part of the discussion, Denysyk stated, “[u]nless you have approved George giving these types of interviews on behalf of the campaign, I suggest that Sam or I call him and tell him to cease and desist speaking on behalf of the campaign unless specifically approved by Mash and Sam.”³³⁶¹ Dearborn replied the same day and stated, “Shut him down.”³³⁶²

(U) Denysyk emailed Papadopoulos on October 3, 2016, component to a discussion with Papadopoulos about a Greek-American coalition, and wrote:

Also, please remove your title as Foreign Policy Advisor to the campaign. Rick and Sam confirmed that you have been an informal resource and not an Adviser.

More broadly, Rick has asked me to thank you for the policy activities you have been involved with but you cannot any longer speak on behalf of the campaign or publicly comment on what the campaign position is on any issue. You can refer people to the campaign website.

We have had numerous complaints about your Interfax interview. I hope you understand.

*For reference, Alan and Sam agree with this decision.*³³⁶³

Papadopoulos initially replied “[n]ot an issue, Bo,” but said as a result he would not be able to “further assist on this or any other coalition.”³³⁶⁴ The following day, Papadopoulos also wrote that the development would affect his support for a Greek-Americans for Trump coalition:

*I have been predominantly working with the leadership in NY over the past months on numerous initiatives. As far as they told me, they did not give or were aware of an order to effectively sideline me from the campaign for the interview I gave. Will wait for their instructions on me continuing as a surrogate/advisor before I decide on the [Greek-Americans for Trump] coalition.*³³⁶⁵

³³⁵⁹ (U) “George Papadopoulos: Sanctions have done little more than to turn Russia towards China,” *Interfax*, September 30, 2016.

³³⁶⁰ (U) Emails, Clovis, et al., October 3, 2016 (DJTFP00018382).

³³⁶¹ (U) Email, Denysyk to Clovis, et al., October 3, 2016 (DJTFP00018382).

³³⁶² (U) Email, Dearborn to Denysyk, et al., October 3, 2016 (DJTFP00018382).

³³⁶³ (U) Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos, October 3, 2016 (DJTFP00035676–35677).

³³⁶⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk, October 3, 2016 (DJTFP00035676–35677).

³³⁶⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk, October 4, 2016 (DJTFP00035676).

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Denysyk replied to Papadopoulos, “Up to you and will pass this along to Rick and Sam,” to which Papadopoulos replied:

*Please do, Bo. I was informed by top people in the campaign that the buck stops with Steve Bannon on this issue. Steve and I coordinated Mr. Trump’s high level meetings during UN week. If he tells me he wants me off the team, of course, I will immediately step down. In the interest of the team, however, I will refrain from any other interviews or appearances until there is a final verdict.*³³⁶⁶

(U) Papadopoulos sent an email to Boris Epshteyn, a Trump Campaign surrogate and employee, on October 4, 2016, stating that he had been “told by a couple folks in the campaign, Rick Dearborn, Sam Clovis, (both via [B]o Denysyk)” that he was “effectively now off the campaign” because of his recent interview and asked Epshteyn for clarification on whether that statement was accurate.³³⁶⁷ Papadopoulos sent a similar note to Glassner twenty minutes later, who responded: “News to me – I suggest you follow up directly with Steve Bannon or Jason Miller.”³³⁶⁸

(U) Papadopoulos had already emailed Bannon on October 3, 2016:

*I’m effectively off the campaign for giving an interview on US policy in the Middle East/Russia after I was approved to do it and spoke on my behalf (not the campaigns [sic]). Can you confirm/deny the validity of this please? You are the CEO so I wanted to make sure I asked you before moving back to London to take up my work placement again.*³³⁶⁹

Bannon initially forwarded the note to Jason Miller early on October 4, and asked him, “What’s up with this???”³³⁷⁰ Miller responded to Bannon almost immediately, and stated: “I’ve never even heard of this person.”³³⁷¹ Bannon subsequently also replied to Papadopoulos on October 4: “Who told u that[?]”³³⁷² Papadopoulos stated that the decision had come from “Rick Dearborn and Sam Clovis (via Bo Denysyk).”³³⁷³ The Committee is not aware of any further action that Bannon took regarding Papadopoulos’s inquiry.

³³⁶⁶ (U) Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos, October 4, 2016 (DJTFP00035676); Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk, Clovis, and Dearborn, October 4, 2016 (DJTFP00035676).

³³⁶⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Epshteyn, October 4, 2016 (DJTFP00018498).

³³⁶⁸ (U) Email, Glassner to Papadopoulos, October 4, 2016 (DJTFP00018500).

³³⁶⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, October 3, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001768).

³³⁷⁰ (U) Email, Bannon to J. Miller, October 4, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0002093).

³³⁷¹ (U) Email, J. Miller to Bannon, October 4, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001771).

³³⁷² (U) Email, Bannon to Papadopoulos, October 4, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0002092).

³³⁷³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, October 4, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001769).

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(U) On October 5, 2016, in response to a query from Epshteyn about whether “George [was] still part of [the] campaign,” Cobb wrote: “George got way off the reservation on an issue, but I don’t think he is ‘off the campaign.’”³³⁷⁴ Upon further inquiry by Cobb, he subsequently wrote back to Epshteyn: “Dearborn is telling me that George has been told to cease and desist several times.”³³⁷⁵ In response, Epshteyn suggested that “Dearborn send him a formal letter to end his ‘confusion.’”³³⁷⁶

(U) On October 5, 2016, Clovis sent Papadopoulos the following email message:

*Not sure what all is going on with you right now, but I wanted to ask that you not represent yourself as a spokesperson or surrogate for the campaign. I am not sure I fully understand why this has come up, but for the sake of the campaign and everyone involved, we need to keep distractions to a minimum right now. I know you understand. Thanks. Please acknowledge receipt of this email.*³³⁷⁷

(U) Despite Denysyk’s and Clovis’s emails, the Committee notes Papadopoulos remained active and engaged with the Campaign, to include engagements with media associated with Greek and Russian interests.

(U) On October 9, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email message to Epshteyn with the subject “Russia strategy,” in which he wrote:

*It’s obvious Mr. Trump has expressed that it’s important to cooperate with Russia in Syria. . . . I support this completely. I’m free to discuss this week with you about how to articulate it even more with your help if it’s in the interest of the principal.*³³⁷⁸

(U) On October 19, 2016, Mifsud sent an email to Papadopoulos inviting him to speak to a session of the European Council on Foreign Relations on “any issue or topic related on the

³³⁷⁴ (U) Emails, Cobb and Epshteyn, October 4–5, 2016 (DJTFP00018820).

³³⁷⁵ (U) Email, Cobb to Epshteyn, October 5, 2016 (DJTFP00018835).

³³⁷⁶ (U) Email, Epshteyn to Cobb, October 5, 2016 (DJTFP00018835).

³³⁷⁷ (U) Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos, Cobb, and Dearborn, October 5, 2016 (DJTFP00035692). Papadopoulos responded that he did not want to be a distraction, but also said “as long as it’s understood that the Greek/Jewish/Armenian fund raisers and coalition groups I was on the verge of putting all together will likely not come to fruition if they know I’m not representing the campaign anymore.” Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, et al., October 5, 2016 (DJTFP00035694). Denysyk told the Committee in his interview that Papadopoulos also was asked to stay out of this type of coalition building. Denysyk Tr., p. 30; *see also* Email, Clovis to Dearborn, Cobb, and Denysyk, October 5, 2016 (DJTFP00035689) (“He’s been told several times to steer clear of representing the campaign. If need be, I can communicate with him these issues.”).

³³⁷⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Epshteyn, October 9, 2016 (DJTFP00019321).

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Trump campaign, putting your views forward.”³³⁷⁹ He further stated in the email that “the attendance to this meeting is strictly by invitation and normally has top politicians, journalists, diplomats in London and will be curtailed by number.”³³⁸⁰ Papadopoulos responded several hours later stating that he was not sure he could make a trip to London as he “decided to go back on the campaign until the end.”³³⁸¹

(U) On October 26, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Lanza an email regarding media requests from “Greek American newspapers and CNN Greece”³³⁸² Lanza replied shortly after Papadopoulos sent the initial email, copying an associate to help assist Papadopoulos in booking the engagement.³³⁸³

(U) Less than one hour after sending the initial email to Lanza on October 26, 2016, Papadopoulos then forwarded a request from a U.S. correspondent for *Antenna TV Greece* to Lanza and Lanza’s associate on the previous email.³³⁸⁴ Papadopoulos sent the e-mail to Bannon and Lanza’s associate just prior to sending the email to Lanza.³³⁸⁵

(U) Also on October 26, 2016, Papadopoulos received an email from a producer claiming to be from “the U.S. State Department’s TV Rain Russia Media CoOp program” who stated she had received his contact information from Richard Weitz.³³⁸⁶ The producer requested that Papadopoulos participate in an interview with two Russian journalists who were going to be in Washington, D.C. after the election.³³⁸⁷ Papadopoulos agreed to do an interview on November 14, 2016.³³⁸⁸

xvii. (U) Mifsud Reacts to the Election

³³⁷⁹ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, October 19, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000837).

³³⁸⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

³³⁸¹ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Mifsud, October 19, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000837).

³³⁸² (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza, October 26, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000437).

³³⁸³ (U) Email, Lanza to Papadopoulos and Henning, October 26, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000437).

³³⁸⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza and Henning, October 26, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000439).

³³⁸⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon and Henning, October 26, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000439). In a separate email to Bannon, Papadopoulos clarified that he mistakenly forwarded the message to Bannon, and should have sent it to Bryan Lanza instead. However, Papadopoulos did not produce this communication to the Committee. *See* Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, October 26, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001373).

³³⁸⁶ (U) Email, Schmidt to Papadopoulos, et al., October 26, 2016 (HUD00000198). According to the *Defense One* website, Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute and an “Expert” with the WikiStrat consultancy. *DefenseOne.com*, “Author archive: Richard Weitz.” For additional information on WikiStrat and its founder Joel Zamel, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.J.3.

³³⁸⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³³⁸⁸ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Schmidt, et al., October 26, 2016 (HUD00000198).

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(U) On November 1, 2016, Mifsud sent an email to Papadopoulos with the subject “How are you?” in which he wrote, “[L]et us start thinking of the post-US elections – anything you can/wish to share? I hope it goes well for you.”³³⁸⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) On November 10, 2016, Mifsud sent an email to Papadopoulos, congratulating him on Trump’s victory and asking: “I wondered if you and I can touch base and prepare your presentation in London and also to see if we can work together.”³³⁹² Papadopoulos responded to Mifsud’s note, stating that he “[w]ould be happy to work together. What do you have in mind?”³³⁹³ Mifsud responded the next day:

As there are much [sic] requests from Europe, Russia and Middle East on Mr. Trump’s foreign policy focus liaising with institutions and think tanks will be on top of the agenda. We can offer a service to these via you. I would be happy to fly to meet with you in the USA in the first week of December and have a meeting with you (and with others that you might wish to identify).

*I will fly to where you will be and meet face to face there. If I can be of any support here please do let me know.*³³⁹⁴

³³⁸⁹ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, November 1, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000839).

³³⁹⁰ [REDACTED] See, e.g. [REDACTED] Lee Smith, “The Maltese Phantom of Russiagate,” *RealClearInvestigations*, May 30, 2018.

³³⁹¹ [REDACTED]

³³⁹² (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, November 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000841).

³³⁹³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud, November 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000842).

³³⁹⁴ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, November 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000842–843).

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(U) Mifsud sent another email to Papadopoulos on November 11, 2016, regarding a phone call Mifsud had with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) about general foreign policy topics, including the U.S. posture towards Russia, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia as well as offering to “brief you or your team on the view from the Europeans.”³³⁹⁵

(U) Mifsud reached out again on November 16, 2016, stating that he was “very interested in meeting with you during my visit to the USA which will start on the 3rd December until the 9th. I can meet you at any time or any place that you wish – Washington or New York.”³³⁹⁶ On November 18, 2016, Mifsud again asked Papadopoulos: “[w]here and at when can we meet? I would be willing to travel to where is more convenient for you. There are a number of issues that I would like to discuss with you.”³³⁹⁷ Mifsud sent another email message to Papadopoulos on December 2, 2016, again stating “[a]s mentioned I will be in the US from tomorrow. Can you kindly let me know where and how we can meet? I would be willing to come to Chicago for the meeting.”³³⁹⁸ On December 6, 2016, Mifsud again reached out to Papadopoulos, stating, “Dear George, I hope you are well. I am in US. Is a meeting still possible?”³³⁹⁹

(U) Despite the multiple emails from Mifsud, the Committee has seen no indication that Papadopoulos responded, and the Committee does not know if Papadopoulos and Mifsud met subsequent to the election.

xviii. (U) Papadopoulos Coordinates Multiple Foreign Engagements for the Transition

(U) After the election, foreign governments sought points of contact who could secure a phone call with the President-Elect’s Transition Team. Representatives from the UK, Cyprus, Egypt, Taiwan, and Greece all leveraged Papadopoulos as an interlocutor. The Committee has no evidence suggesting that the Russian government used Papadopoulos as a conduit.³⁴⁰⁰

(U) On November 9, 2016, the Head of the Political Team for the British Embassy to the United States sent Papadopoulos an email with the subject “Request for a call between the British Prime Minister and President-elect” which stated: “[T]he Prime Minister is keen to secure an early call with President-elect Trump. We have already registered this request with the transition team but have now belatedly realised that perhaps the campaign would have been the

³³⁹⁵ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, November 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000845).

³³⁹⁶ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, November 16, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000847).

³³⁹⁷ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, November 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000849).

³³⁹⁸ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, December 2, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000851).

³³⁹⁹ (U) Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos, December 6, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000853).

³⁴⁰⁰ (U) For more on Russia’s approach to the Trump Transition team, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.K.

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right approach.”³⁴⁰¹ The message also included a letter of congratulations from United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May which the Embassy was “keen to ensure reaches the candidate as soon as possible.”³⁴⁰² Papadopoulos separately forwarded the letter to Bannon, Hicks, and Glassner within an hour of receiving the email from the British Embassy.³⁴⁰³

(U) On November 9, 2016, Leonidas Pantelides, the Ambassador of Cyprus to the United States, sent Papadopoulos via email a letter from the President of Cyprus to President-Elect Trump.³⁴⁰⁴ Papadopoulos forwarded the communication to Bannon and Glassner.³⁴⁰⁵

(U) On November 10, 2016, Yasser Elshemy, a Counselor at the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, sent Papadopoulos an e-mail with the subject line “letter from Foreign Minister to VP ‘Pence’,” stating that the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States “is looking forward to meeting Vice President ‘Pence’ to deliver the congratulation letter addressed to him from [Egypt’s] Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry.”³⁴⁰⁶ Papadopoulos passed the message on to Glassner.³⁴⁰⁷ On November 18, 2016, Elshemy sent an email to Papadopoulos with the subject “meeting- urgent” asking Papadopoulos to “grab a lunch together, we need to follow up many things we discussed before the elections results.”³⁴⁰⁸ In a subsequent note, Elshemy clarified that he needs “help to set a meeting between Amb. Reda and Mr. Bannon in DC on the earlier convenience. [W]e also need an access point to Mr. Pence office.”³⁴⁰⁹ One minute later, Papadopoulos wrote back, “Ok will call and ask him what he can do.”³⁴¹⁰

(U) On November 10, 2016, Papadopoulos received an email message from Seth Cropsey of the Hudson Institute, recommending that President-Elect Trump call Tsai Ing-Wen, the President of Taiwan to “assure her of Trump administration solidarity in defense of Taiwan. . . a call would also tell Xi Jinping that Trump takes security in the region seriously, especially

³⁴⁰¹ (U) Email, Goshko to Papadopoulos, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000643).

³⁴⁰² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000644); Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000644); Email, Papadopoulos to Hicks, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000644).

³⁴⁰⁴ (U) Emails, Pantelides to Papadopoulos, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000671).

³⁴⁰⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000671); Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner, November 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000671).

³⁴⁰⁶ (U) Email, Elshemy to Papadopoulos, November 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000669).

³⁴⁰⁷ (U) Email Papadopoulos to Glassner, November 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000669).

³⁴⁰⁸ (U) Email, Elshemy to Papadopoulos, November 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000619).

³⁴⁰⁹ (U) Email, Elshemy to Papadopoulos, November 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000619).

³⁴¹⁰ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos and Elshemy, November 18, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000619). The Committee notes that two additional emails follow Elshemy’s acknowledgement of Papadopoulos’s note, but those emails were redacted when produced to the Committee. See B&P GP File 2018 000619–620.

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the South China Sea.”³⁴¹¹ Cropsey resent the email to Papadopoulos on November 11, 2016.³⁴¹² On November 11, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Cropsey, “I set up [Trump’s] calls with prime minister May and president sisi. If the leader of Taiwan wants a call, may you have her send a formal letter I can then forward from my email? That’s how it worked for sisi and may.”³⁴¹³ In a separate email message on the same day, but as part of the same conversation thread, Papadopoulos wrote “Regarding Australia ditto. I had a couple nice conversations over gin in London with their former foreign minister and current high commissioner to the U.K., Alexander Downer where we discussed the relationship.”³⁴¹⁴

(U) Papadopoulos, however, was about to travel to Greece, and was keeping senior members of the Trump Transition Team apprised of his engagements. On December 9, 2016, Papadopoulos passed on a purported request from the Prime Minister of Greece to meet with President-Elect Trump in early January 2017 to Bannon.³⁴¹⁵ In an email the following day, December 10, 2016, Papadopoulos further stated that he “[s]poke with the Greek defense minister.”³⁴¹⁶ They want to sign a government to government agreement with the USA for all rights to all energy fields offshore. Strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and Balkans.”³⁴¹⁷ Bannon replied to the note, adding Michael Flynn and Kathleen Troia (K.T.) McFarland to the communication, both of who were senior national security officials on the Transition Team.³⁴¹⁸ Papadopoulos then wrote to the group on December 10, 2016, that the Greek defense minister had “earmarked the island of [K]arpathos for a potential listening post and air base for the US” and further stated “A base on [K]arpathos is key to controlling sea lines of communication in the Aegean/plan b should Incirlik once again become unusable.”³⁴¹⁹ The following day, December 11, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Flynn’s Transition Team email address, passing along the phone number for Kammenos, the Greek Defense Minister, noting that the “[I]ine is not secure, however. He can pass along a secure number when you both find the time to discuss.”³⁴²⁰

³⁴¹¹ (U) Email, Cropsey to Papadopoulos, November 11, 2016 (HUD00000191).

³⁴¹² (U) Email, Cropsey to Papadopoulos, November 11, 2016 (HUD00000191).

³⁴¹³ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos to Cropsey, November 11, 2016 (HUD00000172).

³⁴¹⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Cropsey November 11, 2016 (HUD00000191–192).

³⁴¹⁵ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, December 9, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000609).

³⁴¹⁶ (U) According to Greek press reporting, Papadopoulos and Kammenos had lunch in Piraeus on Saturday, December 10, 2016, where Papadopoulos described himself as a “representative of Trump.”

Kourdistorportocali.com, “World Exclusive: George Papadopoulos and Panos Kammenos in ‘Dourabei,’” December 10, 2016.

³⁴¹⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, December 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000609).

³⁴¹⁸ (U) Email, Bannon to Papadopoulos, Flynn, McFarland, December 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000609).

³⁴¹⁹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Flynn, Bannon, McFarland, and Kellogg, December 10, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000610).

³⁴²⁰ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Flynn, December 11, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000610).

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(U) Papadopoulos again reached out to Bannon on January 4, 2017, relaying a request from the Greek Foreign Minister for a phone call with Trump.³⁴²¹ Bannon responded, adding Flynn, which Papadopoulos used to also request a meeting with the Egyptian ambassador.³⁴²²

xix. (U) Papadopoulos Angles for an Administration Position

(U) Despite what Papadopoulos purportedly told Millian, he used the Transition period and into January to point out what he saw as his contributions to the Campaign, almost certainly in the hopes of gaining an administration position. On November 11, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Clovis:

*I made the introduction between Mr. Trump and president Sisi based primarily on the trust the region has on my work etc. Have met with the highest levels of the aforementioned countries and established robust and positive ties. The paper I wrote for [REDACTED] was well received as well and provided insight.*³⁴²³

(U) On December 22, 2016, Papadopoulos wrote to Lanza asking him for guidance regarding interviews with media outlets, as he was “getting some interview requests from Russian media.”³⁴²⁴ Lanza provided some guidance back to Papadopoulos, indicating that “[w]e are telling everyone pursuing Admin[istration] jobs to pass on all interviews.”³⁴²⁵ Papadopoulos wrote back to Lanza minutes later, “Thank you for letting me know. In that case [I] am passing on the interviews.”³⁴²⁶

(U) Papadopoulos sent Bill Grous, Managing Director for the financial services company Alex. Brown, an email on January 5, 2017, thanking him for meeting that day and included a short bio and resume “for consideration by the Trump administration.”³⁴²⁷ The next day, Grous forwarded the message to Dearborn, copying Michael Karloutsos³⁴²⁸ stating, “[s]pecifically he is

³⁴²¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Bannon, January 4, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000635).

³⁴²² (U) Email, Bannon to Papadopoulos and Flynn, January 4, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000635); Email, Papadopoulos to Flynn and Bannon, January 6, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000635).

³⁴²³ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis, November 11, 2016 (DJTFP00024754).

³⁴²⁴ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza, December 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000451).

³⁴²⁵ (U) Email, Lanza to Papadopoulos, December 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000451).

³⁴²⁶ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza, December 22, 2016 (B&P GP File 2018 000463).

³⁴²⁷ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Grous, January 5, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000465-467).

³⁴²⁸ (U) Michael Karloutsos became the U.S. Department of State Deputy Chief of Protocol, and is the son of Father Alexander Karloutsos. See Rob Tornoe, “How a Philly restaurant owner landed a top State Department job,” *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 11, 2017; “Michael Karloutsos: Serving as Layperson,” *The National Herald*, August 17, 2015. Alexander Kaloutsos, according to the FBI, is connected to Preibus and Kotsias. FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017. According to press reporting, Papadopoulos reached out to Alexander Karloutsos shortly after being named to the Trump Campaign; Karloutsos helped Papadopoulos make contacts with Greek business and

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looking to fill the role held by Amos Hochstein, the special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs and leads the bureau of energy resources at the state department, if a position on the national security council is not available.”³⁴²⁹

(U) Papadopoulos followed up with Dearborn on January 9 and January 17, 2017, noting in the latter email that he had “[b]een in talks with Steve Bannon and Mike Flynn about various things and have been assisting on key issues already.”³⁴³⁰

(U) Papadopoulos, in an email communication with Lanza on January 17, 2017, also mentioned that he had “[b]een aiming for either a post on the NSC, or specifically, the special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs (currently held by Amos [H]ochstein).”³⁴³¹

[REDACTED] On March 4, 2017, Papadopoulos sent a message to Michael Cohen in which he wrote, “Michael, Hope all is well. Are you free for a meeting next week? Wanted to talk about my value added to the administration among other things. Definitely want to come onboard. [B]est, George.”³⁴³² The Committee has no record of a response from Cohen.

(U) The Committee has no indication as to whether the Transition Team considered Papadopoulos for a position in the administration.

5. (U) Counterintelligence Concerns about Papadopoulos’s Interactions

[REDACTED]

government officials. Griff Witte, “For Trump adviser at center of Russia probe, a rapid rise and dramatic fall in his ancestral land,” *The Washington Post*, December 10, 2017.

³⁴²⁹ (U) Email, Grous to Dearborn, Karloutsos, and Papadopoulos, January 6, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000465–467).

³⁴³⁰ (U) Emails, Papadopoulos to Dearborn, January 9 and 17, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000466–467).

³⁴³¹ (U) Email, Papadopoulos to Lanza, January 17, 2017 (B&P GP File 2018 000674).

³⁴³² (U) FBI, FD-302, Papadopoulos 9/19/2017 [REDACTED]

³⁴³³ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Andrew McCabe, February 14, 2018, pp. 30–31.

³⁴³⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴³⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 33.

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(U) Papadopoulos was first interviewed by the FBI on January 27, 2017.³⁴³⁸ According to DOJ’s sentencing memorandum, Papadopoulos’s “lies to the FBI in January 2017 impeded the FBI’s investigation . . . [and] substantially hindered investigators’ ability to effectively question the Professor [Mifsud] when the FBI located him in Washington, D.C. approximately two weeks after the defendant’s January 27, 2017 interview.”³⁴³⁹ Specifically, Papadopoulos misrepresented specific sequencing concerning his affiliation with the Trump Campaign and his interactions with Joseph Mifsud.³⁴⁴⁰ Papadopoulos falsely claimed to have received the information on the Russian’s possessing “dirt” on Clinton from Mifsud prior to Papadopoulos’s affiliation with the Trump Campaign and attempted to minimize the extent and importance of his communications with Mifsud.³⁴⁴¹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

³⁴³⁶ (U) L. Page Tr., p. 40.

³⁴³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 39–42.

³⁴³⁸ (U) Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. August 17, 2018).

³⁴³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴¹ (U) *Ibid.*

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[REDACTED] Mifsud departed the United States on February 11, 2017, and has not returned.³⁴⁴³

[REDACTED]

3442 [REDACTED]

3443 (U) Government's Sentencing Memorandum, *United States v. George Papadopoulos*, Case No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM (D.D.C. August 17, 2018).

3444 [REDACTED]

F. (U) Carter Page

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) Carter Page was the only member of the Trump Campaign’s foreign policy advisers publicly identified as a Russia “expert.” Page had previously lived in Russia and worked on Russia policy and energy issues. For these reasons, Page was a subject of interest to Russian officials, including Russian intelligence, which had in previous years interacted with Page. As such, the Committee sought to understand Page’s role on the Trump Campaign, his connection to the Russian intelligence services, and any connection between him and Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

(U) Prior to joining the Trump Campaign, Page communicated with, met, and provided private business information to Russian SVR officers in New York, whom the FBI believed were acting in a manner consistent with attempts to recruit Page. Page later was referred to as “Male-1” in the complaint filed against three SVR officers in January 2015 in federal court in the Southern District of New York. Page later publicly identified himself as “Male-1” on several occasions, including to Russian officials in New York at the United Nations General Assembly.

[REDACTED]

(U) Trump named Page as one of his foreign policy advisers as part of an effort to bolster the public perception that Trump had substantive foreign policy advisers in early 2016. Trump met once with a group of these and other foreign policy and national security advisers on March 31, 2016. Page was not in attendance and never subsequently met with Trump. The Committee found no evidence to suggest that Page made significant contributions to speeches or policy initiatives for the Trump Campaign.

(U) In July 2016, Page was invited to make two addresses in Russia, including an address during the commencement ceremonies at Moscow’s New Economic School (NES), an invitation extended because of his perceived role in the Trump Campaign. At the commencement ceremony, Page had a brief exchange with then-Deputy Prime Minister Arkady

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Dvorkovich, about whom the Committee has counterintelligence concerns. In December 2016, following his separation from the Campaign the previous September, Page traveled to Moscow again, where he had a longer meeting over dinner with Dvorkovich.

(U) The Committee found no indication that Page had useful Campaign information for the Russian intelligence services to extract, nor meaningful influence for them to exploit. Despite Page having little influence on the Campaign, interested Russians may have perceived him as more closely connected than he was. Page was receptive to Russian outreach, and the sponsors of the NES speech in 2016 made clear that they invited Page because of his perceived role in the Trump Campaign.

(U) The Trump Campaign directed Page's separation from the Campaign in September 2016 because of the unwanted media attention he was generating.

(U) Many media reports about Page's activities in Russia in 2016, as well as almost all assertions in the "Steele dossier," remain unverified. In addition, Page's claims to the Campaign regarding his activities in Moscow remain unsubstantiated.

2. (U) Background on Page and Limitations on the Committee's Investigation

(U) Between 2003 or 2004 and 2007, Carter Page lived and worked in Moscow.³⁴⁴⁶ Page worked for Merrill Lynch at the time, and told the Committee that his primary client was the Russian state-owned energy firm Gazprom.³⁴⁴⁷

(U) Page, along with other individuals formally associated with the Trump Campaign, was a target of interest for foreign governments seeking to gather information on the Campaign. Page also advocated for better relations with Russia, a position in concert with Moscow's official perspective and consistent with candidate Trump's minimalist posture that sought better relations with Moscow.³⁴⁴⁸

[REDACTED] The Committee had some limited insight into the Russian government and [REDACTED] interest in Page:

³⁴⁴⁶ (U) C. Page Tr., p. 30 (stating 2004 to 2007); *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 6 (stating 2003 to 2007).

³⁴⁴⁷ [REDACTED] Page Tr., pp. 29–30.

[REDACTED] According to Page, he was introduced to Gazprom by the Russia-based American investor Allen Vine. Page's primary point of contact at Gazprom was an executive named Sergei Yatsenko, who Page described as "a pretty well-connected guy." Yatsenko later served on the board of Page's company, Global Energy Capital. C. Page Tr., pp. 30, 33–34, 94.

³⁴⁴⁸ (U) See, e.g., C. Page Tr., pp. 154.

(U) The *SCO Report* cited an email from Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov responding to an inquiry about whether Peskov wished to facilitate introductions for Page to Russian officials during Page’s July 2016 visit, to which Peskov responded, “I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin.”³⁴⁵⁰

(U) The Committee interviewed Page and members of the Trump Campaign who interacted with Page. The Committee also reviewed communications and other documents related to Page. The interviews and materials did not provide a thorough understanding of all of his activities while in Russia during his two visits in 2016.

(U) The Committee had significant challenges in its attempt to understand Page’s activities, including his role as a foreign policy adviser to the Trump Campaign. After weeks of negotiation and an eventual Committee subpoena, Page produced some electronic documents, some of which included his own annotations and alterations to the original document form, and

3449 [REDACTED]

3450 (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 100.

[REDACTED]

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sat for an interview that lasted six and a half hours. Page’s responses to basic questions were meandering, avoidant, and involved several long diversions. Despite the meticulous records Page kept on his personal hard drive detailing his daily routines, he was unable to recall any details of his trips to Moscow, or the names of senior Russian officials with whom he met, despite using his engagements with them to build his credentials within the Campaign.

3. (U) Page and U.S. and Russian Intelligence Services

(U) Prior to 2016, Page had encounters with both U.S. and Russian intelligence.

i. (U) Page and U.S. Intelligence Prior to 2016

(U) Page voluntarily met with U.S. intelligence officials and law enforcement, from CIA and FBI, on several occasions from roughly 2008 through 2013.³⁴⁵¹ He told the Committee that “the CIA guys would invite me out to lunch from time to time in New York.”³⁴⁵² In a letter to then-Director Comey of the FBI, he acknowledged, “Having interacted with members of the U.S. intelligence community including the FBI and CIA for many decades.”³⁴⁵³

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

³⁴⁵¹ [REDACTED] C. Page Tr., pp. 227, 231.

³⁴⁵² (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 227, 231.

³⁴⁵³ (U) Letter, Page to Comey, September 25, 2016 (DJTFP00018015).

³⁴⁵⁴ [REDACTED]

ii. (U) Page and Russian Intelligence

(U) Page told the Committee that he knew of no instance where he was approached by Russian intelligence officers related to the 2016 U.S. election.³⁴⁵⁷ However, the Russian intelligence services had previously approached Page years prior to his involvement with the Trump Campaign in an effort to explore an intelligence collection relationship with him. After the FBI publicly exposed those Russian intelligence officers, Page told the FBI that he was “on the books” with the Russian intelligence services.³⁴⁵⁸

(U) Beginning in New York City in 2008, Page was approached by, and met with, Russians he was later informed were intelligence officers. According to the *SCO Report*, Page met with Alexander Bulatov, a Russian official assigned to the New York Consulate, and “later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelligence officer.”³⁴⁵⁹ In 2013, another Russian

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³⁴⁵⁷ (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 284–285.

³⁴⁵⁸ (U) FBI, FD-302, Page 3/31/2017.

³⁴⁵⁹ [REDACTED] *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 96.

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intelligence officer, Victor Podobnyy, similarly formed a relationship with Page and met with him numerous times.³⁴⁶⁰

(U) In 2015, Buryakov, Podobnyy, and a third Russian intelligence officer, Igor Sporyshev, were indicted for conspiring to act as unregistered agents of a foreign government.³⁴⁶¹ In the complaint, FBI recordings of the Russians in April 2013 reveal them speaking disparagingly of “Male-1” and of their attempted use of Male-1 as an intelligence source for Russia.³⁴⁶²

(U) According to the complaint, FBI agents interviewed Page in June 2013, where he described meeting Podobnyy at a conference in New York City as well as subsequent emails and encounters, where he shared reports about energy matters.³⁴⁶³

(U) Page deduced he was Male-1 when he read the 2015 complaint.³⁴⁶⁴ He has since then openly referred to himself as Male-1, including in his interview with the Committee.³⁴⁶⁵ In March 2017, Page suggested to the FBI that he had referred to himself as Male-1 in a meeting with a Russian official at the United Nations (UN).³⁴⁶⁶ When the FBI later asked him about this in a subsequent interview, Page stated that everyone in Russia knew he was Male-1, and that his encounter with the Russians at the UN did not portray Page correctly and that Page wanted nothing to do with espionage.³⁴⁶⁷

(U) In his interviews with the FBI, Page described his relationship with Russian intelligence as being “on the books,” a colloquial term for being an intelligence source. During a March 30, 2017, interview, FBI agents attempted to explain how the Russian intelligence services worked, and suggested that the Russian intelligence services had been tracking Page since his years living in Russia.³⁴⁶⁸ The agents further, and specifically, stated that the [REDACTED] might consider Page either an unwitting or witting “on the record” source for intelligence gathering.³⁴⁶⁹ Page questioned the assessment, yet said “I’m sure I’m on the books,” and “they know who I am.”³⁴⁷⁰ The following day, the FBI again asked Page

³⁴⁶⁰ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 96.

³⁴⁶¹ (U) *Complaint, United States v. Evgeny Buryakov, et al.*, (S.D.N.Y. January 23, 2015).

³⁴⁶² (U) *Ibid.*, ¶¶ 32–34.

³⁴⁶³ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁶⁴ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 97 (describing Page introducing himself as “Male-1” to Russian officials in New York).

³⁴⁶⁵ (U) C. Page Tr., p. 53.

³⁴⁶⁶ (U) FBI, FD-302, Page 3/16/2017.

³⁴⁶⁷ (U) FBI, FD-302, Page 3/30/2017.

³⁴⁶⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁶⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

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if he knew what it meant to be “on the books.”³⁴⁷¹ Page reiterated that he considered himself to be “on the books,” but objected to any characterization that he was “working with” the Russian intelligence services.³⁴⁷²

4. (U) Page and the Trump Campaign

(U) Ed Cox, chairman of the New York Republican Party, first met Page around 2008, when they both worked on the McCain presidential campaign.³⁴⁷³ Cox recalled also encountering Page at Council on Foreign Relations events in New York, where both were members.³⁴⁷⁴ On December 31, 2015, Page emailed Cox, stating that he was “cautiously optimistic that the next Administration might finally offer a change of direction in U.S.-Russia relations,” and that “recent statements by Trump give me renewed hope.”³⁴⁷⁵ He asked if Cox had any recommendations “as to how one might be able to support [Trump], including by becoming one of his delegates.”³⁴⁷⁶ Attached to the email was a draft opinion piece by Page that he wrote for *Global Policy*, titled “Trump, Putin and the Possible End of the Second Cold War,” that concluded, “Trump’s stance toward Russia reflects optimism for a fresh approach, and this could serve as an important legacy of his candidacy.”³⁴⁷⁷ The next day, Cox forwarded the email along with the attachment to Corey Lewandowski, introducing him to Page.³⁴⁷⁸ On January 2, 2016, Lewandowski responded, “happy to meet anytime,” and the two arranged to meet at Trump Tower on January 12, 2016.³⁴⁷⁹

(U) Lewandowski told the Committee he did not recall the meeting, but said it was possible that it was among the many meetings he held at the time.³⁴⁸⁰ Sam Clovis, the national co-chair of the Trump Campaign who served as the policy director for the Campaign, recalled the meeting, which included Michael Glassner, another Campaign official at the time.³⁴⁸¹ Clovis told the Committee: “I showed up in New York one morning early and I walked up into the fifth floor area [at Trump Tower]. . . . Corey [Lewandowski] and Michael [Glassner] are there, and there’s a guy with them, and Corey says: This is Carter Page; get to know him; he wants to

³⁴⁷¹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Page 3/31/2017.

³⁴⁷² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷³ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Ed Cox, March 19, 2018, p. 16.

³⁴⁷⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³⁴⁷⁵ (U) Email, Page to Cox, et al., December 31, 2015 (DJTFP00009580–9581).

³⁴⁷⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷⁷ (U) *Ibid.* It does not appear that this article was ever published. *Global Policy* is a journal based at Durham University. Page had previously published articles there.

³⁴⁷⁸ (U) Email, Cox to Lewandowski, et al., January 1, 2016 (DJTFP00009595).

³⁴⁷⁹ (U) Email, Page to Lewandowski and Cox, January 2, 2016 (DJTFP00009595); Emails, Page, Lewandowski, et al., (DJTFP00009611–9612).

³⁴⁸⁰ (U) Lewandowski Tr., pp. 20, 29.

³⁴⁸¹ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 48–49; *see also* SSCI Transcript of Interview with Michael Glassner, August 10, 2018, p. 31 (recalling briefly meeting Page while Page was meeting with Lewandowski in Lewandowski’s office).

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help.”³⁴⁸² Clovis and Page discussed Page’s background and desire to help the Campaign.³⁴⁸³ Later that day, Page sent an email thanking Clovis and Glassner for the meeting, and forwarding them the draft opinion piece.³⁴⁸⁴

(U) On February 17, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, Glassner, and Lewandowski to say that Page had heard that Trump was in the process of assembling a foreign policy advisory team.³⁴⁸⁵ Page wrote that he wished to “express my interest in contributing as a member of that team. Although I have little to gain from this personally, I’m committed to supporting Mr. Trump’s efforts to make America great again.”³⁴⁸⁶ He included a bio highlighting his academic and professional experience on energy and foreign policy issues, including Russia.³⁴⁸⁷ Clovis responded the following day, suggesting that Page call him for additional information.³⁴⁸⁸

i. (U) The Trump Campaign’s National Security Advisory Committee is Formed

(U) On March 21, 2016, Trump released five names of his foreign policy advisers, including Page, during a meeting with *The Washington Post* editorial board.³⁴⁸⁹ The Committee interviewed several members of the Trump Campaign to understand how this group was formed, and how Page came to be one of the original members.

(U) Ten days later, Trump held his first—and only—meeting of the Campaign with his “national security team,” which included several of the previously announced foreign policy advisers, at the Trump International Hotel in Washington.³⁴⁹⁰ Page was traveling and did not attend.³⁴⁹¹

(U) As described elsewhere in this Report, the formation of a foreign policy and national security team was undertaken in large part to respond to public scrutiny over the lack of expertise on the Campaign.³⁴⁹² Clovis recalled in particular that Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump asked him in mid-March to start assembling this team, which would be formed around then-Senator

³⁴⁸² (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 48–49.

³⁴⁸³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 49

³⁴⁸⁴ (U) Email, Page to Glassner and Clovis, January 12, 2016 (DJTFP00009643).

³⁴⁸⁵ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, et al., February 17, 2016 (DJTFP00009815–9816).

³⁴⁸⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸⁷ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, Lewandowski, and Glassner, February 17, 2016 (DJTFP00009815).

³⁴⁸⁸ (U) Email, Clovis to Page, February 18, 2016 (DJTFP00009817).

³⁴⁸⁹ (U) Opinions Staff, “A transcript of Donald Trump’s meeting with The Washington Post editorial board,” March 21, 2016.

³⁴⁹⁰ (U) Instagram, @realDonaldTrump, March 31, 2016.

³⁴⁹¹ (U) Clovis Tr., p. 15; Gordon Tr., p. 51.

³⁴⁹² (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.E.

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Jeff Sessions.³⁴⁹³ Clovis recalled that the Campaign was “desperate to get the press off our backs.”³⁴⁹⁴

(U) In early March 2016, Clovis started assembling names for all of the planned policy teams, including foreign policy and national security and conveyed a policy team “matrix” via email to Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Lewandowski, Glassner and Stephen Miller on March 6, which included Page under “Foreign Policy.”³⁴⁹⁵ On March 16, Clovis emailed Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Lewandowski, and Glassner, “As you asked for today, find attached the list of those from whom I have commitments to the team.”³⁴⁹⁶ Clovis included short bios, about which he added, “The abbreviated versions hardly capture the accomplishments of these individuals.”³⁴⁹⁷ This appears to be the first time this group is referred to as the “National Security Advisory Committee,” chaired by Sessions. The list includes Page’s academic credentials, his current role as “Founder and Managing Partner” of Global Capital Energy, LLC, and his previous position as “Deputy Branch Manager, Merrill Lynch, Moscow.”³⁴⁹⁸ Two days later, Kushner responded to Clovis, asking, “How would you rate this team? Will people think its [sic] impressive?”³⁴⁹⁹ To which Clovis responded:

*I like the team well enough. . . . I don’t think we can play “match the list” right now. I have interviewed, vetted and have paperwork on all the folks on our list and am very comfortable working with them. Some of them are already sending inputs that are most helpful.*³⁵⁰⁰

(U) On March 21, Clovis submitted an updated list of eight individuals for potential “National Security/Foreign Policy Team Recruiting,” where he stated that he had “secured NDAs [non-disclosure agreements] from the following individuals.”³⁵⁰¹ The list again included Page.³⁵⁰² Clovis told the Committee that all eight original members of the Campaign’s National Security Advisory Committee were people who had previously reached out to the Campaign, to either him or Lewandowski, Glassner, or members of the Trump family.³⁵⁰³ Clovis vetted the advisers by conducting Google searches on them “to make sure we didn’t have any immediate

³⁴⁹³ (U) Clovis Tr., p. 13.

³⁴⁹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁴⁹⁵ (U) Email, Clovis to Kushner, et al., March 6, 2016 (DJTFP00009899–9912).

³⁴⁹⁶ (U) Email, Clovis to Kushner, I. Trump, Lewandowski, and Glassner, March 16, 2016 (DJTFP00009953–9954).

³⁴⁹⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁴⁹⁹ (U) Email, Kushner to Clovis, et al., March 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4105-0002).

³⁵⁰⁰ (U) Email, Clovis to Kushner, et al., March 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4105-0002–3).

³⁵⁰¹ (U) Email, Clovis to Lewandowski, Glassner, Hicks, and S. Miller, March 20, 2016 (DJTFP00010078–10082).

³⁵⁰² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰³ (U) Clovis Tr., pp. 16–17.

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land mines out there. . . but there was an urgency because we were just getting pounded in the press. I think that the urgency of that overcame a more deliberate approach.”³⁵⁰⁴ Clovis added, “Those eight people were the eight that I could find in that short a notice that I could put on there.”³⁵⁰⁵

(U) Trump Campaign staff interviewed by the Committee downplayed the significance of the National Security Advisory Committee as well as Page’s role. J.D. Gordon, a former director of the Trump Campaign’s National Security Advisory Committee told the Committee that it was “just an advisory committee. They didn’t even set foot in our [Campaign] office, didn’t have a badge, didn’t have a DonaldTrump.com email account.”³⁵⁰⁶ Hope Hicks, the Campaign’s press secretary, told the Committee, “I think there was an understanding that this group was put together when nobody wanted to be associated with our campaign or our candidate.”³⁵⁰⁷ Of Page, she said:

*I think describing him as an “adviser” is inaccurate. I don’t know who he was advising, but he was not advising the candidate or the policy team. . . . He was just a person whose name got slapped on a list for a committee because we didn’t have anybody else.*³⁵⁰⁸

(U) Nevertheless, in some instances, Page may have been given reason to believe his access extended further than it did. On March 22, 2016, Clovis emailed Page and other members of the foreign policy and national security advisory team.³⁵⁰⁹ Clovis wrote:

*Gentlemen, Expect a call from Mr. Trump today at some point. I was asked for your numbers this morning. Given the events of the day, expect to be asked some questions about what we need to be doing about the unfolding events.*³⁵¹⁰

Subsequent communications indicate that Page prepared and waited for the call, which did not take place.³⁵¹¹ As noted above, Page never met or spoke with Trump.

ii. (U) Page On The Campaign

³⁵⁰⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46.

³⁵⁰⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³⁵⁰⁶ (U) Gordon Tr., p. 42.

³⁵⁰⁷ (U) Hicks Tr., pp. 20–21.

³⁵⁰⁸ (U) Hicks Tr., p. 20.

³⁵⁰⁹ (U) Email, Clovis to Page, Papadopoulos, Schmitz, et al., March 22, 2016 (Page Production).

³⁵¹⁰ (U) *Ibid.* Clovis was likely referencing a series of terrorist attacks that had occurred earlier that day in Brussels.

³⁵¹¹ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, March 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010094); Email, Page to Clovis, March 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010092).

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(U) Almost immediately after the March 21, 2016, announcement of the advisory committee, the media began to focus on Page's Russia-related interests. On March 23, 2016, Page sent an email to Clovis about media outreach regarding Page's role as a Campaign adviser and his Russia background.³⁵¹²

(U) J.D. Gordon told the Committee that Page attended several informal gatherings of the foreign policy and national security advisory team. In the first week of June 2016, Page attended a dinner with other Campaign advisers, and in late June or early July 2016, Page attended an advisory committee meeting at the Capitol Hill Club in Washington.³⁵¹³ Sessions attended the event and spoke with Page briefly.³⁵¹⁴ In August 2016, Page attended a dinner hosted by Keith Kellogg, another Campaign adviser, at Kellogg's home that was also attended by the other foreign policy advisers.³⁵¹⁵

(U) Page frequently emailed members of the Trump Campaign on Russia policy matters. For example, on January 30, 2016, before being announced as a foreign policy adviser, Page emailed Glassner and Clovis, and copied Lewandowski. He wrote:

Following up on our discussions about Russia earlier this month and Fox's obnoxious failed comments regarding the Putin-Trump relationship this week, I wanted to share with you a few thoughts and suggestions about some massive additional potential upside for the campaign. I spent the past week in Europe and have been in discussions with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin. The possible game-changing effect which Mr. Trump could have in bringing the end of the new Cold War that Obama and George W. Bush managed to create in recent years has literally brought a new exceptionally high level of optimism in Moscow and across the country. Given the essential strategic position that Russia has in the world as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, etc., the effect of Mr. Trump could be nothing short of monumental. Through my discussions with these high level contacts, it is their belief that a direct meeting in Moscow between Mr Trump and President Putin could be arranged.³⁵¹⁶

(U) In his interview with the Committee, Page claimed that he could not remember which well-connected individuals to whom he was referring in this email.³⁵¹⁷

³⁵¹² (U) Email, Page to Clovis, March 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010094).

³⁵¹³ (U) Gordon Tr., p. 64.

³⁵¹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*; Page Tr., 148–149, 256.

³⁵¹⁵ (U) Gordon Tr., p. 65.

³⁵¹⁶ (U) Email, Page to Glassner, Clovis, and Lewandowski, January 30, 2016 (DJTFP00009674).

³⁵¹⁷ (U) C. Page Tr., p. 94. Page suggested he may have been referring to Sergei Yatsenko, but Page was not clear about this point.

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(U) In the same email, Page also sent a notice of his upcoming attendance at a one-day J.P. Morgan Securities “Gazprom Investor Day” in New York.³⁵¹⁸ In the email Page wrote:

*the U.S. Government’s failed sanctions policy has severely hindered the development of Gazprom in recent years with potential catastrophic consequences for the people of Russia. They too are eagerly awaiting the massive changes which Mr. Trump has readily positioned himself to soon bring.*³⁵¹⁹

Clovis replied later that day, thanked Page, and said that he would be in touch the following week.³⁵²⁰

(U) On February 7, 2016, Page again emailed Clovis, Glassner and Lewandowski, noting that Forbes had ranked Putin as the most powerful world leader, and that, in Russia, relationships are very important.³⁵²¹ Page continued: “As I have alluded to before, there is no question that a Trump visit to Moscow and related meetings with Putin would prove to be the most important campaign event in the history of U.S. politics.”³⁵²²

(U) On February 17, 2016, Page wrote an email to the same three Campaign officials regarding the February 2014 release of the phone conversation between the former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, a story he would repeatedly cite as an example of Clinton’s mismanagement of foreign policy.³⁵²³ During this 2014 call, Nuland is recorded discussing the composition of the Ukraine opposition as well as criticizing the European Union support for Ukraine.³⁵²⁴ The link to the released phone conversation was first posted on Twitter by an aide to then-Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.³⁵²⁵

(U) On March 16, 2016, the Trump Campaign released a brief ten-second video on Instagram featuring Hillary Clinton barking followed by a clip of Putin laughing that concluded: “We don’t need to be a punch line! Make America Great Again!”³⁵²⁶ Kremlin spokesperson

³⁵¹⁸ (U) Email, Page to Glassner, Clovis, and Lewandowski, January 30, 2016 (DJTFP00009674).

³⁵¹⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵²⁰ (U) Email, Clovis to Page, Glassner, and Lewandowski, January 30, 2016 (DJTFP00009676).

³⁵²¹ (U) Email, Page to Glassner, Clovis, and Lewandowski, February 7, 2016 (DJTFP00009721–00009722).

³⁵²² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵²³ (U) Email, Page to Glassner, Clovis, and Lewandowski, February 17, 2016 (DJTFP00009814).

³⁵²⁴ (U) “Leaked Audio Reveals Embarrassing U.S. Exchange on Ukraine, EU,” *Reuters*, February 6, 2014.

³⁵²⁵ (U) The leaked phone conversation was widely reported at the time. *See, e.g., ibid.* For more information on this topic, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.

³⁵²⁶ (U) Instagram, @realDonaldTrump, March 16, 2016. The clip showed video of Putin and an ISIS fighter in succession and suggested that these were America’s “toughest opponents.”

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Dmitry Peskov responded publicly the next day: “It’s an open secret for us that demonizing Russia and whatever is linked to Russia is unfortunately a mandatory hallmark of America’s election campaign.”³⁵²⁷ Peskov’s comment was widely covered in the U.S. press.³⁵²⁸ Page sent an email on March 17, 2016, to Clovis linking to a *Reuters* article writing:

*I know people who work closely with the [spokesman] from the Kremlin. . . . Perhaps the more relevant responses to yesterday’s Instagram video were many of the amazing comments written in Russian. Clearly there’s an extraordinary level of excitement from the people of that country regarding the new potential for relations between our 2 global powerhouses. Make the World Great Again.*³⁵²⁹

(U) Also on March 17, 2016, Page sent Clovis one of several documents that Page created for the Campaign, seemingly at his own initiative, which he referred to as both the “President’s Daily Brief” and the “Candidate’s Daily Briefing.”³⁵³⁰ These documents presented Page’s analysis in a bulleted briefing slide format, and covered a range of topics, but often focused on Russia.³⁵³¹ The briefing slides and accompanying emails from Page portrayed Putin as a victor in Syria, complimented Russian forces’ stabilizing role in Syria, and criticized the U.S. military’s lack of effectiveness in Syria as well as U.S. “meddling.”³⁵³² The documents, which also covered Ukraine, were critical of NATO, particularly regarding its strategy of deterring Russia, and advocated for a strong personal relationship between the top leadership in Washington and Moscow.³⁵³³ The Committee found no evidence indicating that these documents were used by the Campaign.

(U) On May 9, 2016, Page emailed Gordon a list of more than ten examples of media requests he had received in which he confirmed his role as an adviser to the Campaign but otherwise offered “no comment.”³⁵³⁴ In the same email, Page stated he had received offers for “speaking engagements in Russia and the Middle East,” including from a “close advisor of President Putin,” Sergey Karaganov, and asked for a copy of the approval form for Campaign

³⁵²⁷ (U) Andrew Osborn and Dmitry Solovyov, “Kremlin says Donald Trump pre-election clip demonizes Russia,” *Reuters*, March 17, 2016.

³⁵²⁸ (U) See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum and Andrew Roth, “The bromance between Trump and Putin is over,” *The Washington Post*, March 17, 2016.

³⁵²⁹ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, March 17, 2016 (DJTFP00009958).

³⁵³⁰ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, March 17, 2016 (DJTFP00009962–9963); Email Page to Clovis, March 19, 2016 (DJTFP00010056–10057); Email, Page to Clovis, March 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010090–10091); Email, Page to Clovis, March 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010094–10095).

³⁵³¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵³² (U) Email, Page to Clovis, March 17, 2016 (DJTFP00009962–9963).

³⁵³³ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, March 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010090–10091); Email, Page to Clovis, March 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010094–10095).

³⁵³⁴ (U) Email, Page to Gordon, May 9, 2016 (DJTFP00000097–98).

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advisers to seek approval for such events.³⁵³⁵ Page told the Committee that he met Karaganov in the late 1990s and again when Page lived in Moscow from 2004 to 2007, but he provided no clear explanation for the invitation he was referring to in the May 9 email, but suggested that it may have come as a result of Karaganov’s involvement with a Russian university.³⁵³⁶ In the late April 2016 email exchange that led to Page’s invitation to speak at the New Economic School (NES) in Moscow (described below), Andrej Krickovic, an academic acquaintance of Page at the Moscow Higher School of Economics (HSE), offered to connect Page to Karaganov.³⁵³⁷

(U) Karaganov has been a dean at the HSE since 2003 and has served as chairman of a Russian state-funded think tank, the Valdai Discussion Club since 2004.³⁵³⁸ Karaganov has also served as an adviser to the Kremlin and to President Putin, including as a foreign policy adviser to the Russian Presidential Administration from 2001 to 2013 and Chairman of the Russian Presidium on Foreign and Defense Policy.³⁵³⁹ Karaganov is known for advising the Kremlin on Russian opportunities for expansionism, at U.S. expense, around the world.³⁵⁴⁰

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(U) Gordon responded to Page’s May 9 email later the same day and provided the speech and media forms requested.³⁵⁴⁶ Gordon expressed his gratitude, writing, “If we had 10 Carter Pages... imagine what we could do!”³⁵⁴⁷ Gordon, however, also advised Page that all members of the advisory committee were “keeping a very low profile right now” due to a George

³⁵³⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵³⁶ (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 219–221.

³⁵³⁷ (U) Email, Krickovic to Page, April 25, 2016 (Page Production).

³⁵³⁸ (U) HSE.ru, “Sergey A. Karaganov.”

³⁵³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴⁰ (U) In 1994, Karaganov gave a speech that suggested that Russia had to be committed to defending the interests of Russians who lived in Russia’s “near abroad,” which was then dubbed the “Karaganov Doctrine.” There are numerous references in open source information since 1994, of the “Karaganov Doctrine.” See, e.g., Andrew Stuttaford, “Meet Sergey Karaganov,” *National Review*, April 10, 2014.

³⁵⁴¹ [REDACTED]

³⁵⁴² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴³ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴⁶ (U) Email, Gordon to Page, May 9, 2016 (DJTFP00000099).

³⁵⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

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Papadopoulos interview that went poorly, as well as the transition of focus from the primary to general election.³⁵⁴⁸

(U) Nevertheless, Page continued to draw media attention about his role in the Campaign and specifically his views on Russia. On June 11, 2016, Gordon emailed Campaign officials Rick Dearborn and John Mashburn with the subject line “Carter Page, Gazprom & Media Engagement.”³⁵⁴⁹ Gordon discussed Page’s history of speaking with the press and suggested that while Page was generally helpful, he was “difficult to manage,” especially as it related to the press. In the email, Gordon noted that he “wanted to draw your attention to National Review piece on Carter,” which referred to Page as an “out-and-out Putinite,” who is “tight with the Kremlin’s foreign-policy apparatus and has served as a vehement propagandist for it.”³⁵⁵⁰ Gordon also alluded to a recent inquiry to Page by *The Washington Post*’s Tom Hamburger and suggested that any resulting piece would be damaging to the Campaign.³⁵⁵¹

(U) The same day, Page initiated an email thread by writing to Hope Hicks including draft responses to questions posed to Page by *The Washington Post*.³⁵⁵² Most of the questions focused on Page’s role in the Campaign and his views on Russia policy.³⁵⁵³ Hicks forwarded the email to Stephen Miller and Lewandowski, asking, “Can you please advise? I don’t know Carter well or the extent of his involvement.”³⁵⁵⁴ Shortly thereafter, on June 14, 2016, *The Washington Post* published the first article on the DNC hack.³⁵⁵⁵ Although the article was neither written by Hamburger nor about Page, Page emailed Hicks and Gordon with a link to the article, writing, “Looks like Tom & Co concocted another fairytale instead of the original inaccurate attack job against DJT, me and my firm... at least so far.”³⁵⁵⁶

iii. (U) Page Travels to Russia, July 2016

(U) Page sought and received approval from then-Trump Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to travel to Russia in July 2016, in order to make two addresses at the NES in Moscow. Lewandowski explicitly told Page this would be speaking in his own capacity and not related to the Campaign.

³⁵⁴⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴⁹ (U) Email, Gordon to Dearborn and Mashburn, June 11, 2016 (DJTFP00002990–2991).

³⁵⁵⁰ (U) *Ibid.*; Robert Zubrin, “Trump: The Kremlin’s Candidate,” *National Review*, April 4, 2016.

³⁵⁵¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵² (U) Email, Page to Hicks, June 11, 2016 (DJTFP00002888–2892).

³⁵⁵³ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵⁴ (U) Email, Hicks to S. Miller, June 11, 2016 (DJTFP00002887–2892).

³⁵⁵⁵ (U) Ellen Nakashima, “Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump,” *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2016.

³⁵⁵⁶ (U) Email, Page to Hicks and Gordon, June 14, 2016 (DJTFP00003226).

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(U) Page’s invitation from the NES was based solely on their perception of Page as an adviser to the Trump Campaign. Page’s invitation to Russia was proffered by the rector of the NES, Shlomo Weber.³⁵⁵⁷ Weber told the Committee that he had first heard of Page through two individuals at the HSE. The first of these individuals was his son, Yuval Weber, an American academic who was on the faculty of the HSE.³⁵⁵⁸ The second was another academic whom Weber did not know as well, Andrej Krickovic, who was also at the HSE and had first met Page when Krickovic was an intern at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Page was working at Merrill Lynch in Moscow.³⁵⁵⁹

(U) On April 25, 2016, Krickovic emailed Page with the subject line “Introducing Shlomo Weber,” opening his email with: “It’s been a while since we last talked. I’ve been following the news and did not have chance [sic] to congratulate you on your new appointment. Great news!”³⁵⁶⁰ Krickovic further stated:

*The reason I’m writing you is to introduce Professor Shlomo Weber. . . . He is interested in engaging with the Trump campaign on Russia issues. I don’t know Shlomo personally, but I am very good friends with Yuval Weber, his son. . . Yuval reached out to me to make the introduction to you. Do you still have the time to come to Russia these days? We’d love for you to give a talk on US Russia relations, and your thoughts about how they could change under a Trump presidency.*³⁵⁶¹

(U) Page responded the same day, but was noncommittal and concerned about speaking on Trump’s foreign policy before the policy was formed.³⁵⁶²

(U) Page made reference to Trump’s upcoming foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel, saying that it would “not give extensive details of the kind that you’ve envisioned for such a talk.”³⁵⁶³ He also referred to the negative press he was already receiving and said: “So suffice to say, I need to be careful.”³⁵⁶⁴ Krickovic responded, expressing his understanding of Page’s

³⁵⁵⁷ (U) Weber was a native of the Soviet Union who left in the 1970s to immigrate to Israel, losing his Soviet citizenship. In the early 1990s, he immigrated to the United States and had a career as an academic for over two decades. Upon his retirement from his academic position in the United States in the 2010s, he became a guest lecturer at Moscow’s NES, and eventually became the rector of the school, a position he held until 2018. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Shlomo Weber, December 3, 2018, p. 5.

³⁵⁵⁸ (U) Weber Tr., pp. 8–9.

³⁵⁵⁹ (U) *Ibid.*; FBI, FD-302, Krickovic 8/15/2017.

³⁵⁶⁰ (U) Email, Krickovic to Page and Y. Weber, April 25, 2016 (Page Production).

³⁵⁶¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶² (U) Email, Page to Krickovic, April 25, 2016 (Page Production).

³⁵⁶³ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶⁴ (U) *Ibid.*

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“reluctance to speak publicly. . . . Perhaps after Mr. Trump wins and you are head of the Russia desk at State you can come and give a talk to our faculty.”³⁵⁶⁵ He concluded by asking that Page let him know when next he’s in Moscow: “Perhaps we can even arrange a private meeting with our dean, Sergei Karaganov. As you know he has quite some influence in high places here. It would be really good to get a dialogue going.”³⁵⁶⁶

(U) On April 26, Shlomo Weber emailed Page: “Thank you for your interest and the willingness to meet with me. I look forward to getting together in Moscow next time you are there or otherwise connecting over the phone or video.”³⁵⁶⁷ Weber then stated:

*Allow me to add that I am a Russian-born US citizen and staunch Republican. . . . I would be very happy to contribute my expertise on foreign and economic affairs . . . to a successful Republican presidential candidate.*³⁵⁶⁸

Page responded that he had not yet finalized his plans to travel to Moscow, but that he would be in touch once he had.³⁵⁶⁹

(U) On May 3, Shlomo Weber emailed Page again: “I understand that those are early days and I realize that you have multiple connections in Moscow. I just would like to let you know that NES would be happy to host you.”³⁵⁷⁰ Page responded, asking for clarification if NES would be willing to pay for the travel for him to give a lecture.³⁵⁷¹ Page again noted that he was under media scrutiny and that he needed to be careful to “make sure I don’t create any perceived conflicts of interest in my firm’s dealings.”³⁵⁷² Weber responded on May 12, 2016:

*I talked with several people here and we would like to invite you to NES. You can give a talk here and, possibly, in some other places. We will cover your travel and accommodation expenses. One of the options could be our graduation ceremony on July 8.*³⁵⁷³

³⁵⁶⁵ (U) Email, Krickovic to Page, April 25, 2016 (Page Production).

³⁵⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶⁷ (U) Email, S. Weber to Page, April 26, 2016 (Weber Production).

³⁵⁶⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶⁹ (U) Email, Page to S. Weber, April 26, 2016 (Weber Production).

³⁵⁷⁰ (U) Email, S. Weber to Page, May 3, 2016 (Weber Production).

³⁵⁷¹ (U) Email, Page to S. Weber, May 5, 2016 (Weber Production).

³⁵⁷² (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷³ (U) Email, S. Weber to Page, May 12, 2016 (Page Production). Instead of responding directly to Page, Shlomo Weber forwarded to Page an email from his son, Yuval Weber, that included what appeared to be a response to Page purporting to be from Shlomo Weber. While it is unclear why this occurred, this was at least the second such instance of a message from Shlomo Weber to Page coming from an originally forwarded message. It is possible that some of Shlomo Weber’s correspondence with Page was written or approved by Yuval Weber.

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Page replied to Weber's offer the same day and conditionally accepted the offer: "That sounds great Shlomo. . . . Please note that we have some internal procedures for the campaign so I will need to get approval."³⁵⁷⁴

(U) Shlomo Weber told the Committee that:

*There was some interest to see, to learn a little bit more about [Trump] and his potential policy towards Russia was tremendous, so that's what we thought, if somebody is working on his campaign, it could be of interest to Russia, for students, for [the] general public. . . . I thought that at this time that the campaign of then-candidate Trump was really lacking in expertise about foreign policy, and particularly about Russia. And I just thought that maybe we informing the campaign about the Russian issues will be a good thing to do.*³⁵⁷⁵

(U) Weber also told the Committee, "Because of [Page's] role in this campaign we thought it would be good," and said, "the hope was we would hear something from a potentially important person."³⁵⁷⁶

(U) Page raised the invitation to speak at NES with J.D. Gordon and asked for the Campaign speech request forms, which Gordon provided him on May 14.³⁵⁷⁷ On May 16, Page emailed Gordon, Phares, and Clovis with a link to the speech President Obama gave at the NES commencement in 2009. Noting Obama's NES speech, Page proposed that Candidate Trump take Page's place at the upcoming event.³⁵⁷⁸ Two days later, Page submitted the speech request form to Gordon.³⁵⁷⁹

(U) A little over one month later, on June 19, 2016, Page emailed Gordon, Lewandowski and Hicks, copying Clovis, and stated:

*I'm resending this Campaign Advisor Speech Request Form which I submitted over a month ago. . . . I'm literally saying nothing about the campaign so I don't think this administrative procedure is relevant in this case. But please let me know as soon as possible in case anyone might have any reservations.*³⁵⁸⁰

³⁵⁷⁴ (U) Email, Page to S. Weber, May 12, 2016 (Weber Production).

³⁵⁷⁵ (U) Weber Tr., pp. 10–11.

³⁵⁷⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 21.

³⁵⁷⁷ (U) Email, Gordon to Page, May 14, 2016 (DJTFP00000140–141).

³⁵⁷⁸ (U) Email Page to Gordon, Phares, and Clovis, May 16, 2016 (DJTFP00000182).

³⁵⁷⁹ (U) Email, Page to Gordon, May 18, 2016 (DJTFP00000208–209).

³⁵⁸⁰ (U) Email, Page to Gordon, Lewandowski, Hicks, and Clovis, June 19, 2016 (DJTFP00003431).

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(U) Page also renewed his suggestion that Trump attend, stating “[a]s I had also previously suggested, I’m sure they would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration.”³⁵⁸¹ Page added: “Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich is a board member and a graduate who will likely be in attendance.”³⁵⁸²

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(U) Regarding Page’s repeated requests, Gordon told the Committee:

*[Page] sent me the request. I did not pass it on. But he started to ask me more about it, and I would still tell him it’s a bad idea. So eventually he went to the campaign leadership in New York and he got permission to go.*³⁵⁸⁵

(U) On June 19, 2016, Lewandowski wrote to Page: “Carter-- If you want to do this, it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr. Trump will not be able to attend.”³⁵⁸⁶

(U) Lewandowski told the Committee that he recalled the email on that day, because it was the day before he got “fired from the campaign.” He said:

*I was trying to be kind: I’m certain Mr. Trump will not be able to attend. You have no formal role in the campaign, so you asking me permission I don’t understand, because you don’t work for us. You’ve never signed a nondisclosure agreement. You don’t get paid by the campaign. You have no role in the campaign. So if you want to do this, it would be outside of your role with the DJT for President campaign, is what I was very clear.*³⁵⁸⁷

3581 (U) *Ibid.*

3582 (U) *Ibid.*

3583

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3585 (U) Gordon Tr., p. 55.

3586 (U) Email, Lewandowski to Page, Gordon, Hicks, and Clovis, June 19, 2016 (DJTFP00003437).

3587 (U) Lewandowski Tr., p. 32.

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(U) Despite meeting Page briefly in January of that year, Lewandowski added:

*[A]n individual who I don't think I had ever met before is asking for permission to go to a place to give a speech on something I know nothing about, and is not part of the team I'm running, didn't raise a red flag to me because I didn't have any authority to agree or not agree to let him do something.*³⁵⁸⁸

(U) As noted previously, the week before his departure for Moscow, Page attended a dinner meeting of the Campaign's foreign policy and national security advisers at the Capitol Hill Club in Washington. As the meeting was ending, Page had a brief encounter with Sessions, whom Page informed about his upcoming travel to Moscow to give a speech.³⁵⁸⁹ According to Page, there was no meaningful response from Sessions.³⁵⁹⁰

(U) Page was in Moscow from July 4, 2016, through July 9, 2016. Near the start of his time in Moscow, Page had dinner with Shlomo Weber, Krickovic, and several others, some of whom were affiliated with NES and HSE.³⁵⁹¹ This was the first time Weber met with Page. Weber arrived over two hours late and could not recall to the Committee the specific substance of the discussions that night, but recalled that it generally dealt with U.S.-Russia relations and how the relationship might evolve.³⁵⁹² Weber recalled that while Page was in Moscow Page made several references to Igor Sechin, but that he had no knowledge of any meeting between Page and Sechin in Moscow.³⁵⁹³

[REDACTED] Sechin is the CEO of Rosneft, Russia's largest oil company. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is widely referred to in open source reporting as being one of the most powerful figures inside Putin's inner circle.³⁵⁹⁵ The

³⁵⁸⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.

³⁵⁸⁹ (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 148–149.

³⁵⁹⁰ (U) *Ibid.* (“[I]t was like in one ear and out the other for him.”) Asked about this encounter by HPSCI, Page said Sessions “had no reaction whatsoever.” HPSCI Transcript of Interview with Carter Page, November 2, 2017, pp. 68–69.

³⁵⁹¹ (U) Weber Tr., pp. 84–86.

³⁵⁹² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁵⁹³ (U) FBI, FD-302, Weber 7/28/2017 (“Weber recalled that Page kept going on and on about ‘Igor Ivanovich, Igor Ivanovich, Igor Ivanovich’ which is how Page referred to Igor Sechin. . . . Weber made it clear that Page never discussed meeting Sechin, but he did talk about Sechin a lot.”); Weber Tr., p. 121 (“[Page] was making allusions to Igor Sechin, but not about a meeting.”).

³⁵⁹⁴ [REDACTED]

³⁵⁹⁵ (U) See, e.g., Henry Foy, “‘We need to talk about Igor’: the rise of Russia’s most powerful oligarch,” *FT Magazine*, March 1, 2018.

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information from the “Steele Dossier,” discussed *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B, asserted that Page had a meeting with Sechin during this July 2016 visit.

[REDACTED] The Committee has no further information or details about this reference.

(U) Page told the Committee he met with Andrey Baranov, who he had known since his days living in Moscow and who, in 2016, was the head of investor relations for Rosneft, the company run by Sechin.³⁵⁹⁷ During the July visit, Page and Baranov met one evening at a Morgan Stanley social event to watch the European Cup.³⁵⁹⁸ Page said no deals were discussed during this meeting,³⁵⁹⁹ although he told the FBI that the subject of Sechin came up, but in an immaterial way.³⁶⁰⁰

(U) On July 5, 2016, Page sent an email to Shlomo Weber and his assistant to ask them to remove reference to Page’s role as a Trump adviser on the school’s website announcing his role in the commencement.³⁶⁰¹ However, Weber told the Committee that throughout this process Page gave the impression that he was an adviser to the Trump Campaign and that “[n]obody ever doubted” he was a Campaign adviser.³⁶⁰² Weber said that in the preparations for the speech, it was not clear whether he wanted to be mentioned as an adviser of the Campaign publicly and that the public interest in the election was “quite substantial at this juncture.”³⁶⁰³

[REDACTED] There are indications that news of Page’s visit reached senior levels of the Kremlin. Denis Klimentov became the press secretary of the NES in the fall of 2016.³⁶⁰⁴ Page had repeated direct contact with Klimentov starting as early as his July 2016 trip to Moscow, most of which dealt with outreach to Russian press and journalists seeking to cover Page’s speech.³⁶⁰⁵ [REDACTED]

³⁵⁹⁶ (U) *DOJ OIG FISA Report*, p. 225.

³⁵⁹⁷ (U) *C. Page Tr.*, pp. 156–157.

³⁵⁹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁵⁹⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 157.

³⁶⁰⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Page 3/30/2017.

³⁶⁰¹ (U) Email, Page to S. Weber and Ovchinnikova, July 5, 2016 (Weber Production).

³⁶⁰² (U) *Weber Tr.*, p. 67.

³⁶⁰³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 70.

³⁶⁰⁴ (U) FBI, FD-302, Denis Klimentov 6/9/2017. Klimentov told the FBI that he was not employed at NES at the time of Page’s July 2016 speech at NES but attended at the request of Weber. However, at least as early as July 8, 2016, Klimentov was communicating with Page about the speech and media outreach.

³⁶⁰⁵ (U) *See* Emails, Page, Klimentov, et al., July 8, 2016–June 4, 2017 (Page Production).

[REDACTED] Klimentov's brother and business partner, Dmitriy Klimentov, is a U.S.-based public relations consultant who is a former acting New York bureau chief for the Russian news agency RIA Novosti.³⁶⁰⁹ Dmitriy Klimentov maintains regular contact with Dmitry Peskov, who is the Press Secretary for the President Putin.³⁶¹⁰ Dmitriy Klimentov told the FBI that he contacted Peskov about Page's July visit, in the event Peskov wanted to facilitate any meetings.³⁶¹¹ According to Klimentov, there was no interest in meeting Page and Peskov responded that Page was not high-level enough to meet.³⁶¹²

(U) Page gave two speeches in Moscow. On July 7, he gave a speech to the NES that he titled, "The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential." The speech was amplified online by Russian nationalist influencers, some of whom have significant ties to the Russian government and Russian intelligence services, and one of whom attended the event and asked Page a question regarding Trump and sanctions.³⁶¹³ The next day, at the commencement ceremonies, Page gave a short talk that he titled "Maximizing personal potential in uncertain times: past and future."³⁶¹⁴ Page made no mention of the U.S. 2016 presidential campaign in either set of prepared remarks.

(U) At the second event, the commencement ceremonies on July 8, Page had a brief encounter with Dvorkovich. According to Weber, who observed the encounter but was not close enough to hear what was said, the two shook hands and "talked for a couple of minutes."³⁶¹⁵ Page told the Committee his encounter with Dvorkovich lasted a "maximum [of] 10 seconds,"

³⁶⁰⁶ (U) [REDACTED]

³⁶⁰⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³⁶¹⁰ (U) FBI, FD-302, Dmitri Klimentov, 11/27/2018.

³⁶¹¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶¹² (U) *Ibid.* The SCO obtained an email from Peskov where Peskov stated "I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that his is far from being the main one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin." *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 100.

³⁶¹³ (U) See Twitter, @A_G_Dugin, July 7, 2016; Twitter, @KatasonovaMaria; Facebook post, Konstantin Rykov, July 7, 2016. Katasonova appears to have attended the event and asked Page a question related to Trump and U.S.-Russia relations. See YouTube, youtu.be/adJscX0j4CY, July 7, 2016.

³⁶¹⁴ (U) Document, "Maximizing personal potential in uncertain times: past and future" (Page Production).

³⁶¹⁵ (U) Weber Tr., p. 59.

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which he described as a “sort of a brief, in-passing moment,” where Dvorkovich gave “warm pleasantries.”³⁶¹⁶

(U) While in Moscow, Page emailed Trump Campaign staff member Tera Dahl, copying J.D. Gordon, to inform them that he was overseas and could not attend a meeting with a European delegation sponsored by the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Terrorism that hoped to meet with the Clinton and Trump Campaigns.³⁶¹⁷ Page wrote:

*On a related front, I'll send you guys a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here. Suffice to say that after watching their national economy and relationships with Europe get derailed by Washington mismanagement with disastrous consequences over recent years, Russians from the highest levels of government to the average man on the street have a new optimism and hope for the future based on Mr. Trump's common sense statements about his foreign policy approaches over the past year.*³⁶¹⁸

(U) Later the same day, Page emailed Gordon, Dahl and Walid Phares with the subject line: “Feedback from Russia – Executive Summary,” to which he attached a document with the same title.³⁶¹⁹ The document began with the statement: “On Thursday and Friday (July 7 & 8, 2016), campaign advisor Carter Page presented before gatherings at the New Economic School (NES) in Moscow including their 2016 Commencement Ceremony.”³⁶²⁰ The first bullet stated:

*Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES Board Member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this sentiment is widely held at all levels of the government.*³⁶²¹

(U) The Committee asked Page about the source of his “incredible insights,” the private conversation with Dvorkovich, and the “diverse array of sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration” that he wrote about in this email. As was the case with his January 30, 2016

³⁶¹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

³⁶¹⁷ (U) Email, Page to Dahl and Gordon, July 8, 2016 (DJTFP00004021).

³⁶¹⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶¹⁹ (U) Email, Page to Dahl, Gordon, and Phares, July 8, 2016 (DJTFP00004022–4023).

³⁶²⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶²¹ (U) *Ibid.*

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email to Glassner, Clovis, and Lewandowski, Page had difficulty recalling his allegedly high-level engagements. He told the Committee that he was referring to: the exchange with academics over dinner on July 5; one encounter he had with a staff member who worked for a Duma (Russian parliament) member and whose name he could not recall; and, the handshake with Dvorkovich at the commencement ceremony on July 8.³⁶²² Page told the Committee that the unnamed Duma staffer and Dvorkovich were the only two people that he directly interacted with in the Russian government during the trip.³⁶²³ Page allowed that his written comments from the email relating to outreach from Russian legislators “may have been an exaggeration.”³⁶²⁴

(U) Page’s visit to Moscow in July drew international media attention. While still in Moscow, Page emailed Gordon and Hicks, copying Clovis:

*I wanted to give you a quick heads up about a few developments during my Moscow trip. . . . I have been doing everything possible to keep a low profile...and to the extent people do learn I'm here, ensuring they all understand that my visit is outside of my role with the campaign. But given the vast outpouring of support for Mr. Trump and the strong social network in Russia, a few journalists caught wind of my presence in Russia and have been following my every move closely. As always, I have been avoiding any media interview until otherwise instructed.*³⁶²⁵

(U) Gordon forwarded the email to Mashburn and Dahl, with the comment: “FYI. We probably ought to print this out for our files.”³⁶²⁶

(U) Page’s July speeches in Moscow were monitored by American businessman Paul Erickson, Russian national Maria Butina and Russian government official Alexander Torshin. A July 18, 2016 exchange between Butina and Torshin revealed Butina’s interest in Page:

Butina: Right now I would rather meet with Carter Page. He’s Trump’s advisor for the RF and heads the pro-Russian group. He was in Moscow at a meeting with Putin last year. Can you find out how we feel about him?

Torshin: I’ll try, but tomorrow. Not long ago one of his advisors was in Moscow. I don’t remember the last name.

³⁶²² (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 176–177.

³⁶²³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 181–182. Katasonova, described above, introduced herself as an assistant to a Duma official when asking Page a question during his NES speech. See YouTube, youtu.be/adJscX0j4CY, July 7, 2016.

³⁶²⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 181.

³⁶²⁵ (U) Email, Page to Gordon, Hicks, and Clovis, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00003920) (second ellipsis in original).

³⁶²⁶ (U) Email, Gordon to Mashburn, et al., July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00003920).

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*Butina: . . . Thank you very much for the information. Carter Page is his name. This is very important. I have not yet agreed to a meeting with him. It depends on your opinion.*³⁶²⁷

For more information on Torshin and Butina, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.H.

(U) Page attended the GOP convention held in Cleveland from July 18 through July 21, 2016. At one of the receptions, Page and Gordon had a brief encounter with Sergei Kislyak, Russia's Ambassador to the United States. Page told the Committee it was the first time he had met Kislyak, and that Page offered the Ambassador his business card, but that the Ambassador did not offer Page his card in return.³⁶²⁸

(U) The media attention from Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow followed Page until after he was dismissed from the Campaign in September 2016.

(U) The media attention regarding Page's travel to Moscow also drew political attention. On August 27, 2016, Senator Harry Reid, Senate Minority leader, wrote and publicly released a letter to FBI Director James Comey.³⁶²⁹ The letter expressed Reid's concern about Russian interference in the 2016 elections and quoted former Acting Director of CIA Michael Morrell, declaring candidate Trump an "unwitting agent" of Russia and the Kremlin. While naming no Trump Campaign officials, the letter does state:

*For example, questions have been raised about whether a Trump advisor who has been highly critical of U.S. and European economic sanctions on Russia, and who has conflicts of interest due to investments in Russian energy conglomerate Gazprom, met with high-ranking sanctioned individuals while in Moscow in July of 2016, well after Trump became the presumptive nominee. (The same individual recently broke precedent by giving a speech critical of U.S. policy while in Moscow.) Any such meetings should be investigated and made a part of the public record.*³⁶³⁰

(U) Following his return from Moscow in July, Page continued to email his opinions on media reports regarding Russia to Campaign staff and other Campaign advisory committee

³⁶²⁷ (U) Twitter direct messages, Torshin and Butina, July 18, 2016.

³⁶²⁸ (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 253–262; *see also* Gordon Tr., pp. 37–42.

³⁶²⁹ (U) Letter, Reid to Comey, August 27, 2016. Reid's letter to Comey was sent after Reid's briefing as a "Gang of Eight" member with CIA Director Brennan. [REDACTED]

³⁶³⁰ (U) *Ibid.*

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members. His emails, which covered topics ranging from the hack of the DNC to the U.S. role in Ukraine, were often conspiratorial and generally reflective of Russian policy positions.³⁶³¹

(U) On July 28, 2016, Page emailed Hicks and copied Clovis and Gordon about being contacted by a “barrage of reporters over recent days.”³⁶³² Page wrote that he would “continue avoiding all interview requests” but continued to offer the Campaign his “help in the media department.”³⁶³³ Hicks forwarded the email to Stephen Miller, and asked, “Who can weigh in here?”³⁶³⁴ Miller responded: “[N]one of our FP guys should be doing any interviews on [R]ussia right now.”³⁶³⁵ To which Hicks responded: “Agreed!!!!”³⁶³⁶

(U) On September 13, 2016, shortly before he was separated from the Campaign, Page sent an email to the other Campaign foreign policy and national security advisers and several Campaign staff.³⁶³⁷ In the email, Page commented on an upcoming event which he planned to attend at the Council on Foreign Relations that would feature then-Vice President Joe Biden.³⁶³⁸ Page proposed asking Biden a question regarding his son’s work in Ukraine.³⁶³⁹ Another Campaign adviser, Bert Mizusawa responded the next day: “Mentioning Biden’s children could backfire.”³⁶⁴⁰ To which Kubic added: “I agree with Bert – not sure you should use his son to bait him.”³⁶⁴¹

iv. (U) Page Leaves the Trump Campaign

(U) Page’s profile in the U.S. media increased following his July 2016 visit and speeches in Moscow. It was not until September 2016, however, that the Campaign moved to dismiss him because he had become a media distraction.

(U) On August 2, 2016, in response to yet another media query about Page which Page appears to have accepted without permission, Hicks reached out to Stephen Miller, Dearborn,

³⁶³¹ (U) See, e.g., Email, Page to Clovis, et al., July 24, 2016 (DJTFP00004447).

³⁶³² (U) Email, Page to Hicks, et al., July 28, 2016 (DJTFP00004499).

³⁶³³ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶³⁴ (U) Email, Hicks to S. Miller, July 28, 2016 (DJTFP00004499).

³⁶³⁵ (U) Email, S. Miller to Hicks, July 28, 2016 (DJTFP00004499).

³⁶³⁶ (U) Email, Hicks to S. Miller, July 28, 2016 (DJTFP00004499).

³⁶³⁷ (U) Email, Page to Mizusawa, Kubic, Papadopoulos, Clovis, Phares, et al., September 13, 2016 (DJTFP00017287).

³⁶³⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴⁰ (U) Email, Mizusawa to Page, Kubic, Papadopoulos, Clovis, Phares, et al., September 14, 2016 (DJTFP00017286–17287).

³⁶⁴¹ (U) Email, Kubic to Page, Mizusawa, Papadopoulos, Clovis, Phares, et al., September 14, 2016 (DJTFP00017286).

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and Jason Miller in order to find someone who could speak with Page about the interview.³⁶⁴² Stephen Miller responded, writing: “We need to stop this,” to which Hicks responded: “I do not know Carter. He’s sent me a few emails, but I think someone with authority should remind him he does not speak for the campaign, or Mr. Trump and we strongly advise against this (all via phone).”³⁶⁴³

(U) Late on September 22, 2016, Michael Isikoff emailed Jason Miller with questions about Page, prior to publishing a story about alleged U.S. intelligence focus on Page and his role in the Trump Campaign.³⁶⁴⁴ Miller sent an email to Hicks and other Campaign staff, stating: “I’m pretty sure we’ve answered re: Carter Page 100x previously, but I forgot the answer.”³⁶⁴⁵ Hicks responded to Miller: “He has no role. We are not aware of any of his activities, past or present.”³⁶⁴⁶

(U) On September 23, Isikoff published the article, which generated additional media queries about Page to the Campaign. In an email regarding the article Stephen Miller wrote: “We should say he’s not an advisor, he’s never advised Mr. Trump, and has made no contribution to the campaign. Speaking for myself, I’ve never spoken to him, and wouldn’t recognize him if he were sitting next to me.”³⁶⁴⁷ Hicks emailed Dearborn, Stephen Miller, Clovis, and Jason Miller: “For the final time, we need to cut ties with Carter. . . . Please advise as to how we do this logistically and Jason and I will strategize on not looking reactionary!”³⁶⁴⁸ Dearborn responded: “Sam, you know him best yes? I’ve never met or talked with him.”³⁶⁴⁹

(U) On the same day, September 23, 2016, Page reached out to Hicks, Jason Miller, and others with a proposal for a long press statement, formatted under the official Trump Campaign logo, that addressed the press queries about him.³⁶⁵⁰ Fifteen minutes later, Jason Miller responded to Page’s email, “Carter— let’s talk in the morning. I had a different direction in mind.”³⁶⁵¹

³⁶⁴² (U) Email, Hicks to S. Miller, Dearborn, and J. Miller, August 2, 2016 (DJTFP00023340);

³⁶⁴³ (U) Email, S. Miller to Hicks, Dearborn, and J. Miller, August 2, 2016 (DJTFP00023340); Email, Hicks to S. Miller, Dearborn, and J. Miller, August 2, 2016 (DJTFP00023339–23340).

³⁶⁴⁴ (U) Email, Isikoff to J. Miller, September 22, 2016 (DJTFP00017694); see Michael Isikoff, “U.S. Intel officials probe ties between Trump advisor and Kremlin,” *Yahoo News*, September 23, 2016.

³⁶⁴⁵ (U) Email, J. Miller to Hicks, S. Miller, et al., September 22, 2016 (DJTFP00017694).

³⁶⁴⁶ (U) Email, Hicks to J. Miller, S. Miller, et al., September 23, 2016 (DJTFP00017694).

³⁶⁴⁷ (U) Email, S. Miller to Hicks, et al., September 23, 2016 (DJTFP00017740).

³⁶⁴⁸ (U) Email, Hicks to Dearborn, et al., September 23, 2016 (DJTFP00017705).

³⁶⁴⁹ (U) Email, Dearborn to Hicks, et al., September 23, 2016 (DJTFP00017711).

³⁶⁵⁰ (U) Email, Page to J. Miller, et al., September 23, 2016 (DJTFP00017783–17784).

³⁶⁵¹ (U) Email, J. Miller to Page, et al., September 23, 2016 (DJTFP00017783).

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(U) On September 25, 2016, Kellyanne Conway, then-Campaign manager, publicly stated that Page was “certainly not part of the campaign I’m running.”³⁶⁵² In a forwarded email to Hicks, Conway wrote, “Mr. Trump saw this segment and called me to say he has no idea who Carter Page is and wants to be sure he has never met him. May be best to check that he did not actually meet with him at any point and be sure Clovis, et. al [sic] remove Page’s name from materials, website.”³⁶⁵³ Hicks responded, incorrectly: “He did meet with him one time in March at the old post office with a group of about 12 other people. They have never interacted or spoken since.”³⁶⁵⁴ As noted previously, Page did not attend the publicized meeting of the other national security and foreign policy advisers with Trump on March 31, 2016.

(U) The Campaign made no formal statement severing its relationship with Page. According to Clovis, Jason Miller communicated Page’s termination to him. Clovis testified to the Committee: “The last I left it with the campaign was Jason Miller was going to take care of that. My job was to tell Carter to knock it off, as a person who knew him. As far as I know, Jason was the one that laid down the law to him.”³⁶⁵⁵

(U) Very early on September 26, 2016, Page sent an email to Eric Trump and copying numerous other Campaign staff and advisers telling him that: “I wanted you to know that I have decided to take a leave of absence from my work on the campaign.”³⁶⁵⁶ He attached a letter, dated the day before, that he said he intended to send to FBI Director James Comey.³⁶⁵⁷ Eric Trump forwarded this email to Hicks with the message: “I know nothing of this guy. Do you?”³⁶⁵⁸ Hicks responded:

*Know of him. He was listed on an initial foreign policy adviser board Sam Clovis put together in the spring. He has never met or spoken to DJT or anyone on the campaign except Sam for that matter. It has now come to light he has ties to the Russian government so of course people are pushing it out as if he is the person whispering in DJT’s ear. Nonsense. Regardless, we requested he resign. I have no idea why he is directing that to you.*³⁶⁵⁹

As noted, aspects of Hicks’s statement are incorrect – although Page never met the candidate, he did meet occasionally and often communicated with various members of the Campaign staff.

³⁶⁵² (U) David Cohen, “Conway denies Trump campaign ties to Russia figure,” *Politico*, September 25, 2016.

³⁶⁵³ (U) Email, Conway to Hicks, September 25, 2016 (DJTFP00017849).

³⁶⁵⁴ (U) Email, Hicks to Conway, September 25, 2016 (DJTFP00017849).

³⁶⁵⁵ (U) Clovis Tr., p. 67. The Committee did not interview Jason Miller.

³⁶⁵⁶ (U) Email, Page to E. Trump, et al., September 26, 2016 (DJTFP00018044–18045).

³⁶⁵⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵⁸ (U) Email, E. Trump to Hicks, September 26, 2016 (DJTFP00018044).

³⁶⁵⁹ (U) Email, Hicks to E. Trump, September 26, 2016 (DJTFP00018046).

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(U) The letter Page addressed to FBI Director Comey, dated September 25, 2016 stated, in part: “I am writing to request the FBI’s prompt end of the reported inquiry regarding my personal trip to Russia in July 2016 – an investigation which has been widely mentioned in the media.”³⁶⁶⁰ Among other things, Page noted: “I have not met this year with any sanctioned official in Russia despite the fact that there are no restrictions on U.S. persons speaking with such individuals.”³⁶⁶¹ He also stated in the letter that he had “interacted with members of the U.S. intelligence community, including the FBI and CIA for many decades.”³⁶⁶²

(U) The first FISA order on Page was approved October 21, 2016.³⁶⁶³

(U) Media attention on Page, and Page’s continuing engagement with the media, continued to distract the Campaign into the presidential Transition. On the day that Page announced his “leave of absence” to Eric Trump, he gave a long interview to *The Washington Post*.³⁶⁶⁴ Also on that same day, Page emailed a link to the article to Clovis, Hicks, Miller, Bert Mizusawa and Joseph Schmitz, and stated: “now that I’ve finally begun to defend myself, we’re starting to quickly set the record straight for everyone.”³⁶⁶⁵ Page also asked Clovis to send him a copy of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) he recalled signing when he joined the Campaign as an adviser.³⁶⁶⁶ Hicks forwarded the email back to Clovis with the request: “Please make sure his NDA was in fact counter signed. Send him a copy and please ask him to stop talking. He is not being helpful. He has never spoken to or met Mr. Trump.”³⁶⁶⁷

5. (U) Page Returns to Russia, December 2016

(U) Following the election and his separation from the Campaign, Page returned to Moscow in mid-December 2016. Page told the Committee that he paid his own way to Moscow in December.³⁶⁶⁸ Shlomo Weber, who saw Page while he was in Moscow, told the Committee he did not know why Page visited.³⁶⁶⁹

³⁶⁶⁰ (U) Letter, Page to Comey, September 25, 2016 (DJTFP00018045).

³⁶⁶¹ (U) *Ibid*.

³⁶⁶² (U) *Ibid*.

³⁶⁶³ (U) The Carter Page FISA order and renewals are examined in detail in the *DOJ OIG FISA Report*. While there were several problems with the FBI’s FISA renewals for Page, the Committee assesses that Page’s previous ties to Russian intelligence officers, coupled with his Russian travel, justified the FBI’s initial concerns about Page.

³⁶⁶⁴ (U) Josh Rogin, “Trump’s Russia adviser speaks out, calls accusations ‘complete garbage,’” *The Washington Post*, September 26, 2016.

³⁶⁶⁵ (U) Email, Page to Clovis, et al., September 26, 2016 (DJTFP00018048–18049).

³⁶⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid*.

³⁶⁶⁷ (U) Email, Hicks to Clovis, et. al, September 26, 2016 (DJTFP00018052).

³⁶⁶⁸ (U) C. Page Tr., p. 287.

³⁶⁶⁹ (U) Weber Tr., pp. 135–137.

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(U) On December 12, 2016, Page made a live televised presentation from the auditorium of the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, which is a news organization of the Russian government.³⁶⁷⁰ Denis Klimentov, who in December was the press secretary for the NES, told the FBI that Page contacted the news agency on his own, and the agency enthusiastically accepted, based on Page's notoriety by that time.³⁶⁷¹

(U) While Weber insisted that the NES had nothing to do with Page's December visit,³⁶⁷² he did accept Page's request to introduce him at the public speech, which was sparsely attended, mostly by Russian and international journalists. Video of the event shows that, among the logos of Russia state media that appear behind Page on the electronic screen, the NES logo also appears.³⁶⁷³

(U) Page's speech included criticisms of Bill and Hillary Clinton, as well as a reference to "conspiracy theories about Wikileaks used to distract from disastrous information revealed on her illegal mail server."³⁶⁷⁴ Page praised Rex Tillerson, who had been nominated to be Secretary of State, and inserted a reference to Igor Sechin, who Page stated he "didn't meet...but it would have been a great honor."³⁶⁷⁵ Page stated that there was "nothing there" on reports of Russia's intervention in the U.S. presidential election.³⁶⁷⁶ Page also said, when asked about whether he's met with Trump, "I've certainly been in a number of meetings with him."³⁶⁷⁷

(U) Weber convened a small dinner for Page during this visit, which included Klimentov and a Vice Rector of NES.³⁶⁷⁸ Weber said that once Page arrived in Russia, Page asked that Weber invite Deputy Prime Minister Dvorkovich to meet with him, which Weber did, not expecting Dvorkovich to accept.³⁶⁷⁹ According to Weber, Page made the request because "it would be good to discuss the future relationship under the new president." Dvorkovich was the only request Page made.³⁶⁸⁰

³⁶⁷⁰ (U) See YouTube, "LIVE: Former Trump adviser Carter Page holds presentation in Moscow," December 12, 2016.

³⁶⁷¹ (U) FBI, FD-302, Denis Klimentov 6/9/2017.

³⁶⁷² (U) Weber Tr., pp. 135-137.

³⁶⁷³ (U) See YouTube, "LIVE: Former Trump adviser Carter Page holds presentation in Moscow," December 12, 2016.

³⁶⁷⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, starting at 14:14, 23:57, and 25:45 (related to the Clintons); at 22:54 and 24:25 (related to WikiLeaks)

³⁶⁷⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, starting at 15:30 (related to Tillerson); at 12:43, 16:23, and 22:42 (related to Sechin).

³⁶⁷⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, starting at 42:08.

³⁶⁷⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, starting at 29:54. While the Committee is aware that Page attended events in which Trump spoke, the Committee is not aware of any instance in which Trump and Page attended the same "meeting."

³⁶⁷⁸ (U) Weber Tr., p. 160.

³⁶⁷⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157, 164.

³⁶⁸⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 157.

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(U) Weber said he was “shocked” that Dvorkovich showed up.³⁶⁸¹ He did not stay for the full dinner, but only for about 30 to 35 minutes.³⁶⁸² Weber recalled that Page did not speak much, but that Dvorkovich spoke of “[f]uture relationships” and the “[e]conomic relationship” between Russia and the United States.³⁶⁸³ Weber told the Committee that although the “economic relationship” and “difficulties of the relationship” were discussed, sanctions were not explicitly mentioned.³⁶⁸⁴ Dvorkovich also “explained that the Russia would like to be a friend of the United States.”³⁶⁸⁵

(U) Page told the Committee he once again met with Andrey Baranov of Rosneft during his December 2016 trip.³⁶⁸⁶

(U) The information produced by Page for the Committee does not include many details of his time in Moscow, in either July or December, nor was Page able to account for much of his time on the ground in Moscow in his interview with the Committee. The Committee has no further insight into Page’s other meetings or activities there.

6. (U) Page During the Transition

(U) Page told the Committee that he “sent a note” and “talked with a few people in the transition, that if I could help in any way, you know, I would be open to that.”³⁶⁸⁷ According to the *SCO Report*:

*On November 14, 2016, [Page] submitted an application to the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with “top world leaders” and “effectively responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas.” Page received no response from the Transition Team.*³⁶⁸⁸

³⁶⁸¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 164. Despite attending the dinner with Page and Dvorkovich in Moscow, in interview with the FBI, Klimentov denied knowing about any meeting between Page and Dvorkovich. FBI, FD-302, Denis Klimentov 6/9/2017. Separately, Klimentov may have met with Page in the United States shortly before Page’s December 2016 trip. According to Page’s personal schedule he maintained on his computer, on November 26, 2016, Page and Klimentov were scheduled to meet for lunch in New York. “travel and work records.xlsx” (Page Production).

³⁶⁸² (U) Weber Tr., pp. 170–171.

³⁶⁸³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 167–168.

³⁶⁸⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 168–169.

³⁶⁸⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 168.

³⁶⁸⁶ (U) C. Page Tr., p. 287.

³⁶⁸⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 295.

³⁶⁸⁸ (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 102–103 (internal citations omitted).

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(U) Twice during the Transition Page was explicitly asked in writing by Donald McGahn, who at the time remained counsel to the Trump Campaign, to stop making misrepresentations of his association with the Trump Campaign in the media. On December 22, McGahn sent Page a letter instructing Page to stop associating himself with the Campaign.³⁶⁸⁹ On December 25, 2016, Page sent a lengthy email to Hicks, copying McGahn, K.T. McFarland, and Keith Kellogg.³⁶⁹⁰ While the email reprises and expands on Page's objections to the way he perceived himself to having been treated, it includes in one section:

*A long list of top U.S. foreign policy leaders have contacted me to offer their support to the Trump Administration's agenda. The same holds for even more senior Russian leaders, but I won't mention them in writing out of risk of some new bogus media controversy or federal investigation.*³⁶⁹¹

(U) On January 16, 2017, McGahn again wrote to Page, citing the previous letter from December 22, 2016. He wrote:

*Given that you have no role with Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., or the President-Elect's Transition Team, or with any other entity associated with Mr. Trump, we ask that you immediately cease suggesting to anyone that you are anything other than a former member of an advisory committee who never actually met with the President-Elect.*³⁶⁹²

7. (U) Page in the "Steele Dossier"

(U) Page is featured prominently in what is referred to as the Steele dossier, materials prepared in 2016 by former [REDACTED] officer Christopher Steele.³⁶⁹³ Of the 17 reports that comprise the 35-page publicly available Steele dossier, first released in its entirety by *BuzzFeed* on January 10, 2017, Page is named in eight of them.

(U) Regarding assertions in the Steele dossier about Page, the Committee heard testimony from Michael Cohen that he never met Page.³⁶⁹⁴ Page told the Committee he never met Paul Manafort, but included him only once on a group email, for which he was chastised by

³⁶⁸⁹ (U) See Letter, McGahn to Page, January 16, 2017 (DJTFP00027831) (referring to a prior December 22, 2016 letter to Page). The Committee asked for all Donald Trump for President, Inc., materials in its document production request, but did not obtain a copy of the December 22, 2016 letter.

³⁶⁹⁰ (U) Email, Page to Hicks, McGahn, McFarland, and Kellogg, December 25, 2016 (DJTFP00025723).

³⁶⁹¹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁶⁹² (U) Letter, McGahn to Page, January 16, 2017 (DJTFP00027831).

³⁶⁹³ (U) Ken Bensinger, et al., "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties to Russia," *BuzzFeed News*, January 10, 2017.

³⁶⁹⁴ (U) Cohen Tr., p. 245.

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others on the Campaign.³⁶⁹⁵ He told the Committee he never met, nor “heard of,” Igor Diveykin.³⁶⁹⁶ Page has publicly and repeatedly denied meeting with Igor Sechin.³⁶⁹⁷ Other than the dossier’s assertions that Page traveled to Moscow in July 2016 and served as a foreign policy adviser to Trump—facts which were readily available in news reports at the time of their inclusion in the dossier—the Committee did not find any information that corroborates the allegations related to Page in the dossier. For more information on the dossier, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B.

³⁶⁹⁵ (U) C. Page Tr., pp. 196–197, 214.

³⁶⁹⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.

³⁶⁹⁷ (U) *See, e.g.*, HPSCI Transcript of the Interview with Carter Page, November 2, 2017, p. 101.

G. (U) Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) On April 27, 2016, Trump gave a high-profile speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., the first formal campaign presentation of his approach to foreign policy.³⁶⁹⁸ Immediately before the speech, some members of the Campaign, including Trump, Kushner, and possibly Sessions, briefly met the Russian ambassador, Sergei Kislyak, along with other select “VIPs” in a corner of the room where the speech was given. The Committee examined whether anything related to this event raised counterintelligence questions.

(U) The Committee found no evidence that foreign interference occurred during or as a result of the April 27, 2016, Trump campaign speech held at the Mayflower Hotel. The Committee found that language in the speech about Russia was drafted by the Campaign’s senior speech writer, Stephen Miller, and was consistent with the candidate’s views.

(U) The Mayflower speech was organized by the Washington-based Center for the National Interest (CNI), a nonpartisan think tank, at the request of the Trump Campaign. Dmitri Simes, the president of CNI, worked with the Campaign to organize the event.³⁶⁹⁹

(U) Russian ambassador Sergei Kislyak, along with other members of the Washington diplomatic corps, was invited to the speech by Simes, with the Campaign’s knowledge. Trump met Kislyak for the first time in a small VIP receiving line arranged briefly before the speech. Kislyak also spoke to Kushner and expressed to him Russia’s interest in Trump’s position on improved bilateral relations if Trump were elected.

(U) The Committee could not reliably determine whether then-Senator Jeff Sessions, the chairman of the Campaign’s National Security Advisory Committee, met and spoke with Kislyak at the event. Sessions did not recall meeting the ambassador at this event, but allowed that it was possible and asserted that if he had spoken with Kislyak, “[I]t would’ve been . . . nothing improper.”³⁷⁰⁰

³⁶⁹⁸ (U) On March 21, 2016, Trump gave a speech on U.S.-Israeli relations before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in Washington, D.C.

³⁶⁹⁹ (U) Simes is a Russian scholar who emigrated from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and who has written about Russia since. In the early 1990s, Simes served as senior advisor to former President Richard Nixon, and accompanied Nixon on his last private trips to the Russia in the early 1990s. In his years at CNI, Simes had also had interactions with Alexander Torshin and Maria Butina. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.H.

³⁷⁰⁰ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing with Attorney General Jeff Sessions, June 13, 2017.

2. (U) The Mayflower Speech

i. (U) Organizing the Event

(U) Simes and Jared Kushner first discussed the concept of the speech after they met in New York City in March 2016, at a luncheon hosted by a member of CNI’s board where Henry Kissinger, at the time an honorary chairman of the CNI board, spoke. Kushner requested a meeting with Simes for later in the month, but then reached out to Simes by phone and raised the possibility of CNI hosting Trump’s first foreign policy speech, a request Simes and CNI accepted.³⁷⁰² Simes stated that he and the Center wanted to provide a platform for a serious, foreign policy pronouncement, not a campaign event, and offered that CNI, in addition to hosting and organizing the logistics of the event, would avail the Campaign of the substantive national security advice of CNI’s members. While the Campaign agreed to CNI organizing and hosting the event, no one in the Campaign relied on CNI’s expertise. Simes also told the Committee that “[w]e never had substantive interactions with Mr. Trump.”³⁷⁰³

(U) The Trump Campaign chose the Mayflower hotel as the venue after Trump rejected the National Press Club because he deemed it too small and unable to accommodate “35-45 cameras.”³⁷⁰⁴ The Campaign focused on the optics of the event, and CNI issued invitations to what they viewed as a typical list of Washington experts, media, government figures, and ambassadors, many of whom had previously attended CNI events.³⁷⁰⁵

(U) At the end of the Monday prior to the speech, April 25, Simes emailed Kushner with the most recent “acceptance list,” which listed 64 individuals, including four ambassadors: the ambassadors from the Philippines, Italy, and Singapore, and Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak.³⁷⁰⁶ Later that evening, Simes sent another email to Kushner proposing attendees who should be invited to the event’s “VIP reception.” There were 13 individuals Simes suggested, including the ambassadors of the Philippines and Italy, but not the ambassadors of Singapore or

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3702 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Dmitri Simes, March 30, 2018, pp. 25–27.

3703 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

3704 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 46–48. The candidate had also proposed his Virginia golf club as a venue, which CNI rejected.

3705 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 53. A Committee staff member attended the event. That staff member was not part of the Russia investigation team.

3706 (U) Email, Simes to Kushner, April 25, 2016 (NSSCI0000001–5). Not all confirmed attendees attended.

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Russia.³⁷⁰⁷ The list also included Celeste Wallander, at the time Senior Director for Russian Affairs at the National Security Council, who ultimately did not attend the event.³⁷⁰⁸

(U) According to Simes, the Campaign made “no request about bringing any foreigners to the meeting and most certainly no particular requests about bringing any Russians to the meeting.”³⁷⁰⁹

ii. (U) Drafting the Speech

(U) Stephen Miller, at the time the senior policy adviser to the Campaign, was the “predominant writer” of the speech.³⁷¹⁰ While Simes offered to assist in drafting the speech,³⁷¹¹ Miller told the Committee that “the speech itself was written from a zero-based draft on a blank sheet,”³⁷¹² and that “everything in the speech is informed by the candidate’s own publicly-stated views on all these issues.”³⁷¹³

(U) The Committee reviewed drafts of the speech as it was shared for comments and edits among senior Campaign staff, to include Manafort, Gates, Lewandowski, Miller, and others, and as it evolved into the final version delivered by Trump. These drafts included comments and suggested edits by several members of the national security advisory committee.³⁷¹⁴

(U) The Committee assesses that the drafts of the speech it reviewed showed consistent language regarding Russia through the five days of drafting. For example, an April 22 draft

³⁷⁰⁷ (U) Email, Simes to Kushner, April 25, 2016 (NSSCI00000007–8).

³⁷⁰⁸ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰⁹ (U) Simes Tr., p. 52.

³⁷¹⁰ (U) Miller interview, p. 131.

³⁷¹¹ (U) Simes Tr., pp. 36–37.

³⁷¹² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 123.

³⁷¹³ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 132.

³⁷¹⁴ (U) Email, Manafort to Gates, April 24, 2016 (DJTFP0011000–11012) (attaching draft speech); Email, Gates to Manafort, April 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010810–10823) (attaching draft speech); Email, Christie to Lewandowski and Manafort (DJTFP00010834–10845) (attaching draft speech); Email, Manafort to [mfreedman@globalimpact.com], April 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010861–10871) (attaching draft speech); Email, Kubic to Lewandowski, April 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010873–10897) (attaching draft speech); Email, Lewandowski to Manafort, Christie, Kushner, and S. Miller, April 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010898–10928) (attaching multiple draft speech documents); Email, Chang to Lewandowski, S. Miller, and Manafort, April 24, 2016 (DJTFP00010957–10969) (attaching draft speech); Email, S. Miller to Lewandowski, April 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010935–10945) (attaching multiple draft speech documents); Email, S. Miller to Chang, Lutes, and Gates, April 24, 2016 (DJTFP00010946–10956) (attaching draft speech); Email, Kubic to Lewandowski, April 24, 2016 (DJTFP00010970–10978) (attaching draft speech); Email, Kubic to Lewandowski, April 24, 2016 (DJTFP00010979–10999) (attaching draft speech); Email, Gates to Manafort, April 27, 2016 (DJTFP00011265–11290) (attaching draft speech).

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includes the language: “My negotiating skills tell me an easing of tensions and improved relations with Russia is possible. Some say the Russians won’t be reasonable. I intend to find out.”³⁷¹⁵ When Trump delivered the speech, he said: “Some say the Russians won’t be reasonable. I intend to find out.”³⁷¹⁶

(U) As drafts were circulated, stronger language on Russia was proposed by New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and national security advisory committee member Admiral Chuck Kubic. Christie’s suggested additions to the draft speech included a bullet that stated:

*We need to stand up to Russian aggression together, and make clear that our commitment to our NATO allies in Eastern Europe is absolute. And if Putin’s Russia wants to rejoin the community of civilized nations, then they’re going to have to behave like one.*³⁷¹⁷

(U) Kubic’s suggested add on Russia stated:

*How we deal with Russia in the years ahead will be a test for how we will stand with all our allies everywhere. We should remain focused on achieving peace through economic and military strength, recognize areas where we have “common cause” with the Russian people, and make it clearly known that once again American is playing to win and won’t back down.*³⁷¹⁸

(U) Neither of these suggested additions was accepted. The final language delivered by Trump on April 27 was consistent with the drafts the Committee reviewed. The only references to Russia in the speech are one sentence that states, “The Russians and Chinese have rapidly expanded their military capability, but look what’s happened to us,” and the following passage:

We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and China. We have serious differences with these two nations, and must regard them with open eyes, but we are not bound to be adversaries. We should seek common ground based on shared interests.

Russia, for instance, has also seen the horror of Islamic terrorism. I believe an easing of tensions, and improved relations with Russia from a position of strength

³⁷¹⁵ (U) Email, Gates to Manafort, April 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010810-10823) (attaching draft speech).

³⁷¹⁶ (U) “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech,” *The New York Times*, April 27, 2016 (transcribed by the Federal News Service).

³⁷¹⁷ (U) Email, Christie to Lewandowski and Manafort, April 22, 2016 (DJTFP00010834, 10842).

³⁷¹⁸ (U) Email, Kubic to Lewandowski, April 23, 2016 (DJTFP00010873, 10882).

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only is possible, absolutely possible. Common sense says this cycle, this horrible cycle of hostility must end and ideally will end soon. Good for both countries.

*Some say the Russians won't be reasonable. I intend to find out. If we can't make a deal under my administration, a deal that's great – not good, great – for America, but also good for Russia, then we will quickly walk from the table. It's as simple as that. We're going to find out.*³⁷¹⁹

(U) While the speech touched on many other topics, the only other topic of tangential relation to Russia was Trump's criticism regarding unfair burden-sharing among NATO allies, a theme Trump was already voicing in public.³⁷²⁰

iii. (U) The VIP Reception

(U) CNI organized a reception before the speech for "VIP" attendees in a space cordoned off by a curtain in the same room used for the speech. The reception included approximately 20-25 attendees, mostly members of Congress and ambassadors. Trump arrived approximately 15 minutes before the speech and a reception line in the designated VIP area was assembled to meet him. This was where Trump met Kislyak.³⁷²¹ Simes introduced them and observed only an exchange of pleasantries between the two. Simes told the Committee that he believed this was the first time the two met, and that "they were not familiar with each other."³⁷²² Jared Kushner, who accompanied Trump for this event, told the Committee that he also shook Kislyak's hand and that the ambassador told him: "I really like what he's saying; America and Russia should have a good relationship; we don't have one now with the current administration; and I hope if President Trump wins that will change."³⁷²³

(U) In addition to Simes, Kushner, and Miller, the Committee interviewed the following Trump Campaign staffers who attended the speech: Cory Lewandowski, Hope Hicks, John Mashburn, J.D. Gordon, and Rick Dearborn. The Committee also interviewed Sandy Luff, who during 2016 had served as Legislative Director for Session's Senate office. None of them knew at the time who the Russian ambassador was, nor what he looked like, but most of them were attending to various duties and were not in the reception area. The Committee notes that, by election night, 2016, neither Kushner nor Hicks could recall the name of the Russian ambassador

³⁷¹⁹ (U) "Transcript: Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Speech," *The New York Times*, April 27, 2016 (transcribed by the Federal News Service).

³⁷²⁰ (U) For example, Trump raised this issue in on-the-record interviews with *The Washington Post* on March 25, 2016 (published March 26) and *The New York Times* on March 21, 2016.

³⁷²¹ (U) Simes Tr., pp. 53–58.

³⁷²² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 67. Simes told the Committee he had lunch with Kislyak the week prior and that Kislyak "indicated to me he did not know Mr. Trump."

³⁷²³ (U) Kushner Tr., p. 26

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when they were contacted by the Embassy to pass on congratulations to Trump for winning the election.³⁷²⁴

(U) Sessions attended the Mayflower event as chairman of Trump's national security advisory committee. During his January 10, 2017, confirmation hearing on his nomination to be Attorney General, Sessions failed to reveal several meetings with Kislyak to the Judiciary Committee.³⁷²⁵ According to an amended submission from Sessions, these included a meeting with Ambassador Kislyak in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016 and an encounter with the Ambassador at the July 2016 Republican National Convention in Cleveland. However, Sessions consistently said he could not recall meeting Kislyak at the Mayflower event.³⁷²⁶

(U) The Committee held an open hearing with Sessions to address this issue on June 13, 2017. In prepared remarks issued as a Department of Justice press release on the same day, Sessions stated:

Though I do recall several conversations I had during that pre-speech reception, I do not have any recollection of meeting or talking to the Russian Ambassador or any other Russian officials. If any brief interaction occurred in passing with the Russian Ambassador during that reception, I do not remember it But whether I ever attended a reception where the Russian Ambassador was also present is entirely beside the point of this investigation into Russian interference with the 2016 campaigns. Let me state clearly: I have never met with or had any conversations with Russians or any foreign officials concerning any type of interference with any campaign or election. Further, I have no knowledge of any such conversations by anyone connected to the Trump campaign.³⁷²⁷

(U) When Vice Chairman Warner pressed Sessions on his failure to recall his meeting with Kislyak at the Mayflower, Sessions responded: "I don't recall it, Senator Warner. It would've been certainly, I can assure you, nothing improper, if I'd had a conversation with him. And it's conceivable that it occurred. I just don't remember it."³⁷²⁸

³⁷²⁴ (U) Simes Tr., p. 113; Kushner Tr., p. 55.

³⁷²⁵ (U) Senate Judiciary Committee, "Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Jeff Sessions to be Attorney General of the United States," January 10-11, 2017.

³⁷²⁶ (U) Letter, Sessions to Grassley and Feinstein, March 6, 2017.

³⁷²⁷ (U) "Attorney General Jeff Sessions Prepared Remarks To The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," June 13, 2017.

³⁷²⁸ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing with Jeff Sessions, June 13, 2017, p. 37.

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(U) The Committee asked multiple individuals in attendance at the event that day if they saw Sessions and Kislyak together.³⁷²⁹ All knew Senator Sessions, but none knew who the Russian ambassador was. Thus, they could not speak to seeing them together. In the spring of 2017 following Sessions' confirmation hearing, CNI issued a statement that said: "We are not aware of any conversation between Ambassador Kislyak and Senator Jeff Sessions at the reception. However, in a small group setting like this one, we consider it unlikely that anyone could have engaged in a meaningful private conversation without drawing attention from others present."³⁷³⁰ The Committee asked Simes about his recollection of any encounter between Sessions and Kislyak. Simes told the Committee: "I did not focus on who was talking to who. But since you asked and since it became an issue, I have looked into this after the event, and I could not find a single person who saw Mr. Kislyak and Mr. Sessions talking to each other."³⁷³¹

[REDACTED]

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³⁷²⁹ (U) These included Cory Lewandowski, Hope Hicks, J.D. Gordon, Rick Dearborn, Sandy Luff, Jared Kushner, John Mashburn, and Stephen Miller.

³⁷³⁰ (U) "Statement Regarding President Trump's April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the Center for the National Interest," *The National Interest*, March 8, 2017. *The National Interest* is the flagship journal of CNI.

³⁷³¹ (U) Simes Tr., p. 64.

³⁷³²

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H. (U) Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) The Committee sought to understand the activities of Russian national Maria Butina and Russian government official Alexander Torshin related to the 2016 U.S. election. Starting in 2013, and continuing over a several year period, Butina and Torshin established a broad network of relationships with the leaders of the National Rifle Association (NRA), conservative political operatives, Republican government officials, and individuals connected to the Trump Campaign, and took steps to establish informal communications channels to influence American government policy towards Russia. Butina and Torshin's activities were known to and almost certainly approved by the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In December 2018, Butina pleaded guilty to failing to register as a foreign agent of Russia for her U.S. activities. The Committee sought to understand whether Butina's and Torshin's activities, and that of their associates, amounted to a counterintelligence threat.

(U) During its investigation, the Committee interviewed a number of individuals with direct insight into the nature of Butina and Torshin's activities. The Committee interviewed Butina on April 16, 2018.³⁷³⁶ However, the Committee faced significant limitations in its efforts to fully understand Butina and Torshin's activities. In particular, the Committee's ability to gain insights into elements of their efforts that occurred in Russia was limited, and the Committee never spoke with Torshin. The Committee's inability to compel testimony from Butina's close associate and financial backer Paul Erickson also hindered its ability to fully address some aspects of Butina and Torshin's activities.³⁷³⁷

(U) The Committee found that Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin engaged in a multi-year influence campaign and intelligence-gathering effort targeting the NRA, the Republican Party, and conservative U.S. political organizations for the benefit of the Russian government. Their goal was to develop and use backchannel communications to influence U.S. policy outside of the formal diplomatic process to Russia's advantage and to the detriment of the United States.

(U) Torshin's and Butina's efforts began in at least 2013 and continued until at least 2018. Torshin and Butina initially leveraged Torshin's existing relationships with the NRA's

³⁷³⁶ (U) Butina's testimony was frequently incomplete and misleading.

³⁷³⁷ (U) Erickson did produce documents pursuant to a Committee subpoena, but he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in response to a subpoena for his testimony. Erickson was indicted in February 2019 for money laundering and wire fraud. See U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South Dakota, "Sioux Falls Man Charged with Wire Fraud and Money Laundering," February 7, 2019. Documents were also produced to the Committee by the NRA, sporadically and on a rolling basis, beginning in October 2018 and lasting through February 2020, which substantially constrained the Committee's ability to make use of the later-produced materials. It is not clear to the Committee why the NRA's production was delayed so significantly.

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senior leadership. In 2015, Butina and Torshin hosted several NRA leaders in Moscow, where they convened meetings between the NRA delegation, Russian oligarchs, and other Kremlin-connected figures, including individuals subject to U.S. sanctions. The NRA delegation welcomed these interactions, and some later facilitated Torshin and Butina's continuing efforts by inviting them to events in the United States and making introductions. Over time, Butina and Torshin gained further access to U.S. conservative political circles and met prominent Republican figures such as a Republican candidate for president, a Republican congressman, and Donald Trump Jr.

(U) Torshin was Butina's primary backer and link to elements of the Russian government. Torshin advised Butina on where to focus her efforts and assisted her in making inroads with the NRA and elsewhere. Butina reported back to Torshin on her U.S. activities, including in written papers that she understood Torshin would share with Russian government entities, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Butina's reports included assessments of the Republican Party's presidential nominees; the NRA's relationship with the Republican Party; and individuals who were of potential interest to Russian influence efforts.

[REDACTED]

(U) Butina provided Torshin with written assessments of Republican presidential candidates, including their likelihood of winning the Republican Party nomination and the general election. After Trump became the presumptive nominee, and throughout the general election, Butina and Torshin focused their influence efforts on the Trump Campaign to shape the incoming Trump administration's position on Russia. On several occasions, Butina and Torshin attempted to negotiate meetings for themselves with Trump and between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

[REDACTED]

The Committee found Butina's and Torshin's connection to Dmitry Rogozin significant [REDACTED]

(U) Butina had support from, and contact with, numerous Kremlin-linked oligarchs, whom she and Torshin introduced to NRA visitors in Moscow. These individuals included Konstantin Nikolaev, a major financial backer of Butina’s gun-rights organization with reported ties to the Russian Presidential Administration and Russian security services, and U.S.-sanctioned Dmitry Rogozin, then the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian defense and space industries.

(U) Butina’s access to the NRA and conservative political organizations was greatly enabled by Americans, including Paul Erickson and David Keene. Erickson was almost certainly aware that she was acting in furtherance of Russian government interests and coordinating her activities with Torshin. Erickson and Keene helped Butina identify opportunities to advance her goals, including by inviting and accompanying her to conferences and meetings and introducing her to politically-active individuals.

2. (U) Background on Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin

i. (U) Maria Butina

(U) Butina was born in Barnaul, Russia, a city in Siberia, and graduated from Altai State University in 2010.³⁷³⁸ In 2010, Butina, whose father had taught her how to shoot, founded a small gun rights organization in Barnaul.³⁷³⁹ Then, after starting a regional furniture chain, Butina said that she moved to Moscow in 2011 with the intention of growing her business.³⁷⁴⁰ Because the furniture business did not seem viable in Moscow, she sold the business and turned to work in social media advertising.³⁷⁴¹ She also shifted her attention back to the gun rights organization, expanding the group’s membership and ultimately registering it as a nation-wide organization under the name “Right to Bear Arms” in 2014.³⁷⁴²

(U) Although private gun ownership is generally outlawed in Russia, Butina explained that she had little difficulty in growing her organization and obtaining national registration.³⁷⁴³ Butina acknowledged general opposition by the Russian government to gun rights, but said her

³⁷³⁸ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Maria Butina, April 16, 2018, p. 5. In 2008, Butina briefly participated in a program run by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in association with Vladimir Ryzhkov, a former Russian government official who she described as an “oppositional figure” who had funding from Mikhail Khodorkovsky. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 100–101.

³⁷³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁷⁴⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

³⁷⁴¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁷⁴² (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.

³⁷⁴³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9 (“We didn’t have any formal resistance. We had problems with [the] change in registration, because it’s a bit controversial by default, as you may guess.”).

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group was able to work with the Duma.³⁷⁴⁴ According to Butina, the organization eventually grew to over 10,000 members.³⁷⁴⁵

(U) Butina in part chalked her success up to “good lawyers.”³⁷⁴⁶ But, she also benefited from broad connections to Russian government officials and oligarchs, including Alexander Torshin, Konstantin Nikolaev, and Dmitry Rogozin, among others.

(U) Butina told the Committee that she met Alexander Torshin in 2011 or 2012, during her first year in Moscow, following a public demonstration by her group. Torshin, who at the time was the first vice chairman of the Federation Council—ostensibly Russia’s version of the Senate—attended the demonstration, and Butina said she knew him from his Twitter account.³⁷⁴⁷ Butina subsequently met with Torshin in his office and they “became friends.”³⁷⁴⁸ When Torshin later became the Deputy Governor of Russia’s Central Bank, Butina took the title of his “special assistant,” accompanied him on trips to the United States, was present for interactions with the NRA and U.S. political figures, and also provided English interpretation and translation.³⁷⁴⁹

(U) In addition to Torshin’s support, Butina also secured financial backing for her gun rights organization from two significant Russian funders: Konstantin Nikolaev and Igor Zaytsev.³⁷⁵⁰

(U) Nikolaev, a Russian oligarch with reported ties to the Russian Presidential Administration and Russian security services,³⁷⁵¹ is a part owner of Russian private rail transport company N-trans,³⁷⁵² and serves on the board of American Ethane, a Houston-based ethane company chaired by Mikhail Yuriev, a former Deputy Chairman of the Russian Parliament.³⁷⁵³

³⁷⁴⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³⁷⁴⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁷⁴⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁷⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

³⁷⁴⁸ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³⁷⁴⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 18–21.

³⁷⁵⁰ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

³⁷⁵¹ (U) Mike McIntire, “Billionaire Backer of Maria Butina Had Russian Security Ties,” *The New York Times*, September 21, 2018; Jon Swaine, “Maria Butina: ties emerge between NRA, alleged spy and Russian billionaire,” *The Guardian*, July 26, 2018.

³⁷⁵² (U) *Butina Tr.*, p. 181.

³⁷⁵³ (U) See Letter, Yuriev to U.S. Department of State, April 26, 2015 (TSG000700–01). Nikolaev’s son, Andrey, was also in communication with Darren Blanton around and following inauguration. Written Responses, Blanton, August 16, 2019. Blanton is a businessman who secured a contract (through his relationships with Michael Flynn and Steve Bannon) to provide social media influencing for the Trump Campaign in 2016. See *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.J.4.

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Butina told the Committee that Nikolaev supported gun rights because he was a libertarian,³⁷⁵⁴ but also acknowledged that Nikolaev is an investor in a major Russian gun manufacturer run by his wife.³⁷⁵⁵ According to Butina, Nikolaev approached her through an individual named Igor Pisarsky to offer financial backing with no strings attached: “we don’t want anything; you do whatever you want; we just support this issue.”³⁷⁵⁶

(U) Butina described Zaytsev, her other donor, only as the owner of a chain of jewelry stores outside of Moscow.³⁷⁵⁷

(U) Butina also found an ally in Dmitry Rogozin, who served as a Deputy Prime Minister of Russia over the defense and space industries from 2011 to 2018.³⁷⁵⁸ Rogozin was Russia’s ambassador to NATO from 2008 to 2011.³⁷⁵⁹ In March 2014, he was sanctioned by the United States for his role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.³⁷⁶⁰ As of May 2018, Rogozin was appointed to serve as the General Director of the Russian State Corporation for Space (Roscosmos).³⁷⁶¹ Rogozin had no formal role with Butina’s group, but he was on the board—along with Torshin—of the “Federal Practical Shooting Association,” a Russian organization that promotes shooting competitions.³⁷⁶² Butina told the Committee that Rogozin also led a group to advocate for changes to Russian gun rights laws that brought together manufacturers and advocacy organizations, on which Butina had a seat.³⁷⁶³

[REDACTED]

³⁷⁵⁴ (U) Butina Tr., pp. 22, 125.

³⁷⁵⁵ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 178.

³⁷⁵⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 182. Butina described Pisarsky as a “PR person” who she said “has done several presidential campaigns for pro-government candidates and anti-government candidates in Russia.” *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³⁷⁵⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

³⁷⁵⁸ [REDACTED] Butina recalled that Rogozin “control[ed] the military complex of Russia.” Butina Tr., p. 156.

Rogozin met with Putin regularly. *See* Event Feed, President of Russia, kremlin.ru (readouts of meetings between Putin and Rogozin).

³⁷⁵⁹ (U) “Putin Picks Dmitry Rogozin, a leading nationalist, to be NATO envoy,” *The New York Times*, January 10, 2008; Lada Korotun, “Russian Senators approve Grushko to be Russia’s new ambassador to NATO,” *Atlantic Council*, July 17, 2012.

³⁷⁶⁰ (U) The White House, “FACT Sheet: Ukraine-Related Sanctions,” March 17, 2014.

³⁷⁶¹ (U) Events, “Dmitry Rogozin appointed General Director of Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities,” kremlin.ru, May 24, 2018.

³⁷⁶² (U) Butina Tr., pp. 183–184.

³⁷⁶³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 186–187.

³⁷⁶⁴ [REDACTED]

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(U) Butina told the Committee that she eventually determined that she “need[ed] to take an absence” from Russia and “get an education in the West.”³⁷⁶⁷ She matriculated to the American University School of International Service and started living full-time in the United States in May 2016.³⁷⁶⁸ Emails between Erickson and Butina suggest that Erickson funded at least part of Butina’s education and living expenses, either directly or through Bridges LLC.³⁷⁶⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

³⁷⁶⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁷⁶⁶ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁷⁶⁷ (U) Butina Tr., p. 6.

³⁷⁶⁸ (U) *Ibid.*; Email, Butina to Erickson, May 31, 2016 (MB 0002918). The Committee requested documents pertaining to Butina from American University. The documents were ultimately not produced, despite negotiations over the request.

³⁷⁶⁹ (U) *See, e.g.*, Butina Tr., pp. 117, 121–22, 154; Email, Singh to Erickson, May 16, 2016 (MB 0001553) (approving apartment lease application for Maria Butina); Check, Bridges LLC to Butina in the amount of \$10,000, February 1, 2016 (signed by Paul Erickson for “February distribution,” submitted as proof of income verification).

³⁷⁷⁰

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additional information on [REDACTED] and the Trump Tower Proposal is provided *infra* Vol 5, Sec. III.D.3.v.

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[REDACTED] The Committee assesses that the nature and extent of Butina’s contacts and certain communications are indicative of work for the Russian intelligence services and inconsistent with her claims to the Committee about her activities and intentions in the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) On December 13, 2018, Butina pleaded guilty to conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of Russia during her time in the United States.³⁷⁸⁰ Butina admitted that, beginning in at least March 2015, she sought to establish and use “unofficial lines of communication with Americans having influence over U.S. politics,” at the direction of Torshin and for the benefit of the Russian government.³⁷⁸¹ On April 26, 2019, Butina was sentenced to 18 months in prison, including time served, and released back to Russia on October 25, 2019. The Committee’s investigation encompassed conduct that relates to her guilty plea, as discussed further below.

ii. (U) Alexander Torshin

(U) Alexander Porfiryevich Torshin is a Putin-aligned Russian politician who has served in legislative and executive capacities in the Russian government and has supported Kremlin influence operations targeting the United States and its democratic processes.

(U) In 2015, Torshin was appointed as the State Secretary – Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. He retired from his post on November 30, 2018.³⁷⁸² The Central Bank of Russia is part of the Russian government and operates as the country’s central bank and monetary authority. Prior to his Central Bank appointment, Torshin was the First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.³⁷⁸³ He was a member of the Federation Council from 2001 to 2015.³⁷⁸⁴

³⁷⁷⁹ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸⁰ (U) See Statement of Offense, *United States v. Mariia Butina*, Case 1:18-cr-00218-TSC (D.D.C. December 13, 2018). Butina had been arrested on July 15, 2018.

³⁷⁸¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁷⁸² (U) Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Press Service, “Personnel Changes,” November 30, 2018.

³⁷⁸³ (U) See, e.g., Alexander Torshin, “Terror from the Caucasus,” *The National Interest*, March 24, 2011. On April 6, 2018, Torshin was listed among 17 Russian government officials sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for Russia’s global “malign activity.” Treasury, “Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity,” April 6, 2018.

³⁷⁸⁴

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(U) Public reporting indicates that Torshin’s targeting of U.S. political figures began as early as 2009, with then-Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska. According to documents released by the Alaska Governor’s Office in response to a public records request, an aide wrote to Palin in May 2009 that she had “received a request to call the Russian Ambassador regarding a proposed visit by Mr. Alexander Torshin, First Deputy Chairman of the Federal Council of the Russian Federal Assembly.” The office referred the meeting to the Lt. Governor, who later said that he did not recall meeting with Torshin.³⁷⁸⁷

³⁷⁸⁵ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸⁶ [REDACTED]

³⁷⁸⁷ (U) Tim Mak, “Documents Reveal How Russian Official Courtied Conservatives In U.S. Since 2009,” *NPR*, May 11, 2018.

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(U) In 2011, Torshin met David Keene, the incoming-NRA president, at the annual NRA convention in Pittsburgh through the NRA Secretary, Jim Land.³⁷⁸⁸ Keene understood that Torshin was “the speaker of the upper house” of the Russian legislature and assumed Torshin had a “good relationship” with the government.³⁷⁸⁹ According to Butina and press reporting, Tennessee attorney G. Kline Preston may also have been involved in the introduction.³⁷⁹⁰

(U) Keene said that Torshin was “looking for assistance to try and validate his efforts to reform gun laws in Russia” and “wanted the association” with the NRA for that purpose.³⁷⁹¹ Keene also told the Committee that when he and Torshin spoke, Keene “spent a lot of time talking about the NRA’s role and how we promote our policies,” which likely gave Torshin insight into the connections between the NRA and U.S. politics.³⁷⁹²

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(U) Torshin registered as a life member of the NRA on February 10, 2012. The membership lists the email address of Igor Matveev, a Russian diplomatic official with whom he traveled to the United States in 2012, and G. Kline Preston’s phone number.³⁷⁹⁵

³⁷⁸⁸ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with David Keene, p. 22. In a written statement to the Committee, which he described as a draft but still provided, Keene said that Torshin had asked for the introduction. *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21, 25; *see* Written Statement, Keene to SSCI (Keene Production 000297). In his interview, however, Keene hedged: “I don’t know that, actually. That’s what I put, but he may well have. Or Jim may have suggested or he may have said: You’re getting a new president [of the NRA]; could I meet him?” Keene Tr., p. 25.

³⁷⁸⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³⁷⁹⁰ (U) Butina Tr., p. 44; Anita Wadhvani, Joel Ebert, “Nashville lawyer who introduced Russian operative to the NRA has ties to Blackburn,” *The Tennessean*, March 20, 2018.

³⁷⁹¹ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

³⁷⁹² (U) *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³⁷⁹³

³⁷⁹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁷⁹⁵ (U) Email, Robinson to Grable, November 22, 2017 (NRA Production, 0000328, 0000333) (attaching screenshot of NRA membership records for Torshin and Butina); Email, Grable to Hallow, November 22, 2017 (NRA Production, 0000335).

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The screenshot shows a web page titled "The NRA Membership Lookup PAGE..." with a red header. Below the header, there is a search bar and a "GO BACK TO LIST SEARCH" link. The main content area displays the following information:

ALEXANDER P TORSHIN
FEDERATION COUNCIL
BOLSHAYA DMITROVKA, 26
MOSCOW
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Name & Address: [Copy Label](#)

Membership Information	Member Information
Old NRA ID:	Date of Birth:
New NRA ID: 185431121	Phone Number: 611
Membership Type: Regular Life	Email Address: iamatorshin
Expiration Date: 12/31/2075	
Magazine: No Magazine	
Ballot:	
Mail Promote: YES	
Phone Promote: YES	
Fax Promote: YES	
Email Promote: YES	

(U) In 2012, Preston invited Torshin to Tennessee to observe the U.S. presidential election.³⁷⁹⁶ Matveev joined Torshin.³⁷⁹⁷ Preston also reportedly accompanied Torshin to observe Russian elections in 2011, 2012 and 2016.³⁷⁹⁸ The Committee did not examine the origins of the relationship between Preston and Torshin, although Preston and Torshin were in contact during the 2016 U.S. election cycle.³⁷⁹⁹

³⁷⁹⁶ (U) The Tennessee Secretary of State acknowledged this in a statement to *NPR*. Tim Mak, “Depth of Russian Politician’s Cultivation of NRA Ties Revealed,” *NPR*, March 1, 2018. Documents released to *NPR* in response to public records requests include an October 11, 2012, memorandum for the Tennessee Secretary of State, regarding “Kline Preston,” which states that “Russian Senator Alexander Torshin would like to observe our Presidential election.” Tim Mak, “Documents Reveal How Russian Official Courted Conservatives In U.S. Since 2009,” *NPR*, May 11, 2018. Torshin later posted a photo of himself in line at a polling place on Twitter on election day. See Tweet, @torshin_ru, November 8, 2012.

³⁷⁹⁷ (U) Documents released to *NPR* in response to public records requests also include an email from the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections dated October 11, 2012, stating “The gentlemen from Russia who are coming to observe the election are: Senator Alexander P. Torshin and Mr. Igor A. Matveev. . . . Kline Preston will be the local host.” Tim Mak, “Documents Reveal How Russian Official Courted Conservatives In U.S. Since 2009,” *NPR*, May 11, 2018.

³⁷⁹⁸ (U) Preston describes these trips on his law firm website. See klineprestonlaw.com/services/international-law (“Mr. Preston has served as an election observer in three Russian elections: the 2011 Parliamentary Elections, the 2012 Presidential Elections and the 2016 Parliamentary Elections.”). Preston has also spoken about these trips in the press. See, e.g., Tim Mak, “Documents Reveal How Russian Official Courted Conservatives In U.S. Since 2009,” *NPR*, May 11, 2018.

³⁷⁹⁹ (U) Twitter direct messages, Torshin and Preston (Preston Production).

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3. (U) Torshin and Butina Establish Relations with the NRA

(U) In 2013, several NRA members—most notably its former President, David Keene—visited Moscow at Torshin’s invitation to attend a conference hosted by Butina, where Keene had been asked to give remarks.³⁸⁰⁰ This trip marked the beginning of Butina’s access to the NRA and conservative U.S. political organizations.

i. (U) 2013 NRA Trip to Moscow

(U) Torshin invited Keene to Moscow to speak to Butina’s organization, the Right to Bear Arms, at its second annual conference in October 2013.³⁸⁰¹ At the time, Keene had not met Butina and her organization was relatively small, but he still accepted the invitation.³⁸⁰² He went in his official NRA capacity, and the NRA paid for his trip.³⁸⁰³

(U) The NRA hired Paul Erickson³⁸⁰⁴ to do advance work on the trip and accompany Keene, even though he did not speak Russian and Keene did not know if he had been to Moscow before.³⁸⁰⁵ Erickson and Keene had known each other for about a decade.³⁸⁰⁶ Keene said that Erickson picked the Marriott hotel, arranged a museum visit, and selected restaurants for lunch,³⁸⁰⁷ although Erickson’s emails indicate that Butina made those arrangements herself.³⁸⁰⁸

(U) On October 17, 2013, in their first contact known to the Committee, Erickson emailed Butina with details about his and Keene’s travel itinerary.³⁸⁰⁹ Erickson advised that Keene “may have one (1) formal diplomatic meeting on Wednesday, October 30 in the

³⁸⁰⁰ (U) Keene was NRA president from May 2011 to May 2013 and has been on the board since 2000. Keene Tr., pp. 6–7, 46.

³⁸⁰¹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 42. Butina recalled things differently, saying that Torshin provided her with a business card for an NRA staff member and that she sent the NRA an email invitation. Butina Tr., p. 24.

³⁸⁰² (U) Keene Tr., pp. 42, 46–47.

³⁸⁰³ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.

³⁸⁰⁴ (U) On November 18, 2019, Erickson pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of money laundering, arising out of fraudulent schemes that resulted in over \$2.3 million in loss, affecting over 78 people. *See* Plea Agreement and Statement of Factual Basis, *United States v. Paul Erickson*, 4:19-cr-40015 (D.S.D. November 18, 2019). Documents reviewed by the Committee suggest that Butina may have been involved in one of Erickson’s schemes relating to the sale of land in North Dakota, and count eight of the indictment, a charge to which Erickson pleaded guilty, references a check made out to “M.B.” As noted elsewhere, Erickson may have used some of these funds to help Butina finance her education.

³⁸⁰⁵ (U) Keene Tr., pp. 44–45.

³⁸⁰⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.

³⁸⁰⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³⁸⁰⁸ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, October 18, 2013 (PAE0002659–2660).

³⁸⁰⁹ (U) Email, Erickson to Butina, October 17, 2013 (PAE0000078).

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afternoon,” after his and Keene’s arrival.³⁸¹⁰ Butina responded with an invitation on Torshin’s behalf for a 4:00 p.m. lunch on October 30.³⁸¹¹ Erickson and Keene accepted the lunch invitation.³⁸¹²

(U) After Keene arrived in Moscow on October 30, he had dinner with Torshin and Torshin’s wife.³⁸¹³ He did not recall any other meetings with government officials, although emails between Erickson and Butina suggest that Keene was scheduled to meet with Dmitri Peskov, the Press Secretary for the Russian Presidential Administration, on the evening of November 1.³⁸¹⁴ The convention itself took place on October 31 and November 1, and Keene was scheduled to give remarks on the second day.³⁸¹⁵ Keene told the Committee that he spoke about “the history of firearms restrictions and freedoms in the United States.”³⁸¹⁶ The event was attended by several hundred participants, from Russia and fifteen other countries.³⁸¹⁷

(U) Following the convention, Butina and Erickson remained in contact. On November 3 and 7, 2013, Butina emailed Erickson and asked that he “refrain from publishing photos” of Keene and Torshin “during [their] personal meeting at the restaurant,” recommending instead that he only share photos from the conference.³⁸¹⁸ She explained, “I need time to think about how to position the issue.”³⁸¹⁹ Butina also advised Erickson: “Our officials are very closely following the publication of journalists abroad.”³⁸²⁰ Butina told the Committee that she was concerned “Torshin would be very much criticized for his pro-American position.”³⁸²¹ However, Torshin had been regularly attending NRA events for several years and was, according to Butina, already an open supporter of her organization, and gun rights, generally, and the conference attracted “a lot of media coverage.”³⁸²² Erickson accommodated the request.³⁸²³

³⁸¹⁰ (U) Email, Erickson to Butina, October 17, 2013 (PAE0000078). The Committee did not determine which meeting Erickson was referring to.

³⁸¹¹ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, October 18, 2013 (PAE0002659–2660).

³⁸¹² (U) See Emails, Erickson and Butina, October 18, 2013 (PAE0002658).

³⁸¹³ (U) Keene Tr., p. 48.

³⁸¹⁴ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 54; Email, Erickson to Butina, October 31, 2013 (PAE0001376–1377) (“I will be free Friday night after 9 PM (at the conclusion of Mr. Keene’s meeting with Dmitri Peskov).”).

³⁸¹⁵ (U) Schedule of speeches, Program of the Second Annual Meeting (Keene Production 000017).

³⁸¹⁶ (U) Written Statement, Keene to SSCI (Keene Production 000298).

³⁸¹⁷ (U) Keene Tr., p. 54; Butina Tr., p. 26.

³⁸¹⁸ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, November 3, 2013 (PAE0000047); Email, Butina to Erickson, November 7, 2013 (PAE0002843, 2827).

³⁸¹⁹ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, November 3, 2013 (PAE0000047).

³⁸²⁰ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, November 7, 2013 (PAE0002843).

³⁸²¹ (U) Butina Tr., p. 31.

³⁸²² (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.

³⁸²³ (U) Email, Erickson to Butina, November 7, 2013 (PAE0002843).

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(U) On November 6, 2013, Erickson also began assisting Butina in applying for a visa to the United States to visit the NRA “for advice and guidance.”³⁸²⁴ This is the first instance that the Committee is aware of in which Butina used the NRA as a basis for travel to the United States. The Committee found no evidence that this trip occurred, but Butina and Erickson met in Israel in early 2014, when they first became romantically involved.³⁸²⁵ Over time, Erickson became integral to Butina’s activities and assisted her in developing relationships with individuals and organizations involved in U.S. politics.

ii. (U) Butina and Torshin Pursue Follow-up Contacts with the NRA; John Bolton Records a Video for Butina’s Organization

(U) Butina and Torshin pursued several additional contacts with the NRA following the conference.

(U) First, Butina and Torshin requested additional American support for Russian gun rights legislation following the conference, which culminated in remarks by John Bolton to be presented to the Duma.³⁸²⁶ Keene, responding to a request from either Torshin or Butina, contacted Bolton for the event.³⁸²⁷ Keene did not recall mentioning Torshin’s name to Bolton, but did tell Bolton that the request had come from the speaker of the Duma.³⁸²⁸

(U) In a letter to the Committee, Keene wrote that Torshin told him “Bolton’s speech went over very well and that he [Bolton] received a standing ovation from the Russian Senate on its completion.”³⁸²⁹ It is not clear that Bolton’s remarks were part of a formal Duma proceeding, however. According to Butina, Bolton simply taped the remarks and they were subsequently transmitted to Butina by Erickson on December 9, 2013.³⁸³⁰ Butina then showed the video the following day at a session that included Duma members and also her organization.³⁸³¹

³⁸²⁴ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, November 6, 2013 (PAE0002849–2852); Email, Erickson to Butina, November 7, 2013 (PAE0000906, 899); Email, Butina to Erickson, November 12, 2013 (PAE0000769) (attaching copy of draft visa application).

³⁸²⁵ (U) Butina Tr., p. 104.

³⁸²⁶ (U) Written Statement, Keene to SSCI (Keene Production, 000298).

³⁸²⁷ (U) Recollections varied about exactly how this transpired. According to Butina, it was her idea to find a “respect[ed] American politician or NRA member who would address [her] group and endorse [it].” She asked Erickson, who in turn asked Keene, and they came back with the idea to use Bolton. Butina Tr., p. 251–52. Keene recalled that Torshin asked him to find an American speaker to talk about gun rights at an upcoming meeting of the Duma. Keene said that Torshin specifically asked for an American, but did not want someone from the NRA. Keene proposed John Bolton, who was a friend of his, and Torshin agreed. Keene Tr., pp. 81–82.

³⁸²⁸ (U) Keene Tr., pp. 82–83.

³⁸²⁹ (U) Written Statement, Keene to SSCI (Keene Production, 000298).

³⁸³⁰ (U) Email, Erickson to Butina, December 9, 2013 (PAE0000072).

³⁸³¹ (U) Email, Erickson to Butina, December 11, 2013 (PAE0003013); Photograph of Bolton’s remarks to Butina’s organization (PAE0001217). The Committee did not seek to engage with Bolton.



(U) On December 13, Keene emailed Butina directly to follow up on the Bolton video. He also asked for advice from Butina and Torshin on whether to invite Dmitry Rogozin to an event in Las Vegas in 2014:

I'm glad the Bolton tape worked out and I hope we helped a little. A friend of the NRA here called me to ask a favor the other day. He is apparently a friend of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin who would like to attend the S.H.O.T. Show in Las Vegas in January. Rogozin is, according to my friend, a firearms lover and has heard that the show is something worth attending. . . . My friend asked if I would be willing to have NSSF invite Rogozin and I told him I would get back to him. In all that has to do with Russia, we take our lead from you and Senator Torshin. If the two of you think we should do this favor, I will. If not, we won't. If you want me to arrange the invitation, we can make clear that the favor is being done because of our friendship with Torshin.³⁸³²

³⁸³² (U) Email, Keene to Butina, December 13, 2013 (PAE0000302, PAE0000296).

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(U) Later that day, Butina responded with her and Torshin's recommendation to extend the invitation to Rogozin:

*We talked with Mr. Torshin on your invitation [to] Mr. Rogozin. We are confident that this will greatly strengthen our position in Russia. Dmitry O. really is a great lover of weapons. Moreover, I am a member of one of his expert groups for changes in our legislation on weapons. If you mention in conversation about Senator Torshin and me it would be great!*³⁸³³

(U) In addition, in early November 2013, Butina and Erickson discussed the concept of an NRA-hosted event in Moscow in 2014 to honor Butina's group, Torshin, and General Mikhail Kalashnikov, an idea that Torshin and Keene had raised during the Right to Bear Arms conference. Erickson characterized the idea as having "HIGH importance to the NRA," and suggested that "the NRA would bring its top officers and key supporters to Moscow in a show of support for your work." He added: "Our hope would be that Sen. Torshin would be featured at this banquet AND, if appropriate, that Sen. Torshin would invite President Putin to attend as well."³⁸³⁴ Keene explained the idea to the Committee as a way to raise funds from the NRA's most significant donors, who comprise the NRA's "Ring of Freedom" group.³⁸³⁵

(U) Keene said that the idea did not come to fruition because of souring diplomatic relations and because Kalashnikov passed away in December 2013.³⁸³⁶ In January 2014, Keene—the opinion editor at *The Washington Times*—published an op-ed by Torshin about Kalashnikov, which Butina and Erickson helped translate to English.³⁸³⁷

iii. (U) Butina Attends the 2014 NRA Annual Meetings in Indianapolis

(U) In April 2014, Butina attended the NRA's annual meetings in Indianapolis. Torshin did not accompany her.³⁸³⁸ This was her first trip to the United States, although she had previously been rejected for a visa.³⁸³⁹ She obtained her visa for this trip with Keene and Erickson's assistance,³⁸⁴⁰ and in one email to Keene, Butina asked for advice to prepare for her interview:

³⁸³³ (U) Email, Butina to Keene, December 13, 2013 (PAE0000620).

³⁸³⁴ (U) Email, Erickson to Butina, November 7, 2013 (PAE0000087-88).

³⁸³⁵ (U) Keene Tr., p. 23.

³⁸³⁶ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³⁸³⁷ (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58; Butina Tr., pp. 42-43; Alexandr Torshin, "Kalashnikov, the man and the weapon," *The Washington Times*, January 2, 2014.

³⁸³⁸ (U) Butina Tr., pp. 24-25.

³⁸³⁹ (U) *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁸⁴⁰ (U) Email, Erickson to Keene and Hallow, April 7, 2014 (PAE0000626, PAE0000633-635) (forwarding Butina's update on her visa interview and advising that "we need to make our visa assistance calls in the next 48

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*Is there anything that I should say – or not say – in this interview in light of your calls made on my behalf? I don't want to say the wrong thing, or not say the right thing, that would undo the steps you've taken on my behalf.*³⁸⁴¹

Keene responded, “Don't mention calls. Just proceed as normal course of business.”³⁸⁴² Keene told the Committee that he had spoken with a staff member for then-Congressman Edward Royce to help Butina's visa efforts, which he described as a “standard call.”³⁸⁴³

(U) Butina arrived in Indianapolis on April 22.³⁸⁴⁴ While at the annual meetings, Butina planned to meet with Keene,³⁸⁴⁵ and Keene invited her to the NRA's “Ring of Freedom” reception as his guest and scheduled her to deliver five minutes of remarks at the dinner.³⁸⁴⁶ Keene also said Butina would “be introduced at other functions,”³⁸⁴⁷ and Butina recalled meeting the NRA Chief Executive, Wayne LaPierre, and its then-president, Jim Porter, and giving the latter a framed picture.³⁸⁴⁸

(U) Following the Indianapolis meetings, Butina invited Keene on a return visit to Moscow for her organization's third annual conference, to be held in September 2014. Keene declined due to the mid-term elections and because he planned to be on the road, but added a promise to “come next fall if you still want me” and extended an invitation to Torshin and Butina to attend the 2015 NRA Annual Meeting in Nashville.³⁸⁴⁹

(U) At the end of 2014, Butina pursued further opportunities to engage with Keene and the NRA. On December 1, Butina emailed Erickson to request his assistance with a plan for two Russian firearms companies to visit the United States for the April 2015 NRA convention in Nashville and to meet NRA leadership and key donors.³⁸⁵⁰ According to Butina's email, both

hours” and reiterating the need for “[t]he favor we need from a U.S. Congressman.”); Email, Keene to Butina, April 7, 2014 (PAE0000973) (“I will personally follow up at this end on the visa request, etc, so don't hesitate to contact me at any time.”)

³⁸⁴¹ (U) Email, Butina to Keene, April 8, 2014 (PAE0005026).

³⁸⁴² (U) Email, Keene to Butina, April 8, 2014 (PAE0005026).

³⁸⁴³ (U) Keene Tr., pp. 69–70. It is unclear what Keene meant by “standard call.” At the time, Royce was Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

³⁸⁴⁴ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, April 9, 2014 (PAE0001704).

³⁸⁴⁵ (U) Email, Keene to Butina, April 10, 2014 (PAE0002651).

³⁸⁴⁶ (U) Email, Keene to Butina, April 10, 2014 (PAE0002669).

³⁸⁴⁷ (U) *Ibid.*

³⁸⁴⁸ (U) Butina Tr., pp. 130–31.

³⁸⁴⁹ (U) Email, Butina to Keene, August 26, 2014 (MB 0006933).

³⁸⁵⁰ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, December 1, 2014 (PAE0000528–529). One of the companies was the “Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry.” The other was the “Vyatsko-Polyansky Engineering Plant,” which, according to open-source information, was a subsidiary of Rostec, the Russian state-owned holding

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were interested in developing business opportunities to sell firearms in the United States and were “very well prepared to pay” her for the trip.³⁸⁵¹ On January 22, 2015, Butina sent her request to Keene to help the two Russian companies secure invitations to the Nashville convention.³⁸⁵² It is unknown if representatives from the companies ultimately traveled to the United States to meet with the NRA.

(U) In January 2015, Torshin was appointed as the vice chairman of the Russian Central Bank, which required him to leave his position in the Federation Council. On January 20, Butina alerted Keene by email—which she then forwarded to Erickson—of Torshin’s appointment, and expressed concern over the implications for Torshin’s continuing relationship with the NRA: “We have not known yet are these news good or bad. . . . We also will discuss the upcoming NRA Annual Meeting and the possibility to him to participate [in] it but I think there are very few chances that it is possible now.”³⁸⁵³

4. (U) Torshin and Butina Leverage NRA Relationships

(U) Beginning in 2015, Torshin and Butina developed and operationalized a plan, which she called the “Diplomacy Project,” to create channels for informal communication between the Russian and U.S. governments. The plan involved using their existing connections in the NRA to develop further contacts with the Republican Party and conservative U.S. political circles. Their effort was known to, and likely approved by, the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

i. (U) Butina and Torshin Develop a Plan for an “Informal Channel of Communication” Between the United States and Russia

(U) In mid-February 2015, Butina wrote to David Keene and his wife, Donna, with an update about Torshin’s appointment and his “recommendation” that she expand her relationship with the Republican Party and, with the Keenes’ help, lay the foundation for a “trusted dialogue” between Russia and the United States:

Yesterday I met with Mr. Torshin. After his appointment to a new high position within the Russian Central Bank, his position is greatly strengthened because his

conglomerate. In 2017, the Vyatsko-Polyansky Engineering Plant declared bankruptcy. See “‘Hammer’ will go under the hammer,” *Kommersant*, February 7, 2017.

³⁸⁵¹ (U) Email, Butina to Erickson, December 1, 2014 (PAE0000521, 528–529).

³⁸⁵² (U) Butina also provided Keene with descriptions of the weapons these companies produced, passports for their representatives, and letters from business partners. Email, Butina to Keene, January 20, 2015 (PAE0002440).

³⁸⁵³ (U) Email, Butina to Keene, January 20, 2015 (PAE0002440).