attorneys of significant information that undercut certain allegations in the FISA applications, (3) a lack of satisfactory explanations for these failures, and (4) a continuous failure to reassess the factual assertions supporting probable cause in the FISA applications as the investigation proceeded and information was obtained raising significant questions about the Steele reporting. We concluded that these facts demonstrated a failure on the part of the managers and supervisors in the Crossfire Hurricane chain of command, including FBI senior officials.

As described in Chapter Five, NSD officials told us that the nature of FISA practice requires that OI rely on the FBI agents who are familiar with the investigation to provide accurate and complete information. Unlike federal prosecutors, OI attorneys are usually not involved in an investigation, or even aware of a case's existence, unless and until OI receives a request to initiate a FISA application. Once OI receives a FISA request, OI attorneys generally interact with field offices remotely and do not have broad access to FBI case files or sensitive source files. NSD officials cautioned that even if OI received broader access to FBI case and source files, they still believe that the case agents and source handling agents are better positioned to identify all relevant information in the files. In addition, NSD officials told us that OI attorneys often do not have enough time to go through the files themselves, as it is not unusual for OI to receive requests for emergency authorizations with only a few hours to evaluate the request.

Despite the necessity that OI receive complete and accurate information from the FBI, our review identified numerous instances in which the FBI did not provide information relevant to the probable cause determination to OI and, therefore, that information was not shared with either the decision makers in the Department who ultimately approved the applications, or with the court, which ultimately found probable cause to believe that Carter Page was an agent of a foreign power and authorized FISA surveillance of him on four separate occasions. We found this failure by the FBI particularly concerning given the critical gatekeeper role that OI attorneys have in ensuring that FISA applications (a) contain sufficient evidence, in NSD's view, to support a probable cause finding, and (b) include information that is inconsistent with or contrary to the information presented in support of establishing probable cause. We concluded that OI attorneys were unable to fulfill this responsibility because members of the Crossfire Hurricane team repeatedly failed to provide OI with all relevant information. As a consequence, the factual representations in the initial and renewal FISA applications filed with the FISC contained information that was inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information the FBI had in its possession at the time the applications were filed.

In addition, we identified significant errors with the Crossfire Hurricane team's compliance with the FBI's Woods Procedures, which were adopted by the FBI in 2001 after errors were identified in numerous FISA applications in FBI counterterrorism investigations. The Woods Procedures are intended to ensure the accuracy of every piece of information asserted in a FISA application by requiring that both an agent and a supervisory agent verify, with supporting documentation that must be maintained in the Woods File, that each factual assertion is accurately

stated. We determined that these requirements were not met with regard to any of the four Carter Page FISA applications.

Below we highlight the significant instances of inaccurate, incomplete, or undocumented information identified during our review, beginning with the first application. After the first application, we highlight significant additional errors and omissions in the renewal applications, including the agents' failures to update factual assertions repeated in the renewal applications, disclose new relevant information, and reassess the evidence supporting probable cause as the investigation progressed. Finally, we describe the failures in the performance of the Woods Procedures that could have prevented some, but not all, of the errors and omissions we identified.[490]

1. The First FISA Application

As with all applications, the FISC Rules and FBI procedures required that the Carter Page FISA applications contain all material facts. Although the FISC Rules do not define or otherwise explain what constitutes a "material" fact, the FISA SMP PG states that a fact is "material" if it is relevant to the court's probable cause determination.

In all four applications, the factual basis supporting probable cause relied upon Page's historical (pre-2016) contacts with known Russian intelligence officers, as well as information from four Steele reports (Reports 80, 94, 95, and 102). The most prominent of the Steele reports were Report 94 concerning alleged secret meetings between Carter Page and two Russian nationals (Igor Sechin and Igor Divyekin) in July 2016, and Report 95 concerning the alleged role of Page as an intermediary between the Trump campaign and Russia. According to Report 95, Paul Manafort was using Page as an intermediary between the Trump campaign and Russia in a "well-developed conspiracy" that involved Russia's agreement to disclose hacked DNC emails to WikiLeaks in exchange for the Trump campaign's agreement, to include at least Page, to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue. Steele told us that the allegations in Report 95 came from one person (Person 1) and were provided to Steele by Steele's Primary Sub-source. The allegation in Report 102 that Russia released the DNC emails to WikiLeaks in an attempt to swing voters to Trump, an objective allegedly conceived and promoted by Page and others, also came from Person 1 and was provided to Steele by Steele's Primary Sub-source.[491]

However, as more fully described in Chapter Five, based upon the information known to the FBI in October 2016, the first application:

---

[490] Chapters Five and Eight more fully describe the most significant instances of inaccurate, incomplete, and undocumented information we identified during our review, and Appendix One provides a complete list of the failures we identified in the Woods Procedures.

[491] Person 1 was also one of two sources for the allegation in Report 80 that derogatory information about Hillary Clinton had been compiled for many years, was controlled by the Kremlin, and had been fed by the Kremlin to the Trump campaign for an extended period of time.

1. Omitted information from another U.S. government agency detailing its prior relationship with Page, including that Page had been approved as an operational contact for the other agency from 2008 to 2013, and that Page had provided information to the other agency concerning his prior contacts with certain Russian intelligence officers, one of which overlapped with facts asserted in the FISA application;

2. Included a source characterization statement asserting that Steele's prior reporting had been "corroborated and used in criminal proceedings," which overstated the significance of Steele's past reporting and was not approved by Steele's FBI handling agent, as required by the Woods Procedures;

3. Omitted information relevant to the reliability of Person 1, a key Steele sub-source (who, as previously noted, was attributed with providing the information in Report 95 and some of the information in Reports 80 and 102 relied upon in the application), namely that (1) Steele himself told members of the Crossfire Hurricane team that Person 1 was a "boaster" and an "egoist" and "may engage in some embellishment" and (2) [redacted];

4. Asserted that the FBI had assessed that Steele did not directly provide to the press information in the September 23 *Yahoo News* article, based on the premise that Steele had told the FBI that he only shared his election-related research with the FBI and Simpson; this premise was factually incorrect (Steele had provided direct information to *Yahoo News*) and also contradicted by documentation in the Woods File—Steele had told the FBI that he also gave his information to the State Department;

5. Omitted Papadopoulos's statements to an FBI CHS in September 2016 denying that anyone associated with the Trump campaign was collaborating with Russia or with outside groups like WikiLeaks in the release of emails;

6. Omitted Page's statements to an FBI CHS in August 2016 that Page had "literally never met" or "said one word to" Paul Manafort and that Manafort had not responded to any of Page's emails; if true, those statements were in tension with claims in Steele's Report 95 that Page was participating in a "conspiracy" with Russia by acting as an intermediary for Manafort on behalf of the Trump campaign; and

7. Selectively included Page's statements to an FBI CHS in October 2016 that the FBI believed supported its theory that Page was an agent of Russia but omitted other statements Page made, including denying having met with Sechin and Divyekin, or even knowing who Divyekin was; if true, those statements contradicted the claims in Steele's Report 94 that Page had met secretly with Sechin and Divyekin about

future cooperation with Russia and shared derogatory information about candidate Clinton.

We found no indication that NSD officials were aware of these issues at the time they prepared or reviewed the first FISA application. Regarding the third listed item above, the OI Attorney who drafted the application had received an email from Case Agent 1 before the first application was filed containing the information about Steele's "boaster" and "embellishment" characterization of Person 1, whom the FBI believed to be Source E in Report 95 and the source of other allegations in the application derived from Reports 80 and 102. This information was part of a lengthy email that included descriptions of various individuals in Steele's source network and other information Steele provided to the Crossfire Hurricane team in early October 2016. The OI Attorney told us that he did not recall the Crossfire Hurricane team flagging this issue for him or that he independently made the connection between this sub-source and Steele's characterization of Person 1 as an embellisher. We believe Case Agent 1 should have specifically discussed with the OI Attorney the FBI's assessment that this sub-source was Person 1, that Steele had provided derogatory information regarding Person 1, and that [redacted], so that OI could have assessed how these facts might impact the FISA application. As described in Chapter Five, Evans and the OI Attorney told us that they would have wanted to discuss this information internally within NSD and with the FBI and likely would have, at a minimum, disclosed the information to the court.

We were particularly concerned by Case Agent 1's failure to provide accurate and complete information to the OI Attorney concerning Page's relationship status with the other U.S. government agency and Page's communications with the other agency about his contacts with Russian intelligence officers. As described in Chapter Five, in response to a question from the OI Attorney in late September 2016 as to whether Carter Page had a current or prior relationship with the other agency, Case Agent 1 stated that Page's relationship was "dated" (when Page lived in Moscow in 2004-2007) and "outside scope." This representation was contrary to the information that the other agency provided in its August 17, 2016 Memorandum to the FBI, which stated that Page was approved as an operational contact of the other agency from 2008 to 2013 (after Page had left Moscow); it also was contrary to information in the FBI's own case files regarding Page's claims of interactions with the other agency. Moreover, rather than being outside the scope of the FISA application, Page's status with the other agency overlapped in time with some of the interactions between Page and known Russian intelligence officers alleged in the FISA applications. Further, Page provided information to the other agency about his past contacts with a Russian intelligence officer (Intelligence Officer 1), which were among the historical connections to Russian intelligence officers that the FBI relied upon in the first FISA application (and subsequent renewal applications) to

help support probable cause.[492] According to the August 17 Memorandum, an employee of the other agency assessed that Page "candidly described his contact with" Intelligence Officer 1 to the other agency. Thus, the FBI relied upon Page's contacts with Intelligence Officer 1, among others, in support of its probable cause statement, while failing to disclose to OI or the FISC that (1) Page had been approved as an operational contact by the other agency during a five-year period that overlapped with allegations in the FISA application, (2) Page had disclosed to the other agency contacts that he had with Intelligence Officer 1 and certain other individuals, and (3) the other agency's employee had given a positive assessment of Page's candor. The FBI also did not engage with the other U.S. government agency to understand what it meant for Page to have been approved as an operational contact, whether Page interacted with Russian intelligence officers at the behest of the other agency or with the intent to assist the U.S. government, and the breadth of the other agency's information concerning Page's interactions with Intelligence Officer 1, all information that would have been highly relevant to the FISC's probable cause determination.[493]

Case Agent 1 was unable to reconcile for us the information he provided to the OI Attorney with the information in the August 17 Memorandum or FBI case files, explaining to the OIG that he did not recall his state of knowledge in 2016 regarding Page's history with the other U.S. government agency. We concluded that Case Agent 1 failed to provide accurate and complete information to the OI Attorney concerning Page's relationship and cooperation with the other agency. Further, we believe Case Agent 1 or his supervisor, SSA 1, should have ensured that someone on the team contacted the other agency after receiving the August 17 Memorandum to determine what it meant for Page to have been approved as an operational contact, whether Page interacted with Russian intelligence officers at the behest of the other agency or with the intent to assist the U.S. government, and to seek additional information concerning Page's interactions with Intelligence Officer 1.

We also found troubling the Crossfire Hurricane team's failure to advise OI of statements Page made, as noted in the sixth item above, to an FBI CHS in August 2016 during a consensually monitored meeting through which the Crossfire Hurricane team had sought to obtain information from Page about possible links between the Trump campaign and Russia. This CHS operation was one of the first investigative steps in the Carter Page investigation and took place before the media had publicly reported the allegations in the Steele reports. During the operation, Page made statements that, if true, undercut the allegation in Steele's Report 95 (received by the team in September) that Manafort was using Page as an intermediary with Russia. According to the transcript of the operation, Page told the CHS that he had "literally never met" or "said one word to" Manafort, and that

---

[492] The other agency did not provide the FBI with information indicating it had knowledge of Page's reported contacts with another particular intelligence officer. The FBI also relied on Page's contacts with this intelligence officer in the FISA application.

[493] As noted earlier in this chapter, according to the U.S. government agency that approved Page as an operational contact, the approval did not allow for the operational use or tasking of Page.

Manafort had not responded to any of Page's emails. Page's statements concerning Manafort, which Page made before he had reason to know about Steele's reporting connecting him to Manafort in a conspiracy with Russia, were not provided to OI prior to the filing of the first FISA application. We agree with the OI Attorney who told us that the FBI should have flagged these statements for inclusion in the FISA application because they were relevant to the court's assessment of the allegations in Report 95 concerning Manafort using Page as an intermediary with Russia. We also believe that as the case proceeded and the FBI gathered substantial evidence of Page's past electronic communications, the lack of evidence showing substantive communications between Page and Manafort bolstered the need to, at a minimum, include Page's statements regarding Manafort in the renewal applications.

Further, we were concerned by the Crossfire Hurricane team's assertion, without approval from Steele's handling agent (Handling Agent 1), that Steele's prior reporting had been "corroborated and used in criminal proceedings" (second item noted above), which we were told was primarily a reference to Steele's role in the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) corruption investigation. According to Handling Agent 1, he would not have approved the representation in the application because only "some" of Steele's prior reporting had been corroborated—most of it had not—and because Steele's information was never used in a criminal proceeding. The Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (Supervisory Intel Analyst), who told us he originally provided this language for an intelligence product prepared by his analytical team, told us that he did not review the FIFA case file or "dig into" exactly how Steele's information was used in the FIFA case. SSA 1 told us that the team had "speculated" that Steele's prior reporting had been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings because they knew Steele had been "a part of, if not predicated, the FIFA investigation" and was known to have an extensive source network into Russian organized crime.

The source characterization statement in all four FISA applications stated that Steele's prior reporting had been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings, and the renewal applications further relied upon this assertion as the basis for the FBI's assessment that Steele was still reliable despite his disclosure of the FBI's investigation to media outlet *Mother Jones* in late October 2016. Given the importance of a source's bona fides to a court's determination of reliability—particularly in cases where, as here, the source information supporting probable cause is uncorroborated—we concluded that the repeated failure in all four applications by the agents and the SSAs involved to comply with FBI policy requiring that the handling agent review and approve the language was significant. This created the impression that at least some of Steele's past reporting had been deemed sufficiently reliable by prosecutors to use in court, and that more of his information had been corroborated than was actually the case.

None of the inaccuracies and omissions we identified in the first application were brought to the attention of OI before the last FISA application was filed in June 2017. Consequently, these failures were repeated in all three renewal applications. As a result, the Department officials who reviewed one or more of the applications, including DAG Yates, Acting Attorney General Boente, and DAG Rosenstein, did not have accurate and complete information at the time they

approved the applications. We do not speculate as to whether or how this additional information might have influenced the decisions of senior leaders who supported the applications, if they had known all of the relevant information. Nevertheless, we believe it was the obligation of the agents who were aware of the information to ensure that OI and the decision makers had the opportunity to consider it, both to decide whether to proceed with the applications and, if so, how to present this information to the court. We also do not speculate as to whether this additional information would have influenced the court's decision on probable cause if the court had accurate and complete information at the time of the first application. However, it was the Department's and FBI's obligation to ensure that the applications were "scrupulously accurate" and that the court was provided with a complete and accurate recitation of the relevant facts, which we found did not occur.

2. The Three Renewal Applications

In addition to repeating the errors contained in the first FISA application, we identified other, similarly significant errors in the three renewal applications, based upon information known to the FBI after the first application was filed and before one or more of the renewals was filed. As more fully described in Chapter Eight, the renewal applications:

8. Omitted the fact that Steele's Primary Sub-source, who the FBI found credible, had made statements in January 2017 raising significant questions about the reliability of allegations included in the FISA applications, including, for example, that he/she had no discussion with Person 1 concerning WikiLeaks and there was "nothing bad" about the communications between the Kremlin and the Trump team, and that he/she did not report to Steele in July 2016 that Page had met with Sechin;

9. Omitted Page's prior relationship with another U.S. government agency, despite being reminded by the other agency in June 2017, prior to the filing of the final renewal application, about Page's past status with that other agency; instead of including this information in the final renewal application, the FBI OGC Attorney altered an email from the other agency so that the email stated that Page was "not a source" for the other agency, which the FBI affiant relied upon in signing the final renewal application;

10. Omitted information provided by persons with direct knowledge of Steele's work-related performance in a prior position about Steele's professional judgment, including statements that Steele had held a "moderately senior" position (not "high-ranking" as noted in the applications), had no history of reporting in bad faith but demonstrated "poor judgment," "pursued people with political risk but no intelligence value," "didn't always exercise great judgment," and it was "not clear what he would have done to validate" his reporting;

11. Omitted information from Department attorney Bruce Ohr about Steele and his election reporting, including that (1) Steele's reporting was going to Clinton's presidential campaign and others, (2) Simpson was paying Steele to discuss his reporting with the media, and (3) Steele was "desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being the U.S. President";

12. Failed to update the description of Steele after information became known to the Crossfire Hurricane team, not only from Ohr but from others, that provided greater clarity on the political origins and connections of Steele's reporting, including that Simpson was hired by someone associated with the Democratic Party and/or the DNC;

13. Failed to correct the assertion in the first FISA application that the FBI did not believe that Steele directly provided information to the reporter who wrote the September 23 *Yahoo News* article, even though there was no information in the Woods File to support this claim and even after certain FBI officials involved in Crossfire Hurricane learned in 2017, before the third renewal application, of an admission that Steele made in a court filing about his interactions with the news media in the late summer and early fall of 2016;

14. Omitted the finding from a formal FBI source validation report that Steele was suitable for continued operation but that his past contributions to the FBI's criminal program had been "minimally corroborated," and instead continued to assert in the source characterization statement that Steele's prior reporting had been "corroborated and used in criminal proceedings";

15. Omitted Papadopoulos's statements to an FBI CHS in late October 2016 (after the first application was filed) denying that the Trump campaign was involved in the circumstances of the DNC email hack;

16. Omitted Joseph Mifsud's denials to the FBI that he supplied Papadopoulos with the information Papadopoulos shared with the FFG (suggesting that the campaign received an offer or suggestion of assistance from Russia);[494] and

17. Omitted evidence indicating that Page played no role in the Republican platform change on Russia's annexation of Ukraine as alleged in Steele Report 95, which was inconsistent with a factual assertion relied upon to support probable cause in all four FISA applications.

We found the FBI's failure, noted in the eighth listed item above, to advise OI or the court of the inconsistences between Steele and his Primary Sub-source to be among the most serious omissions of information. As described in Chapter Four,

[494] According to The Special Counsel's Report, Mifsud made inaccurate statements during this FBI interview about his interactions with Papadopoulos. *See The Special Counsel's Report*, Vol. I at 193. Nevertheless, Evans told us that Mifsud's denials during his FBI interview sounded like something "potentially factually similarly situated" to the denials made by Papadopoulos that OI determined should have been included in the applications.

Steele himself was not the originating source of any of the factual information in his reporting; Steele instead relied on his Primary Sub-source for information, who used his/her network of sub-sources to gather information that was then passed to Steele. As described in Chapters Six and Eight, during his/her January 2017 interview with the FBI, the Primary Sub-source made statements that were inconsistent with multiple sections of the Steele reports, including the allegations relied upon in the FISA applications. These inconsistencies should have resulted in serious discussions about the reliability of Steele's reporting—particularly to support a probable cause showing in a court filing—but did not. For example, regarding the allegations in Report 95 that came from Person 1 (Source E), the Primary Sub-source said, among other things, that he/she had only one, 10- to 15-minute telephone call with someone he/she believed was Person 1 and that during this call they had no discussion at all regarding WikiLeaks. Further, the Primary Sub-source told the FBI that there was "nothing bad" about communications between the Kremlin and the Trump team. The Primary Sub-source's account of these communications, if true, was not consistent with the allegations of a "well-developed conspiracy" in Reports 95 and 102 attributed to Source E (Person 1). Further, his/her assertion that he/she and Person 1 had no discussion at all regarding WikiLeaks directly contradicted those allegations. However, the FBI did not share this information with OI. The FBI also failed to share other inconsistencies with OI, including the Primary Sub-source's account of the alleged meeting between Page and Sechin in Steele's Report 94 and his/her descriptions of the source network.[495]

The fact that the Primary Sub-source's account was inconsistent with key assertions attributed to his/her own sub-sources in Reports 94, 95, and 102 should have generated significant discussions between the Crossfire Hurricane team and OI prior to submitting the next FISA renewal application. According to Evans, had OI been made aware of the information, such discussions might have included the possibility of foregoing the renewal request altogether, at least until the FBI reconciled the differences between Steele's account and the Primary Sub-source's account to the satisfaction of OI. However, we found no evidence that the Crossfire Hurricane team ever considered whether any of the inconsistencies warranted reconsideration of the FBI's previous assessment of the reliability of the Steele reports or notice to OI before the subsequent renewal applications were filed.

As a result, the second and third renewal applications provided no substantive information concerning the Primary Sub-source's interview, and instead offered a brief conclusory statement that the FBI met with the Primary Sub-source

[495] As more fully described in Chapter Eight, according to the Primary Sub-source, he/she was not told until October 2016 that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place the previous July. According to the Primary Sub-source, he/she had only told Steele in July 2016 that he/she had heard that the meeting would be taking place. However, Steele authored Report 94 in July 2016 alleging that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place that month and describing the topics that were discussed at the meeting. As noted previously, Page denied to an FBI CHS that he had met with Sechin in July 2016, and, as of the date of the last FISA application, the FBI had not determined whether a meeting between Sechin and Page took place. In addition, the Primary Sub-source's description of each of his/her sources indicated that their positions and access to the information they were reporting were more attenuated than represented by Steele and described in the FISA applications.

"[i]n an effort to further corroborate Steele's reporting" and found the Primary Sub-source to be "truthful and cooperative." We believe that including this statement, without also informing the court that the Primary Sub-source gave an account of the events that was inconsistent with key assertions in Steele's reporting, left a misimpression that the Primary Sub-source had corroborated the Steele reporting. Indeed, as we describe in Chapter Eight, in its July 2018 Rule 13 letter to the court, the Department—which was continuing to rely on the FBI's representations regarding the Primary Sub-source's interview—defended the reliability of Steele's reporting and the FISA applications by citing, in part, to the Primary Sub-source's interview as "additional information corroborating [Steele's] reporting" and noting the FBI's determination that he/she was "truthful and cooperative."

When we asked the case agents and supervisory agents who participated in the preparation or Woods review of the second and third renewal applications, they either told us that they were not aware of the inconsistences or, if they were aware, they did not make the connection that the inconsistencies affected aspects of the FISA applications. For example, Case Agent 1 told us that he believed that someone else should have highlighted the issue for the agents working on the second renewal application because he did not know some of the details concerning Person 1 that would have helped him make the necessary connections. He told us that he did not know whether Steele had his own relationship with Person 1 such that Steele could have had another basis for attributing all the information in Report 95 to Person 1. However, given Case Agent 1's central role in the Page investigation, the Primary Sub-source interview, and the preparation of the first two FISA applications and factual accuracy review on the third, we believe he should have been one of the first to notice, and advise others about, the problems the Primary Sub-source's accounts created for the FISA applications. Similarly, we believe the Supervisory Intel Analyst also should have noticed and advised others about the conflicting information, given he participated in the January 2017 Primary Sub-source interview, helped supervise the team's evaluation of the Steele reporting, and played a supportive role in the preparation of the prior FISA applications. Instead, as discussed in Chapter Eight, the Supervisory Intel Analyst circulated a 2-page intelligence memorandum to senior FBI officials highlighting aspects of the Primary Sub-source's account but failed to advise them of the inconsistencies between Steele and his Primary Sub-source on, among other things, the key allegations against Page in Reports 94 and 95.

In addition to the Primary Sub-source's interview, we found other information in the FBI's possession that raised questions about the accuracy of the Steele reporting regarding Carter Page, but that was not included in the renewal applications. As described in Chapter Five, to support the allegations in Report 95 that Page worked to sideline Ukraine as a campaign issue, the first FISA application described two news articles from July and August 2016 reporting that the Trump campaign had worked behind the scenes to change the Republican Party's platform on providing weapons to Ukraine. As more fully described in Chapter Eight, after the first application, the Crossfire Hurricane team did not learn of any information that Page was involved in the platform change and instead developed evidence tending to show that two other Trump campaign officials were responsible for the

change. Despite this, as noted in the seventeenth item above, the FBI did not include this information in any of the renewal applications or alter its assessment that Page was involved in the platform change. Instead, the renewal applications stated that Page had denied any role in the platform change to the FBI in March 2017 but that the FBI assessed Page may have been downplaying his role.

The renewal applications also continued to fail to include information regarding Carter Page's relationship with another U.S. government agency and information Page had shared with the other agency about his contacts with Russian intelligence officers, even after the Crossfire Hurricane team re-engaged with the other U.S. government agency in June 2017 (item nine above). As described in Chapter Eight, following interviews that Page gave to news outlets in April and May 2017 stating that he had assisted the U.S. intelligence community in the past, one of the SSAs supervising Crossfire Hurricane sought additional information about the issue. SSA 2, who was to be the affiant for Renewal Application No. 3 and had been the affiant for the first two renewals, told us that he wanted a definitive answer to whether Page had ever been a source for another U.S. government agency before he signed the final renewal application, because he was concerned that Page could claim that he had been acting on behalf of the U.S. government when engaging with certain Russians. This led to interactions between the OGC Attorney assigned to Crossfire Hurricane and a liaison from the other U.S. government agency. In an email from the liaison to the OGC Attorney, the liaison provided written guidance, including that it was the liaison's recollection that Page had a relationship with the other agency, and directed the OGC Attorney to review the information that the other agency had provided to the FBI in August 2016. As noted above, that August 2016 information stated that Page did, in fact, have a prior relationship with that other agency. However, the OGC Attorney altered the liaison's email by inserting the words "not a source" into it, thus making it appear that the liaison had said that Page was "not a source"; the OGC Attorney then sent the altered email to SSA 2. Relying upon this altered email, SSA 2 signed the third renewal application (that again failed to disclose Page's past relationship with the other agency). Consistent with the Inspector General Act of 1978, following the OIG's discovery that the OGC Attorney had altered and sent the email to SSA 2, who thereafter relied on it to swear out the final FISA application, the OIG promptly informed the Attorney General and the FBI Director and provided them with the relevant information about the OGC Attorney's actions.

None of these inaccuracies and omissions that we identified in the renewal applications were brought to the attention of OI before the applications were filed. As a result, similar to the first application, the Department officials who reviewed one or more of the renewal applications, including Yates, Boente, and Rosenstein, did not have accurate and complete information at the time they approved them. An exception with respect to Boente concerned information regarding the ties between Steele's reporting and the Democratic Party, which documents indicate were broadly known among relevant Department officials by February and March 2017. Boente recalled knowing the information at the time he approved the second renewal. Rosenstein told us he believes he learned that information from news media accounts, but did not recall whether he knew at the time he approved the

third renewal. As with the first FISA application, we do not speculate whether or how having accurate and complete information might have influenced the decisions of senior Department leaders who supported the renewal applications, or the court, if they had known all of the relevant information. Nevertheless, it was the obligation of the FBI agents and supervisors who were aware of the information to ensure that the FISA applications were "scrupulously accurate" and that OI, the Department's decision makers, and ultimately, the court had the opportunity to consider the additional information and the information omitted from the first application. The individuals involved did not meet this obligation.

Multiple factors made it difficult for us to assess the extent of FBI leadership's knowledge as to each fact stated incorrectly or omitted from the FISA applications. As described in prior chapters, Comey certified the first three applications as the FBI Director, and McCabe certified the final renewal application as the Acting FBI Director. As the FBI's senior leaders, Comey and McCabe would have had greater access to case information than Department leadership and also more interaction with senior CD officials and the investigation team. Further, as described in Chapter Three, CD officials orally briefed the Crossfire Hurricane cases to FBI senior leadership throughout the investigation. McCabe received more briefings than Comey, but both received oral briefings of the team's investigative activities. During one such briefing, McCabe listened to parts of the recording of the conversation between Carter Page and an FBI CHS in August 2016. In addition, in her capacity as the Deputy Director's counsel, Lisa Page attended meetings with Strzok and the Crossfire Hurricane team and reported information back to McCabe. However, limited recollections and the absence of detailed documentation of meetings made it impracticable for us to determine, beyond the more general investigative updates that we know were provided, what specific information was described during these leadership briefings and the precise nature of FBI leadership awareness of critical facts.[496] Moreover, we identified instances in which senior FBI officials were not provided with complete information. For example, although we found that Comey and McCabe had been informed that the FBI had interviewed Steele's Primary Sub-source, the 2-page intelligence memorandum that they were sent highlighting aspects of the Primary Sub-source's account failed to advise them of inconsistencies between Steele's reporting and the Primary Sub-source on key allegations. Thus, while we believe the opportunities for learning investigative details were greater for FBI leadership than for Department leadership, we were unable to conclusively determine whether FBI leadership was provided with sufficient information, or sufficiently probed the investigative team, to enable them to effectively assess the evidence as the case progressed.

3. Failures in the Woods Process

As more fully described in Chapter Two, the FBI's Woods Procedures seek to ensure the accuracy of every factual assertion in a FISA application by requiring that an agent and his or her supervisor verify, with supporting documentation, that

[496] In addition, Comey's decision not to reinstate his security clearance for his OIG interview made the OIG unable to question him or refresh his recollection with relevant, classified documentation.

the assertion is correct and maintain the supporting document in the Woods File. In the case of renewal applications, this process involves re-verifying the accuracy of "old facts" from prior applications that are repeated and verifying and obtaining supporting documentation for any "new facts" that are added.

We examined the FBI's compliance with the Woods Procedures by comparing the facts asserted in the probable cause sections of the FISA applications to the documents maintained in each application's Woods File. Our comparison identified numerous instances in which a fact asserted in the application was not supported by appropriate documentation in the Woods File. The Woods errors we identified generally fell into three categories: (1) a fact asserted in the FISA application that had no supporting documentation in the Woods File, (2) a factual assertion had a corresponding document in the Woods File, but the document did not state the fact asserted in the FISA application, or (3) the corresponding document in the Woods File indicated that the fact asserted in the FISA application was inaccurate.

Among the most significant Woods errors we identified in this review were: (1) the failure to obtain the handling agent's approval of the source characterization statements for Steele and another FBI CHS whose information was relied upon in the applications; (2) documentation in the Woods File used to support the FBI's statement that Steele only shared his election related research with Simpson actually stated that Steele also shared the information with the State Department; and (3) documentation in the Woods File to support the FBI's assertion that Page did not refute his alleged contacts with Sechin and Divyekin to an FBI CHS actually stated that Page specifically denied meeting with Sechin and Divyekin to the CHS. Appendix One describes additional Woods errors that our review identified.

Some of the Woods errors, including the ones highlighted above, were repeated in all four applications, demonstrating that the agents and supervisors performing the Woods Procedures did not attempt to re-verify the accuracy of factual assertions repeated from prior applications—or if they did, they did not read the documents completely but only confirmed that a corresponding document appeared in the Woods File.

As described in Chapter Two, the Woods Procedures were adopted in 2001 following errors in numerous FISA applications in counterterrorism investigations. When properly followed, the Woods Procedures help reduce errors in the information supporting a FISA application by requiring an agent to identify and maintain a source document for every fact asserted in the application and complete a list of database searches on the FISA target and any CHSs relied upon in the application. We observed that the Woods process focuses on the facts actually asserted in an application and will not necessarily identify relevant facts that are missing from an application. For this reason, performance of the Woods Procedures, alone, would have caught some but not all of the many problems we identified. We believe these problems nevertheless would have been caught, or never would have existed in the first place, had the Crossfire Hurricane team adequately performed its duty of sharing all relevant information with OI.

C. Conclusions Regarding the FISA Applications

1. The Failure to Share Relevant Factual Information with OI, the Department's Decision Makers, and the Court, and Other FISA Related Errors

As described in Chapters Five and Seven, all four FISA applications received the necessary Department approvals and certifications—in each instance the approval required for submission of the proposed application (read copy) was appropriately executed by the OI Unit Chief, and the final application was certified by the FBI Director or Acting Director and approved by the DAG or, in the case of the second renewal application, the Acting Attorney General. Further, we found that all four applications received more attention and scrutiny than a typical FISA application in terms of the additional layers of review and number of high-level officials who read the application. This was particularly true of the first application, which underwent a lengthy review and editing process within NSD, the FBI OGC, and ODAG.

However, as discussed above, relevant information was not shared with, and consequently not considered by, the decision makers who ultimately decided to support the applications. The failure to update OI with accurate and complete information resulted in FISA applications that made it appear that the evidence supporting probable cause was stronger than was actually the case. Based upon the information in the application, Yates told us that when she approved and signed the first application, she did not believe it presented a close call from a legal sufficiency standpoint, and she was comfortable that the request for FISA authority sought by the FBI was an appropriate investigative step to take. Similarly, Rosenstein told us that by the time he signed Renewal Application No. 3 probable cause was not "a great stretch" and seemed obvious to him, given that the prior applications relied upon the same information that had been approved and granted three times by federal judges. As detailed in this report, these assessments by these decision makers were not based on a complete understanding of all relevant information that was available to the FBI at the time the applications were submitted. Indeed, by the time Rosenstein signed the final application, among other things, the following information had not been provided to the decision makers: (1) Steele's Primary Sub-source had not confirmed the allegations regarding Carter Page to the FBI and instead gave an account that was inconsistent with and contradicted them, and (2) testimonial and documentary evidence obtained by the FBI tended to show that other Trump campaign officials, not Page, were responsible for influencing the Republican platform change.

Some factual misstatements and omissions were arguably more significant than others, but we concluded that the case agents' failures to share all relevant information with OI made OI unable to perform its gatekeeper function and deprived the decision makers the opportunity to make fully informed decisions. While we found isolated instances where a case agent forwarded documentation to the OI Attorney that included, among other things, information omitted from the FISA applications, we noted that, in those instances, the Crossfire Hurricane team did not alert the OI Attorney to the information. For example, when Case Agent 6

provided the OI Attorney in June 2017 with the 163-page document detailing Page's meeting with the FBI CHS in August 2016, he directed the OI Attorney's attention to statements that Page made that the FBI believed furthered the FISA application but did not identify for the OI Attorney relevant information that tended to undercut the probable cause analysis.[497] Although we agreed with the OI Attorney that he should have examined material that the FBI provided to him more carefully, we concluded that the responsibility to raise relevant issues for OI fell squarely on the case agents who were most familiar with the case information. Further, we found instances when the OI Attorney asked the Crossfire Hurricane team the right questions, such as in September 2016 when he asked the case agent about Page's relationship with the other U.S. government agency, yet was provided with inaccurate or incomplete information. As noted previously, we do not speculate whether the correction of any particular misstatement or omission, or some combination thereof, would have resulted in a different outcome. Nevertheless, the decision makers should have been given complete and accurate information so that they could have meaningfully performed their duty to evaluate probable cause.

The failure to update OI on all significant case developments relevant to the FISA applications led us to conclude that the agents did not give equal attention or treatment to the relevant facts that did not support probable cause, or reassess the evidence supporting probable cause as the investigation progressed. The FISA Request Form does not specifically ask the case agent to share with OI information that, if accurate, would tend to undermine or would be inconsistent with the information being relied upon to support the government's theory, in whole or in part, that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. We believe sworn law enforcement officers should already understand this basic obligation based on their training and experience. Nevertheless, we recommend that the FBI and the Department take additional steps to re-emphasize this obligation in the FISA context and help ensure that agents focus their attention equally on their obligation to share information with OI that might detract from a probable cause finding, regardless of whether they believe it to be true. FBI procedures should also ensure that OI receives all information that bears on the reliability of every CHS whose information the FBI intends to rely upon in the FISA application. This should include all information from the derogatory information sub-file, recommended later in our analysis of the FBI's relationship with Steele and its assessment of Steele's election reporting. A more robust questionnaire in the FISA Request Form could also help ensure that all relevant information is shared with OI so that its attorneys can do their job, and that case agents are not leaving to themselves the determination that is also properly OI's of what information might be significant or relevant to probable cause, or should be disclosed to the court.

We also found the quantity of omissions and inaccuracies in the applications and the obvious errors in the Woods Procedures deeply concerning. Although we

---

[497] As described in Chapter Five, Case Agent 6 told us that he did not know that Page made the statement about Manafort because the August 2016 meeting took place before he was assigned to the investigation. He said that the reason he knew about the "October Surprise" statements in the 163-page document was that he had heard about them from Case Agent 1 and did a word search to find the specific discussion of that topic.

did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the case agents who assisted OI in preparing the applications, or the agents and supervisors who performed the Woods Procedures, we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or missing information. In most instances, witnesses told us that they either did not know or recall why the information was not shared with OI, that the failure to do so may have been an oversight, that they did not recognize at the time the relevance of the information to the FISA application, or that they did not believe the missing information to be significant. On this last point, we believe that case agents may have improperly substituted their own judgments in place of the judgment of OI to consider the potential materiality of the information, or in place of the court to weigh the probative value of the information. As described above, given that certain factual misstatements were repeated in all four applications, across three different investigative teams, we also concluded that agents and supervisors failed to appropriately perform the Woods Procedures on the renewal applications by not giving much, if any, attention to re-verifying "old facts." We recommend that the Woods Form be revised to emphasize to agents and their supervisors this obligation and to have them certify that they re-verified factual assertions repeated from prior applications.

As noted throughout this report, Case Agent 1 was primarily responsible for some of the most significant errors and omissions in the FISA applications, including (1) the mischaracterization of Steele's prior reporting resulting from his failure to seek review and approval of the statement from the handling agent, as the Woods Procedures required, (2) the failure to advise OI of Papadopoulos's statements to FBI CHSs that were inconsistent with the Steele reporting relied upon in the FISA applications that there was a "well-developed conspiracy of co-operation" between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and Russia, (3) the failure to advise OI of Page's statements to an FBI CHS regarding him having no communications with Manafort and denying the alleged meetings with Sechin and Divyekin, (4) providing inaccurate and incomplete information to OI about information provided by another U.S. government agency regarding its past relationship with Page that was highly relevant to the applications, (5) the failure to advise OI of the information from Bruce Ohr about Steele and his election reporting, and (6) the failure to advise OI of the inconsistences between Steele and his Primary Sub-source. The explanations that Case Agent 1 provided for these errors and omissions are summarized in Chapter Five and Chapter Eight of this report. While we found no documentary or testimonial evidence that this pattern of errors by Case Agent 1 was intentional, we also did not find his explanations for so many significant and repeated failures to be satisfactory. We therefore concluded that these explanations did not excuse his failure to meet his responsibility to ensure that the initial FISA application, the first renewal application, and the third renewal application were "scrupulously accurate."

We similarly found errors by supervisory FBI employees with responsibility for the accuracy of the FBI applications. For example, SSA 1 performed the supervisory accuracy review for the first application required under the Woods Procedures and did not correct the errors we identified before the application was filed. We found that the team "speculated" that Steele's prior reporting had been

corroborated and used in criminal proceedings, but did not take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of this statement and did not confirm that Handling Agent 1 had reviewed and approved its content, as required by the Woods Procedures. Separately, SSA 3 and SSA 5 failed to correct all of the errors we identified in the renewal applications, as did Case Agent 1 and Case Agent 7, when they performed the accuracy review under the Woods Procedures for one or more of the renewals.[498]

These failures by supervisory and non-supervisory agents represent serious performance failures.[499] However, as we next discuss, the breadth and significance of these and other errors raised broader concerns as well.

2. Failure of Managers and Supervisors, including Senior Officials, in the Chain of Command

As this chapter summarizes, we identified at least 17 significant errors and omissions in the Carter Page FISA applications, and many additional Woods related errors. These errors and omissions resulted from case agents providing wrong or incomplete information to OI and failing to flag important issues for discussion, without any satisfactory explanations. Moreover, case agents and SSAs did not give equal attention or treatment to the relevant facts that did not support probable cause, or reassess the evidence supporting probable cause as the investigation progressed and the information gathered undercut the assertions in the FISA applications. Further, the agents and SSAs did not follow, or appear to even know, the requirements in the Woods Procedures to re-verify the factual assertions from previous applications that are repeated in renewal applications and verify source characterization statements with the CHS handling agent and document the verification in the Woods File. That so many basic and fundamental errors were made on four FISA applications by three separate, hand-picked teams, on one of the most sensitive FBI investigations that was briefed to the highest levels within the FBI and that FBI officials expected would eventually be subjected to close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the FBI chain of command's management and supervision of the FISA process.

As described in prior chapters, FBI Headquarters established a chain of command for Crossfire Hurricane that included close supervision by senior CD managers, who then briefed FBI leadership throughout the investigation. Although we do not expect managers and supervisors to know every fact about an

---

[498] Case Agent 7 was a relatively new FBI special agent who was recently assigned to assist Case Agent 6 with the Carter Page investigation when he conducted the Woods Procedures on Renewal Application No. 3. During the Woods process, Case Agent 7 and Case Agent 6 identified and added some documents missing from the Woods File to provide support for the factual assertions in Renewal Application No. 3. In addition, SSA 5 said that on numerous occasions, Case Agent 1 and Case Agent 6 told him that the OI Attorney preparing the Carter Page FISA applications had "already seen all of the supporting documentation."

[499] After reading a draft of our report, SSA 1 and other members of the Crossfire Hurricane team told us that their performance should be assessed in light of the full scope of responsibilities they had in 2016, in connection with the FBI's Russian counterintelligence investigation, and that the Carter Page FISA was a narrow aspect of their overall responsibilities.

investigation, or senior leaders to know all the details of cases they are briefed on, in a sensitive, high-priority matter like this one, it is reasonable to expect that they will take the necessary steps to ensure that they are sufficiently familiar with the facts and circumstances supporting and potentially undermining a FISA application in order to provide effective oversight consistent with their level of supervisory responsibility. We did not find that this was the case with the Carter Page FISA applications. Time and again, when we questioned managers, supervisors, and senior officials during their OIG interviews about the breadth of issues we identified during the review, the answers we received reflected a lack of understanding or awareness of important information that related to many of the problems we identified.

Nevertheless, we found that managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command were aware of sufficient information that should have resulted in questions being raised regarding the reliability of the Steele reporting and the probable cause supporting the FISA applications. For example, after months of effort, the Crossfire Hurricane team had not corroborated any of the specific substantive allegations against Carter Page contained in the election reporting and relied on in the FISA applications (confirming only limited factual details such as Page's dates of travel), or any other evidence implicating Page. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Seven, before Renewal Application No. 2 was submitted to the court in April 2017, the Deputy Assistant Director and SSAs at FBI Headquarters supervising the Carter Page case had actually discussed, based upon the information gathered by that time, whether Page was a significant subject in the FBI's investigation by that time, let alone be the target of a FISA order.[500] In addition, senior FBI officials were aware of Steele's political ties, and his disclosures of information to *Mother Jones* and other third parties. The Crossfire Hurricane team had also received information directly from persons with direct knowledge of Steele's work-related performance in a prior position that he had a history of demonstrating poor judgment, and they were aware of the information from Ohr concerning Steele's motivations and potential bias. Additionally, before the final FISA renewal application, the team had received the results of the FBI's source validation review of Steele, including the finding that Steele's past assistance to the FBI's criminal program had been "minimally corroborated," and Strzok and other supervisors had received information that Steele had been a source for the *Yahoo News* article. We recognize that FBI managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command were not made aware of all of the significant information undermining the Steele reporting, such as the inconsistencies between the reporting relied upon in the FISA applications and the Primary Sub-source's accounts of this information. Nevertheless, we concluded that the information that was known to them should have resulted in greater vigilance in overseeing the use of a highly intrusive technique in such a sensitive case, but did not. In our view,

[500] Under existing FBI policy the CD Assistant Director has no role in the review or approval of FISA applications. Priestap told us that, in comparison to the FBI Director, Deputy Director, and their staffs, the Assistant Director is in a better position to understand the facts supporting FISA applications, though he cautioned that review and approval of FISA applications by an Assistant Director should be limited to the only the most significant cases, if FBI policy is changed in this way.

this was a failure of not only the operational team, but also the managers and supervisors, including senior officials, in the chain of command.

For these reasons, we recommend that the FBI review the performance of the employees who had responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or approval of the FISA applications, as well as the managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command of the Carter Page investigation, and take any action deemed appropriate. In addition, given the extensive compliance failures we identified in this review, we believe that additional OIG oversight work is required to assess the FBI's compliance with Department and FBI FISA-related policies that seek to protect the civil liberties of U.S. persons. Accordingly, we have initiated an OIG audit that will further examine the FBI's compliance with the Woods Procedures in FISA applications that target U.S. persons in both counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. This audit will be informed by the findings in this review, as well as by our prior work over the past 15 years on the Department's and FBI's use of national security and surveillance authorities, including authorities under FISA, as detailed in Chapter One.

3. Clarification Regarding OGC Legal Review During the Woods Process

As described in Chapter Two, the Woods Procedures do not currently explain the steps that should be taken during OGC's final legal review of a FISA application or require that documentation of the final legal review be maintained in an appropriate FBI file. And, as described in Chapter Seven, the FBI was unable to provide the OIG with documentation of the OGC legal review of Renewal Application Nos. 1 and 2. We therefore recommend that the FBI revise the Woods Procedures to specify what steps must be taken and documented during the legal review performed by an OGC line attorney and SES-level supervisor before submitting the FISA application package to the FBI Director for certification. Because we were advised that the SES-level review is sometimes delegated to a non-SES-level supervisor, we also recommend that the FBI revise the Woods Procedures to clarify which positions may serve as the supervisory reviewer for OGC.

III. The FBI's Relationship with Christopher Steele and Its Receipt and Use of His Election Reporting

In this section, we analyze the FBI's handling of Christopher Steele and its use of his election reporting in Crossfire Hurricane, and whether the FBI's receipt and use of his reporting during that investigation complied with FBI CHS policies and procedures. As described in Chapter Four, Steele is a former intelligence officer [redacted] who in 2009 formed a consulting firm specializing in corporate intelligence and investigative services. In 2010, Steele was introduced by Department attorney Bruce Ohr to an FBI agent, and for several years provided information to the FBI about various matters, such as corruption in the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA). In October 2013, the FBI agent, referred to in our report as Handling Agent 1, completed the paperwork to make Steele an FBI CHS. Handling Agent 1 took

this step because the volume of Steele's reporting had increased and involved persons of interest to the FBI, and he wanted to task Steele to collect additional information and compensate him for this work. Over the next 3 years, Steele provided the FBI with reporting primarily about Russian oligarchs.

In June 2016, Steele and his consulting firm were hired by Fusion GPS, a Washington, D.C. investigative firm, to obtain information about whether Russia was trying to achieve a particular outcome in the 2016 U.S. elections, what personal and business ties then candidate Trump had in Russia, and whether there were any ties between the Russian government and Trump or his campaign. Steele's work for Fusion GPS resulted in at least [redacted] reports related to the election and, with Fusion GPS's authorization, Steele provided [redacted] of the reports to the FBI between July and October 2016, and [redacted] others to the FBI through Ohr and other third parties (as we described in Chapters Six and Nine).[501] As noted earlier, we determined that Steele's election reporting played a central and essential role in the Department's decision in connection with the Crossfire Hurricane investigation to seek a FISA order in October 2016 authorizing electronic surveillance [redacted] targeting Carter Page.

We found that FBI policy permitted the receipt and use of Steele's election reporting in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, and we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that this decision was the result of political bias or other improper considerations. We further found that the FBI was aware of the potential for political influences on Steele's reporting from the outset of receiving it in July 2016 and, in part to account for those potential influences, the Crossfire Hurricane team undertook substantial efforts to evaluate the accuracy of the reporting and the reliability of the sources of Steele's information. We determined that these investigative efforts raised significant questions about the accuracy and reliability of Steele's election reporting. However, as described in Chapters Seven and Eight and earlier in this chapter, we concluded that the FBI did not share these questions about the reporting with Department attorneys working on the Carter Page FISA applications and failed to reassess its reliance on Steele's reporting in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

We also found the FBI and Steele held differing views about the nature of their relationship during this time period. Steele had signed CHS paperwork with the FBI following his opening as a CHS in 2013. Accordingly, the FBI considered

---

[501] Following his attorney's review of a draft of this report, Steele advised us through his attorney that it was important to note that his election reporting consisted of information transmitted by word of mouth by a number of individual sources. According to Steele, this is a necessary practice to obtain information in a closed society like Russia and the election reports are descriptions of what certain individual sources, deemed to be reliable by Steele's consulting firm (Orbis), stated. Further, in Steele's view, his election reports should not have been treated as facts or allegations but as the starting point for further investigation, which he said was the intended use of the reports furnished to Fusion GPS. Steele advised us through his attorney that "it is with that lens that the accuracy and value of Steele's reporting should be assessed." Steele told us that it was his hope and expectation that the FBI would have used its resources to investigate the report information. We found no evidence that Steele communicated this view of his reporting to Handling Agent 1 or members of the Crossfire Hurricane team.

Steele a CHS bound by certain obligations. Steele, however, considered himself a businessperson whose firm (not Steele) had a contractual CHS agreement with the FBI and whose election related work was not undertaken pursuant to that agreement, but instead was conducted solely on behalf of his firm's client (Fusion GPS), not the FBI. This disagreement led to divergent expectations about Steele's conduct, affected the FBI's control over Steele during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, and ultimately resulted in the FBI formally closing Steele as a CHS (although, as we discuss later in this chapter, we found the FBI continued its relationship with Steele through Ohr).

A. The FBI's Receipt, Use, and Assessment of Steele's Reporting

As described in Chapter Four, the Crossfire Hurricane team first learned of Steele's reports when they received six of them from Handling Agent 1 in September 2016.[502] The reporting was not the result of any proactive FBI investigative action, or any FBI tasking or direction to Steele. Rather, Steele's election reporting was developed at the request of his consulting firm's client, Fusion GPS, and was provided to the FBI with his client's consent. We found that the FBI was aware of the potential for political bias in the Steele election reporting from the outset of obtaining it. Handling Agent 1 told us that when Steele provided him with Report 80 in July 2016 and described his engagement with Fusion GPS, it was obvious to Handling Agent 1 that the request for the research was politically motivated.[503] The Supervisory Intel Analyst explained that he also was aware of the potential for political influence on the Steele election reporting when it became available to the Crossfire Hurricane team in September 2016.

We determined that the FBI's decisions to use Steele's information in Crossfire Hurricane and to task him in October 2016 were based on multiple factors unrelated to political considerations, including: (1) Steele's prior work as an intelligence professional for a [redacted]; (2) his expertise on Russia; (3) his past record as an FBI CHS, which included furnishing information concerning the activities of Russian oligarchs and investigative leads involving corruption in FIFA; (4) the assessment of Handling Agent 1 that Steele was reliable and had provided information to the FBI in the past

[502] Steele first gave Handling Agent 1 two of these six reports in July 2016, approximately 2 months before the Crossfire Hurricane team received them on September 19. We describe in Chapter Four the various explanations we received for this delay in transmitting the reports to the team, none of which we found to be satisfactory.

[503] As described in Chapter Four, Handling Agent 1 told us that Steele informed him at their July 2016 meeting that Fusion GPS had been hired by a law firm to conduct research, though, according to Handling Agent 1, Steele stated that he did not know the law firm's name or its political affiliation. Notes that Steele allowed us to review and that he represented were written contemporaneously with the meeting state that Steele told Handling Agent 1 that "Democratic Party associates" were paying for Fusion GPS's research, the "ultimate client" was the leadership of the Clinton presidential campaign, and "the candidate" was aware of Steele's reporting. We also reviewed notes made by an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) in the FBI's New York Field Office (NYFO) of a July 13 call the ASAC had with Handling Agent 1 about Report 80. Among other things, the notes identify Simpson as a client of a law firm and that the "law firm works for the Republican party or Hillary and will use [the information described in Report 80] at some point."

that had been corroborated; and (5) that Steele's reporting was consistent with the FBI's knowledge at the time of alleged Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. elections.

The fact that Steele had been retained to conduct political opposition research did not require the FBI, under either Department or FBI policies, to ignore the information. The FBI and federal law enforcement regularly receive information from individuals with potentially significant biases and motivations, including drug traffickers, convicted felons, and even terrorists. The FBI is not required to set aside such information; rather, under CHS policy, the FBI is required to critically assess the information in light of any potentially significant biases and motivations. The "FBI must, to the extent practicable, ensure that the information collected from every CHS is accurate and current, and not given to the FBI in an effort to distract, mislead, or misdirect FBI organizational or governmental efforts."[504] Past OIG reviews of the Department's law enforcement components have found that the use of information from such individuals presents significant risks.[505]

In the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, as described in detail in Chapters Four and Six of this report, the team undertook substantial efforts to verify Steele's election reporting, including interviewing Steele; identifying and interviewing certain of Steele's sub-sources; undertaking CHS and Under Cover Employee (UCE) meetings with Papadopoulos, Page, and a high-level Trump campaign official; conducting database inquiries; open source research; and seeking information from other U.S. government intelligence agencies.[506] However, we found that corroboration for the election reporting proved to be elusive for the FBI to identify. FBI officials told us that the singular nature of the reporting (*e.g.*, its recounting of conversations between a small number of persons) made it extremely difficult to verify. We determined that prior to and during the pendency of the FISAs the FBI was unable to corroborate any of the specific substantive allegations against Carter Page contained in the election reporting and relied on in the FISA applications, and was only able to confirm the accuracy of a limited number of circumstantial facts, most of which were in the public domain, such as the dates that Page traveled to Russia, the timing of events, and the occupational positions of individuals referenced in the reports.

---

[504] *Confidential Human Source Validation Standards Manual* ("VSM"), 0258PG (March 26, 2010), § 1.0.

[505] U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), *Audit of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives' Management and Oversight of Confidential Informants*, Audit Report 17-17 (March 2017); DOJ OIG, *Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Confidential Source Policies and Oversight of Higher-Risk Confidential Sources*, Audit Report 15-28 (July 2015); DOJ OIG, *A Review of ATF's Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters* (September 2012); and DOJ OIG, *The FBI's Compliance with the Attorney General's Investigative Guidelines* (September 2005).

[506] FBI staff told us that because they knew of the potential for political influences on the election reporting, they did not devote resources to determine precisely which organization or persons were sponsoring Steele's reporting. Consistent with what we were told, we found that the FBI did not focus much attention on seeking to identify the client of Fusion GPS that was funding Steele's research.

In addition to the lack of corroboration, we found that the FBI's interviews of Steele, the Primary Sub-source, and a second sub-source, and other investigative activity, revealed potentially serious problems with Steele's description of information in his election reports. For example, as noted above, the Primary Sub-source's accounting of events during his/her January 2017 interview with the FBI (after the filing of the first FISA application and Renewal Application No. 1, but before the filing of Renewal Application No. 2) was not consistent with and, in fact, contradicted the allegations in Reports 95 and 102 attributed to Person 1, as well as those in Report 94 concerning the meeting between Page and Sechin. In addition, another sub-source told the FBI in August 2017 (after the filing of Renewal Application No. 3) that information in Steele's election reporting attributable to him/her had been "exaggerated." Because the sub-sources themselves could have furnished exaggerated or false information to Steele, as well as to the FBI during their interviews, the cause of these inconsistencies remains unknown. According to the Supervisory Intel Analyst, the FBI ultimately determined that some of the allegations contained in Steele's election reporting were inaccurate, such as the allegation that Manafort used Page as an intermediary (Report 95) and that Michael Cohen had travelled to Prague for meetings with representatives of the Kremlin (Reports 134, 135, 136, and 166). Although the Supervisory Intel Analyst also stated that some of the broader themes in Steele's election reporting were consistent with USIC assessments, such as Russia's desire to sow discord in the Western Alliance, he further told us that, as of September 2017, the FBI had corroborated limited information in the Steele election reporting, and much of that information was publicly available.[507]

As we described earlier in our analysis, the FBI failed to notify OI, which was working on the Carter Page FISA applications, of the potentially serious problems identified with Steele's election reporting that arose as early as January 2017 through the efforts described above. As previously stated, we believe it was the obligation of the agents who were aware of this information to ensure that OI and the decision makers had the opportunity to consider it, both for their own assessment of probable cause and for consideration of whether to include the information in the applications so that the FISC received a complete and accurate recitation of the relevant facts. Moreover, even as the FBI developed this

[507] As discussed in detail in Chapter Six, FBI leadership, including Comey and McCabe, advocated for the Steele election reporting to be included in the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Russian election interference that was being prepared in December 2016. For example, in a December 17 telephone call with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Comey stated that the FBI was "proceeding cautiously to understand and attempt to verify the reporting as best we can, but we thought it important to bring it forward to the IC effort." However, according to the Intel Section Chief and Supervisory Intel Analyst, as the interagency editing process for the ICA progressed, the CIA expressed concern about using the Steele election reporting in the body of the ICA, and recommended that it be moved to an appendix. In a December 28, 2016 email to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Principal Deputy Director, McCabe objected to this recommendation, stating, "We oppose CIA's current plan to include [the election reporting] as an appendix." However, the FBI Intel Section Chief told us that the CIA viewed the Steele reporting as "internet rumor." The FBI's view did not prevail, and the final ICA report included a short summary of the Steele election reporting in an appendix.

information, we found no evidence that the Crossfire Hurricane team reconsidered its reliance on the Steele reporting in the FISA renewal applications.

In addition to these investigative efforts by the Crossfire Hurricane team to evaluate Steele as a source, the FBI's Validation Management Unit (VMU) completed a human source validation review of Steele in March 2017. We examined VMU's assessment, and in doing so, identified two procedural problems that affected the usefulness of its work product that, if not addressed by the FBI, could negatively affect VMU's future CHS assessments.[508] First, we found instances where information we deemed significant about Steele was not included in his Delta file, and therefore was not available to VMU so that it could be taken into account during VMU's validation review. The information omitted from Steele's Delta file included facts that the Crossfire Hurricane team learned in December 2016 about Steele relating to his work-related performance in a prior position, and the FBI Transnational Organized Crime Intelligence Unit's concerns about the number of contacts that Steele purportedly had with Russian oligarchs. We have raised issues in prior OIG reviews about the FBI's handling of derogatory CHS information.[509] We believe the FBI needs to assess how to better ensure that derogatory information about its CHSs is included in Delta and is readily identifiable once added. The FBI should establish enhanced procedures to ensure the completeness of its Delta files, including for investigations that are operated from FBI Headquarters.

Second, we determined that it was an error for VMU to omit from the Steele validation report its finding that its assessment of Steele's work for the FBI failed to reveal corroboration for the election reporting from the FBI and other U.S. government holdings that VMU examined. The supervising Unit Chief told us that the reason for the omission was VMU's practice of reporting on "what we positively find" and not on what is lacking. As a result, the VMU report acknowledged Steele's contribution to the FBI criminal program but did not elaborate on his contributions, or lack thereof, to the counterintelligence program. In Steele's case, VMU's approach misapprehended the reason for CD's request for the validation review. CD's interest in Steele resulted from his election reporting so any conclusions that VMU reached about it would be of intense interest to CD. According to Priestap, who had previously overseen the work of VMU in his capacity as Deputy Assistant Director in the Directorate of Intelligence, VMU's decision to omit its conclusion that Steele's election reporting was uncorroborated "defeats the whole purpose of us asking [VMU] to do the validation reporting." We believe the FBI should evaluate the reporting practices of VMU.

Finally, we found that the FBI was aware of the potential for disinformation in the Steele election reporting and, in part to address that issue, made some effort to

---

[508] We note that, by the date of the VMU human source validation review in March 2017, the Crossfire Hurricane team had identified potentially significant issues with Steele's reporting and the VMU validation review did not make any findings that would have altered that judgment.

[509] U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), *Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of its Confidential Human Source Validation Process*, Audit Report 20-009 (November 2019); DOJ OIG, *A Review of the FBI's Handling and Oversight of FBI Asset Katrina Leung* (May 2006).

assess that possibility. However, in view of information we found in FBI files we reviewed, and that was available to the Crossfire Hurricane team during the relevant time period, we believe that more should have been done to examine Steele's contacts with intermediaries of Russian oligarchs in order to assess those contacts as potential sources of disinformation that could have influenced Steele's reporting or, at a minimum, influenced Steele's understanding of events in Russia that furnished context for the analytical judgments he used to evaluate the reporting. We agree with the assessment of Priestap and Evans that this issue warranted more scrutiny than it was afforded.

B. The Lack of Agreement on Steele's Status as an FBI CHS and its Effect on the Crossfire Hurricane Team's Relationship with Steele

We determined that, from the outset of the FBI's formal relationship with Steele in 2013 (when Steele first received FBI CHS admonishments), the FBI and Steele had differing views on the nature of Steele's relationship with the FBI. The FBI considered Steele to be an FBI CHS following his enrollment as a CHS, which was reinforced by Steele's later signing of CHS payment and admonishment paperwork, while Steele considered the CHS documentation to be a business arrangement between him, on behalf of his consulting firm, and the FBI. As detailed in Chapter Four, we found evidence during our review that supported both the FBI's view and Steele's position.

The paperwork enrolling Steele as a CHS in 2013 was the FBI's standard CHS opening documentation; the FBI documented Steele's receipt of CHS admonishments; and the documentation did not reference in any way a relationship between the FBI and Steele's consulting firm. Similarly, on multiple occasions thereafter, Steele signed, using his FBI assigned code name, FBI payment forms that were plainly denominated as CHS documentation and that did not reference his consulting firm. However, we also identified material indicating that Steele made known to Handling Agent 1 from the outset of their discussions in 2010 that he could not be a CHS for the FBI due to his prior work as a foreign intelligence professional. We also identified a memorandum that the FBI sent to Steele's [redacted], prior to opening Steele as a CHS in 2013, explaining that "Mr. Steele is providing the FBI with information," while also stating that the information that the FBI was to obtain would be furnished "primarily through Mr. Steele's privately owned company" and that the FBI would "treat any material provided as information obtained through a Confidential Human Source." Similarly, Steele's letter to his [redacted], dated at around the same time as the FBI memorandum, informed the [redacted] that Steele's consulting firm (rather than Steele) was planning to enter into a commercial relationship with the FBI. Given the similarities between the FBI and Steele memoranda to Steele's [redacted], the FBI's description of Steele appears crafted to satisfy Steele's concerns and, in our view, is indicative of the understanding reached between Steele and the FBI concerning his status—that both sides would leave unresolved their differing perspectives on the nature of their relationship in order to keep information flowing to the FBI and to ensure that Steele could be paid for any work he performed on behalf of the FBI.

This uncertainty about the nature of the relationship had an impact on each side's understanding of Steele's obligations to the FBI in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, particularly after the meeting between the FBI and Steele in early October 2016 about Steele's election reporting. Steele told us that he never viewed himself or his firm as performing election-related work on behalf of the FBI; rather, Steele considered himself to be functioning as a consultant to a paying client of his firm, which was seeking information about Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections from Steele's source network. Steele reported the information to his client, Fusion GPS, as he acquired it and followed his client's instructions. In contrast, we found that the FBI agents viewed Steele as a former intelligence officer colleague who was an FBI CHS with obligations to the FBI, and that the agents displayed insufficient awareness of the priority Steele placed on his business commitments.[510]

We concluded that, at the outset of Steele's interactions with the FBI in July 2016 regarding his election reporting work, it was clear that Steele was operating as a businessperson working on behalf of a client of his firm, rather than as a CHS for the FBI. Indeed, as detailed in Chapter Four, when Steele met Handling Agent 1 on July 5, 2016, Steele told him about his consulting firm having been retained by Fusion GPS, and provided Handling Agent 1 with Report 80. Handling Agent 1 made clear to Steele that he was not working for the FBI on his election assignment and was not being tasked to collect election related information. We found that Handling Agent 1's caution to Steele was unnecessary from Steele's perspective, as he did not view himself as working on behalf of the FBI to gather election related information, and he and his client were taking steps to disseminate the election reporting to other parties. Handling Agent 1 told us, however, that from his perspective he believed his caution to Steele was necessary because he believed Steele was a CHS and his election related activity would be harmful to Steele's relationship with the FBI.

As detailed in Chapter Nine and discussed later in this chapter, beginning in July 2016, Steele had multiple contacts with Department attorney Bruce Ohr about his reports. That same month, Steele first provided his election reporting to the State Department. In August 2016, the FBI received correspondence from Members of Congress that described information included in the Steele reports, and in September 2016, Steele met with journalists from The *New York Times, The Washington Post, Yahoo News, The New Yorker*, and CNN about his work. Steele in fact was the "Western intelligence source" referenced in the September 23, *Yahoo News* article entitled, "*U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Advisor and Kremlin*," that described efforts by U.S. intelligence to determine whether Carter Page had opened communication channels with Kremlin officials. The FBI did not ask Steele whether he was a source for the article, nor did it question Steele about the apparent dissemination of his election reporting to other parties.

---

[510] In comments on this report, Handling Agent 1 told us that he was well aware of Steele's business priorities, but that he was not aware that Steele would be a "front man" in dealings with the press and that Steele would fail to inform him of these and other contacts that violated the FBI's instructions at the early October meeting.

However, the caution provided by Handling Agent 1 to Steele at their July 2016 meeting—that Steele was not being tasked to collect election related information—changed in early October 2016 when Crossfire Hurricane investigators met with Steele and attempted to task him as a CHS. During that meeting, the FBI requested that Steele collect "3 buckets" of information, which was a small subset of information related to the FBI's investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.[511] The FBI told Steele that the FBI was willing to compensate him "significantly" for this information, and that he would be paid $15,000 just for attending the October meeting.[512] Additionally, investigators told us that they orally instructed Steele to report information he gathered in response to these taskings exclusively to the FBI. These taskings and instructions were consistent with the FBI considering Steele to be a CHS going forward.[513]

Based on the testimony we obtained from participants in the early October meeting and the documents we reviewed that memorialized it, Steele appears to have made no commitments in response to this FBI request for exclusivity, though we found that he did not expressly reject it either. From the surrounding circumstances, we concluded it was unlikely that Steele agreed to the FBI's request. Steele was a businessperson with a paying client for whom he had worked on other projects and had committed to assist the client on the election project. Steele told us that any attempt by the FBI to interfere in his assignment from Fusion GPS would have been a "showstopper." Case Agent 2 could not recall Steele agreeing to anything during the meeting in early October, and acknowledged to OI following the meeting that they needed to be "realistic" about the prospects of Steele limiting the dissemination of his reporting to the FBI.[514]

---

[511] The 3 buckets concerned (1) information on the Crossfire Hurricane subjects; (2) physical evidence; and (3) leads for sources.

[512] Although the FBI did not condition this payment on Steele's future performance, the FBI cancelled the payment after it decided to close Steele as a CHS in November 2016.

[513] We also examined whether the FBI disclosed classified information to Steele during the early October meeting. We determined that Case Agent 2 did when he discussed information with Steele that the FBI received from the FFG, and that he did not have prior authorization to make the disclosure. However, we found that: (1) Case Agent 2 was given significant latitude from his supervisors to frame his discussions with Steele; (2) Case Agent 2 believed he had authorization to discuss classified information with Steele based on prior discussions with his supervisors; (3) a CD Section Chief was present when Case Agent 2 made the disclosure, and the CD Section Chief did not voice objection to it at the time or afterward; and (4) Case Agent 2 included the disclosure in a written summary he prepared of the early October meeting that was uploaded to the Crossfire Hurricane case file. We also found that the CHS Policy Guide (CHSPG) does not address the disclosure of sensitive or classified information to CHSs and that the FBI has not otherwise developed guidance on the issue. We found no evidence that Case Agent 2 attempted to conceal his disclosure or that it was for any purpose other than advancing the objectives of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Case Agent 2 is retired from the FBI. We make a recommendation in this report that the FBI establish guidance for sharing sensitive information with CHSs.

[514] As we described in Chapter Four, Handling Agent 1 believed that Steele failed to abide by FBI instructions when he continued to meet with the media and the State Department about issues over which the FBI had sought to establish an exclusive reporting relationship at the early October meeting. Case Agent 2 told the OIG that he thought it was "terrible" for Steele to complain to the FBI about leaks during the meeting given that he had been meeting with media outlets in September and

Nevertheless, we found that, following this October meeting, the FBI viewed Steele as a CHS with respect to these taskings and considered him bound by the standard "CHS admonishments" that he had received initially in 2013 and renewed most recently in January 2016, which committed him to "abide by the instructions of the FBI" and to "provide truthful information to the FBI."[515] Handling Agent 1 told us that he previously had provided oral instructions to Steele that included not divulging the existence of his relationship with the FBI to others, and not sharing with third parties the information he was providing to the FBI aside from his client paying for the research. However, these oral instructions were not documented in Steele's Delta file, and Steele told us that he did not recall receiving them, but understood that the FBI did not want him to reveal their relationship to others. We also found that the FBI's standard admonishment form does not include an instruction to the CHS not to disclose the existence of the CHS's relationship with the FBI to others absent the FBI's permission.[516]

In contrast, Steele told us that, from the outset of his relationship with the FBI, the FBI acquiesced in practice to an arrangement that recognized the existence of the "two pipelines" of information that Steele described to us and which we discussed more fully in Chapter Four. In Steele's view, any FBI admonishments and instructions were relevant only to his FBI assignments (*i.e.* Pipeline 2 work), but not to his work for his firm's clients that Steele chose to share with the FBI (*i.e.* Pipeline 1 work). Steele stated that he was free to discuss Pipeline 1 work with his clients and with third parties, as necessary, without gaining permission from the FBI. Steele told us that the FBI indicated at the meeting in early October that it sought to convert his Pipeline 1 election project for Fusion GPS into a Pipeline 2 project for the FBI, and take control of it. Steele also told us that he made it clear during the meeting that was not going to happen because he was obligated to his client and was "not dumping the client" in favor of the FBI, but that he also wanted to be as helpful to the FBI as he could. According to Steele, the FBI accepted his position, though they requested that he not share his election reporting with other U.S. government entities or with third-party clients other than Fusion GPS. Steele said he could not recall if he agreed to this FBI request but believed that the request was not resolved at the meeting. FBI attendees at the early October meeting told us they had no recollection of Steele rejecting their request that he provide information on the "3 buckets" exclusively to the FBI, and if he had rejected their request it would have been documented.

Consistent with their inability in 2013 to reach a shared understanding on Steele's status with the FBI, we concluded that the FBI and Steele in October 2016

---

had provided information that was used in the *Yahoo News* article. According to Case Agent 2, in hindsight "[c]learly [Steele] wasn't truthful with us. Clearly." Steele denied to us that he ever lied or purposely misled the FBI.

[515] The FBI form memorializing Steele's receipt of admonishments in 2016 states that Handling Agent 1 "verbally admonished the CHS with CHS admonishments, which the CHS fully acknowledged, signed and dated." The FBI could not locate the signed admonishment form, however.

[516] For safety and security reasons, among others, we believe such an instruction should be a part of the standard admonishments provided by the Department's law enforcement components to its CHSs, and we therefore include a recommendation to that effect in this report.

appeared to reach a similarly imperfect arrangement that reflected the competing needs and interests of each party. The FBI provided instructions to Steele, but Steele did not make any express commitment to abide by specific terms. The FBI also sought exclusivity for information Steele developed in response to the tasking, but we found that Steele did not make an express commitment to the FBI to honor this request.

As described in Chapter Six, the FBI closed Steele as a CHS for cause in November 2016, after determining that Steele breached an obligation when he divulged his FBI relationship to a journalist for *Mother Jones* the month before. This obligation was based upon the oral admonishment the FBI said it previously provided to Steele, an admonishment Steele said he did not recall receiving or agreeing to, but one that he said reflected an expectation he understood. Steele also told us, in explaining his disclosure to *Mother Jones*, that he believed the FBI had misled him when Comey notified Congress in late October 2016 that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation while at the same time an FBI official was quoted in *The New York Times* as saying that there was no investigation of Trump or the Trump campaign.

We believe that the FBI's decision to close Steele, as well as its failure to press him about his role in the September 2016 *Yahoo News* story and his October 2016 visit to the State Department, were consequences of the FBI's and Steele's inability to come to a shared understanding on the terms of their relationship. We also believe that the FBI allowed the arrangement with Steele to exist because its expectations about Steele's behavior were heavily influenced by his background as a former intelligence officer and his past assistance to the FBI in that capacity, with insufficient focus on Steele's current business interests and obligations, even though Steele disclosed them to the FBI. Indeed, as we describe in the next section, we found that even after the FBI closed Steele as a CHS in November 2016 for cause, and as a result, under FBI policy should have ceased its contact with Steele absent exceptional circumstances or reopening him as a CHS, the FBI continued its relationship with Steele by allowing Steele to regularly provide information to the FBI through a senior Department attorney, Bruce Ohr, with whom Steele was friendly.

IV. Issues Relating to Department Attorney Bruce Ohr

In this section, we analyze the interactions Department attorney Bruce Ohr had with Christopher Steele, Simpson, the FBI, and the State Department during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. We also analyze Ohr's interactions with Department attorneys and FBI officials concerning the Department's criminal investigation of Paul Manafort. At the time of these activities, Ohr was an Associate Deputy Attorney General in ODAG and the Director of the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF).

As described more fully in Chapter Nine, at about the same time that Steele was engaging with the FBI on his election reporting, Steele was also sharing his reporting with Ohr, with whom he had a pre-existing professional and "friendly"

relationship since at least 2007. Beginning in July 2016, Steele had contacted Ohr on multiple occasions to discuss information from Steele's election reports. At Steele's suggestion, Ohr also met in August 2016 with Simpson, the owner of Fusion GPS, to discuss Steele's reports. At the time, Ohr's wife, Nellie Ohr, worked at Fusion GPS as an independent contractor. Ohr had a second meeting with Simpson in December 2016, at which time Simpson gave Ohr a thumb drive containing numerous Steele election reports.

On October 18, 2016, three days before the first FISA application was submitted to the FISC, and after speaking with Steele that morning, Ohr requested a meeting with, and that same day met with McCabe to share Steele's and Simpson's information with him. Thereafter, Ohr met with members of the Crossfire Hurricane team 13 times between November 21, 2016, and May 15, 2017, concerning his contacts with Steele and Simpson. All 13 meetings occurred after the FBI had closed Steele as a CHS for disclosing information to *Mother Jones* and, except for the November 21 meeting, each meeting was initiated at Ohr's request. Ohr told us he did not recall the FBI asking him to take any action regarding Steele or Simpson, but Ohr also stated that "the general instruction was to let [the FBI] know...when I got information from Steele." At two of these meetings, both in December 2016, after Nellie Ohr had left Fusion GPS, Ohr provided the FBI with open source research Nellie Ohr conducted on Manafort while working at Fusion GPS. The Crossfire Hurricane team memorialized each meeting with Ohr as an "interview" using an FBI FD-302 form.

In addition to the FBI, Ohr met with senior State Department officials in November 2016 to discuss State Department efforts to investigate Russian influence in foreign elections. On this and several other days Ohr had separate discussions with State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Kathleen Kavalec about Steele and his election information specifically to obtain relevant information that he could share with the FBI.

Department leadership, including Ohr's supervisors in ODAG and ODAG officials who reviewed and approved the Carter Page FISA applications, were unaware of Ohr's meetings with FBI officials, Steele, Simpson, and the State Department until after Congress requested information from the Department regarding Ohr's activities in late November 2017.

In addition, shortly after the U.S. elections in November 2016, Ohr participated in several meetings with Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Deputy AAG) Bruce Swartz, Chief of the Fraud Section Andrew Weissmann, and Counsel to the Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General Zainab Ahmad regarding the Department's money laundering investigation of Manafort. Two of these meetings included FBI officials Peter Strzok and Lisa Page.[517] The FBI opened the Manafort money laundering investigation in January 2016, before the opening of Crossfire Hurricane and before Manafort joined the Trump campaign, and the case was being led in 2016 by prosecutors from the Criminal Division's (CRM) Money Laundering

[517] One of the two meetings attended by Strzok and Page was also attended by Acting Section Chief 1 of the FBI.

and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS). Ohr and the three CRM officials he met with did not have supervisory authority over the MLARS criminal investigation, and they did not advise their supervisors in ODAG and CRM MLARS prosecutors of the meetings. However, we did not find evidence that these meetings progressed beyond discussion into any specific actions that interfered with the MLARS investigation or Department leadership's oversight of that matter.

In light of these activities, we considered the following issues addressed below: (1) whether Ohr's interactions with Steele, Simpson, the FBI, and State Department violated Department policy or resulted in any specific performance failures, (2) whether the FBI's interactions with Ohr concerning Steele and Simpson after Steele was closed as an FBI CHS violated Department or FBI policy, (3) whether Nellie Ohr's work for Fusion GPS implicated any ethical rules applicable to Ohr, and (4) whether the meetings between Ohr, CRM officials, and the FBI regarding the MLARS investigation violated Department policy or resulted in any specific performance failures.

A. Bruce Ohr's Interactions with Steele, Simpson, the State Department, and the FBI

We did not identify a specific Department policy prohibiting Ohr from meeting with Steele, Simpson, or the State Department and providing the information he learned from those meetings to the FBI. Further, we found no evidence that the FBI expressly requested that Ohr obtain information from Steele, or anyone else, on the FBI's behalf. However, as described in Chapter Nine, Ohr told us that "the general instruction [he received from the FBI] was to let them know...when I got information from Steele." Similarly, SSA 1 told us that Ohr likely left their initial November 21, 2016 meeting with the impression that he should contact the FBI if Steele contacted him, which is what Ohr did.

In this regard, we concluded that Ohr committed consequential errors in judgment by (1) failing to advise his direct supervisors or the DAG that he was communicating with Steele and Simpson and then requesting meetings with the FBI's Deputy Director and Crossfire Hurricane team on matters that were outside his areas of responsibility, and (2) making himself a witness in the investigation by having direct communications with Steele about his reporting and activities and providing Steele's information to the FBI.[518]

We found that Ohr's failure to advise his supervisors resulted in Ohr being aware of relevant information that was not made known to Department officials, thereby interfering with those officials' supervisory responsibility for the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and the Carter Page FISA applications. As described in Chapter Eight, Yates, Boente, and Rosenstein told us that they had no knowledge at the time they reviewed and approved the Page FISA applications that Ohr had provided the FBI with information related to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and that was relevant to the FISA applications. Other ODAG officials who reviewed one or more of the applications told us that they were also unaware of Ohr's

[518] We did not find evidence that Ohr shared non-public information with Steele or Simpson.

activities at the time, including the Associate Deputy Attorney General responsible for ODAG's national security portfolio who interacted with NSD and OI officials on the FISA applications and was aware of their efforts described in Chapter Five to evaluate the Steele information being relied upon to support probable cause. Although we found no information suggesting that Ohr knew about any of the FISA applications before they were filed, by failing to advise his supervisors of his interactions with Steele, Simpson, and the FBI, Ohr deprived those supervisors of the ability to ensure that the ODAG officials working on the applications were made aware of information relevant to evaluating the Steele reporting in the applications. It also deprived ODAG officials of the opportunity to ensure that NSD and OI were made aware of the information that Ohr knew from his Steele interactions so that NSD and OI could consider whether to include the information in the next FISA application, though we believe that the FBI case agent should have been the first to advise NSD and OI of Ohr's activities. As described in Chapter Eight, the late discovery of Ohr's interviews with the FBI prompted NSD to submit a Rule 13 letter to the court, over a year after the final FISA orders were issued, to inform the court, among other things, of information that Ohr had provided to the FBI but that the FBI had failed to inform NSD and OI about, including that Steele was "desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being the U.S. President."

Additionally, as described in earlier chapters, beginning in early 2017, Boente and later Rosenstein requested multiple briefings on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, which included, among many topics, updates on the FBI's continued efforts to assess Steele and his information. Because Ohr did not advise anyone in ODAG about his activities, Boente, Rosenstein, and the other ODAG officials briefed into Crossfire Hurricane had no idea that one of the senior attorneys on their staff, with no responsibility over counterintelligence investigations, had made himself a witness in the investigation by having direct communications with Steele about his reporting and activities and initiating contact with the Crossfire Hurricane team to provide the FBI with information he received from Steele, as well as information he received separately from Simpson, Kavalec, and Nellie Ohr.

Further, we found that Ohr's failure to advise his supervisors of his activities deprived the DAG and senior ODAG officials of the ability to decide for themselves the prudential question of whether to have an ODAG attorney act as a conduit between a closed FBI CHS and the FBI on matters relating to an open investigation. The opportunity to consider that question for themselves was particularly important here, given the connections to a high priority, politically sensitive investigation and the involvement of a closed CHS with ties to a political party and candidate for President, and indirect connections to the ODAG attorney's spouse. Former Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General (PADAG) Matthew Axelrod, Ohr's direct supervisor in 2016, told us that he would have expected to know about Ohr's communications with Steele and the FBI. Axelrod stated that if ODAG officials had known, they would have questioned Ohr's involvement and determined whether the FBI had the ability to "pull him out" of acting as a conduit between Steele and the FBI. He said that he thought it "unlikely that we would have been comfortable with [Ohr] continuing to play that role." Axelrod's immediate successor, former Acting

PADAG James Crowell, who supervised Ohr in 2017, told us that he was "flabbergasted" when he learned of Ohr's interactions with the FBI regarding Steele. According to Crowell, Ohr should have informed ODAG officials of his relationship with Steele and Simpson and his interactions with the FBI, especially after Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel and began directly supervising the investigation, because "a potential fact witness" was on Rosenstein's staff. Crowell told us that he would have taken steps to eliminate any appearance that Ohr was involved in ODAG's oversight of the investigation.

We found that, while no Department or ODAG policy specifically prohibited Ohr's activities, Ohr was clearly cognizant of his responsibility to inform his supervisors of his interactions with Steele, the FBI, and State Department. Indeed, Ohr acknowledged to the OIG that the possibility that he would have been told by his supervisors to stop having such contact may have factored into his decision not to tell them about it. Precisely because of this possibility, and the reasons more fully described above, we concluded that Ohr committed consequential errors in judgment by failing to advise his direct supervisors or the DAG that he was communicating with Steele, Simpson, and the FBI on matters related to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, and that this performance failure had a negative impact on the investigation and ODAG's fulfillment of its own management responsibilities. We are referring our finding to the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility for any action it deems appropriate. We are also providing our finding to Ohr's current supervisors in CRM for any action they deem appropriate.

B. FBI Interactions with Ohr Concerning Steele and Simpson

As described in Chapter Two, the FBI's CHS Policy Guide (CHSPG) provides guidance to agents concerning contacts with CHSs after they have been closed for cause, as was the case with Steele as of November 1, 2016. According to the CHSPG, a handling agent must not initiate contact with or respond to contacts from a former CHS who has been closed for cause absent exceptional circumstances that are approved (in advance, whenever possible) by an SSA. Where there is contact with a CHS following closure (whether or not for cause), new information "may be documented" to a closed CHS file. However, the CHSPG requires the reopening of the CHS if the relationship between the FBI and the CHS is expected to continue beyond the initial contact or debriefing. Reopening requires high levels of supervisory approval, including a finding that the benefits of reopening the CHS outweigh the risks.

In this instance, we found that the FBI did not initiate direct contact with Steele after his closure on November 1, 2016. However, the FBI did respond to numerous contacts made by Steele to the FBI through Ohr. Ohr himself was not a direct witness to the facts and circumstances that were the focus of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation; rather, his purpose in communicating with the FBI was to pass along information from Steele. Further, although Ohr initiated his meetings with the Crossfire Hurricane team, as noted above, the team gave Ohr the impression that he should contact them in the event he had additional contact with Steele. While the FBI's CHS policy does not explicitly address indirect contact

between an FBI agent and a closed CHS, we concluded that the FBI's repeated acceptance of information from Steele through a conduit (Ohr) was equivalent to responding to a contact from Steele and therefore should have triggered the CHS policy requiring that such contact occur only after an SSA determines that exceptional circumstances exist. Here, the SSAs on the Crossfire Hurricane team attended the meetings with Ohr and served as Ohr's points of contact, and in this manner approved the contact. However, we found no evidence that the SSAs made a considered judgment that exceptional circumstances existed for the repeated contact; in the absence of such a circumstance, the FBI's re-engagement of Steele did not fully comply with the FBI's CHS policy.

In addition, the Crossfire Hurricane team memorialized the meetings with Ohr and the information Ohr provided in FD-302 forms serialized to the case file. Although the information was not separately documented in Steele's closed CHS file, the guidance regarding documentation is discretionary (new information "may be documented" to a closed CHS file). We believe the FBI should make such documentation mandatory so that the CHS file contains all relevant information about the CHS.

As noted above, the CHSPG contemplates the reopening of the CHS if the relationship between the FBI and the CHS is expected to continue beyond the initial contact or debriefing, which helps to ensure that high level supervisors weigh the risks presented by reengagement with the CHS and that operational assessments of the CHS are undertaken. Although the FBI met with Ohr on 13 occasions and accepted information that Ohr received from Steele, the FBI never assessed whether to re-open Steele as a CHS. As described in Chapter Nine, there were differing views about whether the information Ohr was providing had any investigative value. SSAs on the investigation also told us that they had some concern at the time that continuing to engage with Ohr regarding his interactions with Steele was "out of the norm" and a "bad idea." Although the FBI did not have a direct "relationship" with Steele after November 1, 2016, we believe the use of Ohr as a conduit between the two created a relationship by proxy that should have triggered a supervisory decision early in the process about whether to reopen Steele as a CHS or discontinue accepting information indirectly through Ohr. We concluded that not obtaining supervisory review was inconsistent with the CHS policy's intent to have a higher level official determine whether the "exceptional circumstances" that an SSA believes are present to authorize an initial contact with a closed CHS warrant reopening of the CHS.[519]

We found that the Crossfire Hurricane team did not consider Ohr providing the FBI with information from Steele to be a re-engagement of their relationship with Steele. Rather, the team viewed Ohr as just another "stream of reporting." On the other hand, Priestap told us that he was not aware of the full extent of Ohr's communications with Steele and the Crossfire Hurricane team and that the number

[519] Even if the SSAs had determined that exigent circumstances existed for the initial re-engagement with Steele, once it was clear the contact between FBI and Ohr was expected to continue beyond the initial contact, we believe FBI policy required the SSAs to either reopen Steele at that time or discontinue accepting his information indirectly through Ohr.

of times Ohr provided the FBI with information from Steele would have raised "red flags" for him. We believe that additional policy guidance would be helpful to clarify the considerations and requirements that apply in the third-party context. Accordingly, we recommend that the FBI revise its CHS policy to explicitly address the situation that occurred here, namely the steps that should be followed before and after accepting information from a closed CHS indirectly through a third party, and the considerations that should be taken into account before doing so. Further, we recommend that the CHS policy be clarified to require that contact with a closed CHS be documented in the CHS file.

C. Ethics Issues Raised by Nellie Ohr's Former Employment with Fusion GPS

Fusion GPS employed Nellie Ohr as an independent contractor from October 2015 to September 2016. We considered whether Bruce Ohr complied with his financial disclosure reporting obligations under 5 C.F.R. part 2634 related to Nellie Ohr's employment. On his annual financial disclosure forms covering calendar years 2015 and 2016, Ohr listed Nellie Ohr as an "independent contractor" and reported her income from that work on the form. We determined that 5 C.F.R. part 2634, which sets forth the financial disclosure rules for executive branch employees, and the supplemental guidance from the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), did not require Ohr to list on the form the specific organizations, such as Fusion GPS, that retained and paid Nellie Ohr as an independent contractor during the reporting period. We further noted that, consistent with OGE practice, Ohr's financial disclosure form, which listed Nellie Ohr as an "independent contractor" and reported her total income but not the specific source(s) of the income, was reviewed and approved for filing by the ODAG and Department ethics officers before being submitted to OGE. Accordingly, we determined that Ohr complied with his financial disclosure reporting obligations.

We separately considered whether the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch required Ohr to recuse himself from participating in activity related to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation because of Nellie Ohr's prior work for Fusion GPS as an independent contractor. Specifically, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) provides that an employee should not participate in a matter, unless agency ethics counsel authorizes participation, "[w]here an employee knows that a particular matter involving specific parties is likely to have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interest of a member of his household...and where the employee determines that the circumstances would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question his impartiality in the matter...." Section 402(b)(1) defines "direct and predictable effect" as "a close causal link between any decision or action to be taken in the matter and any expected effect of the matter on the financial interest." We found that Nellie Ohr's relationship with Fusion GPS ceased on September 24, 2016, which was prior to Ohr's meeting with McCabe on October 18, 2016, as well as all 13 of his meetings with the Crossfire Hurricane team, the first of which was on November 21, 2016. Accordingly, by those dates, Ohr's activities could not have had a direct and predictable effect on his or his wife's financial interests, and federal ethics rules did

not require that Ohr obtain Department ethics counsel approval before engaging with the FBI in connection with the Crossfire Hurricane matter.

The federal ethics rules further provide in Section 502(a)(2) that an employee "who is concerned that circumstances other than those specifically described in this section would raise a question regarding his impartiality should use the process described in this section [namely, to consult with Department ethics officials] to determine whether he should or should not participate in a particular matter." However, while OGE has made clear that employees are "encouraged" to use this process, it also has stated that "[t]he election not to use that process should not be characterized...as an 'ethical lapse.'" OGE 94 x 10(1), Letter to a Department Acting Secretary, March 30, 1994; *see also*, OGE 01 x 8 Letter to a Designated Agency Ethics Official, August 23, 2001. While OGE guidance establishes that Ohr did not commit a formal ethical violation, we nevertheless concluded that Ohr, an experienced Department attorney and a member of the SES, should have been more cognizant of the appearance concerns created by Nellie Ohr's employment with Fusion GPS and availed himself of the process described in Section 502(a). We found that his failure to take this step displayed a lapse in judgment.

D. Meetings Involving Ohr, CRM officials, and the FBI Regarding the MLARS Investigation

As described in more detail in Chapter Nine, on November 16, 2016, Ohr advised CRM officials Bruce Swartz and Zainab Ahmad of information "about [Paul] Manafort and Trump and possible Russian influence that [Ohr] was getting from Steele and Glenn Simpson." This discussion led to subsequent meetings with them and Andrew Weissmann about the pre-existing MLARS investigation of Manafort and whether the Fraud Section could move the investigation forward. At the time of these meetings, Swartz was a CRM Deputy AAG and Weissmann was the Chief of the Fraud Section. During this period, Ahmad was initially Counsel to the Criminal Division AAG and then became an Acting CRM Deputy AAG.[520] None of these CRM officials had supervisory responsibility over the MLARS investigation. Ahmad and Weissmann did not have prior direct involvement in the investigation. Swartz had assisted MLARS with gathering evidence from abroad, and therefore, had extensive prior knowledge and involvement with the investigation, but was not responsible for investigative decisions. The MLARS Manafort investigation was outside Ohr's areas of responsibility. At Ohr's suggestion, Ohr, Swartz, and Ahmad also met with FBI officials Peter Strzok and Lisa Page in December 2016 to discuss the MLARS investigation because Ohr knew by that time that the FBI's CD was working on a separate matter involving Manafort. On January 31, 2017, one day after Yates was removed as Deputy Attorney General, Ahmad, after consulting with Swartz and Weissmann, called a second meeting, citing to "a few Criminal Division related developments." None of the attendees of the meeting could explain to us what the "Criminal Division related developments" were, and we did not find any. However,

[520] Swartz, Ohr, and Weissmann were members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Ahmad was on detail to the Criminal Division from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York and was not a member of the SES.

we are not aware of any information indicating that these discussions resulted in any actions taken or not taken in the MLARS investigation and ultimately the investigation remained in MLARS until it was transferred to The Special Counsel's Office in May 2017.

MLARS officials were not invited to these meetings or informed of them. The then Chief of MLARS, Kendall Day and the acting Chief who replaced him in January 2017, both told us that they were unaware at the time that these CRM officials and Ohr were discussing the MLARS investigation and engaging with the FBI Day told us that when he learned in March or April 2017 that Swartz, Ohr, Ahmad, and Weissmann were "collectively interested" in the Manafort investigation, he met with Swartz and Ahmad and told them that their "unusual level of interest" could create a perception that the Department was investigating Manafort for inappropriate reasons.[521]

In addition, Ohr, Swartz, Ahmad, and Weissmann told us that they did not advise their supervisors of their meetings, and senior CRM and ODAG officials told us that they were unaware of them. Further, Swartz told us that he specifically did not advise political appointees leading the Criminal Division of the meetings. According to Swartz, he did not believe at the time that he needed to advise political appointees because the meetings had not resulted in any steps being taken in the MLARS investigation, and by not informing them he was keeping the MLARS investigation from being "politicized" and protecting the Department from allegations that its MLARS investigation of Manafort was politically motivated. Swartz stated that he would have informed his political superiors if any decision to take action had been made as a consequence of the meetings. Weissmann told us that he thought not telling Department leadership was an "incorrect judgment call," but could not recall if he expressed this view to Swartz or Ahmad.

The former senior Department leaders we interviewed expressed serious concern about Swartz's assertion that not informing Department leadership about case related investigative activities somehow protected the Department. For example, after Yates learned during her OIG interview of the meetings involving Ohr, Swartz, Ahmad, and Weissmann, she told us that a decision not to advise political appointees "trouble[d]" her because the Department does not "operate that way." Yates said that there is not "a career Department of Justice and a political appointees' Department of Justice. It's all one DOJ." Former CRM Assistant

[521] After reviewing a draft of this report, Swartz told us that he had provided information to the OIG demonstrating his long standing interest and official involvement in reviewing Manafort's conduct, dating back to at least 2014, and that he was concerned by what he perceived as the "languishing" pace at which the MLARS investigation was progressing, and that it was his "duty" to attempt to move it forward. He therefore believed it was appropriate for him to meet with Weissmann to discuss potential avenues for doing this, and to meet with FBI officials to ensure that the FBI was aware of MLARS' investigation. Although we acknowledge Swartz's long-standing interest and official involvement in Manafort-related inquiries, we believe that Swartz could have raised his concerns directly with MLARS, Day, or others in MLARS' direct supervisory chain. Indeed, when asked about Swartz's concerns, then Acting DAG Boente told us that the Manafort investigation was an MLARS case, and Swartz could have taken his concerns to the then Acting Assistant Attorney General, who was a career Department employee, to attempt to address his concerns.

Attorney General (AAG) Leslie Caldwell told us that a decision to not advise political appointees of meetings they were having relating to the MLARS investigation to avoid "politicizing" it was "inappropriate" and showed "poor judgment" because it "suggest[ed] a lack of trust or a lack of confidence in the political appointee . . . and that seem[ed] a little bit paranoid to [her]."

We did not identify any Department policies prohibiting internal discussions about a pending investigation among officials not assigned to a matter, or between those officials and senior officials from the FBI. However, we were troubled by the testimony more fully described in Chapter Nine that there was a deliberate decision not to inform the political appointees, or the Acting AAG of CRM after the change in presidential administrations – who was a career Department employee – of these discussions in order to insulate the MLARS investigation from becoming "politicized." We concluded that the decision to intentionally withhold information from the Department's leadership in both the prior and current administrations, in the absence of concerns of potential wrongdoing or misconduct fundamentally misconstrued who is ultimately responsible and accountable for the Department's work.[522] We agree with the concerns expressed to us by Yates and Caldwell. Department leaders cannot fulfill their management responsibilities, and be held accountable for the Department's actions, if subordinates intentionally withhold information from them in such circumstances. The Department's leadership, which is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is ultimately answerable within the Executive Branch, to Congress, and in the courts for the investigations, prosecutions, and other activities of the Department, whether politically sensitive or routine. Ultimately, however, we did not find evidence that the meetings between Ohr and CRM officials Swartz, Ahmad, and Weissmann, amongst themselves and with FBI officials Strzok, Lisa Page, and Acting Section Chief 1, progressed beyond discussion to any specific actions that interfered with the MLARS investigation or Department leadership's oversight of that matter.

V. The Use of Other Confidential Human Sources and Undercover Employees and Compliance with Applicable Policies

In this section, we analyze the FBI's use of CHSs, other than Steele, and Under Cover Employees (UCEs) in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, and discuss whether the FBI placed any CHSs or UCEs within the Trump campaign or tasked any CHSs or UCEs to report on the Trump campaign. Additionally, we analyze whether the Crossfire Hurricane team's use of such individuals complied with Department and FBI policies. We also discuss SSA 1's participation on behalf of the FBI in a strategic intelligence briefing given by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to candidate Trump and his national security advisors, including Michael Flynn, and a separate strategic intelligence briefing given to candidate

[522] Had Ohr and the CRM officials believed that the circumstances involved potential wrongdoing or misconduct, they should have reported their concerns to the OIG or the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility; they also could have reported their concerns to Congress.

Clinton and her national security advisors, and the observations that SSA 1 made of Flynn and others as a result of his participation in those briefings.

Overall, we determined that the Crossfire Hurricane team tasked several CHSs and UCEs during the 2016 presidential campaign, which resulted in multiple interactions with Carter Page and Papadopoulos, before and after they were affiliated with the Trump campaign, and an interaction with a high-level Trump campaign official who was not a subject of the investigation. The Crossfire Hurricane team also attempted to contact Papadopoulos through additional CHSs, but those efforts were unsuccessful. We further determined that the Crossfire Hurricane team received general information about Page and Manafort from another FBI CHS, but that this CHS had no further role in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Additionally, we identified several individuals who had either a connection to candidate Trump or a role in the Trump campaign, and were also FBI CHSs, who the Crossfire Hurricane team could have tasked, but did not. We found no evidence that the FBI placed any CHSs or UCEs within the Trump campaign or tasked any CHSs or UCEs to report on the Trump campaign. We also did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the FBI's decision to use CHSs to interact with Page, Papadopoulos, and the high-level Trump campaign official in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

We concluded that the investigative activities undertaken by the Crossfire Hurricane team involving CHSs and UCEs received the necessary FBI approvals and complied with applicable Department and FBI policies. However, we also determined that neither the Department's nor the FBI's policies required the FBI to notify the Department of these investigative activities, and we are unaware of any Department official having had advance knowledge of the FBI's plans to consensually monitor conversations between FBI CHSs and Page, Papadopoulos, and a high-level official of the Trump campaign. We concluded that Department and FBI policies do not, in these circumstances, provide sufficient oversight and accountability for investigative activity that has the potential to gather sensitive information involving protected First Amendment activity. For example, prior to the operation involving the high-level campaign official, SSA 1 told the OIG that he did not remember having a plan in place in case the FBI recorded information that was politically sensitive. We believe that notification to Department officials in such situations would help to ensure that the FBI has planned sufficiently to address the incidental collection of political information, and make an assessment prior to that collection of whether the potential impact on constitutionally protected activity outweighs any potential investigative benefit.

We therefore make several recommendations to strengthen Department and FBI CHS policies to require Department consultation, at a minimum, when tasking a CHS to interact with officials in national political campaigns; to provide additional guidance to FBI handling agents about how to document the affiliations of CHSs who, on their own, participate in political organizations or activities and then voluntarily provide information to the FBI; and to provide FBI supervisors with the information necessary to assess whether to close a CHS, or designate that individual as a "sensitive source," depending on the level of CHS participation in political organizations or activities.

E. Use of CHSs and UCEs

The agents, analysts, and supervisors assigned to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation told us that CHSs are routinely used in FBI counterintelligence investigations, and that they viewed CHS operations as one of the best methods available to quickly obtain information about the predicating allegations in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, while preventing information about the nature and existence of the investigation from becoming public, and potentially impacting the presidential election. In Chapter Ten we described multiple CHS operations undertaken by the Crossfire Hurricane team, including the tasking of CHSs and UCEs during the 2016 presidential campaign. These investigative activities included numerous CHS interactions with Page and Papadopoulos to collect information about the predicating allegations while both were Trump campaign advisors and after they were no longer affiliated with the Trump campaign. In addition, an FBI CHS was tasked to interact with a high-level Trump campaign official who was not a subject of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation in an effort to gather information potentially relevant to the predicating allegations. We also determined that the FBI attempted to contact Papadopoulos through additional CHSs, but those attempted contacts did not lead to any operational activity.

In our review, we also learned that, in 2016, there were several other individuals who had either a connection to candidate Trump or a role in the Trump campaign, and were also FBI CHSs. Some of these sources were known to and available for use by the Crossfire Hurricane team during the 2016 presidential campaign. The Crossfire Hurricane team received general information about Page and Manafort from one such CHS, but that CHS did not further assist the Crossfire Hurricane team in any way. We found no evidence that any members of the Crossfire Hurricane team ever suggested inserting this CHS into the Trump campaign to gather investigative information. SSA 1 told the OIG, "that was not what we were looking to do." For a different CHS who held a position in the Trump campaign, we learned that the Crossfire Hurricane team decided not to task the CHS, and the FBI Handling Agent minimized contact with the CHS, because of the CHS's campaign involvement. The Crossfire Hurricane team also made no use of an FBI CHS who had a potential opportunity for a private meeting with candidate Trump. That CHS's Handling Agent told the OIG that he "would certainly not be tasking a source to go attend some private meeting with a candidate, any candidate, for president or for other office, to collect the information on what that candidate is saying." Although the Crossfire Hurricane team was aware of these CHSs during the 2016 presidential campaign, we were told that operational use of these CHSs would not have furthered the investigation, and so these CHSs were not tasked with any investigative activities.[523] Moreover, SSA 1 told the OIG that the members of the Crossfire Hurricane team "never [had] any intent, never any

[523] We were troubled by some of the language contained in certain documents we reviewed regarding the use and possible use of some of the CHSs, as we detail in Chapter 10. However, we saw no evidence that the FBI, or specifically the Crossfire Hurricane team, actually used any CHSs as a "passive listening post" for the Trump campaign or to "obtain insight" regarding the incoming Trump Administration.

desire...to collect...campaign or privileged information with regard to the presidential election."

We also learned of two other FBI CHSs, one of whom held a position [redacted] and the other of whom [redacted] We found no evidence that the Crossfire Hurricane team ever knew about the first CHS, who held a position [redacted] and, accordingly, no evidence that the first CHS was tasked to do anything as part of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

We found that the Crossfire Hurricane team did not learn about the second CHS until months after the election. In 2017, the Crossfire Hurricane team learned about the second CHS after the CHS voluntarily provided to the CHS's Handling Agent, after the campaign was over and prompted by events reported in the media, [redacted] and the Handling Agent forwarded the material, through his supervisor and FBI Headquarters, to the Crossfire Hurricane team. The team determined that [redacted]. The Handling Agent told us that, when he subsequently informed the Crossfire Hurricane team that the CHS had [redacted] an Intelligence Analyst assigned to the Crossfire Hurricane team asked the Handling Agent to collect [redacted] from the CHS, which the Handling Agent did. We learned that the Crossfire Hurricane team determined that there was not "anything significant" in this [redacted], and never tasked the CHS to interact with anyone [redacted]

While we found that no action was taken by the Crossfire Hurricane team in response to receiving [redacted], we nevertheless were concerned to learn that the Handling Agent for the second CHS [redacted] that the CHS had voluntarily provided into the FBI's files, and we promptly notified the FBI upon learning that they were still being maintained in the FBI's files. We further concluded that because the second CHS's Handling Agent did not understand the CHS's political involvement, no assessment was performed by the source's Handling Agent or his supervisors (none of whom were members of the Crossfire Hurricane team) to determine whether the CHS required re-designation as a "sensitive source" or should have been closed during the pendency of the campaign. To address this issue, we recommend the FBI provide additional guidance to handling agents concerning their responsibility to inquire whether their CHS participates in the types of groups or activities that would bring their CHS within the definition of a "sensitive source." Handling agents should document (and update as needed) those affiliations, and any others voluntarily provided to them by the CHS, in the Source Opening Communication, the "Sensitive Categories" portion of each CHS's Quarterly Supervisory Source Report, the "Life Changes" portion of CHS Contact Reports, or as otherwise directed by the FBI, so that the FBI can assess the appropriateness of continuing to use a CHS, particularly where the CHS

is participating in political organizations or activities and then voluntarily providing information to the FBI.

Finally, we found no evidence that the Crossfire Hurricane team tasked any CHSs or UCEs to join the Trump campaign, sent any CHSs or UCEs to campaign offices or to campaign events to collect information for the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, or tasked any CHSs or UCEs to report on the Trump campaign.

F. Compliance with FBI Policies

We determined that the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was opened before any CHSs or UCEs were tasked to interact with any members of the Trump campaign. Once the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was opened, the use of CHSs and UCEs was authorized under the AG Guidelines and the DIOG, which permit use of "all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a Full Investigation" including specifically "CHS use and recruitment," "consensual monitoring of communications," and "Undercover Operations."[524]

As noted previously, the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was designated a SIM under DIOG § 10.1.2, because the FBI determined that any potential subjects of the investigation would be "prominent" members of a political campaign. The same designation was assigned to the four individual cases because the FBI determined that the individuals identified as subjects were "prominent" in the Trump campaign. However, the CHS operations undertaken in Crossfire Hurricane did not require heightened review by FBI supervisors or Department approval because, under the DIOG, the operations did not involve the use of "sensitive" sources, "Undisclosed Participation" (UDP) in political organizations, or "sensitive monitoring circumstances." As discussed in Chapter Two, the DIOG requires SAC approval to open a "sensitive" source; SAC approval with notice to the Sensitive Operations Review Committee (a panel that includes Department AAGs or their designees) for UDP in a political organization or other organization exercising First Amendment rights; and Department approval for a CHS to record conversations in a "sensitive monitoring circumstance." We determined that none of these approval requirements applied to the investigative activities undertaken by the Crossfire Hurricane team.

FBI policy defines "sensitive" sources to include CHSs who are political candidates or who are "prominent within a domestic political organization." None of the CHSs tasked in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation fell within these categories, because none of the CHSs were themselves candidates or prominent members of a campaign. The agents, analysts, and supervisors on the Crossfire Hurricane team told the OIG that they did not attempt to recruit or use members of the Trump campaign as CHSs, and we found no evidence suggesting otherwise. However, our interviews with FBI handling agents revealed significant confusion over the meaning

---

[524] AG Guidelines § II.B.4(b)(ii); DIOG §§ 7.3, 7.9(E), 7.9(I), 7.9(U). As noted in Chapter Two, had the investigation been opened as a Preliminary Investigation, rather than a Full Investigation, the use of CHSs and UCEs would similarly have been authorized under the AG Guidelines and the DIOG.

of the phrase "prominent within a domestic political organization," with some agents interpreting that phrase as limited to a person "running for office," and other agents questioning whether a presidential primary campaign was a "domestic political organization." Accordingly, we recommend that the FBI establish guidance to better define this phrase, so that agents understand the meaning of this phrase as it is used in FBI policy.

FBI policies concerning "Undisclosed Participation" (UDP) apply when anyone acting on behalf of the FBI, to include CHSs and UCEs, becomes a member of, or participates in, the activity of an organization without disclosing to the organization their FBI affiliation. These policies likewise did not apply to the Crossfire Hurricane case because we found no evidence that any of the FBI CHSs or UCEs used in Crossfire Hurricane joined or participated in the Trump campaign at all, and certainly not at the direction of, or otherwise on behalf of, the FBI. During our review, this issue briefly arose because we learned that one of the subjects of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation had invited an FBI CHS to join the Trump campaign, prior to the opening of the investigation. However, we found that when the Crossfire Hurricane team learned about this invitation following the investigation's opening, the team did not consider using this opportunity to engage in UDP. Rather, every FBI witness we interviewed said they would not have done so even if the FBI CHS had actually wanted to join the campaign. Strzok's reaction to the possibility—"[O]h god no. Absolutely not"—and the reaction Case Agent 2 attributed to the OGC attorneys—"no freaking way"—were indicative of the reactions we heard from all members of the Crossfire Hurricane team when we questioned them about whether they considered the possibility of inserting an FBI CHS into the Trump campaign to collect investigative information. None of the documents we reviewed indicated that any member of the Crossfire Hurricane team ever advocated for that type of investigative activity.

The use of CHSs and UCEs by the Crossfire Hurricane team also did not present a "sensitive monitoring circumstance," as defined by the AG Guidelines and the DIOG. As described in these policies, a "sensitive monitoring circumstance" arises when the FBI seeks to record communications with officials who have already been elected or appointed, such as Members of Congress, federal judges, or high ranking members of the executive branch. The AG Guidelines and the DIOG do not require prior notice to, or approval by, the Department when the FBI uses a CHS to consensually monitor communications with candidates for political office or prominent officials within their campaigns.

Because the CHS operations conducted during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation did not implicate the FBI's policies regarding sensitive sources, UDP, or sensitive monitoring circumstances, Department or higher level FBI notice or approval was not required for such operations. Under the CHSPG, which vests SSAs with daily oversight responsibility for CHSs in routine investigations, approval at the SSA level was sufficient.[525] The only relevant exception for the Crossfire

[525] CHSPG § 2.1.1.

Hurricane investigation were counterintelligence CHS extraterritorial operations, which required approval by an FBI Assistant Director, and which we found received approval by Priestap.[526] We determined that the day-to-day decisions concerning whether and how to use CHSs and UCEs in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation were made by the investigative team, with the approval of SSA 1 as required by FBI policy. We further found that SSA 1 briefed the FBI supervisors in his chain of command—Strzok, Priestap, and on one occasion McCabe—about the CHS operations planned by the investigative team. Priestap told the OIG that he remembered knowing about, and approving of, all of the CHS operations in Crossfire Hurricane, even though review and approval at his level was not required by the DIOG for operations conducted within the United States.

We further concluded that the use of CHSs and UCEs in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation complied with the DIOG's requirement that "investigative activities be conducted for an authorized purpose."[527] As discussed previously, the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was opened for an authorized purpose—which means "to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence."[528] The DIOG also provides that the underlying purpose of the investigative activity "may not be solely to monitor the exercise of constitutional rights...."[529] While the investigative activity in this case clearly implicated First Amendment protected activity, we did not find evidence that members of Crossfire Hurricane team attempted to use CHSs or UCEs for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Rather, we determined that these investigative activities were focused on obtaining information that would enable investigators to better assess the predicating information. Indeed, a significant amount of the information gathered during these operations was inconsistent with the Steele election reporting and should have been provided to Department attorneys, but was not.

For example, our review of CHS interactions with Page indicated that they were initiated to obtain information relevant to the allegations under investigation. Page was asked about his ongoing ties to Russia, contacts with Russian intelligence officials, views on media reports linking the Trump campaign and Russia, involvement in the committee responsible for the Republican platform language concerning aiding Ukraine, and views on the possibility of an "October Surprise" if the Trump campaign could access information obtained by the Russians from the

---

[526] As described in Chapter Two, the [redacted] Because the Crossfire Hurricane investigation at the outset was a national security investigation, the [redacted].

[527] DIOG § 4.1.2.

[528] DIOG § 7.2.

[529] DIOG § 4.1.2.

DNC emails. Similarly, CHS operations aimed at Papadopoulos were linked to the allegations under investigation in Crossfire Hurricane. For example, when Papadopoulos was asked about the Trump campaign, the questions were focused on obtaining information about other Crossfire Hurricane subjects (Page and Flynn) or determining whether the Trump campaign benefitted from, or anyone in the Trump campaign had knowledge of, Russian assistance or the WikiLeaks release of information that was damaging to the Clinton campaign. Papadopoulos's response—that the Trump campaign was not "advocat[ing] for this type of activity because at the end of the day it's...illegal"—clearly pertained to the issues under investigation and, as discussed elsewhere in this report, should have been provided to the Department's attorneys for evaluation as part of the FISA applications. Likewise, the high-level Trump campaign official was asked about the role of three Crossfire Hurricane subjects—Page, Papadopoulos, and Manafort—in the Trump campaign, and also asked about allegations in public reports concerning Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, the campaign's response to ideas featured in Page's Moscow speech, and the possibility of an "October Surprise." These areas of inquiry were focused on the allegations under investigation in an effort to elicit pertinent information.

However, the CHS and the high-level campaign official [redacted]. We found that the Crossfire Hurricane team made no use of any information collected from the high-level Trump campaign official, because the team determined that none of the information gathered was "germane" to the allegations under investigation. However, as noted above, we were concerned that the Crossfire Hurricane team did not recall having in place a plan, prior to the operation involving the high-level campaign official, to address the possible collection of politically sensitive information.

We also looked for, but did not find, documentary evidence that investigative activities involving CHSs and UCEs during Crossfire Hurricane were undertaken for political purposes, rather than investigative objectives. Similarly, none of the witnesses provided any such information to us. In addition, we evaluated the roles of Lisa Page and Strzok in decision making about how to use CHSs and UCEs in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. We learned that the Crossfire Hurricane case agents had limited and, in some cases, no interaction with Lisa Page, and that she had no authority over, or even involvement in, decision making concerning the use of CHSs or UCEs. Although we found that Strzok oversaw aspects of Crossfire Hurricane, and was briefed regarding the plans for the use of CHSs and UCEs, we found no evidence that Strzok gave specific directions as to which CHSs to task and how to task them, or acted as the sole decision maker for any of the CHS or UCE operations. In addition, none of the Crossfire Hurricane team members stated that they believed Strzok's political views impacted the use of CHSs or UCEs, and we did not find any documentary evidence suggesting such an impact.

Although we found that the Crossfire Hurricane team complied with all applicable Department and FBI policies regarding the use of CHSs, we are

concerned that current FBI and Department policies are not sufficient to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability when such operations potentially implicate sensitive, constitutionally protected activity. During Crossfire Hurricane, the FBI conducted multiple CHS operations that involved interactions with members of a major party candidate's presidential campaign, including a high-level campaign official who was not an investigative subject. Under current Department guidelines and FBI policy, those operations only required the approval of an FBI SSA, a first-level supervisor (although here, as noted above, an FBI Assistant Director approved of all of the CHS operations). The FBI was not required to notify the Department of those investigative activities and we are unaware of any Department official having had advance knowledge of the FBI's plan to consensually monitor conversations between CHSs and Page and Papadopoulos, both before and after they were affiliated with the Trump campaign, and a conversation with a high-level Trump campaign official. The then Chief of NSD's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section David Laufman told the OIG that he believed such activity should require Department authorization. We agree.

We recommend that the Department and FBI assess the definition of a "sensitive monitoring circumstance" contained in the AG Guidelines and the DIOG to determine whether to expand its scope to include consensual monitoring of major party domestic political candidates for federal office or individuals prominent within those domestic political organizations, so that at a minimum, Department consultation is required when tasking a CHS to interact with officials in national political campaigns. Such a change would be consistent with other currently-existing FBI and Department policies intended to ensure appropriate approval and oversight where certain constitutionally protected activity is concerned. Examples include the FBI's heightened approval requirements for sensitive UDP that is likely to affect the exercise of First Amendment rights by members of an organization, the FBI's definition of "Sensitive Investigative Matters" (which includes domestic political candidates and prominent members of domestic political organizations), the Department's approval requirements for consensual monitoring when investigating alleged misconduct by a senior member of the executive branch or a Member of Congress, and the Department's requirement for Attorney General approval for toll record subpoenas and search warrants directed at members of the media. We believe the same considerations that resulted in the adoption of these provisions to protect the exercise of constitutional rights similarly apply to the situation present in Crossfire Hurricane, where the Department and FBI were conducting CHS operations of officials affiliated with a major party candidate's national political campaign.

G. Participation in ODNI Strategic Intelligence Briefing

As described in Section V of Chapter Ten, we learned during the course of our review that in August 2016, the supervisor of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, SSA 1, participated on behalf of the FBI in an ODNI strategic intelligence briefing given to candidate Trump and his national security advisors, including Flynn, and in a separate briefing given to candidate Clinton and her national security advisors. The stated purpose of the FBI's counterintelligence and security portion of the briefings was to provide the recipients "a baseline on the

presence and threat posed by foreign intelligence services to the National Security of the U.S." However, we found the FBI also had an investigative purpose when it specifically selected SSA 1, a supervisor for the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, to provide the FBI briefings. SSA 1 was selected, in part, because Flynn, who would be attending the briefing with candidate Trump, was a subject in one of the ongoing investigations related to Crossfire Hurricane. SSA 1 told us that the briefing provided him "the opportunity to gain assessment and possibly some level of familiarity with [Flynn]. So, should we get to the point where we need to do a subject interview...I would have that to fall back on."

After the meeting, SSA 1 drafted an Electronic Communication (EC) documenting his participation in the ODNI strategic intelligence briefing attended by Trump, Flynn, and another advisor, and added the EC to the Crossfire Hurricane investigative file. The EC described the purpose, location, and attendees of the briefing, and recounted in summary fashion the portion of the briefing SSA 1 provided. Woven into the briefing summary were questions posed to SSA 1 by Trump and Flynn, and SSA 1's responses, as well as comments made by Trump and Flynn. SSA 1 told us that he documented those instances where he was engaged by the attendees, as well as anything related to the FBI or pertinent to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, such as comments about the Russian Federation. SSA 1 said that he also documented information that may not have been relevant at the time he recorded it, but might prove relevant in the future. SSA 1 told us that he did not memorialize in writing the briefing he participated in of candidate Clinton and her national security advisors because the attendees did not include a subject of an FBI investigation, and because there was nothing from the other briefings that was of investigative value to the Crossfire Hurricane team.

As we described earlier in connection with the FBI's decision not to conduct defensive briefings to the Trump campaign about the information the FBI received from the FFG, we did not identify any Department or FBI policy that applied to that decision and determined that those decisions are judgment calls left to the discretion of FBI officials. Similarly, we did not identify any Department or FBI policy or guidance that specifically addresses using FBI counterintelligence and security briefings to members of political campaigns for investigative purposes, as occurred in Crossfire Hurricane. We believe there should be.

Baker told us that the decision to select SSA 1 to participate in the ODNI briefing because of his involvement with Crossfire Hurricane was reached by consensus among a group that he recalled involved multiple FBI officials, including McCabe.[530] If accurate, SSA 1's selection at least was discussed and approved by high-level officials at the FBI, which we believe should occur in advance of such activity. However, there is nothing in FBI policy requiring high-level approval. Further, the Department was not informed that the FBI was using the ODNI briefing of a presidential candidate for investigative purposes, nor was ODNI made aware that the individual providing the FBI's portion of the briefing would be

[530] McCabe told us that it was possible he participated in conversations about whether SSA 1 should conduct the briefings, but could not recall any.

memorializing information from the briefing into an FBI case file for investigative purposes.

ODNI strategic intelligence briefings of the type that were provided to candidates Trump and Clinton convey sensitive information to familiarize the recipients with certain national security issues; and the FBI's counterintelligence and security portion of the briefings highlights why the recipients, once given access to such information, should assume they will be targets of foreign intelligence services. The briefings are important because they attempt to prepare both national political party candidates, on an equal footing, for the national security threats facing them if elected. The transfer of information, the exchanges of questions and answers that can occur, and the effectiveness of this process rely on an expectation of trust and good faith among the participants. The FBI's use of such briefings for investigative purposes potentially interferes with this expectation and could frustrate the purpose of future counterintelligence briefings. For this reason, we recommend that any decision to use FBI counterintelligence and security briefings to members of political campaigns for investigative purposes should require the approval of senior leaders at both the FBI and the Department, and approval should be documented and based on factors set forth in FBI policy.

[PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Conclusions

In July 2016, 3 weeks after then FBI Director James Comey announced the conclusion of the FBI's "Midyear Exam" investigation into presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's handling of government emails during her tenure as Secretary of State, the FBI received reporting from a Friendly Foreign Government (FFG) that, in a May 2016 meeting with the FFG, Trump campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos "suggested the Trump team had received some kind of a suggestion" from Russia that it could assist in the election process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to candidate Clinton and President Obama. Days later, on July 31, the FBI initiated the Crossfire Hurricane investigation that is the subject of this report.

As we noted last year in our review of the Midyear investigation, the FBI has developed and earned a reputation as one of the world's premier law enforcement agencies in significant part because of its tradition of professionalism, impartiality, non-political enforcement of the law, and adherence to detailed policies, practices, and norms. It was precisely these qualities that were required as the FBI initiated and conducted Crossfire Hurricane. However, as we describe in this report, our review identified significant concerns with how certain aspects of the investigation were conducted and supervised, particularly the FBI's failure to adhere to its own standards of accuracy and completeness when filing applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authority to surveil Carter Page, a U.S. person who was connected to the Donald J. Trump for President Campaign. We also identified what we believe is an absence of sufficient policies to ensure appropriate Department oversight of significant investigative decisions that could affect constitutionally protected activity.

The Opening of Crossfire Hurricane and the Use of Confidential Human Sources

The decision to open the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was made by the FBI's then Counterintelligence Division (CD) Assistant Director (AD), E.W. "Bill" Priestap, and reflected a consensus reached after multiple days of discussions and meetings among senior FBI officials. We concluded that AD Priestap's exercise of discretion in opening the investigation was in compliance with Department and FBI policies, and we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced his decision. While the information in the FBI's possession at the time was limited, in light of the low threshold established by Department and FBI predication policy, we found that Crossfire Hurricane was opened for an authorized investigative purpose and with sufficient factual predication.

However, we also determined that, under Department and FBI policy, the decision whether to open the Crossfire Hurricane counterintelligence investigation,

which involved the activities of individuals associated with a national major party campaign for president, was a discretionary judgment call left to the FBI. There was no requirement that Department officials be consulted, or even notified, prior to the FBI making that decision. We further found that, consistent with this policy, the FBI advised supervisors in the Department's National Security Division (NSD) of the investigation only after it had been initiated. As we detail in Chapter Two, high-level Department notice and approval is required in other circumstances where investigative activity could substantially impact certain civil liberties, and that notice allows senior Department officials to consider the potential constitutional and prudential implications in advance of these activities. We concluded that similar advance notice should be required in circumstances such as those that were present here.

Shortly after the FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, the FBI conducted several consensually monitored meetings between FBI confidential human sources (CHS) and individuals affiliated with the Trump campaign, including a high-level campaign official who was not a subject of the investigation. We found that the CHS operations received the necessary approvals under FBI policy; that an Assistant Director knew about and approved of each operation, even in circumstances where a first-level supervisory special agent could have approved the operations; and that the operations were permitted under Department and FBI policy because their use was not for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. We did not find any documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or improper motivation influenced the FBI's decision to conduct these operations. Additionally, we found no evidence that the FBI attempted to place any CHSs within the Trump campaign, recruit members of the Trump campaign as CHSs, or task CHSs to report on the Trump campaign.

However, we are concerned that, under applicable Department and FBI policy, it would have been sufficient for a first-level FBI supervisor to authorize the sensitive domestic CHS operations undertaken in Crossfire Hurricane, and that there is no applicable Department or FBI policy requiring the FBI to notify Department officials of a decision to task CHSs to consensually monitor conversations with members of a presidential campaign. Specifically, in Crossfire Hurricane, where one of the CHS operations involved consensually monitoring a high-level official on the Trump campaign who was not a subject of the investigation, and all of the operations had the potential to gather sensitive information of the campaign about protected First Amendment activity, we found no evidence that the FBI consulted with any Department officials before conducting the CHS operations—and no policy requiring the FBI to do so. We therefore believe that current Department and FBI policies are not sufficient to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability when such operations potentially implicate sensitive, constitutionally protected activity, and that requiring Department consultation, at a minimum, would be appropriate.

The FISA Applications to Conduct Surveillance of Carter Page

One investigative tool for which Department and FBI policy expressly require advance approval by a senior Department official is the seeking of a court order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). When the Crossfire Hurricane team first proposed seeking a FISA order targeting Carter Page in mid-August 2016, FBI attorneys assisting the investigation considered it a "close call" whether they had developed the probable cause necessary to obtain the order, and a FISA order was not requested at that time. However, in September 2016, immediately after the Crossfire Hurricane team received reporting from Christopher Steele concerning Page's alleged recent activities with Russian officials, FBI attorneys advised the Department that the team was ready to move forward with a request to obtain FISA authority to surveil Page. FBI and Department officials told us the Steele reporting "pushed [the FISA proposal] over the line" in terms of establishing probable cause. FBI leadership supported relying on Steele's reporting to seek a FISA order targeting Page after being advised of, and giving consideration to, concerns expressed by a Department attorney that Steele may have been hired by someone associated with a rival candidate or campaign.

The authority under FISA to conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches targeting individuals significantly assists the government's efforts to combat terrorism, clandestine intelligence activity, and other threats to the national security. At the same time, the use of this authority unavoidably raises civil liberties concerns. FISA orders can be used to surveil U.S. persons, like Carter Page, and in some cases the surveillance will foreseeably collect information about the individual's constitutionally protected activities, such as Page's legitimate activities on behalf of a presidential campaign. Moreover, proceedings before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—which is responsible for ruling on applications for FISA orders—are *ex parte*, meaning that unlike most court proceedings, the government is present but the government's counterparty is not. In addition, unlike the use of other intrusive investigative techniques (such as wiretaps under Title III and traditional criminal search warrants) that are granted in *ex parte* hearings but can potentially be subject to later court challenge, FISA orders have not been subject to scrutiny through subsequent adversarial proceedings.

In light of these concerns, Congress through the FISA statute, and the Department and FBI through policies and procedures, have established important safeguards to protect the FISA application process from irregularities and abuse. Among the most important are the requirements in FBI policy that every FISA application must contain a "full and accurate" presentation of the facts, and that agents must ensure that all factual statements in FISA applications are "scrupulously accurate." These are the standards for <u>all</u> FISA applications, regardless of the investigation's sensitivity, and it is incumbent upon the FBI to meet them in every application. That said, in the context of an investigation involving persons associated with a presidential campaign, where the target of the FISA is a former campaign official and the goal of the FISA is to uncover, among other things, information about the individual's allegedly illegal campaign-related activities, members of the Crossfire Hurricane investigative team should have

anticipated, and told us they in fact did anticipate, that these FISA applications would be subjected to especially close scrutiny.

Nevertheless, we found that members of the Crossfire Hurricane team failed to meet the basic obligation to ensure that the Carter Page FISA applications were "scrupulously accurate." We identified significant inaccuracies and omissions in each of the four applications—7 in the first FISA application and a total of 17 by the final renewal application. For example, the Crossfire Hurricane team obtained information from Steele's Primary Sub-source in January 2017 that raised significant questions about the reliability of the Steele reporting that was used in the Carter Page FISA applications. But members of the Crossfire Hurricane team failed to share the information with the Department, and it was therefore omitted from the three renewal applications. All of the applications also omitted information the FBI had obtained from another U.S. government agency detailing its prior relationship with Page, including that Page had been approved as an operational contact for the other agency from 2008 to 2013, and that Page had provided information to the other agency concerning his prior contacts with certain Russian intelligence officers, one of which overlapped with facts asserted in the FISA application.

As a result of the 17 significant inaccuracies and omissions we identified, relevant information was not shared with, and consequently not considered by, important Department decision makers and the court, and the FISA applications made it appear as though the evidence supporting probable cause was stronger than was actually the case. We also found basic, fundamental, and serious errors during the completion of the FBI's factual accuracy reviews, known as the Woods Procedures, which are designed to ensure that FISA applications contain a full and accurate presentation of the facts.

We do not speculate whether the correction of any particular misstatement or omission, or some combination thereof, would have resulted in a different outcome. Nevertheless, the Department's decision makers and the court should have been given complete and accurate information so that they could meaningfully evaluate probable cause before authorizing the surveillance of a U.S. person associated with a presidential campaign. That did not occur, and as a result, the surveillance of Carter Page continued even as the FBI gathered information that weakened the assessment of probable cause and made the FISA applications less accurate.

We determined that the inaccuracies and omissions we identified in the applications resulted from case agents providing wrong or incomplete information to Department attorneys and failing to identify important issues for discussion. Moreover, we concluded that case agents and SSAs did not give appropriate attention to facts that cut against probable cause, and that as the investigation progressed and more information tended to undermine or weaken the assertions in the FISA applications, the agents and SSAs did not reassess the information supporting probable cause. Further, the agents and SSAs did not follow, or even appear to know, certain basic requirements in the Woods Procedures. Although we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the case agents who assisted NSD's Office of Intelligence (OI) in preparing

the applications, or the agents and supervisors who performed the Woods Procedures, we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or missing information. We found that the offered explanations for these serious errors did not excuse them, or the repeated failures to ensure the accuracy of information presented to the FISC.

We are deeply concerned that so many basic and fundamental errors were made by three separate, hand-picked investigative teams; on one of the most sensitive FBI investigations; after the matter had been briefed to the highest levels within the FBI; even though the information sought through use of FISA authority related so closely to an ongoing presidential campaign; and even though those involved with the investigation knew that their actions were likely to be subjected to close scrutiny. We believe this circumstance reflects a failure not just by those who prepared the FISA applications, but also by the managers and supervisors in the Crossfire Hurricane chain of command, including FBI senior officials who were briefed as the investigation progressed. We do not expect managers and supervisors to know every fact about an investigation, or senior leaders to know all the details of cases about which they are briefed. However, especially in the FBI's most sensitive and high-priority matters, and especially when seeking court permission to use an intrusive tool such as a FISA order, it is incumbent upon the entire chain of command, including senior officials, to take the necessary steps to ensure that they are sufficiently familiar with the facts and circumstances supporting and potentially undermining a FISA application in order to provide effective oversight consistent with their level of supervisory responsibility. Such oversight requires greater familiarity with the facts than we saw in this review, where time and again during OIG interviews FBI managers, supervisors, and senior officials displayed a lack of understanding or awareness of important information concerning many of the problems we identified.

In the preparation of the FISA applications to surveil Carter Page, the Crossfire Hurricane team failed to comply with FBI policies, and in so doing fell short of what is rightfully expected from a premier law enforcement agency entrusted with such an intrusive surveillance tool. In light of the significant concerns identified with the Carter Page FISA applications and the other issues described in this report, the OIG today initiated an audit that will further examine the FBI's compliance with the Woods Procedures in FISA applications that target U.S. persons in both counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. We also make the following recommendations to assist the Department and the FBI in avoiding similar failures in future investigations.

II. Recommendations

For the reasons fully described in previous chapters, we recommend the following:

1. The Department and the FBI should ensure that adequate procedures are in place for the Office of Intelligence (OI) to obtain all relevant and accurate information, including access to Confidential Human Source

(CHS) information, needed to prepare FISA applications and renewal applications. This effort should include revising:

a. the FISA Request Form: to ensure information is identified for OI: (i) that tends to disprove, does not support, or is inconsistent with a finding or an allegation that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, or (ii) that bears on the reliability of every CHS whose information is relied upon in the FISA application, including all information from the derogatory information sub-file, recommended below;

b. the Woods Form: (i) to emphasize to agents and their supervisors the obligation to re-verify factual assertions repeated from prior applications and to obtain written approval from CHS handling agents of all CHS source characterization statements in applications, and (ii) to specify what steps must be taken and documented during the legal review performed by an FBI Office of General Counsel (OGC) line attorney and SES-level supervisor before submitting the FISA application package to the FBI Director for certification;

c. the FISA Procedures: to clarify which positions may serve as the supervisory reviewer for OGC; and

d. taking any other steps deemed appropriate to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information provided to OI.

2. The Department and FBI should evaluate which types of Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity and raise policy considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.

3. The FBI should develop protocols and guidelines for staffing and administrating any future sensitive investigative matters from FBI Headquarters.

4. The FBI should address the problems with the administration and assessment of CHSs identified in this report and, at a minimum, should:

a. revise its standard CHS admonishment form to include a prohibition on the disclosure of the CHS's relationship with the FBI to third parties absent the FBI's permission, and assess the need to include other admonishments in the standard CHS admonishments;

b. develop enhanced procedures to ensure that CHS information is documented in Delta, including information generated from Headquarters-led investigations, substantive contacts with closed CHSs (directly or through third parties), and derogatory information. We renew our recommendation that the FBI create a derogatory information sub-file in Delta;

c. assess VMU's practices regarding reporting source validation findings and non-findings;

d. establish guidance for sharing sensitive information with CHSs;

e. establish guidance to handling agents for inquiring whether their CHS participates in the types of groups or activities that would bring the CHS within the definition of a "sensitive source," and ensure handling agents document (and update as needed) those affiliations and any others voluntarily provided to them by the CHS in the Source Opening Communication, the "Sensitive Categories" portion of each CHS's Quarterly Supervisory Source Report, the "Life Changes" portion of CHS Contact Reports, or as otherwise directed by the FBI so that the FBI can assess whether active CHSs are engaged in activities (such as political campaigns) at a level that might require re-designation as a "sensitive source" or necessitate closure of the CHS; and

f. revise its CHS policy to address the considerations that should be taken into account and the steps that should be followed before and after accepting information from a closed CHS indirectly through a third party.

5. The Department and FBI should clarify the following terms in their policies:

a. assess the definition of a "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance" in the AG Guidelines and the FBI's DIOG to determine whether to expand its scope to include consensual monitoring of a domestic political candidate or an individual prominent within a domestic political organization, or a subset of these persons, so that consensual monitoring of such individuals would require consultation with or advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General; and

b. establish guidance, and include examples in the DIOG, to better define the meaning of the phrase "prominent in a domestic political organization" so that agents understand which campaign officials fall within that definition as it relates to "Sensitive Investigative Matters," "Sensitive UDP," and the designation of "sensitive sources." Further, if the Department expands the scope of "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance," as

recommended above, the FBI should apply the guidance on "prominent in a domestic political organization" to "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance" as well.

6. The FBI should ensure that appropriate training on DIOG § 4 is provided to emphasize the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations and to ensure that agents account for these concerns, both in the tasking of CHSs and in the way they document interactions with and tasking of CHSs.

7. The FBI should establish a policy regarding the use of defensive and transition briefings for investigative purposes, including the factors to be considered and approval by senior leaders at the FBI with notice to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General.

8. The Department's Office of Professional Responsibility should review our findings related to the conduct of Department attorney Bruce Ohr for any action it deems appropriate. Ohr's current supervisors in the Department's Criminal Division should also review our findings related to Ohr's performance for any action they deem appropriate.

9. The FBI should review the performance of all employees who had responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or approval of the FISA applications, as well as the managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command of the Carter Page investigation, for any action deemed appropriate.

APPENDIX 1

WOODS PROCEDURES[531]
FIRST FISA APPLICATION

Factual Assertion in FISA Application	Page # or FN	No supporting documentation	Supporting documentation does not state this fact	Supporting document shows that the factual assertion is inaccurate
The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation.	5		X	
Although Page did not provide any specific details to refute, dispel, or clarify the media reporting, he made vague statements that minimized his activities.	27			X
In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison.	FN 6	X		
[Steele] is a former [redacted] and has been an FBI source since in or about October 2013. [Steele's] reporting has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings and the FBI assesses [Steele] to be reliable. [Steele] has been compensated approx. $95,000 by the FBI and the FBI is unaware of any derogatory information pertaining to [Steele].[532]	FN 8	X		
[Steele] reported the information contained therein to the FBI over the course of several meetings with the FBI from in or about June 2016 through August 2016.	FN 8	X		
[Steele] told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.	FN 18			X
Since that time, Source #2 has routinely provided reliable information that has been corroborated by the FBI.	FN 20	X		
Source #2 has been compensated in excess of [redacted] since 2008.	FN 20	X		

[531] This Appendix describes errors we identified in the Woods process for the four Carter Page FISA applications. We did not examine the "facilities" section of the applications. This Appendix does not include non-Woods-related errors in the applications described in Chapters Five and Eight. As described in Chapter Two, the Woods Procedures seek to ensure the accuracy of every factual assertion in a FISA application. These procedures require that the case agent who requests an application create and maintain a "Woods File" that contains: (1) supporting documentation for every factual assertion contained in the application, and (2) results and supporting documentation of the required searches and verifications. In this appendix, we identify each factual assertion in the FISA applications for which we found (1) no supporting documentation in the Woods File, (2) purported supporting documentation in the Woods File that did not state the fact asserted in the FISA application, or (3) purported supporting documentation in the Woods File that actually indicates the fact asserted is inaccurate.

[532] The Woods Procedures require that when an application contains reporting from a Confidential Human Source (CHS), the Woods File must contain documentation from the CHS handling agent verifying that the handling agent has reviewed the facts on the CHS's background and reliability and that the representations in the FISA about the CHS are accurate.

APPENDIX 1

WOODS PROCEDURES
RENEWAL APPLICATION NO. 1

Factual assertion in FISA Application	Page # or FN	No supporting documentation	Supporting documentation does not state this fact	Supporting document shows that the factual assertion is inaccurate
The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation.	6		X	
Although Page did not provide any specific details to refute, dispel, or clarify the media reporting, he made vague statements that minimized his activities.	29			X
According to Source #2, Page initially attempted to distance the think tank from Russian funding.	35	X		
Papadopoulos is a current subject of an FBI investigation.[533]	FN 3	X		
In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison.	FN 7	X		
[Steele] is a former [redacted] and has been an FBI source since in or about October 2013. [Steele] has been compensated approx. $95,000 by the FBI. [T]he FBI assesses [Steele] to be reliable as previous reporting from [Steele] has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings.	FN 9	X		
[I]n or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with [Steele] due to [Steele's] unauthorized disclosure of information to the press.	FN 9		X	
[Steele] reported the information contained therein to the FBI over the course of several meetings with the FBI from in or about June 2016 through August 2016.	FN 9	X		
[Steele] told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.	FN 19			X
Since that time, Source #2 has routinely provided reliable information that has been corroborated by the FBI.	FN 21	X		
Source #2 has been compensated in excess of [redacted] since 2008.	FN 21	X		

[533] Although the Crossfire Hurricane team knew the FBI had an ongoing investigation of Papadopoulos, the Woods File did not contain documentation supporting this factual assertion. The Woods Procedures do not exempt information known to the case agent from having supporting documentation.

APPENDIX 1

WOODS PROCEDURES
RENEWAL APPLICATION NO. 2[534]

Factual assertion in FISA Application	Page # or FN	No supporting documentation	Supporting documentation does not state this fact	Supporting document shows that the factual assertion is inaccurate
The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation.	6		X	
Although Page did not provide any specific details to refute, dispel, or clarify the media reporting, he made vague statements that minimized his activities.	30			X
According to Source #2, Page initially attempted to distance the think tank from Russian funding.	35	X		
Page stated that he believed that he was the subject of electronic surveillance by the U.S. government.	35	X		
The FBI's ongoing investigation has revealed that Page has moved out of his New York City residence and does not currently maintain a permanent address; rather Page lives in and out of hotels inside New York City and other cities.	36	X		
Court-authorized [redacted] revealed a document titled [redacted]." The document outlines what appear to be talking points that are meant to counter media reports that cast Page in a negative light.	42	X		
At a later point in the interview, after the FBI explained to Page how Page could be viewed as having a source-handler or co-optee relationship with the Russian intelligence officers, Page claimed that he believed that he was "on the books," but that he only provided the Russian intelligence officers with "immaterial non-public" information.	46-7	X		
Also during the interviews, Page denied ever meeting with Sechin or Divyekin.	47	X		

[534] The Woods File for Renewal Application No. 2 contains a piece of paper that states "Strat Plan" and another piece of paper that states "New 302," "Feb. Article," and "March Article." The case agent who compiled the Woods File for this application told us that these pieces of paper were "placeholders" he inserted into the file to indicate to the SSA reviewer that a supporting document existed, but that a copy of it was not placed into the file. We do not believe these placeholders met the Woods requirements because the descriptions of the referenced documents were vague and it was not clear to us why the actual documents could not have been included in the Woods File. We also observed that there was no notation or other record indicating that the agent and supervisor performing the factual accuracy review in fact examined the documents identified by the placeholders.

APPENDIX 1

Factual assertion in FISA Application	Page # or FN	No supporting documentation	Supporting documentation does not state this fact	Supporting document shows that the factual assertion is inaccurate
As of March 2017, the FBI has conducted several interviews with Papadopoulos. During these interviews, Papadopoulos confirmed that he met with officials from the above-referenced friendly foreign government, but he denied that he discussed anything related to the Russian Government during these meetings.	FN 4			X
In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison.	FN 8	X		
[Steele] is a former [redacted] and has been an FBI source since in or about October 2013. [Steele] has been compensated approx. $95,000 by the FBI. [T]he FBI assesses [Steele] to be reliable as previous reporting from [Steele] has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings.	FN 10	X		
[I]n or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with [Steele] due to [Steele's] unauthorized disclosure of information to the press.	FN 10		X	
[Steele] reported the information contained therein to the FBI over the course of several meetings with the FBI from in or about June 2016 through August 2016.	FN 10	X		
[Steele] told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.	FN 20			X
Since that time, Source #2 has routinely provided reliable information that has been corroborated by the FBI.	FN 22	X		
Source #2 has been compensated in excess of [redacted] since 2008.	FN 22	X		

APPENDIX 1

WOODS PROCEDURES
RENEWAL APPLICATION NO. 3[535]

Factual assertion in FISA Application	Page # or FN	No supporting documentation	Supporting documentation does not state this fact	Supporting document indicates the factual assertion is inaccurate
The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation.	6		X	
Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."	7	X		
U.S. Person #1 recalled an instance where Page was picked-up in a chauffeured car and it was rumored at that time that Page had met with Igor Sechin.	21		X	
Although Page did not provide any specific details to refute, dispel, or clarify the media reporting, he made vague statements that minimized his activities.	33			X
Court-authorized [redacted] that appears to confirm that Page did, in fact, meet with such officials.	35	X		
Court-authorized [redacted], Page planned to visit members or employees of "Inter RAO."	42	X		
According to Source #2, Page initially attempted to distance the think tank from Russian funding. When Source #2 reminded Page of his previous statement regarding the "open checkbook," Page did not refute his previous comment and provided some reassurance to Source #2 about the likelihood of Russian financial support.	44	X		
Court-authorized [redacted] The document outlines what appear to be talking points that are meant to counter media reports that cast Page in a negative light.	47-8	X		

[535] Similar to the Woods File for Renewal Application No. 2, the file for Renewal Application 3 contains a "placeholder" piece of paper that states "Strat Plan," indicating to the SSA reviewer that a supporting document existed for the factual assertion, but that it was not placed into the Woods File. For the reasons noted above, we do not believe this placeholder met the Woods requirements.

APPENDIX 1

Factual assertion in FISA Application	Page # or FN	No supporting documentation	Supporting documentation does not state this fact	Supporting document indicates the factual assertion is inaccurate
Page downplayed his interactions with Dvorkovich during his March 2017 interviews with the FBI. During these interviews, Page characterized his interaction with Dvorkovich in July 2016 as a simple introduction in passing and a brief handshake.	53		X	
[Steele] is a former [redacted] and has been an FBI source since in or about October 2013. [Steele] has been compensated approx. $95,000 by the FBI. [T]he FBI assesses [Steele] to be reliable as previous reporting from [Steele] has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings.	FN 10	X		
[I]n or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with [Steele] due to [Steele's] unauthorized disclosure of information to the press.	FN 10		X	
[Steele] reported the information contained therein to the FBI over the course of several meetings with the FBI from in or about June 2016 through August 2016.	FN 10	X		
In or about December 2008, Source #2 was opened as an FBI source. In or about January 2011, Source #2 was closed as an FBI source for, among other things, motivation for reporting, but not for validity of reporting. Source #2 was reopened in or about March 2011. Since that time, Source #2 has routinely provided reliable information that has been corroborated by the FBI.	FN 21	X		
Source #2 has been compensated in excess of [redacted] since 2008.	FN 21	X		
[Steele] told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.	FN 22			X
According to information on its website, Gazprombank was founded by Gazprom to provide banking services for gas industry enterprises.	FN 26	X		

APPENDIX 2

FBI'S RESPONSE

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

December 6, 2019

The Honorable Michael Horowitz
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Inspector General Horowitz:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Report titled, "*Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation*" (Report).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the OIG's crucial independent oversight role and the thoroughness and professionalism your office brought to this work. The Report's findings and recommendations represent constructive criticism that will make us stronger as an organization. We also appreciate the Report's recognition that the FBI cooperated fully with this review and provided broad and timely access to all information requested by the OIG, including highly classified and sensitive material involving national security.

The Report concludes that the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation and related investigations of certain individuals were opened in 2016 for an authorized purpose and with adequate factual predication. The Report also details instances in which certain FBI personnel, at times during the 2016-2017 period reviewed by the OIG, did not comply with existing policies, neglected to exercise appropriate diligence, or otherwise failed to meet the standard of conduct that the FBI expects of its employees — and that our country expects of the FBI. We are vested with significant authorities, and it is our obligation as public servants to ensure that

these authorities are exercised with objectivity and integrity. Anything less falls short of the FBI's duty to the American people.

Accordingly, the FBI accepts the Report's findings and embraces the need for thoughtful, meaningful remedial action. I have ordered more than 40 corrective steps to address the Report's recommendations. Because our credibility and brand are central to fulfilling our mission, we are also making improvements beyond those recommended by the OIG. And where certain individuals have been referred by the OIG for review of their conduct, the FBI will not hesitate to take appropriate disciplinary action if warranted at the completion of the required procedures for disciplinary review.

Below is a summary of the actions we are taking, which we describe in more detail in the attachment to this letter.

First, we are modifying our processes under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), both for initial applications and renewals, to enhance accuracy and completeness. The FBI relies on FISA every day in national security investigations to prevent terrorists and foreign intelligence services from harming the United States. We are making concrete changes to ensure that our FISA protocols, verifications, layers of review, record-keeping requirements, and audits are more stringent and less susceptible to mistake or inaccuracy. These new processes will also ensure that the FISA Court and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are apprised of all information in the FBI's holdings relevant to a determination of probable cause.

Second, we undertook an extensive review of investigative activity based out of FBI Headquarters. The FBI is a field-based law enforcement organization, and the vast majority of our investigations should continue to be worked by our field offices. Moving forward, in the very rare instance when FBI Headquarters runs a sensitive investigation, we are requiring prior approval by the FBI Deputy Director and consultation with the Assistant Director in Charge or Special Agent in Charge of the affected field offices.

Third, we are making significant changes to how the FBI manages its Confidential Human Source (CHS) Program. Many FBI investigations rely on human sources, but the investigative value derived from CHS-provided information rests in part on the CHS's credibility, which demands rigorous assessment of the source. The modifications we are making to how the FBI collects, documents, and shares information about CHSs will strengthen our assessment of the information these sources are providing.

Fourth, I am establishing new protocols for the FBI's participation in Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)-led counterintelligence transition briefings (*i.e.*, strategic intelligence briefings) provided to presidential nominees. The FBI's role in these briefings should be for national security purposes and not for investigative purposes. Continued participation by the FBI in these transition briefings is critical to ensuring continuity in the event of a change in administrations. The new FBI protocols about transition briefings will complement procedures already implemented by the FBI earlier this year to govern the separate category of defensive briefings. The FBI gives defensive briefings, which are based on specific threat information, in a wide variety of contexts and for myriad federal, state, and other public and private individuals and entities. The procedures we recently established for defensive briefings regarding malign foreign influence efforts have brought a new rigor and discipline to whether and how such briefings should proceed.

Fifth, I am mandating a specialized, semiannual training requirement for FBI personnel at all levels who handle FISA and CHS matters. This training will be experience-based, and it will cover specific lessons learned from this Report, along with other new and revised material. Earlier in my tenure as Director, I reinstated an annual ethics training program for all FBI employees, because I learned the training had been discontinued in prior years. While that training was not introduced in response to this Report, all current FBI employees involved in the 2016-2017 events reviewed by the OIG have since completed this additional training in ethics and professional responsibility.

Finally, we will review the performance and conduct of certain FBI employees who were referenced in the Report's recommendations — including managers, supervisors, and senior

officials at the time. The FBI will take appropriate disciplinary action where warranted. Notably, many of the employees described in the report are no longer employed at the FBI.

* * *

I want to emphasize that the FBI's participation in this process was undertaken with my express direction to be as transparent as possible, while honoring our duty to protect sources and methods that, if disclosed, might make Americans less safe. Where protection of certain sensitive information is well-founded, I remain committed to upholding the laws and longstanding policies governing classification and public release. I am just as committed to the principle that possible embarrassment and chagrin to the FBI or its employees is not, and should never be, the basis of a decision not to divulge FBI information. The FBI has worked closely with the OIG and DOJ on the classification issues implicated by the Report. Our joint process with the OIG and DOJ has ensured all material facts could be presented in this Report, with redactions carefully limited and narrowly tailored to specific national security and operational concerns. I am grateful for the mutual assistance of the OIG and DOJ in responsible presentation of this extremely sensitive information.

Since becoming FBI Director in August 2017, I have emphasized to FBI agents, analysts, and staff the importance of doing things the right way, by the book. I am humbled to serve alongside these dedicated men and women, and I am confident that the actions we are taking will strengthen our historic institution, ensure that we continue to discharge our responsibilities objectively and free from political bias, and better position us to protect the American people against threats while upholding the Constitution.

Sincerely,

Christopher A. Wray
Director

Enclosure

4

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Response to the Report
December 6, 2019

[Recommendations from the OIG appear verbatim in *italics*.]

1. *The Department and the FBI should ensure that adequate procedures are in place for the Office of Intelligence (OI) to obtain all relevant and accurate information, including access to Confidential Human Source (CHS) information, needed to prepare FISA applications and renewal applications. This effort should include revising:*
    a. *the FISA Request Form: to ensure information is identified for OI: (i) that tends to disprove, does not support, or is inconsistent with a finding or an allegation that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, or (ii) that bears on the reliability of every CHS whose information is relied upon in the FISA application, including all information from the derogatory sub-file, recommended below;*
    b. *the Woods Form: (i) to emphasize to agents and their supervisors the obligation to re-verify factual assertions repeated from prior applications and to obtain written approval from CHS handling agents of all CHS source characterization statements in applications, and (ii) to specify what steps must be taken and documented during the legal review performed by an FBI Office of General Counsel (OGC) line attorney and SES-level supervisor before submitting the FISA application package to the FBI Director for certification;*
    c. *the FISA Procedures: to clarify which positions may serve as the supervisory reviewer for OGC; and*
    d. *taking any other steps deemed appropriate to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information provided to OI.*

The FBI fully accepts these recommendations and is taking the following actions, many of which exceed the OIG's specific recommendations:

1. Supplementing the FISA Request Form with new questions, including a checklist of relevant information, which will direct agents to provide additional information and to collect all details relevant to the consideration of a probable cause finding, emphasizing the need to err on the side of disclosure;
2. Requiring that all information known at the time of the request and bearing on the reliability of a CHS whose information is used to support the FISA application is captured in the FISA Request Form and verified by the CHS handler;
3. Adding reverification directives to the FISA Verification Form, known as the Woods Form, which will require agents and their supervisors to attest to their diligence in re-verifying facts from prior factual applications and to confirm that any changes or clarifying facts, to the extent needed, are in the FISA renewal application;
4. Improving the FISA Verification Form by adding a section devoted to CHSs, including a new certification related to the CHS-originated content in the FISA application by the CHS handler, and CHS-related information that requires confirmation by the CHS handler, which will be maintained in the CHS's file;
5. Adding an affirmation to the FISA Verification Form that, to the best of the agent's and supervisor's knowledge, OI has been apprised of all information that might reasonably

call into question the accuracy of the information in the application or otherwise raise doubts about the requested probable cause finding or the theory of the case;
6. Adding a checklist to the FISA Verification Form that walks through the new and existing steps for the supervisor who is affirming the case agent's accuracy review prior to his or her signature, affirming the completeness of the accuracy review;
7. Formalizing the role of FBI attorneys in the legal review process for FISA applications, to include identification of the point at which SES-level FBI OGC personnel will be involved, which positions may serve as the supervisory legal reviewer, and establishing the documentation required for the legal review;
8. Creating and teaching a case study based on the OIG Report findings, analyzing all steps of that particular FISA application and its renewals to show FBI personnel the errors, omissions, failures to follow policy, and communication breakdowns, and to instruct where new or revised policies and procedures will apply, so that mistakes of the past are not repeated;
9. Requiring serialization of completed FISA Verification Forms in the FBI's case management system to increase accountability and transparency;
10. Developing and requiring new training focused on FISA process rigor and the steps FBI personnel must take, at all levels, to make sure that OI and the FISC are apprised of all information in the FBI's holdings at the time of an application that would be relevant to a determination of probable cause;
11. Identifying and pursuing short- and long-term technological improvements, in partnership with DOJ, that will aid in consistency and accountability; and,
12. Directing the FBI's recently expanded Office of Integrity and Compliance to work with the FBI's Resource Planning Office to identify and propose audit, review, and compliance mechanisms to ensure the above changes to the FISA process are effective. In addition, OIC has been directed to evaluate whether other compliance mechanisms would be beneficial to the implementation of the changes detailed below.

2. *The Department and FBI should evaluate which types of Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.*

The FBI fully accepts this recommendation and is taking the following actions:

1. Identifying, in consultation with the DOJ, which types of SIMs warrant coordination with a senior Department official, implementing heightened FBI approval requirements for the opening of these SIMs, and establishing related processes; and,
2. Training FBI personnel on the changes to ensure that the FBI workforce is consistently recognizing and applying the new requirements and processes for the identified types of SIMs.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Response to the Report, *continued from previous page*
December 6, 2019

3. *The FBI should develop protocols and guidelines for staffing and administrating any future sensitive investigative matters from FBI Headquarters.*

The FBI fully accepts this recommendation. Prior to receiving this recommendation, the FBI established a working group that reviewed all FBI Headquarters investigations. This review resulted in the closing of those investigations not falling within certain limited exceptions or transferring those cases to the appropriate field offices. In addition, the FBI is taking the following actions, affecting all potential FBI Headquarters investigations:

1. Establishing protocols and guidelines for the rare circumstance when a FBI Headquarters-led investigation might be appropriate;
2. Requiring consultation with the Assistant Director(s) in Charge or Special Agent(s) in Charge of all affected field offices prior to the opening of any FBI Headquarters investigation;
3. Requiring FBI Deputy Director approval prior to opening any FBI Headquarters SIM;
4. Developing and implementing protocols to ensure FBI Headquarters-led investigations follow the structure of field-led investigations, apply the same investigative rigor, and engage in timely and relevant information sharing with the appropriate field offices; and,
5. Instituting an annual audit of investigative files opened at FBI Headquarters during the previous year. The purpose of the audit will be to determine whether each investigation complies with policy and if it should remain an FBI Headquarters-run investigation.

4. *The FBI should address the problems with the administration and assessment of CHSs identified in this report and, at a minimum, should:*
    a. *revise its standard CHS admonishment form to include a prohibition on the disclosure of the CHS's relationship with the FBI to third parties absent the FBI's permission, and assess the need to include other admonishments in the standard CHS admonishments;*
    b. *develop enhanced procedures to ensure that CHS information is documented in Delta, including information generated from Headquarters-led investigations, substantive contacts with closed CHSs (directly or through third parties), and derogatory information. We renew our recommendation that the FBI create a derogatory sub-file in Delta;*
    c. *assess VMU's practices regarding reporting source validation findings and non-findings;*
    d. *establish guidance for sharing sensitive information with CHSs;*
    e. *establish guidance to handling agents for inquiring whether their CHS participates in the types of groups or activities that would bring the CHS within the definition of a "sensitive source," and ensure handling agents document (and update as needed) those affiliations and any other voluntarily provided to them by the CHS in the Source Opening Communications, the "Sensitive Categories" portion of each CHS's Quarterly Supervisory Source Report, the "Life Changes" portion of the CHS Contact Reports, or as otherwise directed by the FBI so that the FBI can assess whether active CHSs are engaged in activities (such as political campaigns) at a level that might require re-designation as a "sensitive source" or necessitate closure of the CHS; and*

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Response to the Report, *continued from previous page*
December 6, 2019

f. revise its CHS policy to address the considerations that should be taken into the account and the steps that should be followed before and after accepting information from a closed CHS indirectly through a third party.

The FBI fully accepts these recommendation and is taking the following actions, which also include improvements separately identified in the OIG's parallel review of CHS validation or by the FBI's own analysis:

1. Creating a new admonishment to sources relating to the confidential nature of the FBI-CHS relationship;
2. Adopting additional admonishments, as necessary, to manage the FBI's relationship with the CHS and to improve the FBI's ability to identify when the CHS's status has changed or should be reevaluated;
3. Creating a new subfile, which will supplement the existing Validation subfile created in 2013, specifically dedicated to holding certain information, including derogatory information, necessary for consideration when CHS-originated information is relied on;
4. Creating a mandatory checklist for CHS handlers so that, in instances where CHS-originated information is used in legal process, relevant information from the new subfile is properly disclosed to the attorneys relying on such CHS-originated information;
5. Adding new documentation requirements to ensure that CHS-originated information and contact with a CHS is captured in the correct FBI recordkeeping system(s), even when it occurs in an atypical circumstance or as part of a separate investigation;
6. Updating and modifying the Validation Management Unit's current practices regarding reporting source validation findings and non-findings to ensure all relevant information is shared with FBI and DOJ personnel;
7. Modifying policy and clarifying guidance for both new and long-term CHSs with a focus on source validation;
8. Revising the policy related to potentially higher-risk CHSs to enhance the scrutiny of those CHSs, including periodic reevaluation for potential closure of the CHS;
9. Establishing guidance and mandatory training for FBI personnel on sharing sensitive information or classified information with CHSs;
10. Expanding the definition of a sensitive source that requires additional approval, scrutiny, and oversight to include CHSs who may have access to certain categories of individuals, such as national-level campaign staff, or who report on subjects in a SIM investigation;
11. Revising policy and adding guidance for handling agents so they know when to ask a CHS about participation in the types of groups or activities that would bring the CHS within the newly expanded definition of a "sensitive source" or require their closure;
12. Requiring agents to update the designation of the CHS to a sensitive CHS if, over the course of the CHS relationship with the FBI, the CHS's position or access changes, triggering a need for additional approvals and oversight;
13. Clarifying documentation and updating requirements related to a CHS's status;
14. Clarifying and enhancing guidance on how to respond in the situation where a CHS, acting independently and not in response to an FBI tasking, provides information about a sensitive target or operation;

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Response to the Report, *continued from previous page*
December 6, 2019

15. Revising policy to establish the requirements and procedures for receiving information from a closed source, whether directly or through a third party, and the necessary approvals and processes to permit or preclude acceptance of such information; and,
16. Creating a CHS Management Working Group directed to identify and deliver additional improvements to FBI CHS policies and procedures.

5. *The Department and FBI should clarify the following terms in their policies:*
   a. *assess the definition of a "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance" in the AG Guidelines and the FBI's DIOG to determine whether to expand its scope to include consensual monitoring of a domestic political candidate or an individual prominent within a domestic political organization, or a subset of these persons, so that consensual monitoring of such individuals would require consultation with or advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General; and*
   b. *establish guidance, and include examples in the DIOG, to better define the meaning of the phrase "prominent in a domestic political organization" so that agents understand which campaign officials fall within that definition as it relates to "Sensitive Investigative Matters," "Sensitive UDP," and the designation of "sensitive sources." Further, if the Department expands the scope of "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance," as recommended above, the FBI should apply the guidance on "prominent in a domestic political organization" to "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance" as well.*

The FBI fully accepts these recommendation and is taking the following actions:

1. Assessing, in consultation with the DOJ, the current definition of a "Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance" and determining whether to expand the definition;
2. Identifying, in consultation with the DOJ, the appropriate level of coordination for a Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance;
3. Establishing guidance and, to the extent necessary, adding or modifying the DIOG, including by introducing examples, to better define and explain the phrase "prominent in a domestic political organization";
4. Making any further changes to FBI policy that are required upon an expansion of the definition of a Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance; and,
5. Ensuring that training and guidance are enhanced and provided to FBI personnel pursuant to any revised or expanded definitions.

6. *The FBI should ensure that appropriate training on DIOG § 4 is provided to emphasize the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations and to ensure that agents account for these concerns, both in the tasking of CHSs and in the way they document interactions with and tasking of CHSs.*

The FBI fully accepts this recommendation and is taking the following actions:

1. Establishing and providing at least semiannual, mandatory training for all relevant personnel on CHS handling, source sensitivities, and other source-related topics, such

as the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations. Part of this training will include discussion of the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations, how to approach these considerations, and how to document situations where core constitutional issues, such as First Amendment activity, may be present; and,

2. Instituting regular and mandatory continuing legal training for FBI personnel at all levels and in all investigative roles, in addition to already existing legal and ethics training, to make sure that FBI personnel fully understand and apply their obligations as required by policy and law, including an emphasis on privacy and civil liberties.

7. *The FBI should establish a policy regarding the use of defensive and transition briefings for investigative purposes, including the factors to be considered and approval by senior leaders at the FBI with notice to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General.*

The FBI fully accepts this recommendation and is taking the following actions:

1. Instituting a policy that the FBI's counterintelligence and security portion of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence-led strategic intelligence briefings (also known transition briefings) are solely intended to provide candidates and elected officials with relevant intelligence and threat awareness, and thus FBI briefers will not be associated with any ongoing FBI investigation related to any reasonably foreseeable attendee at the strategic intelligence briefing, will be selected based on their knowledge of the threat or threats to be briefed, and to the extent feasible, the same team of briefers will be used for all recipients of a particular strategic intelligence briefing; and,
2. Continuing to refine the FBI's newly implemented review process for malign foreign influence defensive briefings, and in particular briefings to Legislative and Executive Branch officials. This will encompass actions taken after receipt of specific threat information that identifies malign foreign influence operations – that is, foreign operations that are subversive, undeclared, coercive, or criminal – including convening the FBI's Foreign Influence Defensive Briefing Board (FIDBB) to evaluate whether and how to provide defensive briefings to affected parties. To determine whether notification is warranted and appropriate in each case, the FIDBB uses consistent, standardized criteria guided by principles that include, for example, the protection of sources and methods and the integrity and independence of ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions.

8. *The Department's Office of Professional Responsibility should review our findings related to the conduct of Department attorney Bruce Ohr for any action it deems appropriate. Ohr's supervisors in the Department's Criminal Division should also review our findings related to Ohr's performance for any action they deem appropriate.*

This recommendation is directed to the DOJ, thus the FBI is taking the following action:

With regards to Mr. Ohr, an employee of the DOJ, the FBI respectfully defers to the DOJ for addressing the OIG's recommendation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Response to the Report, *continued from previous page*
December 6, 2019

9. *The FBI should review the performance of all employees who had responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or approval of the FISA applications, as well as the managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command of the Carter Page investigation, and take any action deemed appropriate.*

The FBI fully accepts this recommendation and is taking the following actions:

Recognizing that many of the individuals involved in this matter are no longer with the FBI, undertaking the review of FBI personnel and taking actions as appropriate.

[PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to promote economy and efficiency in the Department's operations.

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the **DOJ OIG Hotline** at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest
Suite 4760
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Website	Twitter	YouTube
oig.justice.gov	@JusticeOIG	JusticeOIG

Also at Oversight.gov

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE